I N S T I T U T E O F P U B L I C A F F A I R S
ul. Flory 9 00-586 Warszawa Polska
tel. (48 22) 845 68 58 fax (48 22) 845 68 62 e-mail: isp@isp.org.pl
LENA KOLARSKA-BOBIŃSKA (ed.) XYMENA DOLIŃSKA
PIOTR JAWORSKI JACEK KUCHARCZYK
BEATA ROGUSKA MICHAŁ WARCHALA
BEFORE THE GREAT CHANGE Polish public opinion and EU enlargement
Warsaw 2001
TABLE OF CONTENT:
Introduction: The Poles before the great change... 3
Poland's Membership of the European Union: From Support to Rejection... 11
The Image of the European Union... 53
Poland and the EU – Unequal Partnership... 67
Adaptation to the European Union: hopes, fears, and costs... 89
Poland's Negotiations with the European Union... 127
Perceptions of the political elite in the context of integration... 143
Information about integration... 156
3 Lena Kolarska-Bobinska
Introduction: The Poles before the great change
Poland’s integration with the European Union should be considered as a general choice of both social order and international alliances: the choice of a certain civilisational option.
Therefore, Poland’s adaptation to EU standards should be analysed as a process of immense social change; yet often it is only the institutional aspect of integration that receives notice;
the emphasis is on the adjustment of standards, regulations and institutions to the requirements of EU countries.
Approaching integration as an important element of the modernization and social transformation now under way in Poland makes it possible to analyse the attitudes and opinions of various social groups on European integration in the broader context of ten years of change. Those attitudes are part of the outlook on the democratic and economic changes in Poland, not merely the hopes and fears aroused by the adaptation of the economy and the state as a whole.
The results of research by the Institute for Public Affairs discussed in this report show that integration with the EU is an aim accepted by Polish society and is not treated as an idea imposed from outside. Support for this civilisational choice stands out most clearly when the European option is compared with the Russian and pro-American ones. The European Union is perceived as Poland’s main partner and the one that which can offer Poland the greatest advantages, even though fewer than a half of the respondents (43 %) favour that direction of the country’s development. Supporters of European cooperation outnumber the group preferring neutrality (21%) two to one. Expanding cooperation either with the US or with Russia were considered to be the best choice for Poland’s future by similarly numerous groups (13% and 11% respectively). However, although options other than joining the EU gain incomparably less support, the total number of their adherents is about the same as the adherents of the European option (45%).
The coming years will be crucial in forming attitudes to integration in Polish society. In this period, civilisational and ideological stances and divisions will become more pronounced and different interests more clearly defined. This will concern the people who are not interested in those matters today as well as those who are now hesitating. As the date of EU
accession EU draws nearer, we shall observe changes in support of integration, shifts within various, so to speak, types of support or rejection.
Changes in attitudes will be brought about by many factors. Along with the development of a market economy, the foundations of a new social structure are emerging, the structure of which sociologists have been writing for the last ten years it is in the process of emerging. Social differences and related interests will become clearer and more strongly verbalized. The integration process will accelerate the formation of social group interests and their verbalization; it will serve as a catalyst, but at the same time it will cause those interests to be redefined in the context of the new future situation. This process will make it difficult for many groups to relate - often lacking basic information - to the future economic and social situation. Yet even now European integration is losing some of its previous character of a distant, abstract goal; many professional groups find it necessary to define their interests and opinions in relation to the dilemmas revealed during negotiations. Gradually, integration is taking the shape of concrete, measurable, calculable consequences of adapting to EU standards. This makes it easier for people to relate to it and for views and interests to become crystallized.
The formation of attitudes in the coming years will also be influenced by public debate, which is already gathering momentum. As politicians present their views of the negotiation situation and its effects regarding the interests both of the state and of specific groups, many who are now hesitating will find it easier to form opinions on these matters. Not only will debate provide the notions necessary to interpret the new and not easily defined situation, but will also spark interest in issues related to Poland’s adaptation to the EU, and later to its position in a united Europe; especially as with the approach of the date of our accession to the EU uneasiness and uncertainty will become more acutely felt and more pronounced. Some people who are now uninterested in these matters, or have no opinion, will start seeking information. That is why it is crucial to determine the types of support for the European option and possible changes within them.
At present, apart from declared adherents of integration (about 50% of the nation) we have a group of potential supporters (10% of the respondents). The ratio of declared and potential opponents is different: the former constitute 13 % of the nation, the latter - potential opponents - are more numerous (20% of the respondents). Potential adherents may in the coming years join either the group of declared adherents or that of potential opponents. The evolution of people who today declare they will not take part in the referendum or are not sure
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yet how they are going to vote is also important. In shaping the attitudes of those inactive and undecided people, the position of the elite and information policies will play a crucial role.
Today, integration remains a certain abstraction, a distant prospect; therefore Poles find it difficult to define its impact on their everyday life, their well-being. Paradoxically, the study has shown that people find it easier to estimate the influence of integration on the situation of the whole country than that of their family or workplace. It is easier because the prospect of integration gives rise to general hopes as a panacea for many Polish problems; it is seen as a chance to accelerate the country’s development, a chance for improvements in many spheres of life. In contrast, when asked to assess the impact of integration on themselves or their workplace, most respondents show uncertainty and ignorance.
There is striking similarity between the perception of the results of integration and the perception of economic and political transformation in its early days: it was seen as a process beneficial primarily to the country as a whole, and only to a much smaller extent to its citizens. ‘Poland’s economy will benefit from the new market rules and from privatisation, for it will become more rational, efficient and effective,” the majority of respondents in a CBOS poll believed in the early 1990s. The costs, however, would be borne by the citizens, who would be affected by unemployment, lower living standards and reduced state welfare provisions. The way integration is perceived now is similar: it is seen as a process favourable to the modernization of the country, but of vague and ambiguous consequences for its citizens.
