• Nem Talált Eredményt

An important part of these professors’ concepts of aesthetics is their rhetoric.

The rhetoric of their monographs has a direct and significant connection to their theses and theories. There is not sufficient space, within the framework of this inquiry, for a detailed explanation of Szerdahely’s and Schedius’ theories and treatises on aesthetics, so I will emphasise only some substantial elements of their ideas and the connections between these ideas and the linguistic character-istics of the medium in which they are presented, i.e. the text of monographs.

If one were to classify Szerdahely’s theory, one could use the term ›eclec-tic‹ in the same way in which Sandra Richter uses it in her monograph.59 The anthropological idea of Homo Aestheticus remains in the centre of this theory.60 57 On the interpretation and context of ›Wissenschaft vom Menschen‹ see among others

Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in Göttingen um 1800. Wissenschaftliche Praktiken, insti-tutionelle Geographie, europäische Netzwerke. Ed. Michel Espagne. Göttingen 2008.

58 On the interpretation of the term ›Kalleologie‹ see Wilhelm Traugott Krug: Geschmacks-lehre oder Aesthetik. Königsberg 1810 (= System der theoretischen Philosophie, 3), 31–112.

59 Sandra Richter: A History of Poetics. German Scholarly Aesthetics and Poetics in Interna-tional Context, 1770–1960. Berlin – New York 2010, 40–62.

60 On the interpretation of Homo Aestheticus see Gergely Fórizs: »Szerdahely György Alajos Aestheticájának alapelvei« [Principles of Georg Aloys Szerdahely’s Aesthetica]. In:

Irodalomtörténet 94 (2013), 187–206.

The main goal of aesthetics is to give this idea form and to motivate the reader to recognize it. Towards that purpose, Szerdahely uses a special kind of rhetoric based on Francis Bacon’s aphoristic way of writing and thinking.61 The narrator of Aesthetica tries to make the process of writing and reading resemble an intel-lectual adventure or an intelintel-lectual experiment. In the introduction, he writes,

»I do not think that I am presenting something which is perfect or which is the absolute truth. Instead, the spiritual worry of knowing how distant I am from being perfect causes me unbearable pain. I should have listened, seen, read, and experienced more. I wrote this book not because I have reached a conclusion.

Instead, may aim was simply to gain more experience.«62 In some chapters, such as one called »How does beauty influence our senses?«63 this subjective doubt and the unavoidable uncertainty of his questions sometimes turn into ironic self-reflection. Here, the narrator states that nobody has been able to answer this question so far and it is a question he cannot answer either. He says, »I would rather leave this issue in its own mystic secrecy instead of trying to answer a thing which I do not know enough. You do not have to blush if you admit that you do not know something when you really do not have any information about something.«64 The empiric, self-critical, and ironic attitude, which was a key feature of contemporary English and Scottish philosophy65, seems to have had much more influence on the author of Aesthetica than has previously been thought. With this kind of rhetoric, Szerdahely tries to involve his reader in his intellectual adventure, and this gives a very dynamic effect to

61 On Bacon’s aphoristic method see Frans De Bruyn: »The Classical Silva and the Generic Development of Scientific Writing in Seventeenth-Century England«. In: New Liter-ary History 2 (2001), 347–373. On the reception of this method see Günther Zöller:

»Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking«. In: Journal of the History of Philos-ophy 3 (1992), 414–441.

62 »Non puto merem perfectam, absolutamque dare. Immo vero angor animi dolore in-credibili, quum video multa mihi ad perfectionem superesse. Et audire, et videre, et legere, et multa experiri debuissem; quibus ego me non parum destitutum profiteri cogor. Adgressus sum opus non tam perficiendi spe, quam experiendi voluntate; nec tam corpus efformare, quam lineamenta ducere volui, quae porro augeri, complerique debeant.« Szerdahely: Aesthetica (= note 16.), I (Prooemium).

63 »Et quomodo Pulcrum agit in sensus?« Ibid. 134.

64 »Malo ego rem hanc inter mysteria refere, quam, quod nescio, temere adferere. Neque enim erubescendum est homini confiteri se nescire, quod nescit; ne dum se scire men-titur, numquam se scire mereatur.« Ibid. 134–135.

65 On this influence see Piroska Balogh: »The Reception of Edmund Burke’s Aesthetics in Hungary«. In: The Reception of Edmund Burke in Europe. Eds. Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones. London 2017, 297–312.

the text. Csuka’s aforementioned essay presents a more detailed explanation of the dynamism of Szerdahely’s aesthetics.66

Schedius’ theory is determined by another type of dynamism. Using Sandra Richter’s terms again, one could characterize Schedius’ aesthetics as a fusion of genetic and logostheological theories.67 Schedius’ terms suggest that beau-ty remains in the centre of his aesthetics. But this conclusion is misleading, because Schedius’ concept of beauty is not a determination of a specific idea.

