Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
2.2. The theory of “failed states”
Somalia is a failed state par excellence. Few things are as clear-cut and unequivocal in the field of security studies as this statement. However, in order to understand the
12 Patrick 2011: 4.
13 Patrick 2011: 5.
threats and challenges emanating from a failed state to its region, we have to know what being a failed state means.
The concept of “failed state” has a huge literature, and it is not the aim of the current paper to present the evolution and the wherewithal of the concept in detail (for this, see Debiel 2002, Fukuyama 2004, Schneckener 2004, Patrick 2011 among others, and for excellent case studies Marton 2006). Still, we would like to give a short overview based on the work of two scholars.14 Doing this, one has to bear in mind, that there is no clear and widely accepted definition of what a failed state is. Most researchers therefore analyze countries on the basis of their relative institutional strengths to determine which country is failed and which country is not. To do this, we have to know which functions a state is required to fulfill.
Statehood in the twenty-first century implies that every state has an obligation to provide its citizens with four main categories of political goods. The first, and perhaps the most important function is to “ensure basic social order and protect inhabitants from the threat of violence from internal and external forces…Increasingly, and particularly within democratic nations, the expectation is that the provision of security will be applied equally to all citizens and that the use of force will be under the ultimate control of accountable political authorities.”15 Schneckener calls this
‘Sicherheitsfunktion’, and defines it as follows: “Eine elementare Funktion des Staates ist die Gewährleistung von Sicherheit nach Innen und Außen, insbesondere von physischer Sicherheit für die Bürger. Kern dieser Funktion ist daher die Kontrolle eines Territoriums mittels des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols, das sich in der Durchsetzung einer staatlichen Verwaltung zur Kontrolle von Ressourcen und dem Vorhandensein einer staatlichen Armee bzw. Polizei zur Befriedung lokaler Konflikte und Entwaffnung privater Gewaltakteure ausdrückt.”16
The second function of the state, according to Patrick, is to provide “legitimate, representative and accountable governance under the rule of law.”17 The state should
14 The following section draws heavily on Patrick 2011: 24-26. and Schneckener 2004: 12-14.
15 Patrick 2011: 24-25.
16 Schneckener 2004: 13.
17 Patrick 2011: 25.
have a recognized leader, protect fundamental rights and govern properly. Schneckener describes this as ‘Legitimitäts- und Rechtstaatsfunktion’ and writes: “Dieser Bereich umfasst Formen der politischen Partizipation und der Entscheidungsprozeduren (Input-Legitimität), die Stabilität politischer Institutionen sowie der Qualität des Rechtsstaats, des Justizwesen und der öffentlichen Verwaltung.”18
The third function, according to Patrick, is for the state to provide basic social welfare for its citizens, “including through delivery of services like water and sanitation and investments in health and education.”19 Schneckener calls this ‘Wohlfahrtsfunktion’, and writes that in the centre of this function “stehen Staatliche Dienst- und Transferleistungen sowie Mechanismen der Verteilung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen – beides in der Regel finanziert durch Staatseinnahmen (Zölle, Steuern, Gebühren und Abgaben).”20
Patrick also adds a fourth function, namely the function to “create a legal and regulatory framework conducive to economic growth and development.”21 The state should provide sound management of public finances and assets enforce property rights and regulate the market activity efficiently.
Schneckener then goes on to give a typology of states which are consolidated, weak, failing or failed.22 The type of each state depends on how much of the mentioned functions it is able to fulfill. Predictably, Somalia is in the fourth category, which includes states which are unable to fulfill any of the functions in any way: “Bei diesem Typ ist keiner der drei Funktionen mehr in nennenswerter Weise vorhanden, so daß man von einem völligen Zusammenbruch oder Kollaps von Staatlichkeit sprechen kann.”23 States that can not fulfill any of the three tasks are, in the view of Schneckener, failed states.
18 Schneckener 2004: 13.
19 Patrick 2011: 25.
20 Schneckener 2004: 13.
21 Patrick 2011: 25.
22 Schneckener 2004: 14-17.
23 Schneckener 2004: 16.
Stewart Patrick uses a somewhat similar approach to typologize and determine failed states. To measure state weakness, he develops a set of twenty indicators which serve as proxies for the four core aspects of state performance.24 The results are then compiled to an “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World”, where 141 states are listed according to their overall score. Somalia, predictably, occupies the first place.
When states cease to perform their fundamental functions, their population pays a heavy price. “States with weak governance are disproportionately susceptible to humanitarian catastrophes, both man-made and natural” – writes Patrick. Other researchers agree:
according to a study by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, fragile states are fifteen times more prone to civil war than OECD countries.25 A failed state, however, does not only fail its own citizens. It also fails to be good neighbor, and here is where the regional effects of state failure come to the fore. However, in order to be able to talk about the regional implications of state failure, we have to determine what “region” means, and then, in the next step, to establish which states form the so-called “regional security complex” around Somalia.