As research by the Institute of Public Affairs shows, Poles are very realistic in their predictions regarding the date of Poland’s accession to the EU, the country’s position, the benefits and costs of the whole undertaking. The largest group of respondents believe Poland will accede to the EU in four to five years’ time. They lay the blame for the delay on both sides, Poland and the Union. They anticipate that Poland may become a second-rate member because it is economically weak and inadequately prepared for membership. Even though Poles fear their country may have an inferior position, they tend to look for causes in the internal situation rather than in the ill will of the Union. Therefore, they believe the conditions of accession depend primarily on our preparation for membership rather than on how firm Polish negotiators are. Negative perceptions of Poland’s economic situation, recently noticeable in opinion polls, may increase apprehension regarding accelerated integration: ‘we are not ready yet,’ many people seem to think.
As for the negotiations themselves, Poles appear to associate them more with having a discussion, making concessions and giving something in exchange for something rather than
with tenacity, cunning, struggle and playing a game. This kind of approach depersonalises negotiations, putting greater emphasis on real processes, structures and the law than on individuals’ skills or strength of character. Confidence in the government, belief that they know how to direct the transformation process and improve the country’s situation, rather than just trust in the negotiators’ skills and good intentions, become essential. The attitude to the administration in power is therefore an important factor influencing attitudes to European integration.
Expectations related to Poland’s accession also play an important part in shaping attitudes. Unrealistic economic aspirations, and the desire to have them promptly satisfied, might lead to bitter disappointment after accession to the EU, should it turn out that the real situation does not meet expectations. That danger would be particularly bad if the expectations concerned just one aspect of integration: material benefits, which are, on the one hand measurable, and on the other, difficult to achieve immediately after accession. In this matter, respondents show moderation and realism. Although they believe that European integration will bring more benefits than losses both to Poland and to themselves, they do not link all their hopes with that one field.
Poles’ hopes are varied and concern both the political and economic effects of integration. What is more, the respondents, when speaking about their hopes connected with integration, mention primarily political matters. In their opinion, accession to the EU will bring about an improvement in Poland’s international security, improved law enforcement, and a civilisational leap. This is an important conclusion, as the political aspirations entertained by Poles in connection with integration are often underestimated. At the same time it must be emphasized that integration is not perceived as a threat to sovereignty, tradition or culture.
There are, however, some fears concerning the economic impact of integration. These concern land being purchased by foreigners and the collapse of certain branches of industry.
Both situations may, in the respondents’ opinion, lead to increased unemployment. On the other hand, they hope that EU aid will help overcome the problems of Polish agriculture. 41%
of the respondents expect their own economic situation to improve, while 46% do not think it is likely to happen.
Thanks to the diversity in appraisal of the political and economic effects of integration and to the non-material hopes attached to it, the discrepancy between aspirations and real chances of their fulfilment after accession will not be too painful. Another crucial element is perceiving the time perspective in which the positive effects of integration may become
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noticeable. At present, the time perspective of thinking about integration is determined by the date of the referendum. All the attention of politicians and the media is focused on the problems arising during negotiations or concerning Poland’s adjustment to EU law.
Consequently, many people may be under the impression that most adaptation problems will disappear after membership is finally achieved, and the benefits will become clearly visible.
Lack of public debate on the situation of Poland and its citizens after integration narrows down the time perspective in thinking of accession and its effects. This might be expected to be reflected in expectations concerning the time scale in which results should become noticeable. However, actually the study has shown that Poles understand that the benefits of integration will be felt after some time and not automatically, immediately after accession: a half of the respondents believe it will be necessary to wait a few years and one third that it will be more than ten years. The question arises whether those expectations are evidence of moderation and realism or rather of inadequate motivation when the aim is distant, abstract and difficult to measure. It is hard to tell unequivocally, but we may assume that this is related to the perceptions of the consequences of integration described earlier: some of the respondents believe the process will not affect their lives, that it will happen beyond them, beyond their and their families’ lives. The expectation of distant rewards may in fact be a sign of scepticism or indifference towards integration and its results.
I stated earlier that the choice of European integration is a civilisational one, and that attitude to integration is part of a broadly understood attitude to the changes taking place in Poland. This can be seen in different fields. On the one hand, we observe a close link between opinions: attitude to integration is strongly related to attitudes to transformation and all its social and economic consequences, such as privatisation, the presence of foreign capital in Poland etc. Acceptance of transformation significantly increases support for integration.
Likewise, a positive attitude to the old system and a relatively negative one to Poland as it is today* are strongly linked to lower acceptance of integration. This is also reflected in political views: the electorate of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasants’ Party, who tend to see communist Poland as a “better country to live in” more often than other voters, are also more sceptical about various aspects of integration. The European option receives most support from voters of a more free-market orientation - adherents of the
* Measured by attitude to the statement “Poland in 2000 is a better country to live in than the People’s Republic of Poland.”
Freedom Union and Solidarity Election Action (AWS).** The euro-sceptic attitude of the SLD electorate, discernible throughout the survey, can not be explained by the sole fact that it is the minority cabinet of AWS that is running the negotiations and the process of adjustment at present. Differences in Polish society are more fundamental and concern general attitudes to system change. Integration is perceived as an element and a continuation of the changes towards a market economy, which must result in further deterioration in the situation of those who “lost out” on the transformation in the first place.
This is confirmed by research results concerning perceptions of the “winners” and
“losers” of transformation and integration. In the general view, the upper layers of society - educated people, the political and economic elite - will gain as a result of integration, while farmers and workers will lose; the same groups are indicated in response to questions about the social profit and loss calculation of transformation. The only exception to this simple transfer of terms in which integration is envisioned is the idea that owners of small and medium-sized businesses may feel the negative results of integration, and that consumers and the unemployed are in a position to gain more than they lose. Those exceptions, however, do not alter the general conclusion, namely, that integration is an anti-egalitarian process, leading to further social stratification. The benefits will go to the chosen few, and the costs will be borne by those who have problems finding their place in a market economy.
