Chapter 6: Low Intensity Conflicts and Decision-making in Parliamentary Democracies: The
6.2 Kenya
6.2.2 The Domestic Political Situation
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government heavily in the polls: the Tories “did disastrously in the local government elections in May 1952.”576 At least, the economy started to correct itself with speed (although not necessarily as a result of Butler’s measures): the loss of reserves stopped by the end of 1952 and the balance of trade deficit dried up.577
Public opinion was quick to plummet but slower to catch up with positive changes in the economic situation. The six percent Conservative lead in the polls in October 1951 turned into a ten percent Labour advantage by July 1952 and even in October the Tories lagged seven percent behind Labour.578 The lack of popularity did not go unnoticed in government circles. In May 1952, Colville – Churchill’s private secretary – recorded the fall in popularity, which he saw as a result of bad publicity, rising prices, and the policy of denationalization.
Moreover, Churchill was personally blamed for these in the party, in the Commons, and around the country. In general there existed a gloom about the government’s prospects and Butler’s financial policy that was severely criticized byThe Financial Times.579
Not only were the Tories unpopular, the Cabinet could not help but notice Churchill’s deteriorating health, which was increasingly difficult to hide from the public. He was seventy-seven years old when he became Prime Minister in 1951 and had already suffered two strokes (and would suffer two more during his premiership) and was infirm of movement and short of hearing.580 Although it would be a fallacy to overestimate his incapacities, his age caused enough concern to his subordinates to complain that he was too old and out of touch with the post-war world, rambled on in cabinet meetings for hours without coming to the point, was not reading his boxes regularly and briefs of five pages had to be summarized in a paragraph
576 Jenkins 2001, 850.
577 Jenkins 2001, 850-851; Sked and Cook 1993, 104-105.
578 “Gallup Polls [Britain]” 2004. For comparison, the mean government lead between 1945 and 2000 was -3.2.
579 Colville 1985, 648-649.
580 Jenkins 2001, 851; Sked and Cook 1993, 102.
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for him.581 His memory was also increasingly failing him.582 Moreover, in February 1952 he suffered a small arterial spasm that gave further concerns about his health.583
Churchill had a curious relationship with his Cabinet. On the one hand, he was reluctant to make solo decisions on his own and, if he could help it, he bound at least the relevant minister into the decision.584 On some occasions, however, he upset his ministers by ignoring them entirely.585 This, for example, resulted in an instance of outrage by ministers in July 1954 when Churchill called for a three-power summit to end the cold war without informing the Cabinet or getting the approval of his Foreign Secretary prior to the move. This led to a serious row in the Cabinet with several ministers threatening to resign.586 Similarly, the quiet disapproval of the Cabinet made it clear by 1953 that using the wartime overlord system will not work in peacetime: ministers insisted on dealing directly with the Prime Minister.587
Moreover, the heir apparent named by Churchill a decade earlier, Anthony Eden, was impatient to take over Churchill’s place. Initially it was understood that Churchill would stay in office only for a year or at most two.588 Yet, Churchill had no intention to go regardless of a Gallup poll taken during the October 1951 election campaign that Conservatives clearly favored Eden over him as leader.589 Nor did he give in to the cajoling of the generally loyal Eden.590 Instead, he put tremendous effort into his public and parliamentary performances to demonstrate that he was still fit for office.591
581 Hennessy 2000, 196; Macmillan 2003, 186 (September 27, 1952); Colville 1985, 637 Colville 1985, 634, 649; Gilbert, Martin. 1990 [1988].Never Despair: Winston S. Churchill 1945-1965. London: Minerva, 703 and 718.
582 Gilbert 1990, 717; Colville 1985, 654.
583 Gilbert 1990, 702; Colville 1985, 642.
584 Hennessy 2000, 195-196.
585 Hennessy 2000, 203.
586 Hennessy 2001, 105; Macmillan 2003, 323-340 (July 6 to July 23, 1954); Colville 1985, 701-702.
587 Jenkins 2001, 844, Hennessy 2000, 190-195; Colville 1985, 633-634.
588 Jenkins 2001, 846.
589 Jenkins 2001, 842.
590 See Headlam, Cuthbert Morley. 1999.Parliament and Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee : the Headlam Diaries, 1935-1951. Edited by Stuart Ball. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 489, 516 (February 24, 1947).
591 Hennessy 2000, 180-181.
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This, of course, did not prevent Churchill’s ministers from trying to remove him from office. They had a formidable task before them: it was difficult to remove from office the man who was widely respected for leading Britain to victory in World War II. Accordingly, the means employed were similarly feeble: it essentially meant lobbying Churchill individually and jointly to go rather than engineering his removal from behind. Apart from one-to-one cajoling, there were at least two joint ministerial attempts to ask him to resign. For example, following Churchill’s minor stroke in February 1952, Lord Salisbury (the commonwealth secretary), Lord Moran (Churchill’s doctor), and Jock Colville (the Prime Minister’s private secretary) agreed that Churchill should remain Prime Minister but go to the House of Lords, which would ease the workload for him and make Edende factoPrime Minister. Lord Moran put the idea to Churchill twice – both in February and March – it failed on Churchill’s unwillingness to go to the House of Lords.592
Another joint attempt was made on June 16, 1952 when Harry Crookshank (Leader of the House and Lord Privy Seal), Lord Salisbury, James Stuart (Scottish Secretary), and Patrick Buchan-Hepburn (Chief Whip) sought a change in leadership and decided to ask Churchill to go or set a date for resignation. Although their conspiracy was picked up by all the major papers, which took note of rumors that Churchill was about to resign, when Buchan-Hepburn put the ultimatum to Churchill, he refused to agree to his ministers’
suggestions.593
All in all, Churchill’s tactics of delay could work as long as his ministers were not impatient at the same time, that is, he did not outrage his ministers by policy failure.594 This was also true, because while the Cabinet wished Churchill to go, enthusiasm in the Cabinet
592 Gilbert 1990, 703-704, 711-712; Colville 1985, 642.
593 Gilbert 1990, 736.
594 Jenkins 2001, 846.
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for Eden was less widespread than in the party or the public.595 Moreover, as long as Eden saw his future hinging on Churchill’s will and not on the Cabinet, the Prime Minister could also be safe, as a failed leadership struggle would have removed Eden from his sure front-runner positions for the premiership. Eden appears to have been aware of this, as his policies were cautious so as not to upset the Prime Minister or possible rivals and guarded his privileged position with jealousy. He did clash in views with Churchill, especially when Churchill interfered into foreign office business but did not plan plots to remove him.596 Consequently, in the absence of a credible challenger, attacks on the Prime Minister are expected to surface through the parliamentary party.