Chapter 5: A High Intensity Conflict and Presidential Decision-making: The Korean War .136
5.3 The Decision to Intervene
5.3.2 The Role of Domestic Politics
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the UN would be able to fulfill its role, so they wished to act through it. The President also expressed this view early in the Korean crisis when he said, “We cannot let the UN down.”451 On June 25 Truman expressed his desire to hold any action back until the UN would vote.452
Truman did respect the UN and tried to work though it rather than just using it to legitimize American action, as many of his successors would do. He went back to the UN each time the course of American policy had to be changed. Yet, involvement in the UN did not influence the decision to fight. The decision to remove any restrictions on the use of air and naval forces in Korea went out to General MacArthur on June 26 – a day before the new Security Council resolution that legitimized it was accepted.453 When Truman first met Congressional leaders in the morning of June 27, he left no doubt that the United States preferred working within the UN, but would go ahead even if a favorable resolution could not be obtained.454 The previous evening, he voiced similar views when he was warned that the Soviets might veto his plans of working with the UN. He said he “rather wished they would veto,” because it would be clear indication of who was behind North Korean action and would help justify US action in defending Formosa.455
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To begin with, to commit troops, decision-makers either had to play at using the rally effect in the short run or aim at success or avoid failure in the long run.
As for the long-term prospects of victory, Truman and his advisors had few illusions about the certainty of victory once ground troops were committed. That is to say, the decision was not based on catering for favorable public reaction in the long run or furthering their survival in their jobs by judging and influencing the prospects of a re-election bid by Truman.
On June 26, Acheson suggested that “it was important for us to do something even if the effort were not successful.”457 This view was seconded by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. The bleak view of a war effort expressed by Acheson was not unfounded on the basis of forces that were available immediately. General Bradley judged that if the US committed ground forces in Korea, it could not carry out its other international commitments without mobilization at home.458
Although Truman was ready to shoulder the chances of a disastrous war effort, he was not willing to do it before he was convinced that it was necessary. On June 26, the President still entertained hopes for a less violent settling of the conflict. He said that every effort must be made to meet the situation, but still shrank back from the idea of mobilization of the National Guard or the reserves, because he said “he did not want to go to war.”459 Although his reasons are not entirely clear, he appeared to identify such a move with personal failure:
he said that the situation at hand was what he tried to prevent in the last five years.460 Yet, he did not coach failure in terms of its possible domestic repercussions. Finally, he decided to
457 “Memorandum of Conversation by Philip C. Jessup,” June 26, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.
458 “Memorandum of Conversation by Philip C. Jessup,” June 26, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.
459 “Memorandum of Conversation by Philip C. Jessup,” June 26, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.
460 “Memorandum of Conversation by Philip C. Jessup,” June 26, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.
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commit ground troops on a limited scale on June 29 and full troop commitment was made a day later when collapse was imminent.461
However, Truman’s policy of delay was not influenced by short-term domestic political calculations, either. If they had been, Congressional criticism of softness should have predisposed the President to full-scale intervention early on, which clearly he was not.
Truman also appeared not to be too worried about anti-Communism in the US. Although he directly referred to general problems with Congress by discussing McCarthyism on the plane back from Independence on June 25, he did not sound alarmed and did not connect it to developments in Korea. Rather he expressed his opinion that McCarthy would soon destroy himself and be thrown out of the Senate because of his lies.462
Even when the President was warned on June 28, 1950 that current Congressional support might evaporate before long if the military situation became troublesome, he did not display concern. As I have shown already, such an eventuality was far from being a remote possibility. As Acheson pointed it out, instead of making any progress, problems in Korea only increased so far. Thus, standing firm in Korea might not be an easy victory march for the US.463 The President was “unmoved by, indeed unmindful of, the effect upon his or his party’s political fortunes of action that he thought was right and in the best interest of the country, broadly conceived.”464 Accordingly, thinking that the Secreatry of State wanted to talk him out of the chosen course of action, the President replied with some irritation that the
461 “Teletype Conference between Washington and Tokyo, ref. CX –56812,” June 26, 1950 in “The Korean War” 2006; Hess 2001, 29-31; Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 341; for the authorization of a limited number of troops see, “JCS Message no. 84681 to CINCFE (Command), Tokyo, Japan,” June 29, 1950 in “The Korean War” 2006.
462 Ayers, Eben A. 1991.Truman in the White House. The Diary of Eben A. Ayers. Edited by Robert H. Ferrell.
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 355.
463 “Meeting of the NSC in the Cabinet Room at the White House,” June 28, 1950,” , in “The Korean War” 2006.
464 Acheson 1970, 535.
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danger involved was obvious, but the United States should only back down in Korea if a military situation elsewhere, that is, strategic considerations, demanded so.465
If the President was not worried about the backing of Congress in the short run, he was not mindful of it in the long run, either. Had he been, he could have foregone future criticism by biding Congress in the war decision by simply asking for a declaration of war. He most likely would have gotten such a declaration. Congress, as well as the press and the nation, supported his policies.466 Senator Lucas foresaw the possibility that Senators would engage in a lengthy debate and a renewal of past criticism against Truman, but he believed that the declaration would not be denied.467
Acheson described the stakes in terms of evaporating support should the war not prove to be an unconditional success. Such a possibility was all the more likely, because although supportive, Congress left the backdoor open for diverging opinions in the future. In the course of the meeting with Congressional leaders, the expression of Congressional support was mixed with criticism over not consulting Congress before such an ominous decisions as sending ground troops.468 In addition, as early as June 28, influential Republicans challenged the constitutionality of Truman’s actions on the floor of the Senate,469 which was not without legal basis. Under a law that the President signed in 1945, US troops could only be committed to support UN action after Congressional authorization. In addition, the Constitution made it clear that only the Senate could declare, that is presumably start, wars.470
465 Acheson 1970, 535; Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 340, 346; Hess 2001, 26-7. Cf. the official minutes of the meeting that does justify Truman’s comment but does not contain Acheson’s warning. “Meeting of the NSC in the Cabinet Room at the White House,” June 28, 1950,” in “The Korean War” 2006.
466 Hess 2001, 32. As for the view of the general public, 890 telegrams received in the White House until June 29 overwhelmingly supported intervention and letters were running 10 to 1 in favor of presidential action. See
“Memorandum for Mr. Ross,” June 29, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.
467 Hess 2001, 35; Acheson 1970, 538-539; Paterson 1988, 87-94.
468 “[Meeting with the Cabinet and Congressional Leaders],” June 30, 1950, 11:10 a.m., in “The Korean War”
2006.
469 Hess 2001, 26.
470 Hess 2001, 37.
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Yet, Truman did not seek a declaration of war even in light of Congressional pressure to do so. The question whether one was to be requested was not dealt with before the second week of the crisis on July 3 – only after troop commitments had been made.471 When the declaration of war was considered, Averell Harriman repeated Acheson’s earlier warning, which Acheson no longer shared, about its usefulness if they ran into trouble. But the President was of a different opinion.472 He dismissed the request in a way that appears to be politically shortsighted, but expressed very well the balance of power between the president and Congress with regard to foreign policy. He asserted that asking Congress for a declaration of war was unnecessary when “they are already with me.”473 Moreover, he believed that the request could not be fit into the short-time, would tie the hands of future presidents in being responsive to international developments, and that being Commander-in-Chief and working under the cover of the UN did not necessitate Congressional declaration of war.474