Kenya’s foreign policy towards Somalia

In his essay on Kenyan foreign policy, Jona Rono summarizes the foreign policy of his country as “pragmatic.”²⁹² Overall, this approach “has served Kenya well” because “the challenges ahead are many and difficult.”²⁹³ The challenges Kenya faces are both domestic (poverty, unemployment, ethnic tensions) and regional (state failure in Somalia, the fragility of South Sudan). In order to manage all these problems, Kenya, in the past, has always chosen a cautious and pragmatic foreign policy approach, emphasizing good neighborliness in its region and maintaining relations with Communist states while also being an important ally of the USA.²⁹⁴

Cautious and pragmatic – this has also characterized Kenya’s foreign policy towards Somalia in the years 2009-2011. At the heart of Kenya’s relationship with Somalia lies the simple recognition that the two countries are tied together for good or worse. As already mentioned, 2-3 million ethnic Somalis live in Kenya, either as refugees or as longstanding citizens. Any change in Somalia’s security situation affects Kenya deeply, as thousands of refugees can flood the country anytime. The countries share a long and porous border. Kenya, being comparably well developed and prosperous, has big allure for the Somalis. Moreover, with 10 percent of its own population being Muslim, Kenya has a large pool of youth who might look to al-Shabaab as a source of inspiration. In short, Kenya is in an extremely precarious position. Overall, the country has to be very careful in its dealings with Somalia, because it is the first to feel the repercussions of a bad decision.

Over the years, Kenya has been affected in four ways by the situation in Somalia. First, there is the issue of refugees, which is largely localized in nature. As we have seen, Kenya does not pay for the caring of the refugees, but the areas surrounding the camps are nevertheless negatively affected by strains on resources like water and firewood.

292 Rono 1999: 115.

293 Rono 1999: 115.

294 Rono 1999: 110.

Yet, by and large, the “problem” of the refugees affects only the communities and people around the camps.

Similarly, cross-border clashes with al-Shabaab have been largely localized. As already noted, al-Shabaab has no intention (and no capability) to “invade” Northern Kenya. Its attacks are usually limited in time, and directed toward a specific person or goal. The rebels clearly do not want to provoke the Kenyan army to enter Somalia. While requiring attention and resources from the security forces, the border clashes are only a minor occurrence.

The third effect is economical, namely the activity of Somali businessmen in Kenya, who otherwise would have possibly stayed at home. While we have pointed out the economic costs of Somalia’s state failure for Kenya, we also tried to show the benefits for the country. Perhaps most intriguing in this respect was data from the World Bank which showed that Kenya was expanding its exports to a lawless Somalia. Apart from the Somali and Kenyan business community, we pointed out that Kenyan consumers and employees are also benefiting from the Somali investments and activity. While acknowledging that it is difficult to measure the exact costs and benefits for Kenya’s economy, our point here is that it should be realized that there do are very substantial benefits for the country.

The fourth effect is the activity of Somali- or Somali-linked radical and terrorist groups inside Kenya. While there is no denying that al-Shabaab is very much active in Kenya (organizing, planning and raising funds for example) the negative consequences of them being in the country have been quite manageable. Most importantly, despite frequent threats, al-Shabaab has not attacked Kenya so far. This is all the more remarkable as they could have easily set off a bomb anywhere in Nairobi, a chaotic city of about 5 million inhabitants with patchy police surveillance, if only they wanted. All asked experts agreed that al-Shabaab has the capacity to bomb Nairobi hands down. So, why did al-Shabaab not attack Kenya so far? This is, after all, a country which strongly supports the TFG and is a close ally of the USA. This question begs an answer.

Several (in fact most) interviewed experts pointed to the same direction. Obviously, al-Shabaab benefits from Kenya. First of all, the country serves as a rear base and conduit

for the leaders of al-Shabaab, where they can raise money, organize and withdraw if need be. The Islamists reportedly have business interests in the city too.²⁹⁵ Moreover, Nairobi, with its sophisticated banking system, is used for money-laundering by al-Shabaab, various Somali warlords and pirates. As we have seen, it was also possible for well-connected Somalis to acquire Kenyan passports to travel abroad. An al-Shabaab attack in Kenya would mean increased harassment and surveillance from the Kenyan security forces, threatening the interests of al-Shabaab and the Somali community in the country.

The other side of the equation is Kenya, which also benefits from the presence of Somalis. As described in the section on the economic impact of the Somalis in Kenya, Somali money stimulates the Kenyan economy in several sectors. Analysts therefore point to a kind of silent bargain, in which Kenya lets al-Shabaab roam more or less freely in the country and the Islamists refrain from attacking Kenya. Some experts described the relationship between Kenya and al-Shabaab as one between “strategic partners.”²⁹⁶

This might also explain the paradox we have encountered in the previous chapter. If the Kenyan state is really that much preoccupied with the inflow of illegal money, why did it pass the anti money-laundering bill only in December 2009; and why is the law, as of March 2011, still not operational? Similarly, the lack of an effective Anti-Terrorism Bill is striking in a country which was so often targeted by terrorists. This is all the more remarkable, as the USA is constantly pushing Kenya to adopt just such a counterterrorism bill.

The answer, several analysts suggest, lies in the mentioned silent bargain. An effective money-laundering bill would disrupt the inflow of Somali money, robbing Kenya of valuable investments and damaging Somali business interests. An anti-terrorism bill, on the other hand, would possibly make the impression that Somalis are being singled out by the Kenyan state. After all, against whom would such a bill be directed if not against al-Shabaab, the only terrorist organization immediately threatening Kenya? In short, such a bill would quite possibly complicate and hinder the dealings of al-Shabaab,

295 Personal interview, 2010 November, Nairobi.

296 Personal interview, 2010 October and November, Nairobi.

which in turn might anger them, leading possibly to an attack. This is obviously not in the interest of Kenya.

This all is not to say that Kenya is on the side of al-Shabaab. Far from that. As we have seen, Nairobi is a steadfast supporter of the TFG, hoping that it might one day become effective and pacify the country. To this end, Kenya even volunteered to initiate a military training mission for Somalis ready to join TFG forces. AMISOM is also strongly supported by Nairobi, which sees it as a bulwark against the Islamist al-Shabaab. After all, the last thing Kenya wants to see is the establishment of an Islamic state in its neighborhood, which might serve as inspiration for its own Somalis/Muslims.

Yet overall Kenya treads a careful path. Mindful of its complicated position, it tries not to give al-Shabaab any reason to attack. This is why the often heavy-handed approach of the Kenyan police against Somalis is extremely dangerous, because it risks angering the young Somali population in the country. Apart from these incidents, however, Kenya seems to have found a modus vivendi with its dangerous neighbor.