Parliamentarism and Foreign Policy

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the presidency, but disloyalty rarely pays dividends for them. First, because disloyalty rarely goes down too well with the public, and when it would have a public rationale, the president is an influential party member and can successfully divert funds and support from a disloyal vice president’s presidential bid. In fact, in the United States, no vice president could benefit from disloyalty to the president under the current system in which the president and the vice president run together. Even unpopular presidents preserve enough power and prestige to block the presidential ambitions of possibly disloyal vice presidents.

The presence of any contending rivals in the cabinet is quite unlikely although not unheard of. For example, Truman’s second Secretary of Defense, Louis B. Johnson, made no secret of his coveting of Truman’s job and often worked at cross-purposes. However, even Truman’s patience ran out after a year and a half when Johnson was replaced with George Marshall.²⁵⁵ All in all, instead of catering for Johnson’s opinion so as to pacify him, the president used his superiority over the cabinet and simply fired him.

(H1C) The preferences of the cabinet are not likely to play any role in presidential foreign-policy choices.

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the prime minister do not have unqualified authority over the cabinet, and only the outer limit of electoral terms are defined, which forces prime ministers to maintain all three of these for staying in office.

All in all, life is much more of a battle for survival for prime ministers than it could ever be for presidents. They are not insulated from any of the actors that may hold them accountable. This puts them constantly on the watch. Thus, they are sensitive to the existence of the separation of purpose whether it appears at the mass or elite level. At the same time, prime ministers are not expected to demonstrate siege mentality all the time. After all, when there is unity of purpose, there is no institutional factor that would propel them toward seeing the world in terms of losses instead of gains.

(H2A) When there is a unity of purpose domestically, parliamentary democracies are expected to behave similarly to presidential democracies, i.e. avoid domestically induced international risk-taking.

However, when a separation of purpose appears, prime ministers live under the threat of losing their job. In such situations, accountability encourages them to see things in term of losses.

(H2B) When there appears a separation of purpose among domestic actors, parliamentary democracies are likely to demonstrate domestically induced risk-taking abroad.

What follows below is the hypothetical explication of how or in what particular constellation the separation of purpose dimension may lead to risk-taking behavior internationally.

3.2.4.1 The British Political ‘Story’ and the Separation of Purpose

Domestic political turmoil may present itself in three forms. When it comes to the electorate, it appears as the unpopularity of the prime minister and the government. In the parliament, it is not the opposition, but the dissatisfaction of the backbenchers that may make the life of

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prime ministers difficult. Finally, division may manifest itself in the cabinet. As I will show below, the operation of these three accountability variables are not entirely independent of each other. They need to operate in certain constellations to bring the separation of purpose about.

Governing parties are unlikely to tolerate unpopular prime ministers whose occupation of the top position threatens with removing the party’s electoral chances. The only exception is when the party is so unpopular that it believes that it is going to lose the next election no matter who leads the party. In that case, the party uses the prime minister as a scapegoat. In every other case, the parliamentary party in government is likely to try to unseat the prime minister. Here I am not suggesting that the parliamentary majority will bring down the government as whole, although on rare occasions it may happen. However, this would also be self-defeating, because members of the governing party would also run the high risk of relegating themselves to opposition status. Therefore, such a move suggests strong ideological policy commitment.

Otherwise, the ability of a party to bring down the government is more likely to be used as a bargaining instrument than a blatant exercise of power. Parties that can easily remove their government from power have a higher chance or better bargaining position to enhance prime-ministerial insecurity by the threat of backbench revolt. The chances for the conditions of such a revolt to appear are especially high when the government has a small majority and/or the party or the governing coalition is ridden by disagreements, i.e. factionalized.

These two factors individually or together may create a precarious majority.

Moreover, a precarious majority and/or low popularity may give rise to the emergence of a credible challenger. A credible challenger is a cabinet member who has an independent power base in the party and is ready to use it in order to gain the premiership for himself.

