The Domestic Political Situation

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moved forward. Malaya had its first free and general elections on July 31, 1955 and independence was achieved on August 31, 1957. With independence the Malayan government took greater responsibility for the war – thus, British troops were gradually withdrawn. It took three more years to clean the country of Communists entirely. The state emergency was finally lifted on July 31, 1960.⁴⁹⁸

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in April 1947. Even though the latter caused serious alarm in the Cabinet, the size of the revolt did not even equal half of Labour’s parliamentary majority. Interestingly though, foreign policy was the main source of backbench revolt.⁵⁰¹

Because of the large majority in the Commons, the only challenge to Attlee’s power could come from within the Cabinet. While the size of the majority made it highly unlikely that the government would be brought down in the Parliament, intra-party bickering – if modest by Labour standards – were quite substantial to cause trouble for the Prime Minister and give a power base to possible challengers. The Prime Minister had four rivals in the Cabinet who could be possible challengers: Hugh Dalton (Chancellor of the Exchequer until 1947), Herbert Morrison (Leader of the House of Commons), Strafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade and successor of Dalton as the Chancellor in 1947), Aneurin Bevan (Minister of Health) and Ernest Bevin (Foreign Secretary).

The year 1947, which Hugh Dalton rightfully described as the annus horribilis for the government, created substantial unpopularity for a challenger to emerge. Events that year hurt the prestige and popularity of Labour. There were plenty of foreign policy-related problems.

The government sent confusing signals: on the one hand, it withdrew from Turkey, Greece, and India and was on the retreat in Palestine. On the other hand, it failed to downscale the size of the army. Nonetheless, the troubles were primarily domestic. It started with the government’s reluctance to face in time the coal and energy shortage created by an exceptionally long winter. Finally it had no choice but to cut power to the population and industries.

Crises culminated in troubles over the convertibility of the pound, which had been demanded by the US in exchange of a loan, in the late summer of 1947. After convertibility was introduced the pound came under more intense pressure than the government had

501 On backbench revolt in the Attlee era, see Morgan 1984, 61-65.

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anticipated. Consequently it had no choice but suspend convertibility.⁵⁰² Not only was the financial crisis serious, but the government also handled it exceptionally badly. The chancellor’s warnings about the gravity of the economic situation had not been taken seriously, and once the crisis erupted even Hugh Dalton, the chancellor, reacted meekly to the grave situation, thinking that the problem could be handled by a few import cuts. His colleagues, either ill or otherwise occupied, did not do much better, either.⁵⁰³ Worse, in the hour of crisis, the government flew without direction and reacted with panic.⁵⁰⁴

As a result, the popularity of the party suffered badly. In August 1947 the first time since the general elections, the Conservative Party overtook Labour in the polls. In November, the government was 12.5 points behind the Tories. The local elections of November 1947 only gives further evidence to the popular discontent with the Labour government. Labour suffered severe losses, conceding local leadership to the Conservatives even is the industrial tows of Birmingham and Manchester.⁵⁰⁵

Such a situation could lead to an emergence of a challenger because, to begin with, Attlee’s support from the party had never been equivocal. Herbert Morrison, as many in Labour, had had doubts about Attlee’s ability to lead even before the 1945 elections.

However, up until 1947 the landslide and Ernest Bevin’s backing had given Attlee enough leverage to shove off Morrison’s bid.⁵⁰⁶

But in the wake of the convertibility crisis, Attlee’s situation was precarious. The Prime Minister’s crisis performance was deemed ‘catastrophic’ and, as the News Chronicle observed, that he left “the impression that the situation was beyond his grasp.”⁵⁰⁷ Dalton and Morrison could not have agreed more and even the loyal Bevin rumbled in anger. In addition

502 Jeffreys 1992, 25-8; Morgan 1984, 336-345.

503 Morgan 1984, 334, 345; Jeffreys 1992, 28.

504 Morgan 1984, 345.

505 Morgan 1984, 334.

506 Jeffreys 1992, 7-9; Pearce, Robert. 1997.Attlee. Profiles in Power. London and New York: Longman, 120-121.

507 Morgan 1984, 351; Jeffreys 1992, 28.

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to his indecisiveness in the crisis, Attlee’s inability to cut down on the defense budget and disasters in Palestine were now held against him as well.⁵⁰⁸ On August 11, even the Parliamentary Labour Party mounted an orchestered attack on the Prime Minister: MPs of all shades of opinion criticized the Prime Minister for his lack of grip on events.⁵⁰⁹ Serious policy disagreement on issues such as the reduction of the armed forces or nationalization of the coal and steel industries aggravated the situation by dividing the Cabinet.⁵¹⁰ All this culminated in an attack of the most prominent Cabinet members on Attlee, which Attlee withstood but not without a sufficient loss of his bargaining power. He yielded control of the economy to Stafford Cripps and foreign policy to Earnest Bevin.

By 1948, however, the situation slightly improved for the Prime Minister. Labour’s popularity with the electorate was on the mend. The 12.5 percentage point disadvantage was minimized to a four point Tory advantage a month before the emergency was declared in Malaya. Low as it is, that level of popularity remained below the five percentage point benchmark.⁵¹¹

As a result of the aborted cabinet coup, the number of challengers drastically dropped.

Although division prevailed in the Cabinet, Ernest Bevin was the only member who could preserve enough power to be a possible challenger. However, a challenge from Bevin was highly unlikely: in 1947 he had already refused to shoulder the task of challenging the Prime Minister because of his loyalty.⁵¹² Moreover, Attlee worked at keeping Bevin happy by making sure that Bevin got enough room for maneuver in foreign policy.

As a consequence, Attlee’s position was relatively safe. Therefore, it is expected that reasoning in the decision-making process will not be based on domestic political factors but

508 Morgan 1984, 351-352.

509 Morgan 1984, 335, 345, 351.

510 Pearce 1997, 142-3; Morgan 1984, 331-334, 335.

511 “Gallup Polls [Britain]” 2004. For comparison, the mean government lead between 1945 and 2000 was -3,2.

See also Morgan 1984, 336; Jeffreys 1992, 32.

512 Morgan 1984, 352-354.

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the decision will be made on the basis of an estimate of the international stakes. As opposed to American cases, I expect a much more substantial role for the cabinet and real effort from the Prime Minister to keep his Cabinet and his party satisfied.