Beauty means here a special type of relationship, the so–called internal organic relationship (»coniunctio interna organica«). According to Schedius’ approach, the organic relationship signifies every mutual, equal, and interior connection which can appear in any dimension of human life. That is why beauty as an organic relationship can be created or come into existence not only in artistic connections, like creation or perception, but in the context of social organisa-tions as well, as in a liaison of love. This interpretation offers an opportunity to establish an internal organic connection between a hideous or ugly object and an insane subject, for example. And it could explain why we consider a piece of art beautiful on one occasion and, on another, ugly. In the background of this coordinate system lies a carefully considered rhetoric too. The approaches in Schedius’ system are divided into two parts: the first part is a conceptual approach, the second is applied. The conceptual approach builds up a con-ceptual dictionary, while the applied approach provides examples and experi-ments using this dictionary. Schedius’ research method was formed under the influence of the hermeneutic and scientific theories with which he familiarized himself at the philological seminars held by Heyne at the University of Göttin-gen68 In Principia, Schedius adopted an interesting method of commentary as a layout by dividing the text into two parts. He parcelled his own theories and proposals into a strict and logical system of numbered chapters, sub-chapters, and paragraphs. Each paragraph is accompanied by a commentary in small print, which is intended to provide bibliographical background. The nature of these citations is not authoritative, because Schedius opted for a polemic

66 See Botond Csuka’s paper »Aesthetics in Motion. On György Szerdahely’s Dynamic Aesthetics« in this volume.

67 Richter: A History (= note 59), 89–99.

68 On the influence of Heyne on Schedius see note 28. On Heyne’s method of criticism see Luigi Marino: Praeceptores Germaniae. Göttingen 1770–1820. Göttingen 1995, 267–

275; and Tanja S. Scheer: »Heyne und der Griechische Mythos«. In: Christian Gottlob Heyne. Werk und Leistung nach zweihundert Jahren. Eds. Bablina Bäbler, Heinz-Günther Nesselrath. Berlin–Boston 2014, 1–28.

approach by contextualising and separating his own statements from the other theories of aesthetics.

From this point of view, we should extend our investigation of Werthes’

theory on aesthetics, which could be interpreted as an aesthetics of rhetoric.

As I have said, until now, the historiography has only discussed and analysed Werthes’ inauguration speech and his dramas on Hungarian history.69 Werthes published only two books on aesthetics, both of which were translations from Italian to German of Bettinelli’s writings about enthusiasm.70 The translations indicate some of his preferences, but they do not reveal his systematic concept of aesthetics. However, if we extend our investigation to the university lec-ture notes written by Adalbert Gerzon from 179171, we come across interesting conclusions. That Latin manuscript contains Werthes’ last lecture on aesthetics at the university in Pest, connected with the first lecture of his successor, the extraordinary professor and Austrian piarist Julius Gabelhofer. Unfortunate-ly, Adalbert Gerzon attended Werthes’ last lecture, which became a fragment because of Werthes’ departure, so we cannot see the whole system of Werthes’

concept. However, the notes make clear that Werthes’ central conclusion bears an unquestionable parallel with Szerdahely’s: namely, that the arts can best fo-ster our moral improvement through vivid representations of sentiments and ideas. But Werthes’ other crucial idea differs entirely from Szerdahely’s concept, namely that the main vehicle of artistic effect is language. Therefore, in Wer-thes’ system the medium between general epistemological theory and special theories of the arts is not poetry, but a special kind of rhetoric. This rhetoric or oratory is a general theory of language use. His lecture proves that Werthes’

concept of the characteristics and substance of language was obviously based on the language theories of Johann Gottried Herder72, Johann Georg Sulzer73, and Christoph Martin Wieland.74 Werthes’ aesthetically based rhetoric was a 69 See note 19.

70 Originals: Saverio Bettinelli: Dell’Entusiasmo delle belle arti. Milano 1769. and L’entu-siasmo. Venice 1780 (= Opere, 2). Translations: Xaver Bettinelli: Über den Enthusiasmus der schönen Künste. Transl. Friedrich August Clemens Werthes. Bern 1778. and Vom Werth des Enthusiasmus. Geschichte seiner Wirkung in der Philosophie, in der Wissenschaft und in der Regierungskunst. Ed. Friedrich August Clemens Werthes. Leipzig 1794.

71 See note 21.

72 Johann Gottfried Herder: Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache. Berlin 1772.

73 Johann Georg Sulzer: »Anmerkungen über den gegenseitigen Einfluss der Vernunft in die Sprache, und die Sprache in die Vernunft«. In: Neues Hamburgisches Magazin 9 (1767), 121–165.

74 Christoph Martin Wieland: Beyträge zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens. Leipzig 1770.

modern, up-to-date theoretical attempt in the 1790s. I base this contention in part on the fact that we find European parallels from that time, for instance Benedictine Benno Ortmann’s Principia cum sacrae, tum civilis eloquentiae from 179775, who compiled his book for his students in the grammar school and lyceum of theology at München. His sources, his concept, and his terminology are extremely similar to Werthes’. I could also mention Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres from 1783 by Hugh Blair76, who composed his aesthetical rhetoric as a university professor at Edinbourgh. Blair’s system combines the fundamen-tal principles of belletristic rhetoric and literary theory in a concise, accessible form. And his intention, like that of Werthes, is to provide the next generation of scholars with a simple, organised guide on the value of rhetoric and belles lettres in the quest for social success. In addition, Werthes consistently uses the term litterae amoeniores, which is the exact (however prevalent) translation of belles lettres. The connection between them is supported by the fact that Blair’s