Diplomatic support for the TFG

The other way in which Kenya tries to shape the situation in Somalia in line with its own interests is diplomacy. All along, Kenya has been one of the strongest backer of the TFG 1.0 and 2.0. What is more, Kenya, which was worried about the situation in Somalia, hosted the peace conference which led to the formation of the TFG 1.0 in 2004. Ever since, Nairobi is among the strongest diplomatic backers of the TFG.

According to two scholars, however, Kenya was less than diplomatic in shaping the outcome of the peace conference it hosted in 2004. “With respect to the peace conference in Kenya, Ethiopia initiated this peace process and has controlled it for two

154 Personal interview, November 2010, Nairobi.

155 Personal interview, November 2010, Nairobi.

years with the help of Kenya...At the beginning of this conference Ethiopia started to manipulate the peace process by controlling the agenda and forum. With the help of the host country Ethiopia gave absolute power to the warlords it supported. Ethiopia and Kenya have also marginalised traditional, religious and civil society leaders.”¹⁵⁶ In short, the strong Ethiopian and Kenyan influence under which the TFG came to life greatly reduced its legitimacy.¹⁵⁷ As the new government remained largely ineffective in the coming years, the flawed construction of the TFG was only a pyrrhic victory for its creators, Ethiopia and Kenya.

Nevertheless, Nairobi kept on supporting the TFG 1.0, especially in the face of the Islamic Courts. Kenya strongly favored the establishment of the IGASOM peacekeeping force, which was supposed to keep the ICU in check.¹⁵⁸ During the days after the Ethiopian attack on the ICU, Kenya sealed its border, “refusing to allow any traffic in either direction. Some of the Islamists sought to cross nonetheless, and were arrested along with hundreds of refugees seeking shelter in Kenya. In yet another controversial move, Kenyan authorities took part in a secret detention and rendition operation with Ethiopian and US officials in which at least 85 people were returned to the TFG’s custody in Somalia, who turned them over to Ethiopian authorities.”¹⁵⁹

During the years of the Ethiopian occupation, Kenya remained a steadfast supporter of the TFG 1.0. However, as the months passed by, Nairobi became increasingly frustrated by the ineffectiveness of Abdullahi Yusuf’s government. Under Kenyan and Ethiopian pressure, Yusuf finally had to resign in December 2008.¹⁶⁰ The new TFG 2.0 was greeted warmly in Nairobi, which was the first stop of the new President’s, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed’s first foreign trip. Kenyan President Kibaki reportedly urged his Somali counterpart to reach out to all power groups in the country and to include them in his government.¹⁶¹ Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula reiterated this demand to the visiting Somali Prime Minister Ali Shermarke in May 2009 [Africa Research

156 Elmi-Barise 2006:42.

157 Menkhaus 2007b 359-364.

158 Shinn 2006: 2.

159 Menkhaus 2007b: 381.

160 Menkhaus 2009: 2.

161 Shabelle: „Kibaki urges Somalis to forge unity”, 10 March 2009

Bulletin 2009/05]. Showing the importance of Kenya for Somalia, several other high-level visits followed in the next months.

In line with its close ally Ethiopia, Kenya also constantly supported the expansion of AMISOM.¹⁶² (As a neighboring country, Kenya is prohibited from sending troops, although there were occasional mutterings to the contrary).¹⁶³ After the 11 July bombing in Kampala, Nairobi, in line with Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and other African states, once again called for the upgrading of AMISOM. Showing the anxiousness prevailing in Nairobi, Foreign Minister Wetangula even proposed “an international task force, with UN and European Union officials, and a large African unit representing all Somalia’s neighbours, with TFG, Somaliland, and Puntland involvement.”¹⁶⁴ The aim would have been to shore up an effective government in Mogadishu with support from the clans and key power-brokers which could carry out the agreed transitional program.

At the UN in September 2010, Wetangula once again said that Somalia posed a direct threat to his country and that AMISOM should be increased to 22,000 troops from its authorized strength of 8,100.¹⁶⁵ A couple of days later the Minister criticized in strong terms the “perceived reluctance of the United Nations Security Council to engage with Somalia”, which “ has been a matter of great concern for those of us who suffer the greatest consequences of the conflict…Unfortunately, the support…by the international community has not been forthcoming” Wetangula said.¹⁶⁶

The Minister also opined that the millions being spent to fight pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia should be spent instead on helping the country become a functioning state. In an interview he said, that “piracy is not born at sea. It's born on land. And if you are able to patrol and protect your coastline, it's unlikely that pirates will find a way

162 See for example: Reuters: „Somali rebels unite, profess loyalty to al Qaeda”, 1 February 2010, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6100F920100201

163 Garowe Online: „Kenya considers deploying troops to Somalia: FM”, 2 February 2010, http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Kenya_considers_deploying_troop s_to_Somalia_FM.shtml

164 Africa Confidential 50/16.

165 East African: „Al-Shabaab a Threat to East African Countries”, 17 September 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201009200004.html

166 UN News Service: „Kenya calls on Security Council to pay greater attention to conflict in Somalia”, 23 September 2010, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36096

to the high seas to cause the menace … Instead, what are we seeing? 52 warships patroling ... the waters of the Indian Ocean, but piracy is still going on.”¹⁶⁷ He also expressed support for the TFG, saying that "if the government was given the capacity to strengthen its ability to fight back, I would have no doubt that al-Shabab can be defeated in a very short time. Those with the money don't seem to open their envelopes to Somalia, or to the cause of Somalia."¹⁶⁸

Overall, the reasons for Kenya’s support for the TFG are clear. It wants a stable, efficient and Kenya-friendly government in Somalia, which is at the same time moderate. A radical Islamist regime in Somalia would be utterly unacceptable for Nairobi.¹⁶⁹ In line with its main ally Ethiopia, it has invested considerable diplomatic capital in the TFG, so it wants to see it succeed. This would also bolster the country’s regional and international stature.

167 AP: „Kenya Says West Wasting Money on Anti-Piracy Ships”, 26 September 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=11727651

168 AP: „Kenya Says West Wasting Money on Anti-Piracy Ships”, 26 September 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=11727651

169 Personal interview, Nairobi, 2010 November.