Training of TFG troops

Just as in the case Kenya, Ethiopia tried to influence the situation in Somalia with the recruiting and training of TFG army and police forces. This policy predates the formation of the TFG 2.0 and ran in parallel to the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia. As the April 2008 United Nations Report of the Monitoring Group pointed out, Somali National Army troops, mostly from Mogadishu, were taken for training to the Bilate camp at Awasa, Ethiopia. According to Transitional Federal Government security forces, groups of between 300 to 1,000 Transitional Federal Government soldiers received training in Awasa. The Monitoring Group also received information regarding police and anti-terrorism training being carried out in Ethiopia. In January 2008, 1,000 TFG police trainees joined the program in Awasa for graduation in July [UN 2008a: 33-34].

The Ethiopian Government provided all trainees with uniforms and individual weapons in preparation for their deployment to Somalia. The military and police contingents reportedly travelled in joint convoys from the Ethiopian border to Baidoa. The Ethiopian-trained military contingent remained under Ethiopian command. By early August 2008, independent reports indicated that as many as 253 newly trained police officers had already deserted. On 14 August, United Nations and NGO reports concurred that a group of Ethiopian-trained security forces had defected, and attacked the Lower Shabelle security forces in the Ma’alim Osman village. Further desertions were reported on 6 September, indicating the problems of the policy of training [UN 2008b: 37-38].

As we have pointed out in the chapter about Kenya, these ad-hoc and uncoordinated training missions by the neighboring states were beset with several problems (uncontrolled weapon transfer to TFG-troops, no coordination between the different training programs of the different states, no proper notification to the UN Sanctions Committee, desertion etc.). In addition to these problems, Amnesty International pointed out that the Ethiopian security forces, who delivered the training, have themselves been accused of repeated violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Somalia, including extra-judicial executions, unlawful killings, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. In addition to the absence of detailed information about the nature, scope and curricula of the training being provided by Ethiopia to the TFG security forces, Amnesty International was also concerned that such training does not include adequate safeguards to ensure respect for international humanitarian and human rights law and best practice standards [Amnesty International 2010b: 15].

Despite these obvious problems and the costs associated with the training in terms of funds, facilities and human resources (e.g. trainers), Ethiopia decided to maintain the training of Somali troops after the formation of the TFG 2.0 in Djibouti. From the beginning of the training program, Addis tried to conceal its activity and gave almost no information about the training, in order to maintain a low-key profile and not to provoke al-Shabaab. Asked by the UN Monitoring Group to provide information about the training program for example, Addis did not reply [UN 2008a: 33]. It is therefore quite difficult to tell the exact number of the trainees, the location of the training and its duration.

Still, from the available information it is possible to sketch the contours of a two-pronged Ethiopian strategy. The first track was the training of TFG army and police units. According to the commander of the Somali military, General Yusuf Husayn Osman (alias Dhumal), one thousand soldiers were being trained in Ethiopia in October 2009 [Africa Research Bulletin 2009/10]. It was not clear, however, how long their training took. It is possible that by March 2010 they were back in Mogadishu.²³⁹ There

239 New York Times: „U.S. Aiding Somalia in Its Plan to Retake Its Capital”, 5 March 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/06/world/africa/06somalia.html

is no further reliable information about whether they have been used to fight al-Shabaab. In addition, there were talks to train up to 1,000 TFG police recruits intended to start in December 2009, with two courses lasting three months each, to be financed by Germany [Amnesty International 2010 b: 25-26]. There are no further reports about this particular program.

The second track seems to be the ad-hoc training of Somali militant groups who happen to fight against al-Shabaab, but are otherwise not associated with the TFG. According to Somali-expert Michael Weinstein, writing for Garowe Online in February 2009, officials of the internationally unrecognized Bay and Bakool governments “traveled to the town of Yeed on the border with Ethiopia and received 200 troops whom Ethiopia had trained.”²⁴⁰ A similar development seems to have occurred in Hiran region, where Ethiopian-trained groups hailing from the region were said to fight al-Shabaab.²⁴¹ The most obvious example for this second track was, of course, the apparent training of ASWJ forces. In fact, ASWJ has acknowledged that some of its fighters received training in Ethiopia in mid-2009 in preparation for an offensive against al-Shabaab based at Eel Buur [UN 2010a: 55]. Units who have finished this program have apparently reached Galgadud region in March 2011 after they completed a year long training program in Ethiopia. Asked about their role, “ASWJ military officials stated that these troops will be part in the war against al-Shabaab with a mission of capturing the remaining parts of Galgadud region.”²⁴²

Concerning the legality of the training of ASWJ troops, the United Nations Monitoring Group opined, that because of the signature of a cooperation agreement between ASWJ and the Transitional Federal Government on 21 June 2009 (subsequently reinforced by the agreement of 30 November 2009), the Monitoring Group accepts that the definition

240 Garowe Online: Somalia Begins a Cycle of Civil Conflict [analysis]”, 5 March 2009, http://insidesomalia.org/20090305213/News/Editorial/Somalia-Begins-a-Cycle-of-Civil-Conflict-analysis.html

241 Voice of America: „Somali Government Forces say Insurgents Pushed from Strategic City”, 27 July 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-27-voa25-68700077.html

242 SomaliaReport: „1000 ASWJ Fighters Return From Ethiopia”, 3 March 201,,

http://ww.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/161/Al-Shabaab_Desecrates_Clerics_Graves?PHPSESSID=3c3952e594156bc62e336b99bc696266

of a Somali security sector institution could be extended to include ASWJ, and therefore does not constitute a violation of the embargo [UN 2010a: 55].