The 11 July bombing in Kampala

On July 11 2010, two suicide bombings were carried out against crowds watching a screening of 2010 FIFA World Cup Final match at two separate locations in Kampala.

The first bombing was carried out at a restaurant called the Ethiopian Village, situated in the Kabalagala neighborhood, with many of the victims foreigners. Fifteen people

271 New Vision: „Al Shabaab terrorist not in Uganda – Army”, 24 March 2010, http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/12/714038

272 The Independent: „Wanted Al Shabaab Terror Suspect Arrested in Uganda”, 2 April 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201004020877.html

273 The Independent: „Wanted Al Shabaab Terror Suspect Arrested in Uganda”

died in this attack. The second attack, consisting of two explosions in quick succession, occurred at 11:18 pm at Kyadondo Rugby Club in the Nakawa neighborhood. All in all, the attacks left 74 dead and 70 injured.

Al-Shabaab immediately claimed responsibility for the bombings. "Al Shabaab was behind the two bomb blasts in Uganda," spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage told reporters. "We are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi: If they do not take out their AMISOM troops from Somalia, blasts will continue, and it will happen in Bujumbura too."²⁷⁴ This was al-Shabaab's first attack outside Somalia. The attacks came only six days after Muktar Abu Zubeir, an al-Shabaab rebel commander issued yet another threat against Uganda. In response to IGAD plans to send more troops to Somalia, he said: “Uganda and Burundi, take out your boys before it is too late. You will run away depressed like the U.S. and the Ethiopians who were more powerful than you.”²⁷⁵

Prior to the bombings, Ugandan security services did receive warnings that an attack might be imminent. According to the East African newspaper, there was information about a possible attack by al-Shabaab as early as June. However, “a focus on the wrong targets combined with friction between private security firms allowed the terrorists to find sitting ducks when they struck”, the newspaper said.²⁷⁶ According to the East African, on June 18, police chief Major General Kale Kayihura issued a circular to Regional and District Police Commanders that warned of possible attacks by al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and the Uganda-based ADF rebels anywhere between June 19 and October 2010. The intelligence was not specific on the nature of attacks or targets and the police response focused on the usual suspects: prominent buildings, strategic installations and petrol stations and fuel tankers.

Apart from focusing on the wrong targets, the other major problem was the unsatisfactory preparation of the police on the night of the attacks. According to a

274 Reuters: „Uganda bombs kill 74, Islamists claim attack”, 12 July 2010, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE66A2ED20100712

275 Reuters: „Bloc promises extra 2,000 peacekeepers for Somalia”, 5 July 2010, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6640IK20100705?sp=true

276 East African: „How Police Focused on the Wrong Targets”, 19 July 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201007191543.html

source quoted by the East African, the predominance of young, inexperienced officers proved tragic as attempts to deploy police at the rugby club “were rebuffed by the private security firm that had been hired to provide security by the organizers. At the other bombing site in Kabalagala, Ethiopian Village, the young officers were also denied access. In both instances, police were left to patrol the perimeter of the venues.”²⁷⁷ At another venue, in the Nakivubo stadium, the police was charged with sniffer dogs and access control equipment that were lacking at the other venues, possibly preventing a deadly attack there.

Interestingly, the investigations quickly bore fruit, maybe because FBI agents were helping the Ugandan authorities, maybe because the attackers made mistakes in disguising their traces.²⁷⁸ Either way, several suspects were arrested after only a couple of days. All in all, Ugandan authorities charged 32 men with 76 counts of murder and 10 counts of attempted murder and committing acts of terrorism. Among the defendants were 14 Ugandans, 10 Kenyans, six Somalis, one Rwandan and one Pakistani. The presence of Ugandans among the suspects (with the alleged masterminds all being Ugandans), pointed to the fact, that there was indeed homegrown terrorism in the country [Africa Research Bulletin 2010/08]. 18 suspects were later released after investigations had proved they were not involved in the two attacks.²⁷⁹ Frequently raised allegations, that the Ugandan anti-Museveni rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) cooperated with al-Shabaab in the execution of the attack, could not be verified.²⁸⁰

The suspected mastermind of the attacks, Issa Ahmed Luyima, told reporters he was motivated by “rage against Americans”, who he blamed for supporting Somalia’s embattled transitional government. He spoke of how he had joined the Somali terrorist outfit in 2009 and participated in fighting Ugandan-led peacekeepers in Mogadishu. He

277 East African: „How Police Focused on the Wrong Targets”

278 Reuters: „U.S. envoy says Uganda-type attacks hard to prevent”, 14 July 2010,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/14/us-uganda-explosions-usa-idUSTRE66C6CN20100714

279 RFI: „Eighteen Kampala bomb suspects released, three re-arrested”, 30 November 2010, http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20101130-18-kampala-bomb-suspects-released-three-re-arrested

280 See for example: The Independent: „Security Find New Clues on the Terror Attacks” 25 July 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201007271123.html. About the ADF, see: Prunier 2004

explained that he left the fighting in Somalia, crossed to Kenya and was then instructed to head to Kampala to plan for the attacks. The 33-year-old man also said he was responsible for sourcing bomb-making material. Luyima and another suspect confessed to being members of Somalia’s al-Shabaab, who said the Kampala blasts were to punish Uganda for deploying troops to the African Union mission in Somalia [Africa Research Bulletin 2010/08].

If the attackers hoped, that the bombing would weaken the resolve of president Museveni to engage the Ugandan troops in the AMISOM mission, they utterly failed. A couple of days after the attacks, Museveni defiantly said, that he will use his position as host of this month's African Union summit to push for upgrading the mission in Somalia from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Museveni also reiterated his longstanding demand for the establishment of a 20,000-troop international mission for Somalia.²⁸¹ While Museveni was unsuccessful in his quest to upgrade the AMISOM mission, he did achieve a new Security Council resolution, which increased its size from 8,000 to 12,000 personnel [UN 2010c]. Uganda promptly increased the number of its troops in Somalia by 2,000, just as Burundi.²⁸²

Uganda remained threatened by another al-Shabaab attack even after the 11 July bombings. As already mentioned, the bomber who accidentally dropped a grenade in Nairobi in December 2010, killing himself and wounding 40, was originally en route to Kampala, which officials believe was the intended site of the attack.²⁸³ Just at the same time, Uganda said that it had received intelligence reports that al-Shabaab was planning to hit the country during the festive Christmas days. Al-Shabaab promised as much on 23 December, when spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage said, that “we warn Uganda and Burundi forces and their people that we shall redouble our attacks.”²⁸⁴

281 Voice of America: „Ugandan Leader Vows Revenge for Kampala Bombings”, 15 July 2010,

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Ugandan-Leader-Vows-Revenge-for-Kampala-Bombings--98517999.html

282 The Monitor: „Uganda to Send 2,000 More Troops”

283 Voice of America: „Police Searching for Answers After Nairobi Explosion”

284 Reuters: „Somalia's al Shabaab say to attack Uganda, Burundi”, 23 December 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/23/us-somalia-conflict-idUSTRE6BM2VF20101223