Chapter 5: A High Intensity Conflict and Presidential Decision-making: The Korean War .136
5.4 The Decision to Go North
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Yet, Truman did not seek a declaration of war even in light of Congressional pressure to do so. The question whether one was to be requested was not dealt with before the second week of the crisis on July 3 – only after troop commitments had been made.471 When the declaration of war was considered, Averell Harriman repeated Acheson’s earlier warning, which Acheson no longer shared, about its usefulness if they ran into trouble. But the President was of a different opinion.472 He dismissed the request in a way that appears to be politically shortsighted, but expressed very well the balance of power between the president and Congress with regard to foreign policy. He asserted that asking Congress for a declaration of war was unnecessary when “they are already with me.”473 Moreover, he believed that the request could not be fit into the short-time, would tie the hands of future presidents in being responsive to international developments, and that being Commander-in-Chief and working under the cover of the UN did not necessitate Congressional declaration of war.474
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again exceed 32% after February 1951.475 In the period of June 26-30, the aim of the US campaign was implied to be what was declared in the UN resolution: to return to the status quo prior to the North Korean attack. That is to say, the division line along the 38th parallel was to be restored. Publicly, the war was put into similar light as a police action.
Within the administration, however, there existed some controversy over objectives.
Even the President himself encouraged the view that the initially agreed upon aims were not to be treated as final.476 On June 26, at the inquiry of Secretary Pace and General Vandenberg about the limits of US action, the President said, “no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel.” But he added, “Not yet.”477 A part of the restriction was lifted three days later, when the Air Force was allowed to bomb purely military targets in North Korea.478 Yet, a full reversal of objectives only happened in September when UN troops started pushing North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel.
To begin with, the decision to go north was based on its expected positive effects on regional stability. The unification of Korea, it was argued, could bring about stability on the peninsula that a divided Korea could not assure. Furthermore, the 38th parallel had no strategic or political significance. Such an objective was also in harmony with earlier UN resolutions about Korea’s future, proclaiming the aim of a unified Korea. This could now be achieved, giving a unique opportunity for victory over Communism.
The second driving principle was the prevention of appeasement, which was expressed in strongly moralistic terms. A State Department memorandum argued that the moral dimension was compelling and, thus, compromise should be avoided. It failed “to see what advantage we gain by a compromise with clear moral principles and a sinking of our duty to make clear once and for all that aggression does not pay. […] When all moral right is on our
475 “Presidential Job Approval,” 2004 and Hess 2001, 70.
476 Hess 2001, 38.
477 “Memorandum of Conversation by Philip C. Jessup,” June 26, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.
478 “JCS Message no. 84681 to CINCFE (Command), Tokyo, Japan,” June 29, 1950 in “The Korean War” 2006.
See also Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 341.
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side, why should we hesitate?” Not everyone agreed. Soviet expert George Kennan warned Acheson unsuccessfully to pay no attention to those “indulging themselves in emotional and moralistic attitudes.”479
However, if China or the Soviet Union decided to directly intervene as a result of American presence on North Korea’s territory, the objective of regional stability could not be attained. Accordingly, the NSC clearly stated that even the rumor of Chinese or Soviet intervention would be among the reasons that would result in canceling the extension of the war to North Korea so as to avoid all out war.480 Warning signals were present. The State Department received several warnings that China would not tolerate UN troop movements north of the 38th parallel. Soviet experts in the State Department predicted Soviet and Chinese intervention.481 Waning support in UN circles for a second resolution so as to extend the war beyond the 38th parallel may have also been a warning sign.482 Yet, National Intelligence Estimates that reached the President’s desk, and served as the basis for presidential policy unequivocally forecast no Chinese involvement. They interpreted Chinese warnings and troop movements as a sign of bluff.483 Thus, it appears that Truman and his advisors based their decision on the desired balance of power in the region, a great deal of moralism to back that argument up, and a misperception of Chinese intentions.
479 Hess 2001, 44-45. See also Truman 1957 [1955-6], 359; Rusk 1990, 167.
480 See “A Report to the President by the National Security Council on United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,” September 9, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.