Such identification of the integration process with transformation may be the result of an awareness of the reforms which Poland still has to face, the conviction that inevitable changes will occur in many spheres of life. In this sense, integration is perceived as continuation of the changes started in the name of transformation. A certain duality is observable in thinking about the changes awaiting Poland and the EU’s role in them: on the one hand, widespread conviction of the necessity of changes and their internal character, on the other - the idea of the EU as a catalyst of reform, a strict teacher urging us to do our homework diligently. A large majority of society (74%) are convinced that changes are necessary whether Poland accedes to the Union or not. But a similarly numerous group expressed the opinion that the European Union is imposing reforms and changes on Poland.
The image is that of an enlightened despot enforcing changes which are believed to be necessary anyway. It does, however, give rise to uneasiness and uncertainty, because too many elements of the process are unclear and unequivocal, information is scanty, and signals contradictory.
** The study was carried out before the establishment of Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform), therefore that party is not included in the analyses of attitudes of different parties’ electorates presented in this report.
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* * *
This report contains a results of the survey carried out by Sopocka Pracownia Badan Spolecznych in June 2000 on a national representative sample of 1,200 people. The chapter
“Poland’s Membership in the EU: From Support to Rejection” by Xymena Dolinska discusses the fundamental issue of support given to integration in Polish society. It contains a detailed typology of both positive and negative attitudes towards integration and an attempt at explaining their causes, especially based on such variables as opinion of the current situation in Poland and attitude to changes related to system transformation. The chapter “The Image of the European Union” presents opinions concerning the Union in Poland in its ‘pragmatic’ and
‘moral’ aspect (the former referring to the efficiency of EU institutions, the latter to their honesty and the question of whether they represent the interests of ordinary citizens.) That chapter also analyses our society’s views on the type of community the European union should become.
The next chapter, “Poland and the EU: Unequal Partnership,” describes the respondents’
opinions on Polish-EU relations, while the chapter “Poland’s Negotiations with the EU”
presents matters related to accession negotiations. How is Poland’s position in relation to our Union partner perceived? Are the negotiators responsible for talks with the EU trusted by the people? Which negotiation subjects do Poles consider to be most important? Finally, what are the reasons behind all these answers - are social and demographic variables decisive, or rather opinions concerning the current situation in the country, subjective views of respondents’ own life situations, and attitudes to system transformation?
The report also contains (in the chapter “Adjustment to the EU: Hopes, Fears, Costs”) analyses concerning the perceived benefits and costs of accession to the Union and the attitude to those matters of the supporters of major political parties. The perceived positive or negative impact of Poland’s joining the EU is considered both at the level closest to the respondent (his or her life situation) and the national level.
The chapter “Perceptions of the Political Elite in the Context of Integration”, which deals with the perceived attitude of the elite to integration, takes into account shifts of opinion accompanying the presidential elections of October 2000. This makes it possible to determine the influence of declarations made by politicians during the presidential campaign on the respondents’ perceptions of those politicians’ attitudes to integration.
The final chapter of the report, “Knowledge about Integration” presents the extent to which the respondents in the survey were informed on matters pertaining to negotiations and Poland’s future membership of the EU. Do respondents feel well informed on these matters, or do they feel a lack in this respect? In what ways does information obtained from different media affect their attitudes to integration? What percentage of the respondents show interest in and use information provided by the governmental Centres of European Information?
All the figures in the tables and graphs come from studies by the Institute of Public Affairs unless otherwise stated. A number of the questions form the survey - those referring to the perceived attitudes of the political elite and the parties to integration - were asked of the respondents again in October 2000 after the presidential election. That survey, similarly to the one from June 2000, was carried out on a representative sample of 1200 adult inhabitants of Poland.
11 Xymena Dolińska
Poland's Membership of the European Union: From Support to Rejection
Since the early 1990s, EU membership has been a strategic goal of Polish policy, pursued consistently by all consecutive cabinets. That pursuit is based on the conviction that member status in the EU will be a significant factor accelerating the development of our country. First of all, it should have a favourable influence on the dynamics of economic development and improve the opportunities for the modernization of the Polish economy, enabling balanced development, on the one hand, of different branches of the economy, and on the other, of different regions of the country. It should also enhance the stability of democratic order not only in Poland, but in the whole region, and strengthen Poland's political position in the European and international arena. However, the process of integration also entails various problems regarding adjustment. It requires numerous changes in specific areas of the economy, such as agriculture, heavy industry, trade etc., as well as in the law and state institutions. Integration into EU structures may therefore mean a change not only on a general scale, but also in people's most immediate surroundings, in the life of individuals. As any violation of a certain status quo, it may raise both hopes and fears, acceptance and opposition.
The analyses presented in this chapter show the variety of types and dimensions of social acceptance of the idea of Poland's membership of the EU. Not only do they present the social, economic and political correlates of support for integration, but they also reach the depths of the issue, revealing attitudes, moods and convictions accompanying the acceptance or rejection of the idea. Support for Poland's EU integration is not necessarily based on rational calculations of the costs and benefits mentioned earlier. It may be rooted in a more general attitude to the world as a whole. It may also be strong or weak, consistent or hesitant.
It may arise from a conscious choice of the solution considered best for Poland, or from a vague, indefinite impression that this may be the right way. All that goes to show how different the types of support can be, and how many elements, both rational and emotional, they comprise and how diverse their manifestations can be.
Social support for a plan as important as accession is worth analysing for several reasons. Integration with the EU is an act, unprecedented in Polish history, of joining not another European country, but a Union of countries. This political act, carried out by a
democratic state, requires social acceptance. Yet support for Poland's joining the EU in opinion polls is dropping, as can be clearly seen from CBOS polls, carried out systematically since 1994.
Figure 1.
