Positional motion and the particularization argument in the Kitāb al-Taʽlīqāt . 157

We have seen in the chapter on Physics that the celestial motions move by positional motion.

Particularity and diversity derive from this source. This tenet, however, and its implication on the physical causality received much stronger attention in the later, bit spurious Kitāb al-Taʽlīqāt. Therefore, in this chapter, we will rely on this latter book, even though its authenticity still needs to be verified. Nevertheless, what we read there, perfectly completes what we read

685 Ilāhiyyāt, 409, 4–5.

686 Ilāhiyyāt, 409, 8.

687 Mabda’, 108.

688 Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Traité de la Providence, 21.

689 Ilāhiyyāt, 291, 1–3.

158 in the authentic works. If Avicenna wrote it, there are no questions. If it was compiled by one of his pupils, we might consider it as the result of their discussions, still being the part of the Avicennian corpus.

In this book, the author talks about the difference between sublunary rectilinear and supralunar celestial motions.⁶⁹⁰ The former strives to its end point, from position to position – what makes it possible is Avicenna’s idea of dynamic instant – and in every position, in an instant, a new impetus pushes it towards the next. On the other hand, celestial motion is not like that. It is not the different positions that generate new alteration in the moving thing, but the renewed imagination of the celestial soul.⁶⁹¹

In this context, the so-called particularization argument equally appears. It usually starts from an epistemic consideration, as we have seen above: from a universal, no particular can derive.

That is, there is no act happening more likely (awlā) than another act. For an act to happen, a specializing factor (mukhaṣṣiṣ) is needed. In the case of the spherical motion, the particular specializing factor is the renewed will.⁶⁹² The similar argument appears many times in the Taʽlīqāt.⁶⁹³

So far, this is quite in line with what we have seen before. However, the Taʽlīqāt gives us more details about the process:

The cause of the celestial motion is the concept-formation of its soul, [producing] concept-formation after concept-formation. This concept formation and imagination that it has with (maʽa) a certain position is the cause of the second imagination, that is, it is prepared for the second [imagination] by the first [imagination].⁶⁹⁴

That is, every reached position in virtue of imagination means a different state from which the next imagination to the next position comes to be. This combination, I mean the imagination at a certain position is a sort of preparation to the next “step” during the celestial motion.

In this reading, the concept-formations are one in species, but different in individuals. The text implies something like Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles: if two items are similar (in every aspect), they are identical. These imaginations are individually different, like different acts of the imagination: in the process of motion, they are different in virtue of being in different positions at different instants. Thus, the position is the only variable at the conceptual level that represents the difference between the different phases.

690 Compare Aristotle, On the Heavens (I.2), 269a19–29.

691 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 105, (M), 296 [517].

692 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 54, (M), 133 [175].

693 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 104–105, (M), 295 [516]; (B) 105–106, (M) 298, [520]; (B) 110–111, (M) 312, [561]; (B) 112, (M) 322 [572].

694 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 105, (M) 297 [518].

159 Therefore, what is at stake here is the differentiation between the positions. The celestial soul forms concepts – using its imagination, or estimation – which are the proximate cause of circular motion. When a motion comes to its end, the soul renews its will, and supposes or estimates – imagines a new position, which will serve as the end-point of the motion. Thus, in the particularization process, we have the particular will on the one hand and spatial position on the other.

Apparently, it is in this conceptual unity – if one is entitled to consider several passages a

“conceptual unity” in the Taʽlīqāt – where the author differentiates between the specializing (mukhaṣṣiṣāt) and individualizing factors (mushakhkhiṣāt). There are two passages of crucial importance that run parallel to Avicenna’s distinction between quiddity and existence – saying that individualizing factors are in the constitution of the thing, whereas specializing factors affects its existence. In this context, the specializing factors correspond to the secondary, preparatory causes:

The individualizing factors end up in a thing that is individuated in itself, and this is the place and the position because they are individuated in themselves. The specializing factors end up in [a thing] specialized in itself, and that is the motion by will. Just like as in the relation there is something related in itself, which is the relational relation (al-nisba al-iḍāfiyya), there must be a thing that is individuated in itself. The position is individuated in itself, and the place is individuated in itself. Every circular motion has a specialized position.⁶⁹⁵

Or:

The individuated [thing] is that which has no similar until it exists. The human has a similar, inasmuch as it is a human; but not inasmuch as it is individuated. Because, by which Zayd is individuated – that is, place and position – is not by which ʽAmr is individuated.