481 Hess 2001, 44. See also McCullough 1993 [1992], 799 and Rusk 1990, 167.
482 Hess 2001, 48.
483 See for example “190. Intelligence Memorandum 324, 8 September 1950, Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” “191. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 15 September 1950, Soviet/Communist Activity,” “193. Daily Summary Excerpt, 30 September 1950, Possible Chinese Intervention in Korea,” “194.
Daily Summary Excerpt, 3 October 1950, Possible Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” and “195.
Weekly Summary Excerpt, 6 October 1950, Korea and Soviet Policy; Chinese Communist Problems,” in Kuhns, Woodrow J., ed. 2005.Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years. N.p.: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence and the University Press of the Pacific. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the- study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/index.html. Access: January 2007. See also Truman 1957 [1955-6], 361; Record 2002, 44.
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5.4.2 The Role of Domestic Politics
McCullough suggests that the decision was a result of President Truman and his advisors were caught up in the spirit of the moment and allowed for pressure from the press, Congress, and the public who demanded such a move.484 Had it been true, it might have been an example of domestically inspired risk-taking, but not as a result of a loss framework. Even then, it is more likely that the situation was based, as it was in reality, on a mistaken evaluation of Chinese intent.
Yet, the situation in which Truman made the decision was quite different. He ordered preparations for crossing the 38th parallel on September 11 – four days before the war turned to America’s advantage. Domestic euphoria and pressure on the President to enlarge the war was not born as a consequence of battlefield success. Even so, euphoria did not translate into substantially high approval, staying at the same precarious level as it was before American troops were on the advance.485 In August 1950, before the decision to extend the war, Truman’s popularity with the electorate stood at 43%.486 Contrary to McCullough’s argument, instead of actually being popular, the President was still quite unpopular when he (re)defined the aims of the war.
However, things did not look so unequivocal from the White House. While polls showed overall support for the President’s policies in Korea, letters pouring in the White House showed a different picture. They were twenty to one against sending American boys to fight overseas so soon after the end of the World War.487
Truman’s discussions with British Prime Minister Clement Attlee in December 1951 after China entered the war also suggest that domestic politics had been divided and, thus, gave little guidance to presidential policies. After mentioning his problems with Congress,
484 See McCullough 1993 [1992], 799.
485 Hess 2001, 46.
486 “Presidential Job Approval,” 2004.
487 McCullough 1993 [1992], 790-791.
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Truman willingly acknowledged that domestic forces were pulling him in every direction.
Some wanted a wider war, others believed in isolationism, even others thought that the US should stay the course in Europe, but abandon Korea.488
If anything, Truman’s approach to the war appeared to be remarkably apolitical.489 It appears that he stood by his own dictum that “a president must not be influenced by [… the]
distortion of opinion” at home.490 I have already showed that he ignored domestic political views when he made the two most important decisions of the war and he continued to pursue his Korean policies that way until the end. When cease-fire negotiations started in May 1951, he chose to stand by his insistence of voluntary repatriation of the 150,000 Chinese/North Korean prisoners of war on moral grounds. He stated publicly that forced repatriation “was unthinkable. It would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our actions in Korea.”491 Some in Washington, D.C. also judged compulsory repatriation contrary to US interests, because returning soldiers could be used to rebuild North Korean/Chinese armies that might destabilize the situation.492
Despite domestic support for such an attitude, domestically, a quick cease-fire would have been more advantageous to the President, whose popularity suffered immensely after Chinese entry in the war. At the time the State Department judged the American public believing that leadership in the country was “utterly confused and sterile.”493 Acheson and the Commander of the UN forces, General Ridgway advised Truman accordingly, recommending a quick cease-fire agreement, which would have allowed for the earliest return of American POWs. A quick cease-fire agreement could have helped Truman stand a chance with the electorate in the 1952 presidential election by putting the war, which more than 50% of
488 Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 409-410 and 414.
489 Hess 2001, 16.
490 Truman 1957 [1955-6], 414.
491 Hess 2001, 72. See also McCullough 1993 [1992], 872.
492 Hess 2001, 70.
493 Hess 2001, 62.
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Americans considered a mistake,494 behind and focusing on other issues in the next one and a half years until the election, which Truman finally decided not to contest.