Support for integration in Poland
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
VI '94 V '95 V '96 III '97 IV '97 VIII '97 V '98 VIII '98 XII '98 V '99 XI '99 II '00 V '00 IX '00
For Against Don't know
Source: CBOS data
The steady fall in acceptance of Poland's integration with the EU since 1997 can be attributed to a number of reasons. One of them might be that the promised benefits are too abstract and general; therefore only a small proportion of the society can perceive in them any gain for themselves. This would suggest that information about the positive results of integration is inadequate, limited to certain social groups and certain issues only. Benefits presented at a very abstract level cannot counterbalance very real and concrete fears. The rise of the latter is aided by (indicated among the reasons for decreasing support for integration) problems related to the adjustment process being precisely specified and the frequent mention in public debate of difficulties directly touching people's lives. Some interpretations point to fatigue with the long-winded negotiations. An additional factor might be voices from the EU, heard also in Poland (at least before the Nice conference, and the IPA study was carried out before that event), advocating postponing enlargement in the east to a distant future. The initial euro-enthusiasm is also sometimes interpreted as an extension of the tendency to idealize the prosperity of the capitalist West, which lost much force in confrontation both with
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Poland's new free market economy and with problems within the European Union described in the media. The analyses presented here, focusing on various points and aspects of social support for integration in mid-2000, identifying its various types and dimensions, also touches upon those issues.
Another reason which makes it worth analysing social support for Poland's planned membership of the EU is the evaluation of the effectiveness of adjustment activities.
Integration with the nations of the Union will not happen at the moment of accession. It is a process which has already begun and which will continue after Poland joins EU structures. Its success depends, among other things, on whether and to what extent it will give rise to social conflict, and whether and to what extent it will arouse and consolidate forces of resistance.
The success of integration as a profound, long-term process depends on social support - as broad as possible - for the political vision behind it and the social and political changes it implies.
That political vision - membership in European Union structures - also has all the traits of a civilisational choice. In preparation for accession, the beginnings of our history are often mentioned: the Baptism of Poland, the Congress of Gniezno - events which also signified a political choice by Polish rulers, the choice to include Poland in the world of Western culture and civilization. Membership in the European Union should, on the one hand, confirm the direction taken a thousand years ago, and on the other, close the circle of Polish history.
The first, most general step of the analysis will be to determine to what extent acceptance for the "western option" is common in Polish society, what it means today, and whether and to what extent the alternative scenarios appear attractive to Poles. In the next steps we shall focus on more practical and pragmatic aspects of the problem, such as interest in EU matters, declarations regarding voting in the integration referendum, the expected and desired time of accession, and, finally, the emotions the scheme stirs up in Polish society.
The European Union as a civilisational choice
By signing the European treaties in 1991, and later submitting a formal application for membership of the European Union in 1994, Poland chose a certain political scenario - according to its representatives, the one most advantageous to the country's future. The questions whether in the early 1990s (after the break-up of the Eastern bloc and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact) Poland was in fact faced with a real choice: the West or the East, the European Community or the USA, and whether remaining a neutral non-member was an actual, feasible (and not just theoretical) alternative are not particularly important for our purposes. We must remember, however, that at the time the first steps towards accession were taken, the decision to apply for membership in NATO and the EU, supported with political arguments citing the need to break through post-Yalta divisions, to build one common Europe, as well as economic explanations concerning creating better conditions for economic growth, received almost universal support.1 In the first years after the fall of the Berlin Wall Western Europe, the EEC, the USA and NATO were all treated almost as synonyms, or as indistinguishable elements of a whole known generally as "The West".
Acceptance of the choice of the European Community as the aim of our foreign policy could therefore be treated as acceptance of a certain civilisational choice, even if this means focusing on the material aspect of civilization (prosperity, capitalism, wealth) rather than culture, tradition and the fundamental values it is based on.
Do Poles still consider this direction as the most advantageous scenario for Poland's development after nearly ten years, or would a majority prefer different options? To what extent to they support the Western orientation, and how strong are the sentiments or interests directed eastward, to Russia? Does historical experience breed resentment towards belonging to large international political structures, and suggest the choice of neutrality, not only in a military sense, but also politically - a state outside all pacts and treaties?
Asked to choose between the EU, Russia or the USA as Poland's main and best partner in international political and economic relations, the majority of respondents point to the Union. It is not an absolute majority, though: 43% of those questioned indicated joining the European Union as the option most advantageous to Poland's development. The supporters of the European option are twice as many as those who would prefer Poland to remain a neutral
1 In a survey by CBOS, "Public Opinion on Poland's Associate Membership of the EEC" (January 1992) 89% of the respondents expressed their support for Poland's full membership of the EEC as soon as possible.
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country (21%). Closer co-operation with either the United States or Russia are considered the best options by groups of similar size (13% and 11% respectively). Although options other than the EU taken separately gain incomparably smaller support, in total they have as many adherents (45%) as the European alternative. It is also worth noting that the "pro-Western"
options (EU and the USA) together have received the support of not many more than a half of the respondents (56%).
Table 1.
The best scenario for Poland’s development (in percentage terms).
What, in your opinion, would be most advantageous to Poland's development?
Joining the European Union 43 Remaining a neutral country 21 Closer economic and political links with the USA 13 Closer co-operation with Russia 11
Hard to tell 12
As we can see, the Union wins, albeit not undisputedly and not equally in all social groups. Certain correlations can be observed between particular social and demographic variables and choosing the EU as the best solution for Poland. The European option is chosen particularly by young people (52%) and rejected by the oldest age group (30%). People with only primary education are noticeably less well-disposed towards it (29%) than those with higher education (62%). The frequency with which joining the EU is indicated as the best scenario also rises with the increase in income per person in the family: from 34% among those with the lowest incomes to 47% among wealthier people. Significantly, however, even in the groups where the percentage of answers indicating the EU is considerably lower, it is still the option chosen most often. Farmers were the only exception to this rule (12% chose the EU). Even more importantly, they were the only group in which alternative scenarios received more support than European integration: remaining a neutral country was chosen by 27% of the respondents and closer co-operation with Russia by 25%. The farmers' unwillingness to join the EU is consistent and receives positive expression in the form of choosing a different partner. It would, however, be difficult to judge to what extent this is a rational choice, based on the wish to recover access to the so-called eastern markets, lost after the crisis in Russia, and to what extent it is simply a demonstration of protest against anticipated changes in rural areas after joining the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU.
Apart from this one exception, the distribution of support for the "American" and
"Russian" scenarios is relatively similar in all the socio-demographic groups.