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The possibility of such rivalry flows from the collective nature of the executive. The prime minister needs to seek out unanimity in the cabinet for a decision. However, cabinet support is not automatic, because the necessity for unanimity and the dependence of the executive on the legislature allows ministers to develop an independent power-base.

It is at this point that the interest of the cabinet diverges from the prime minister’s. While the whole cabinet wishes to see the government popular among the electorate and in the parliamentary party, because they know they need both to keep the government in office, the very same features also present cabinet members with the opportunity to advance their bid for the premiership. Unlike in presidential democracies, cabinet members may have an independent power-base within their governing party (or parties) in the parliament. This makes it possible for them to remove a prime minister from office without necessitating new elections.

Credible challengers, of course, do not appear out of the blue. Their ability to master party support is no secret before they would appear to be credible challengers and, as heavyweights in their party, they are likely to hold one of the influential government positions. Under a popular prime minister, such parliamentary factions and potential rivals give their (tacit) support to the premier. Nonetheless, such tacit support may be withdrawn in more difficult times, when a credible challenger may have a chance to unseat the prime minister. But as soon as there is open division in a party in the form of a threat of backbench revolt and a credible challenger appears, less enthusiastic or loyal ministers are likely to start taking sides, dividing the cabinet.

Small parliamentary majority

and/or precarious majority

Strong factions and/or government vulnerable low approval rate to backbench revolt

and/or divided cabinet

credible challenger in cabinet

Figure 4. The conditions of the separation of purpose in parliamentary governments

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Figure 4 provides a visual representation of the conditions leading to the separation of purpose, that is, government vulnerability to backbench revolt or a divided cabinet. None of the sets of conditions are necessary or sufficient in themselves. In other words, either of a pair might lead to the outcome. For the underlined outcomes the set of antecedent conditions are meant to be jointly sufficient. That is, the presence of the two will produce the outcome.

Government vulnerability to backbench revolt (without a challenger) and divided government are both unstable situations that may lead to risk-taking behavior.

In such situations, it is the prime minister’s ability to lead that is questioned and that threatens his job. Good performance in a crisis, however, could help save his job. Good performance necessitates that he shows decisiveness, which predisposes him toward tough action internationally.

Once committed to war, there is little difference between presidential and parliamentary democracies: in the long run, they all need to pursue war with resolve and success. However, chief executives rarely commit themselves immediately to war (after all, no one wishes to acquire the image of a thoughtless war-monger) and this is where things diverge for presidents and prime ministers. Presidents may decide to display resoluteness in their approach, but if in the long run they judges war too high a price, they have the power to accept (and sell) less favorable deals or simply negotiate so long that the crisis loses its importance. Similarly, popular prime minister may afford some loss of prestige and still preserve their job.

As opposed to this, for a battered prime minister, it is necessary to project resoluteness and make an unequivocal policy commitment. His tough stand decreases the likelihood that he will be able to negotiate an international agreement with the adversary, since what he asks for is quasi-acquiescence. Worse, being constantly held accountable in parliament and in the

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cabinet makes it difficult for him to settle for less without removing the last doubts of incompatibility. At the same time, these conditions allow rivals to simply wait at the wings.

Under the conditions of separation of purpose, a prime minister is likely to be challenged when he does not honor earlier tough policy commitment or when he does but his policy fails. This is so, because in both situations he demonstrates his (perceived) lack of leadership skills either by softness or failure. As for the first, should the prime minister choose to continue to work toward a peaceful solution when most options appear to be exhausted, he will risk losing his job by doing so and not honoring his commitment. If instead he marches down on the path toward war, he still has a chance to preserve his position at home. He might win or lose, but at least there remains a chance that he remains in office. If he wins, his position at home is likely to be solidified and party opposition silenced – at least for a while.

If he loses, he will probably be ejected from office but this outcome is no worse than the perceived consequences of not taking the risks involved in war.²⁵⁶