State failure in a regional context

Having determined what the concept of “failed state” and the “regional security complex theory” comprises, we are able to tell which countries in the region Somalia affects by being failed. We should now turn to the question of how state failure affects its surrounding states. To answer this rather rarely studied question, we turn to the research of Daniel Lambach, who wrote extensively about the regional implications of state failure.

41 The Economist: „St Tropez in the Horn?”, 19 March 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/10881652

42 UNHCR 2011.

43 See for example: Garowe Online: „Al Shabaab Warns Djibouti Not to Send Peacekeepers”, 18 September 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200909211097.html

44 Personal interview, November 2010, Nairobi.

45 World Bank 2011b.

In his study Close Encounters in the Third Dimension. The Regional Effects of State Failure Lambach differentiates between two kinds of regional effects: structural and dynamic factors. “The first kind represents long-term social formations, attachments and networks that evolve slowly over time, whereas the second encompasses shorter-term developments that directly affect neighboring countries.”⁴⁶ As our paper only examines a time-span of three years, it is clear that we will focus on the dynamic factors rather than the structural factors. While not excluding them totally, we believe that it is obviously rather difficult to point down structural changes in such a short time-span.

Lambach then goes on to make a typology of the factors, which can be presented in the following graphic⁴⁷:

Table 1: Lambach’s Typology of Factors (Source: Lambach 2007: 40.)

46 Lambach 2007: 39.

47 Taken from: Lambach 2007: 40.

As we can see, Lambach identifies three ways in which a failed state can influence its neighbors: military, social and economic. Military effects can be cross border incursions into neighboring states by the conflict parties in a given failed state (like al-Shabaab does in Northern Kenya). Or it can be military interventions by the neighboring states into the failed state (like Ethiopia did on several occasions).

On the military front, Lambach makes a further very important distinction, between inside-out and outside-in regionalization. Inside-out regionalization “comprises acts by conflict parties inside the failed state that serve to export violence to neighboring countries. Examples include constructing bases in other countries or conducting large-scale raids on other countries. These acts can be committed with or without the support, tacit or overt, of the government of the affected country or of the dominant local authorities in the areas across the border.”⁴⁸

Outside-in regionalization, on the other hand, “covers all moves by outside actors to intervene in the failed state, usually by deploying military force or by supporting armed actors across the border.” In both cases, writes Lambach, regionalization can be achieved through proxy fighters instead of committing one’s own military forces, which makes the distinction between inside-out and outside-in sometimes quite difficult.

On the social front, the author identifies refugee flows as one of the most important factors, which also features prominently in our paper. About the refugees, Lambach writes: “Refugees impose a great financial burden on their host countries which is usually only partly alleviated by international assistance through UNHCR and other organizations. They contribute to economic and social conflicts by competing in the job market, thus lowering local wage levels. There is a possibility that refugees upset the ethnic balance within the province where they are sheltered. International and local funds necessary for the support of the refugees usually go to areas that are relatively poor and underdeveloped compared to the rest of the country, which might upset fragile political balances. Refugee flows, especially in tropical and underdeveloped regions, can also lead to a spread of infectious diseases such as Malaria and HIV.”⁴⁹ Moreover, it

48 Lambach 2007: 39.

49 Lambach 2007: 39-40.

is very difficult to separate between civilian refugees and former fighters. Another problematic factor for the host country is the fact that the refugees provide a vast pool from which to recruit new fighters – something which al-Shabaab has reportedly tried to do in Northern Kenyan refugee camps.

On the economic front Lambach identifies several possible factors, including the flight of investors from countries bordering a failed state, rising transaction and infrastructure costs, tourists who stay away and increased military expenditure as countries next to an internal conflict usually spend more on the military, thus taking resources away from more productive investment [Lambach 2007: 42]. Another factor might be the shadow economy. Neighboring but relatively stable states (such as Kenya) “are utilized by war entrepreneurs and conflict parties to import small arms and military equipment, export conflict goods (e.g., drugs, timber, precious metals, diamonds) and conduct financial transactions.”⁵⁰ We should complement this by adding money-laundering to the list, something the warlords and pirates of Somalia and Puntland are doing in Nairobi. All in all, the economic effects of state failure are grave: by one calculation, being “merely adjacent to what the World Bank calls a Low-Income Country Under Stress (LICUS) reduces a country’s annual growth by an average of 1.6 percent.”⁵¹

Overall it is clear that neighboring states are affected in many ways by a failed state.

However, as Lambach points out, the dynamics between a failed state and its surrounding states are not one-sided. It is not that just the failed state affects its neighbors, it is also the other way round. After all, in Lambach’s model there are not only inside-out, but outside-in effects as well. In other words, there is an interaction between a failed state and its neighboring states, in which the neighboring states are in no way only passive players. As we will see, each of the four states analyzed tries to influence the security situation in Somalia quite strongly. They also reap benefits from the situation in Somalia. Ethiopia and Uganda, for example, can show their usefulness to the USA vis-á-vis Somalia, and there are strong signs that Kenya benefits from the Somalia diaspora’s business activity in the country. Finally, Eritrea can cause headache to Ethiopia by engaging itself in Somalia. But this is to anticipate. What is important

50 Lambach 2007: 43.

51 Patrick 2011: 44.

from Lambach’ s model, which we will use as a yardstick in the chapters analyzing each state’s Somali policy, is to bear in mind that there is a two-sided, dynamic interaction between Somalia and its surrounding states.