Interestingly, though, stronger correlations are noticeable between opinions concerning the best scenario for Poland and opinions regarding the Polish transformation and accompanying phenomena, for example, privatisation and the presence of foreign capital (Kramer's V 0.25 and 0.24 respectively). Among people who believe privatisation is beneficial to the Polish economy, two thirds (67%) consider joining the EU to be the best option, only 5% would like to see closer cooperation between Poland and Russia and 10%
would choose neutrality. In contrast, among the opponents of privatisation, neutrality has the largest number of adherents (29%), and support for European integration is not much over a half of the average in the whole sample (27% compared with 43%).
The difference between the groups of supporters and opponents of the presence of foreign capital in Poland is similar: nearly two thirds (64%) of those considering the presence of such capital in Poland to be a good thing chose the EU scenario; while among the opponents the proportion was one in five.
Table 2.
Best scenarios for Poland’s future in the view of adherents and opponents of the presence of foreign capital in Poland (in percentage terms).
In your opinion, is the presence of foreign capital in Poland' s economy:
Best scenario for Poland's future
Closer economic and political links with the
USA
Joining the European Union
Closer cooperation with Russia
Remaining a neutral country
Hard to tell
Beneficial? 12 64 11 9 4
Equally beneficial and harmful? 13 45 11 20 11
Harmful? 14 20 15 36 15
Hard to tell? 14 25 7 23 31
Total? 13 43 11 21 12
The correlation between opinions concerning the best direction in foreign policy and the feelings and expectations regarding the current situation in Poland and its development is also marked. Two thirds (66%) of the optimists - those who believe the situation in our country is going in the right direction - indicated integration with the EU as the best choice for Poland.
In contrast, one third (34%) of those who believe the situation in Poland to be developing in a
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bad direction indicate the EU as the best choice. Similar tendencies can be observed when analysing opinions about the future: 59% of the respondents who believe the situation will improve choose joining the EU, while among pessimists the figure is 32%. Differences are also noticeable in relation to the question of whether in five years' time Poland will be a better country to live in than it is now: the stronger the opposition to this statement, the less often respondents chose joining the EU, and the more often they indicated remaining neutral or closer co-operation with Russia as the best alternative.
Table 3.
Best scenarios as related to predictions concerning Poland’s future (in percentage terms)
In 5 years' time, Poland be a better country to live in:
Best scenarios for Poland’s future
Closer economic and political links with the
USA
Joining the European Union
Closer cooperation with Russia
Remaining a neutral country
Hard to tell
Strongly agree 13 68 9 8 2
Agree 13 54 10 16 7
Disagree 15 29 11 32 13
Strongly disagree 8 11 25 43 13
Hard to tell 13 27 9 24 27
Support for the EU scenario increases significantly with the rise in optimism and acceptance of phenomena related to transformation. Notably, closer economic links with the USA receive the same support (about 13%) in all groups selected with regard to attitude to changes occurring in Poland. The choice of Russia as a partner is somewhat differentiated.
The option which, similarly to the European one, received the most unequal support in different groups divided with regard to their attitude to transformation, was the possibility of remaining outside all pacts and treaties, as a neutral country. All that seems to indicate that the pro-American and pro-EU options are now clearly distinguished in the public consciousness: that the so-called "West" is no longer a monolithic concept. The American scenario appears to belong to the sphere of politically unrealistic options, which always - regardless of sentiments and levels of optimism - find a small group of sympathizers. In contrast, the European scenario is treated as a hard, albeit potential, reality. The observed differences also suggest that, according to Poles, the real choice is not between the East and West, but between joining the European Union and remaining outside all structures. Support for the latter option - increasing significantly along with rising pessimism and disapproval of
circumstances accompanying transformation - should be understood as an expression of resentment towards the changes initiated over the last ten years, a wish maybe not to reverse or block, but at least to slow down those changes.
To sum up, it is worth noting that integration with the European Union means, in Poles’
opinion, a choice not so much of a broadly understood Western option as of a realistic - looked forward to by some and dreaded by others - political scenario, which entails the necessity of social and economic transformation. It receives considerably stronger support from younger, better-educated and higher-income respondents. But most importantly, it is considered to be the best option for Poland by those who accept the currently occurring changes, are optimistic about the future and open to the Western world and its rules.
Therefore, its only alternative can be the opposite scenario. Not making any changes, and remaining outside all political and economic systems, may be considered such an option.
The eastern option is also a form of demonstration against the changes of the last ten years, involving a sense of nostalgia for the past and pessimism with regard to the present and future situation. But it attracts significantly fewer people than the neutrality scenario, even among those most antagonistic towards the transformation process. The choice of the USA as a strategic partner seems to lie in a different sphere, according to respondents, and does not constitute a real alternative to EU integration. The American scenario is no competition to the Union.
The above conclusions suggest that we may distinguish three types of euroscepticism.
The first, pro-American, springs form other reasons than aversion to change. The remaining two are based on rejecting those changes; of these two, pro-Russian euroscepticism is characterized by a longing for the old days2, while support for neutrality is the attitude of people who do not accept the transformation, resent the accompanying processes and have problems finding their place in the emerging world.
Which of these types of euroscepticism is the strongest; which is most likely to evolve into active resistance against Poland’s accession to the European Union, expressed by voting
"no" in the accession referendum? This problem will be considered in the following pages.
2 In the question whether Poland in the year 2000 is a better country to live in than the People's Republic, the percentage of adherents of closer cooperation with Russia increased disproportionably faster along with the increase in nostalgia for pre-1989 Poland than the percentage of adherents of a neutral state.
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Interest in issues pertaining to integration among Poles
As far as interest in issues related to Poland's EU accession is concerned, Polish society is divided almost equally: on the one hand, nearly a half of the respondents (48%) declared interest in integration (only 7% of those described themselves as very interested), on the other, 50% stated they were not very interested or not interested at all. Taking into consideration how important integration issues are to Poland's future, such a level of interest in those matters must be considered rather low.
Table 4.
Interest in issues pertaining to integration (in percentage terms)
Are you interested in matters pertaining to Poland's integration (accession) with the European Union?