The specializing [factor] is by which existence is getting singled out for a thing, and by which it is distinguished from a similar [thing]. The specializing [factor] enters the existence of the thing, whereas the individuating thing enters its constitution and its actually becoming an individual.⁶⁹⁶

As we have seen, on the epistemic level, an individual always must be related to something already individual. To avoid circularity, an ultimately individuated element is needed: this is spatial position and place. Although, as we shall see later, the Kitāb al-Taʽlīqāt not entirely consistent, because there are indeed Avicennan arguments that the spatial position is the individuated in itself, not the place, the author sometimes mentions them together.

This passage clearly shows that the “existential approach” has been well distinguished from the conceptual one, at least in Avicenna’s later discussions with his pupils.

695 Taʽlīqāt, (B), 106 (M), 300 [524].

696 Taʽlīqāt, (B), 107 (M), 303 [529–530].

160 As we reiterated several times, term mukhaṣṣiṣ already appears in the Muʽtazilī circles of Avicenna’s time.⁶⁹⁷ It is not quite significant in this context in the Metaphysics of the Shifā’, but, as we have seen, it equally appears. Later on, the secondary, physical causes are called equally mukhaṣṣiṣāt in the context of the generation of simple elements. These preparatory causes prepare the underlying matter to correspond to a certain form; this preparation indeed preponderates (murajjiḥ) one form against others.⁶⁹⁸

On the other hand, the author picks up an ultimate specializing factor: the particular will of the spheres. This is what specializes and particularizes the existence. This is the factor that ultimately explains the particularity of the existent. Because this is what necessitates that matter gets prepared, to receive the existence, and this is the ultimate reason for this. What Avicenna has in mind here, is particularization, that is, what explains the multiplicity of the world in general.

In other words, the feature that is individuated in itself is spatial position, because it is unshareable, and this enters into the constitution of the thing – that contributes to the material individual’s being distinct from others. On an epistemic level, indeed, in his logical works, Avicenna has been looking for the already individuated element, and this is what it seems to be. On the other hand, there is the other approach, the one from existence: every particular existent – apart from God – has a cause, and the particular existence has a cause as well. These are the mukhaṣṣiṣāt, the specializing factors that prepare the underlying matter, as we shall see.

However, at the very beginning of this process, there is the celestial motion. Not only in the sense that it is the ultimate source of multiplicity in the world but, celestial motions, spheres have indeed an influence on the sublunar world: the proximate cause of this process is the celestial will.

The other, and even more significant feature of these passages that the author talks about a twofold approach to individuation: something may be specialized in its existence, and something may be individuated as an essence. The specialization of existence relates to the existence, and this specialization process runs from one specializing factor, namely, a preparatory cause to another, until they in a specializing factor in itself, which is the celestial will. When it comes to the other approach, namely, that of the quiddity or essence, the individuating factors need an individuated factor in itself, and it is a spatial position taken on the condition of time.

697 ʽAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, IX, 29; 30: in case of the theory of motion and impetus; ʽAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsa, 96.

698 Ilāhiyyāt, 410, 5–9.

161 3.4.3.7.3 The role of preparatory causes

Avicenna in his authentic works attributes to the celestial spheres an important role in the generation of the simple elements: since their matter is common, it is only their forms that differ. The source of this difference is the difference in the states of the celestial spheres, while the fact that their matter is common is due to what is common in the states of the celestial spheres.⁶⁹⁹

What is more, the sort of relations that follow from the common and different natures in the supralunar realm, because of motion, is the principle of changing and alternating states in the sublunar realm.⁷⁰⁰

Avicenna is adamant in holding that the celestial bodies indeed influence sublunar substances.

At first sight, their motion is the source of diversity in the world, and their souls influence earthly souls as well.⁷⁰¹

In the context of the generation of the elements, Avicenna even calls these causes specializing (mukhaṣṣiṣāt), or preparing factors (muʽiddāt).⁷⁰² These factors prepare the underlying matter so that its aptitude (to receive the form) will correspond to something more than to something else. This preparation preponderates (murajjiḥ) the existence of what is more likely, from the Dator Formarum.⁷⁰³

What we find in the Taʽlīqāt is quite in line with this rough outline. The preparing causes are infinite in number, they follow each other, whereas the real causes are finite. The celestial motions are the source of the preparatory, accidental causes.

