Having reviewed the Somali policies of the four analyzed states, we now turn to the key findings of this paper. At the beginning of our work, we postulated five statements about the relationship between Somalia and Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. We now examine them one by one to see if they stand up to scrutiny:
(1) We postulated that living in the neighborhood of a failed state (in our case Somalia) is highly disadvantageous in terms of security and stability for the surrounding countries (in our case Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda).
This statement is only partly true. It is clear, that, on occasions, the war in Somalia affected the security of the analyzed states adversely. This was clearly the case when al-Shabaab attacked Kampala in July 2010, or, earlier, when the ICU declared jihad on Ethiopia in 2006. Yet, as we have seen, this is the exception rather than the rule. During most of times, the conflict parties in Somalia are busy to strengthen their inner-Somali standing and power base. When attacking the surrounding countries, these actions tend to be localized, mostly around the common border of Somalia/Kenya and Somalia/Ethiopia. There are no signs that al-Shabaab would attempt an all-out attack on Kenya or Ethiopia, nor has it the capacity to do so. Terrorism activity by al-Shabaab is very much taking place in two of the countries (Kenya and Uganda), yet there has been, to date, only one deliberate terrorist attack attributable to the group. Moreover, Eritrea’s security has been largely unaffected by the instability in Somalia. It seems that Somalia does not present a constant and grave national security threat to its neighbors. The state failure in Somalia, lasting for twenty years, is a chronic phenomenon, yet that does not mean that it is threatening its neighbors all the time. Rather, it produces threats only from time to time, with these threats occasionally flaring up and then dying down. The situation in Somalia is nevertheless a significant security concern for the four countries, but at most of times, it is not an ever-present lingering threat, rather than a constant concern, containing which is tying up the capabilities of the surrounding states. In short, it is definitely disadvantageous to live with a failed state, but, in the case of Somalia, to a lesser extent than previously imagined. As of yet, the state failure in Somalia has not
led to regional security destabilization on the scale of West Africa and the Great Lakes region in the 1990s.
(2) We presumed that the economic costs for the states of the region caused by the state failure in Somalia hugely outweigh the benefits.
This statement, though hard to quantify and answer definitely, is only partly true. The only state out of the analyzed countries with which Somalia has close economic links is Kenya, so it would be foolhardy to think that our analysis settles this huge question once and for all. But analyzing the Kenyan example led us to surprising findings. To be sure, there are huge economic costs for Kenya: the caring for the refugees, smuggling and the influx of illegal money from Somali piracy and warlord activity are all problems. But it is important to point out, that the Kenyan state and consumers benefit greatly from Somali business activity and investment in Nairobi, which probably would have never occurred on such a scale had the Somali state never collapsed. As we have shown, Somalis are active in a wide range of sectors, ranging from transport to retail and construction. Cheap products sold by Somali traders make life easier for Kenyan customers. Crucially, the growths of GDP and tourist arrivals do not seem to be greatly influenced by occurrences next door. In fact, the bilateral trade is growing rapidly.
Summing up, it is perhaps impossible to measure exactly the overall cost and benefit-ratio for Kenya. But, rather than focusing only on the negative effects, we should simply realize that Kenya does benefit from the current situation in Somalia.
(3) We supposed that the four analyzed states are all interested in contributing to stabilize the situation in Somalia
This statement is also only partly true. Eritrea, for one, used the Somali civil war for its own ends, fuelling the flames according to its own interests. This suggests that rather than naively assume that all countries in the neighborhood of a failed state want to see peace, we should see that some are interested in the opposite. Eritrea, as not being adjacent to Somalia, is barely affected by the negative consequences of the conflict, so it can allow it to fester. Ethiopia and Kenya are much more strongly affected by the Somali civil war, which would suggest that they want to see peace in Somalia as soon as possible. Yet as we have seen, they do not want to pacify Somalia by all means. Rather,
they want to bring peace on their own terms and according to their own interests. This meant supporting power groups (TFG, ASWJ, warlords) only if they were friendly to them. This suggests that the threat emanating from Somalia is not big enough to compel surrounding states to seek peace there at any price. The situation there is of concern, but the threats are not grave enough to warrant a peace deal which might possibly be at odds with the perceived short-term interests of Addis Ababa or Nairobi. This concurs with our finding (1), which argued similarly.
We should also not forget that the capability of outside states to influence the situation seems to be, by and large, quite small. Despite the strong diplomatic and military backing of three powerful states in the region (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda), plus the USA and the EU, the TFG 2.0 is still largely ineffective and controls only a small part of the country. Obviously, the current level of engagement of outside actors is not enough to decisively shape the situation inside the country. This leads to two other findings: we do not believe that the civil war in Somalia is caused only by the malevolent meddling of the analyzed outside states (a frequent claim by Somalis).
While they occasionally contributed to the worsening of the security situation in Somalia, they can not be blamed for the whole affair. The other finding is that we have to realize that outside actors have generally only limited capabilities to influence the situation in Somalia.
(4) We postulated that the four analyzed states influence the situation in Somalia according to their interests.
This turned out to be, by and large, right. This statement is, of course, barely controversial. But while it is absolutely obvious that states act according to their interests, somehow Western policymakers working on Somalia tend to forget about this and suppose that every state in the region wants to stabilize Somalia as soon as possible.
As we have seen in finding (3), the picture is definitely more complicated. A comprehensive peace plan must factor in the interests of the surrounding states if it wants to be successful. A peace deal without their support is unlikely to pacify Somalia.
As we have also seen, the influencing of the surrounding states can at times be absolutely detrimental for peace. In Eastern African politics, interests definitely trump ideals.
(5) We postulated that the states of the region have successfully found a modus vivendi with Somalia, one in which they strive to minimize the threats and problems coming from Somalia while working to reap the possible benefits.
This assumption turned out to be true. Sometimes admirably, the four states indeed found ways and means to achieve huge benefits from the sad state of Somalia. “Thanks”
to state failure in Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia, in particular, could render valuable services to the Western world. In turn, to some extent, America turned a blind eye to the human rights abuses of the respective regimes. As we have seen, because of the situation in Somalia, Kampala and Addis Ababa could show their importance for Washington. The Somali quagmire also allowed Ugandan President Museveni to expand its army and channel international funds for the AMISOM mission to the pockets of the regime. Kenya, in turn, learned to keep the al-Shabaab mostly in check by accommodating it in the country while also benefiting from the economic activity of Somalis in Kenya, as shown in Finding (2). Eritrea also identified interests which could be pursued by meddling in Somalia. Especially, Asmara wants to remain a player in the region not to be ignored. The support for al-Shabaab guarantees a valuable bargaining chip. Bearing all this in mind, we have to realize that the four analyzed countries are extremely astute in adapting to the ever-changing situation in Somalia.