Very interested 7
Interested 41
Not very interested 31
Not at all interested 19
Don’t know 2
The social and demographic variable that appears most strongly related to interest in integration issues is education: 75% of respondents with higher education declared their interest, while two thirds (64%) of respondents with primary education admitted they were
"not very" or "not at all" interested. Clear differences in level of interest can also be noticed among different occupational groups: managers and high-level executives, white-collar workers and business owners show more than average interest in integration issues, whereas one third of unskilled workers, farmers and the unemployed are not at all interested in those matters. Interestingly, a variable which did not clearly differentiate respondents with regard to this question was age.
The level of interest in matters related to Poland's integration with the EU is not strongly related to respondents' feelings about Poland's present and future situation or their opinions on circumstances accompanying the transformation process. The percentage of people interested in EU matters is only slightly higher among optimists than among pessimists. Proportionately, there are nearly twice as many people not interested in these matters at all among pessimists than among optimists. Only 11% of those considering the presence of foreign capital as positive declared a total lack of interest in EU matters, as
compared with a quarter (26%) of those unfavourably disposed towards foreign capital. The proportions among supporters and opponents of privatisation are similar.
What is worth emphasizing is the strong correlation between level of interest and civic activity as measured by voting in parliamentary elections (Kramer's V= 0.23): those who declare voting in elections often also declare interest in integration as well. Two thirds of the people who were uncertain whether they would vote of were positive they would not are not very or not at all interested in matters related to the EU. This means that interest in integration is part of a broader civic attitude to involvement in public matters.
The analyses presented above suggest that interest in matters pertaining to integration lies primarily in the sphere of knowledge and action, and only to a smaller extent in the sphere of emotions. It is strongly related to voting and education and to a much smaller extent to feelings and opinions about the changes accompanying the Polish transformation. The better educated and more aware the citizen, the more open he or she is to matters pertaining to the country's political future. However, the emotional element is also present, albeit on a smaller scale: indifference to integration issues increases with resentment towards the changes occurring around us.
Interest in EU matters is also related to the choice of the most advantageous (in respondents' opinion) scenario for Poland's future. Those interested in EU issues tend to choose the European option more often than those uninterested. Respondents who declared no interest at all usually (33%) preferred remaining a neutral country. The American option receives about 13% support irrespective of interest in EU matters. Interestingly, however, the percentage of respondents choosing closer co-operation with Russia rises with increasing interest in integration issues: similarly to the integration path, the greater interest in Union issues, the more often this scenario is indicated as the best for the country's future.
21 Table 5.
Interest in issues pertaining to integration and choice of best scenario for Poland (in percentage terms)
Are you interested in matters related to Poland's integration (accession) with the European Union?
Best scenario for Poland's future
Closer economic and political links with the
USA
Joining the
European Union Closer co- operation with Russia
Remaining a neutral country
Hard to tell
Very interested 11 53 15 16 5
Interested 13 52 12 16 7
Not very interested 13 39 11 22 15 Not at all interested 12 23 8 33 24
Don’t know 15 31 8 15 31
It is therefore possible to conjecture that the adherents of the Eastern scenario - more interested and involved in matters pertaining to the country's future - are more probably potentially active opponents of integration than those favouring the neutrality option (among whom indifferent and uninterested people are a majority). The more active a group's attitude to integration issues, the less frequently remaining a neutral state is preferred.
Support or rejection of Poland's accession to the EU in a referendum
Support for a scenario placing Poland in the European Union (43%) shows in most general terms the level of social acceptance for such a choice of foreign policy. Another way to approach this question is to ask respondents about their behaviour in a possible integration referendum. This part of the report will be devoted to the analysis of potential support for and opposition to the idea of Poland's membership of the EU measured by the readiness to approve or reject such a proposition in a referendum. It is possible to analyse in this manner the support of either the whole society (a part of which does not intend to vote in the referendum) or only the group who declare their participation. The analyses presented on the following pages will pertain to support measured for the whole society, including those declaring their absence from voting. Relative support, in relation to the group intending to take part in the referendum, will be discussed separately.
Support for the idea of integration expressed in declarations regarding voting in a possible pre-accession referendum (49%) turns out to be very similar to the support for the European scenario analysed earlier. The idea of integration can therefore be said to have the consistent support of nearly a half of all the respondents. Only 13% would reject the proposal of Poland's accession to the EU in a referendum. Significantly, however, nearly one third (27%) declare they will not vote in a referendum.
Regarding the long-term support results presented earlier, showing steadily decreasing support for integration, the question arises how far that can change over a short period of time. For example, did any significant changes occur in levels of support between June 2000, when the survey was carried out, and October of the same year and later, after the presidential election and the period of increased political activity (by party representatives as well as some of the citizens) accompanying it? In other words, did the campaign, in which the subject of integration was also featured, alter Poles' attitudes to this issue?
The survey was repeated in October with results only fractionally different from those obtained in June. A few points are worth stressing, though. In October, a half of the respondents expressed support for Poland joining the EU. At the same time the percentage of respondents opposed to that plan fell, albeit marginally (from 13 to 10%). More importantly, the number of people declaring they would not vote in a referendum also dropped as well.
Table 6.
Support for Poland's membership of the EU - comparison of declarations of voting in an accession referendum in June and October 2000 (in percentage terms)
Declared voting in an accession referendum June 2000 October 2000 People voting for Poland's accession to the EU 49 54 People voting against Poland's accession to the EU 13 10
Abstentions 27 21
People uncertain whether or how they will vote 11 15
The differences described above, although small, demonstrate the interesting impact of the presidential campaign on attitudes to integration. Firstly, they reveal the voters' potential for mobilization. Secondly, they show that the anti-European rhetoric used by some candidates met with little response, while pro-integration programmes were received with more openness. In the long run, it can be expected that after some time, when the general
23
interest in public matters, boosted by the campaign, subsides, the declared support in a referendum will also drop by a few percentage points.
