Diplomatic support for the TFG and AMISOM

At first glance, it might seem odd that Uganda is in any way connected to Somalia. The two countries are hundreds of kilometers away and do not share a common border. The Somalia diaspora in Uganda is small, numbering around 20,000 people. Yet because of Kampala’s active significant engagement in Somalia, Uganda is affected in several ways by the state failure in Somalia.

The first outside-in effect is diplomacy. From the very beginning, Uganda was one of the strongest backers of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. Abdullahi Yusuf‘s second trip abroad in November 2004 led him to Kampala, showing the importance of this alliance. At a press conference after the meeting in Kampala, Ugandan president Museveni stated that his country was ready to offer troops to any force the African Union might call for to help Somalia [UN 2005: 3]. In the coming months, especially after the rise of the ICU, Kampala underscored its diplomatic support for the TFG with military hardware: according to the May 2006 Monitoring Group Report, three aircraft transported a contingent of UPDF military personnel and other officials of the Ugandan government to Baidoa. The military personnel were armed and brought with them a variety of military materiel, including a quantity of ammunition, tents, communication equipment, a forklift and fencing material. They also brought with them the barrels of 80 anti-aircraft guns [UN 2006b: 27]. Apart from Ethiopia and Eritrea, Uganda was the only country to station part of its military on Somali soil.

As early as 2006, Uganda was among the IGAD states which wanted to establish a regional peacekeeping mission called IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (or IGASOM). IGASOM was expected to eventually reach 8,000 troops. According to the Security Council Resolution 1725, which endorsed the mission, states bordering Somalia would not be eligible to deploy troops under IGASOM [UN 2006c]. In fact,

Uganda was the only country eager enough to volunteer troops for the mission.²⁴⁴ Because the ICU, which controlled Mogadishu by then, was unwilling to let peacekeeping troops in, IGASOM never materialized, but the momentum for an African peacekeeping mission in Somalia carried on.

Shortly after the defeat of the ICU by the Ethiopians, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union decided to establish the AMISOM mission. Its mandate was (i) to provide support to the TFG in its efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia [AU 2007: 2]. AMISOM was to comprise 9 infantry battalions of 850 personnel and was, initially, envisioned for six months. On 21 February 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved the mission's mandate [UN 2007a].

Uganda was among the first countries to signal readiness to contribute troops to the mission. Initially, the country offered 1,500 troops.²⁴⁵ The first Ugandan troops arrived in Mogadishu in the first days of March 2007.²⁴⁶ During these months, there was already heavy fighting between the Ethiopian army and the remnants of the ICU and al-Shabaab troops. AMISOM quickly became engaged in the fighting, with the first death casualty coming one month after the deployment.²⁴⁷ Uganda constantly increased the number of its troops, as other countries, which originally pledged soldiers (Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania), did not fulfill their promise. The only other country, which sent troops, was Burundi, with the first soldiers arriving in December 2007 to join the Ugandans, who, by that time, numbered 1600.²⁴⁸ In line with the longstanding Ugandan demands for more troops, the Security Council in December 2010 decided to increase

244 Shabelle: „Uganda in Quandary of Sending Peacekeepers to Somalia”, 12 December 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200612120179.html

245 BBC News: „Burundi joins Somalia peace force”, 1 February 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6319937.stm

246 BBC News: „Ugandan troops 'not peacemakers'”, 1 March 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6409167.stm

247 AlertNet: „Ugandan peacekeeper killed in Somali battles”, 1 April 2007, http://www.ethiopianreview.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1907&start=0

248 BBC News: „Burundi troops join AU in Somalia”, 23 December 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7158412.stm

the force strength of AMISOM from the previously mandated strength of 8,000 troops to 12,000 troops, thereby enhancing its ability to carry out its mandate [UN 2010c: 3].

As of early 2011, there were 5200 Ugandan peacekeepers and 3126 from Burundi, with 2000 from each country to be deployed in the course of the year 2011.²⁴⁹

After the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops and the formation of the TFG 2.0 in Djibouti, Uganda continued to support the new Transitional Federal Institutions, despite the fact, that the new president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed used to be the leader of the ICU, against whom Uganda deployed its troops in Somalia back in 2006. In fact, with the country leading the AMISOM mission, Uganda became probably the single most important ally of the TFG 2.0. Underscoring this was the fact, that the first foreign trip of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed led him to Kampala (as well as Kenya and Burundi), where he was asking President Museveni for help in rebuilding government institutions in Somalia. Another visit from the Somali President to Kampala followed only a couple of months later, in July 2009, and then again in October [Africa Research Bulletin 2009/10].²⁵⁰ Other visits from Sheikh Sharif followed in July and September 2010, while Museveni was the first foreign head of state to visit Mogadishu in a long time.²⁵¹ By this time, Uganda’s diplomatic support was not confined to bilateral meetings and the manning of AMISOM. As already noted, the country, which at that time was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, co-led the initiative to adopt a resolution against Eritrea.²⁵² In fact, Uganda was drafting the resolution which called for an arms embargo against Eritrea and travel bans and asset freezes for members of its government. After the adoption of the resolution on 23 December, with an unsurprising

“yes” vote from Uganda, the government in Kampala warmly welcomed the UN sanctions. Minister for Regional Cooperation, Isaac Musumba said, that Eritrea

“provided sanctuary to international criminals. It is a rogue state. We petitioned for sanctions on behalf of IGAD and it is gratifying that members of the UN Security

249 The Monitor: „Uganda to Send 2,000 More Troops”, 28 March 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201103280023.html

250 New Vision: „Museveni hosts Somali president”, 8 July 2009, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/687295

251 Daily Nation: „Museveni in Surprise Visit to Mogadishu”, 28 November 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201011290078.html

252 Reuters: „Move at UN to sanction Eritrea over Somalia links”,

Council adopted the resolution."²⁵³ He even went on to say that Kampala is going to demand for more stringent sanctions from the international community against Eritrea, because it was a “spoiler" state.²⁵⁴