Ugandan opposition to AMISOM

One might presume that dangerous military peacekeeping operations in distant countries with little or no imminent political or economical gains for the sending country are not too popular in any given state. (Witness the low support among Germans and Americans for the Afghanistan war.) It is therefore interesting to ask the question: how do the Ugandan voters and the opposition parties regard the Ugandan engagement in Somalia? If it is unpopular, does it present a difficulty for the ruling party and president in maintaining their rule? And: does the public opinion in any way influence the decisions of Museveni and his government?

To answer these questions, it is important to point out, that the opposition parties in Uganda are weak. Multipartyism was only re-introduced in Uganda in 2005, and the first multi-party elections were held in 2006 after a 25-year hiatus.²⁸⁵ At the 2006 parliamentary elections, the party of president Museveni, the NRM, gained 191 seats of 284. The Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) won 37 seats, the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) won 9, while the Democratic Party (DP) won 8. At the presidential elections held on the same day, Museveni got 59 per cent of the votes, while Kizza Besigye, the candidate of the UPC received 37 per cent. Five years later, at the elections in February 2011, Museveni defeated Besigye by 68-26, and the NRM received 250 of the 350 seats in the parliament. The FDC this time took 34 seats, while the DP got 12 and the UPC 10. Overall, the opposition performed much worse in 2011 than five years earlier.

Knowing the weakness of the opposition parties, it is not surprising to conclude, that their influence and leverage over the decisions of the government and the president is minimal. What is more surprising is the fact, that they only rarely pressure the government over its Somali policy. One would think for example, that the quite huge death toll suffered by the UPDF in the course of the AMISOM mission would provide readily found ammunition for the opposition to attack the government. Although there is no precise data about the number of AMISOM deaths and injuries, from press reports one can estimate that at least 50 Ugandan soldiers died since the beginning of the

285 After the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of President Museveni toppled a military junta in 1986, elections were hold on a non-party basis. For this period, see: Hofer 2002.

mission, with well over 100 injured. Still, prior to the 11 July bombings, there were few signs that the opposition would disagree with the government’s Somali policy. Only the FDC had a clear position on the issue, having long opposed the Somalia deployment and arguing that there is no peace to keep [Africa Confidential 51/15].

After the 11 July attacks, the Somali issue got, for a short period, a much bigger significance for the opposition. An FDC spokesman, for instance, called on Museveni to withdraw the Ugandan troops from Somalia. Boniface Toterebuka said, that “we kindly ask the Government to withdraw our forces because we are not stakeholders in whatever is happening. The people of Somalia can solve their problems through dialogue.” DP president Norbert Mao called for a national forum bringing together all political leaders, regardless of their affiliation, to discuss the way forward on this new security threat.

Two other, small opposition parties also called for the withdrawal of the Ugandan troops.²⁸⁶

As ever, the opposition parties were by no means united in their assessment of the Somali question. The Uganda People's Congress president, Olara Otunnu, defended President Museveni for sending troops to Somalia. "It would be suicidal for anyone to tell the Government to withdraw soldiers from Somalia. We must resist the temptation to pull out of Somalia. If that is done, it will make Somalia less secure. Terrorism does not only affect Somalia, but all of us. All countries have a responsibility to fight terrorism," Otunnu said.²⁸⁷

Besigye and others were not only worried about another possible terrorist attack in Kampala. They also presumed, that, in response to the threat, the regime would turn allow even less space for the opposition. “There is going to be increased authoritarianism. We will have an increased security presence and (Ugandan President) Museveni will trample on people's rights in the name of maintaining security", Paul Omach, senior lecturer at the Makerere University told Reuters only a day after the

286 New Vision: „Opposition worried by Uganda’s involvement in Somalia”, 12 July 2010, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/725616

287 New Vision: „Otunnu backs Somalia mission”, 21 July 2010, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/726543

bombings.²⁸⁸ In the same vein, Besigye opined that Museveni “will use this attack to intensify fear among the people” [Africa Confidential 51/15]. According to several analysts in Uganda, this is exactly what happened.²⁸⁹ The call for stricter controls came in especially handy for Museveni in the run-up to the general election in February 2011, which he again won with a healthy margin.

The campaign in Somalia seems to be unpopular among the Ugandans. A poll commissioned by the Monitor newspaper in February 2011 asked whether Uganda should continue to deploy soldiers to Somalia under the AMISOM mission. Some 64 per cent of the respondents in the survey said Uganda should end its deployment of soldiers to Somalia while only 26 per cent said they support the continued deployment.²⁹⁰ Nevertheless, the issue is not in itself important enough to dent the popularity of Museveni or to topple his regime.²⁹¹ Other issues such as poverty and unemployment are much more significant for the Ugandan voters.

288 Reuters: „Analysts' View - Uganda blasts stir regional anxiety”, 12 July 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/07/12/uk-uganda-explosions-analystsview-idUKTRE66B2Q620100712

289 Personal interview, Kampala, 2010 November. See also Amnesty International 2011c.

290 The Monitor: „Museveni leads, Ugandans fear to speak freely – poll”, 13 February 2011, http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1107166/-/c55b67z/-/index.html

291 Personal interview, Kampala, 2010 November.

Chapter 5: Drivers and goals of the selected