There are two interesting points that the author of the Taʽlīqāt adds to the discussion. Firstly that when the preparatory, specializing causes end up in prepared substrate able to receive the form, the place and position of that thing is getting individuated:

The individualizing causes for human seem to be infinite, not existing at the same time in actuality, and, necessarily, motion is in it. If not, causes must have been infinite altogether, but the motion is adhering and perishing. Necessarily, from it being an element until its becoming food, for example, then becomes dead, and so on, until its matter becomes specialized for receiving the form, and then, it becomes individuated by its position and place. All these things are particular individuating features, which individuates another particular, but none is individuated in itself. What is individuated in itself is the position and place, in which [this process]

ends.⁷⁰⁴

699 Ilāhiyyāt, 410, 8–10; Najāt, 317; Mabda’, 83; Ilāhiyyāt-i Dānishnāma, 158, 10–159, 10.

700 Ilāhiyyāt, 412, 10–12; Najāt, 318; Mabda’, 83–84.

701 Mabda’, 84, Ilāhiyyāt, 412, 13–14; Najāt, 318.

702 Ilāhiyyāt, 411, 6–7.

703 Ilāhiyyāt, 411, 5–9, Najāt, 317.

704 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 106, (M) 300 [525].

162 The text suggests that spatial position has a decisive role in generation. However, the text is not entirely clear. Mūsawiyān’s critical edition prefers another reading, (fa-yatashakhkhaṣ ʽinda dhālika waḍʽuhu wa-‘aynuhu), but in a manuscript, there is a variant: (fa-yatashakhkhaṣ ʽinda dhālika bi-waḍʽihi wa-‘aynihi).⁷⁰⁵ However, since the author right after this sentence asserts that it is position that is individuated in itself at the end of this process, it seems more likely that he meant to attribute an individuating role to these categories.

However, this thesis is rather strange. It is clear that spatial position plays a role in multiplicity as the source of differentiation, but here, as a point that closes up a process that goes back in time ad infinitum, it only describes the result, the prepared subject in terms of its spatial

“coordinates.” However, it is at this very moment that the substantial form emanates from the Dator Formarum. Suppose that at the same moment two, otherwise identical pieces of matter/substrate gets prepared to receive the substantial form – in this case, their spatial position is that necessarily differentiates between them. In this way, spatial position indeed plays a differentiating role, which indicates a determined spot in space. If we take the time into the picture, that it happens at an instant, where the process bounded by motion ends, the space-time features to single out a certain substrate – at least conceptually. (It does not seem to be a real temporal priority, as we shall see later.)

The second point that the author reiterates is also to be found elsewhere in the Avicennian corpus: that individuals are the causes of individuality, whereas universals are causes of what corresponds to the species in the mind.⁷⁰⁶ Thus, they are only accidental causes, but they affect the quiddity’s being an individual, actually individuating it. What is important here is that these features must be individual as well: they are spatially and temporally distinguishable elements that contribute to the individuals special and unique features. Again, every individual element in Avicenna’s cosmos starts from the particular celestial will, and the individual position. In the universe, the spatially and temporally distinguished causes are responsible for the changing individual features of any individual.

3.4.3.8 Summary

Whereas the quiddity is individuated by the accidents, the existence also becomes particularized. In itself, it is an empty, extra-cathegorical concept. On a conceptual level, it is unity that describes the particularity of existence, not existence in itself. Both are coextensive features, they are concomitant features of the quiddity, but denote different intentions.

705 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 106, (M), 300 [525], n.10.

706 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 40, (M), 88 [89].

163 If we look at particular existence as a result of the process of becoming, something else is needed to explain its particularity. The existence of Zayd is indeed particular. Existence has a real cause, the Separable Intellects and ultimately, God that emanates existence, but what is emanated is still not particular. Its particularity is due to a chain of the secondary, preparatory causes. Both ends of the chain are described by spatial position. It starts with the singular imaginations of the celestial soul, which moves from a spatially distinct position to another spatially distinct position. At the very end of the chain, it is also a spatial position where the underlying matter gets prepared to receive the substantial form. Here, spatial extension or position is a necessary condition of the particularity of the given form, being a sine qua non of generation. Thus, the spatial position is the utmost principle of particularity.⁷⁰⁷

Particular existence has a bunch of causes. Its particular aspect is not explained by the existence in itself. It has another principle, spatial position, or spatial differentiation.

Nevertheless, the quiddity in the particular overlaps with its existence. Humanity in Zayd may be considered as quiddity-humanity, substance-humanity, and form-humanity. These are three distinct approaches to understand the same object. Especially in case of the latter, the substantial form of humanity actualizes matter. As we will see shortly, form and existence will have another role to play, not to explain distinctiveness but identity.⁷⁰⁸ As such it has a role in individuation, but the statement that “existence individuates,” is too general, it needs specification.

In document Individuation of Material Substances in Avicenna’s Philosophy (Pldal 157-163)