In both the surveys compared here nearly the same percentage of people did not clearly express their support or opposition to Poland's membership of the EU (38% in June, 36% in October). It is an often-heard argument that the opinions of the non-voters are not relevant.
Actually, even thought they do not influence the referendum results, they are an integral part of the broader picture of social acceptance of the integration processes. When analysing the level of support in society one must not omit the opinions of more than one third of the population, who did not state their opinion as to a referendum. The don't knows and those who today declare they will not vote will also face integration with the societies of the European Union. Moreover, in the next few years, they will constitute the main target of information policy, because their votes - if they finally decide to cast them - may determine the result of the referendum. That is why in the next part of this report, after looking at the supporters and opponents of integration in a possible referendum, we shall try to find out something about the opinions of those who do not intend to vote or are not yet sure whether they do.
An analysis of socio-demographic variables reveals only weak links between levels of support for Poland's membership of the EU and such factors as age, education, income, place of residence or occupation. Relatively more supporters of integration can be found among the youngest respondents (18-24): 58% of that group would vote yes in an accession referendum.
In the successive groups support decreases considerably, but only in the oldest group - over 60 - does it fall below the national average, to as little as 38% of the group. Even though in this group the declared level of absence, at 38%, was also higher than average, the rate of opposition against integration stood at an average 12%. This means that relative opposition in the oldest age group is higher. The strongest opposition against joining the EU exists among middle-aged respondents (40-59). As in most opinions on integration, here too a definite, albeit un-dramatic generation gap can be observed - between those who are at the start of their adult lives and those to whom possible changes mean a threat to the accustomed order.
Support for EU membership is equally weakly (Kramer V = 0.138) linked to education.
This variable differentiates respondents with regard to declared voter turnout: higher education seems conducive to this form of political activity (8% of respondents with higher education will not take part in the referendum, as compared with 37% of those with elementary education). If we relate support for integration in the referendum to education, we can see that support is nearly twice as high among the best-educated as in the group with
primary education. However, the rate of opposition to integration in a referendum is the same in all groups.
Table 7.
Support for the idea of integration with the EU related to education (in percentage terms)
Education
Declared voting in an accession referendum
People voting for Poland's
accession to the EU People voting against Poland's
accession to the EU Abstentions People uncertain whether or how they will vote
Elementary 38 14 37 11
Vocational 48 15 25 12
Secondary 59 11 20 10
Higher 72 10 8 10
Total 49 13 27 11
Do these results allow us to conclude that among people with the lowest education support is dramatically low? Such a conclusion, although it should be considered, would be premature at this stage, as we do not yet know what the attitude to integration is among those who declare they are not going to vote. The supposition that support among people with elementary education is low will be verified later, when we analyse opinions expressed by that group on other occasions than voting in a referendum. We may, however, resolve that support for the idea of integration among people with higher education is indeed high:
because of the high declared voter turnout we can make that inference based on the
"referendal support rate".
Support for Poland's EU membership is related to place of residence in only one respect: it depends on whether respondents come from a rural or an urban area. The size of the town or city is of marginal importance: more than a half (from 52 to 57%) of city-dwellers would vote "yes" in a referendum. Opponents in cities amount to less than 10% of the population. In rural areas, though, 41% of the inhabitants would vote "yes" and 19% "no". As all surveys show extremely low support for integration among farmers and their families, it may be assumed that it is this group that accounts for such a low average acceptance rate in rural areas. However, even when farmers are excluded from the analysis, support in rural areas remains lower, and opposition higher. Therefore it is not just farmers - although their attitude is consequential - but simply inhabitants of rural areas - who, immediately, constitute
25
36% of all eligible voters in Poland - that seriously affect the overall rate of support for integration.
Table 8.
Support for the idea of integration with the EU related to place of residence (in percentage terms)
Place of residence
Declared voting in accession referendum
People voting for Poland's accession to the EU
People voting against Poland's accession to the
EU
People declaring absence from the polls
People uncertain whether or how they will vote
City above 200,000 inhabitants
57 10 21 12
Town 50-200,000 54 10 25 11
Town up to 50,000 52 9 31 8
Rural area 41 19 28 12
Total 49 13 27 11
Farmers are not only the occupational group which leads the least support to the idea of Poland's membership in the EU; they are also the only group in which opponents of that idea are more numerous than its adherents (22 and 24% respectively). In no other occupational group has such a difference been noted; in other groups, adherents of integration outnumber its opponents at least three to one. The idea of Poland joining the EU receives strongest support from middle and top managers, white-collar workers, office workers and entrepreneurs (over 63%); the weakest support (apart from farmers) comes from unskilled workers (40%). We have to remember, however, that farmers also declare the lowest turnout at the referendum: as many as 40% of them state they would not vote. Among unskilled workers the rate of declared absence is similarly high; therefore, when considering support for integration in these groups, it is necessary to remember that we do not know the attitude of nearly a half of their representatives (including the undecided) to integration.
The support rate is also different in groups based on income per person in the family.
People with higher incomes (more than PLN 700 per family member) are more likely to approve of the idea of integration (59%) than those with incomes of PLN 300 per family member and less (44%), and conversely: the percentage of opponents is noticeably higher among the latter (11 and 17% respectively).
Differences among the supporters of the main political parties are also worth noting.
the supporters of the Freedom Union are the most pro-Union (84%0, those of Solidarity
Election Action (AWS) slightly less so (69%). The followers of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasants' Party express moderate support for integration (51 and 48%
respectively).
It is also interesting to compare support and opposition to the idea of Poland’s EU membership in a referendum with opinions on the situation in the country - in other words, to verify the idea (suggested earlier) that acceptance of integration is strongly linked to Poles' feelings and opinions concerning the changes our country is undergoing. Levels of optimism and pessimism, as well as opinions on privatisation and the presence of foreign capital in Poland, appear to be much more strongly correlated with the readiness to support Poland's accession to the Union than the socio-demographic variables described above.
The number of "referendal supporters" (yes-voters) among optimists exceeds two thirds (from 67 to 82%)3, while among pessimists it as low as one third (between 26 and 37%).
Optimism regarding the present and future situation clearly goes together with readiness to support the idea of integration, while its lack reinforces disapproval. What is more, those who have a negative view of the present situation in Poland and believe it will deteriorate in the near future would not only vote "no" more frequently than optimists, but also much more often declared absence at the referendum.
3 The percentage of yes-voters differs depending on whether the question asked was in what direction the situation in our country will evolve; whether it will become better or worse; or whether Poland in five years’
time will be a better country to live in than today.
27 Table 9.
Support for the idea of integration with the EU related to appraisal of the future situation in Poland (in percentage terms).
In 5 years' time, Poland will be a better country to live in than now
Declared voting in accession referendum
People voting for Poland's accession
to the EU
People voting against Poland's accession to the EU
People declaring absence from
the polls
People uncertain whether or how
they will vote
Strongly agree 77 4 16 3
Agree 63 11 15 11
Disagree 32 13 44 11
Strongly disagree 14 29 50 7
Hard to tell 32 17 34 17
Total 49 13 27 11
Kramer V = 0,257
Only slightly weaker, but also significant, correlations can be observed with the attitude to privatisation and the presence of foreign capital: nearly three quarters of respondents considering these phenomena as positive, and, in contrast, only one third considering them negative, would support integration in a referendum.
Table 10.
Support for the idea of integration with the EU related to opinion on the presence of foreign capital in Poland (in percentage terms)
In your opinion, is the presence of foreign capital in Poland's economy
Declared voting in accession referendum
People voting
for Poland's accession to the
EU
People voting against Poland's accession to the
EU
People declaring absence from
the polls
People uncertain whether or how
they will vote Beneficial for Poland? 71 6 14 9 Equally beneficial and
harmful? 48 12 28 12
Harmful? 30 24 36 10
Hard to tell? 37 11 36 16
Total 49 13 27 11
To sum up, the greatest number of adherents ready to support the idea of Poland's membership in the EU can be found among people who are young, well-educated, live in cities, hold senior and executive positions, and earn a good income. Significantly, pro- and anti-integration attitudes are more strongly differentiated by subjective factors, expressing optimism or pessimism regarding Poland's present and future situation. Pessimists more frequently declare they would not vote in a referendum. Those who would vote "yes" much more often express positive opinions on such issues as privatisation or the presence of foreign capital in Poland's economy, whereas those who would vote "no" have a negative view of these phenomena.
To conclude the discussion of support for integration as measured by declarations of voting in a referendum, it may be worth looking at a few issues connected with the referendum itself. According to the Polish Constitution, a referendum is valid if more than a half of eligible voters take part in it. In June 2000, 69% of the respondents declared they would vote in a referendum, but only 38% stated they certainly would. The experience of previous referenda suggests a cautious approach to such declarations: before the referendum on general privatisation, declared voting reached 52% (CBOS data), and the actual turnout was 32.4%. Even the weight of the problem put to the vote does not mobilize voters sufficiently to grant a high turnout: in the constitutional referendum in 1997, despite earlier
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declarations by about two thirds of the respondents (65-66%, CBOS data), only 42.9% of eligible voters actually used their vote (the fifty per cent clause was not applicable in that case).
Table 11.
Declaration of voting in a referendum on integration (in percentage terms)
If there was a referendum about Poland’s accession to the European Union this Sunday, would you vote in it?
Definitely yes 38
Probably yes 31
Probably no 16
Definitely no 11
Don't know 4
Low voter turnout in general elections is often a matter of concern to fervent believers in democracy, deploring the inadequate participation of citizens in their country's political life. On the other hand, there are those who claim that what bears testimony to a stable democracy is a steady, not necessarily high, voter turnout.4 However, in this case, when the turnout may determine the final outcome of all the accession aspirations and activities, the undecided one third and the group who declare they will "probably" vote constitute a serious challenge for institutions promoting the vision and idea of Poland's membership in a united Europe.
If the referendum had taken place in June 2000, the supporters of integration would have won, constituting 67% of those decided to vote. Their number is nearly four times that of the opponents (18%). Importantly, 15% of those who declared they would vote could not tell whether they would vote for or against Poland's integration with the Union.
Table 12.
Declared voting among people who stated they would take part in a referendum on integration (in percentages, N = 878)
How would you vote in such a referendum?
For Poland's accession to the European Union 67 Against Poland's accession to the European Union 18
Don't know 15
4 Cf. Nawet sztaby nie wierzą w wygraną, interview with Radosław Marko ski, „Rzeczpospolita” 11.09.2000.
Are there any significant differences between supporters and opponents of Poland's accession to the EU with regard to how certain they are of participating in the referendum? In other words, is either of those two groups - supporters and opponents - better mobilized to push through the option it prefers? A compilation of results from Tables 11 and 12 reveals that in the group who are most certain of their participation in the referendum the percentage of supporters of integration is slightly higher (74%) and the percentage of Don't Knows a little lower. Or, to look at it from another side: 57% of supporters, as compared with 53% of opponents, are certain of their participation in the referendum; 41% of supporters and 46% of opponents say they probably will vote. The mobilization of the adherents appears only marginally higher than that of the opponents. The least mobilized group are those who do not know how they would vote in the referendum - those who have not yet formed an opinion on the subject of accession.
Table 13.
Mobilization of adherents and opponents of accession (in percentages, N=878)
How would you vote in such a referendum?
If there was a referendum about Poland’s accession to the European Union this Sunday, would you vote in it?
Definitely yes Probably yes Don’t know For Poland's accession to
the European Union 57 41 2
Against Poland's
accession to the European Union
53 46 1
Don't know 25 46 29
Two dimensions of support: referendum and preferred scenarios
Comparing data on support for integration expressed by voting in a referendum with opinions concerning the best options for Poland enables an assessment of the strength and consistency of those beliefs. It also allows analysis to what extent the people declaring their support for integration in a referendum are at the same time adherents of the European option, and to what extent they prefer other alternatives; the followers of which scenario most often declare they would vote "no" in a referendum; and which preferred scenario is most often accompanied by declared absence from the referendum.
