Individuation in context - Individuation of Material Substances in Avicenna’s Philosophy

3 Avicenna

3.1.8 Individuation in context

In the introduction, we have distinguished between inner and outer contexts. The inner context is shaped by the given philosophical system: basic principles and tenets necessarily affect the treatment of subtle or secondary questions, like individuation. This is in every part throughout a philosophical system, where “individual,” “uniqueness,” or the like needs to be explained. In Avicenna’s case, as we shall see, it is particularization that extends to numerous areas in his philosophy: individuals in logic, individuals as form-matter compounds, individuals as individuated quiddities, individuals, as particularized existents; or the question about the multiplicity of existents in general, motion, time. In some case, individuation appears only as a premise in a complex argument; where a certain understanding of individuation is taken for granted, like in the case of the generation of the spheres, where Avicenna shows that the outer celestial body cannot be the cause of the inner celestial body.

However, in the case of Avicenna, we have some evidence that he treated individuation as a topic on its own right. In his later works, like in the Mubāḥathāt and Taʽlīqāt, he frequently readdresses the issue. As David Reisman noted, in the Mubāḥathāt, there is a reference by Avicenna himself to a section on the individual,²⁴² from the lost al-Budhūr.²⁴³ Although these passages still do not form an independent treatise, they are scarce passages or thoughts. This text, along with the still spurious Taʽlīqāt, will be considered as well. These passages offer new, still unstudied evidence on Avicenna’s view on individuation. Thus, this will be the rough structure of the following dissertation.

241 On this see Druart, 2000; Adamson, 2004, 74; Marmura, 2008.

242 Or individuation, see Reisman, 2002, 255, n. 134.

243 Reisman, 2002, 256.

60 3.2 Logic

When it comes to the classification of knowledge (ʽilm), Avicenna clearly follows al-Fārābī.²⁴⁴ A thing might be known from two aspects:

- either as a concept formed in the mind (taṣawwur), which means that this concept has its own name, while its meaning is being represented in the mind;

- or as an assent (taṣdīq), where we attach truth-value to the concepts by binding them together in sentences, like „every whiteness is an accident.” If its intentional content corresponds to the state of affairs, that is, corresponds to the way it exists, we label it as true.²⁴⁵

These two sorts of knowledge correspond the definition and description on the one hand, and the syllogisms and demonstration on the other.²⁴⁶ The definable and describable concepts are the bricks from which propositions and syllogisms are to be built.

Why is it important for individuation? Because whenever we know something, be it a universal truth, or a particular concept, we bring it into our mind. Every knowledge is a mental representation either of something external or of something internal. As such, these mental contents have a concrete relation to reality, and this is what the threefold consideration of quiddities represents.

3.2.1 Avicenna’s mental concepts

The very base of Avicenna’s philosophy is his well-known threefold division of quiddities, which serves as a framework to label his whole philosophical system.

In a famous passage in the Madkhal of the Shifā’, his statement reads as follows:

The quiddities of the things can be [either] in the individual instances of the things, [or] in conceptualization.

[The quiddity] has three considerations: consideration of the quiddity inasmuch as it is that quiddity, without being related to any of the two existences, and what is attached to it, inasmuch as it is like that. It has a consideration inasmuch as it is in the individual instances, in this case, that kind of attributes is attached to it, which are peculiar to this kind of existence. It has [another] consideration inasmuch as it is in conceptualization, in this case, that kind of attributes are attached to it, which are peculiar to that existence,

244 al-Fārābī, Burhān, 19.

245 Madkhal, 17, 7–12; see Maróth, 1994, 77.

246 Burhān, 51, 1–2. Actually, this is what became later the general structure of logical works; however, this division appears already in Avicenna’s later works, like in the Manṭiq al-mashriqiyyīn.

61 such as to be a subject, to be a predicate, universality and particularity in predication, essentiality, and accidentality in predication, and others, as you will learn.²⁴⁷

The quiddity (māhiyya) in this context refers to the whatness of the thing, using Avicenna’s favorite examples, like animality, humanity, or horseness. These quiddities exist in the individuals, on the one hand, so to say, as particularized in the very thing: humanity is in every human, but not as one humanity in number, but as different humanities, particularized in the individuals. On the other hand, humanity may exist in the mind, as a mental concept.

This approach bridges the gap between our mental contents and their referents.²⁴⁸ What we usually have in mind as universals, really exist in the outer reality, but not as universals. Just like these common terms, their composite corresponds to their counterpart in the outer existence. If we analyze a concept into a composite of several quiddities, like “white human’, this concept applies to all thing that is white and human. As Avicenna himself asserts, if we want to think and know something, we need to bring it into the mind, that is, into conceptualization. However, as existing in the mind, the quiddity enjoys mental existence: it acquires accidents proper to that sort existence; in other words, our mental concepts are characterized by mental properties. That is, logical, and sometimes grammatical features, that represent either the interrelation of the concepts (if we think on Elias’ technical term

“relational” σχέτικος common items) or grammatical concepts, if we linguistically analyze a statement: the quiddity “human” may be subject or predicate. That is to say, quiddities in the mind, as mental existents, have an internal system that necessarily affects our logical thinking.

This leads to another problem, namely the relation between language and philosophy.

Avicenna criticizes those who maintain that the subject matter of logic is expressions, insofar as they signify concepts.²⁴⁹ He argues instead that if it were possible to learn logic by pure thinking, – so that the concepts would be immediately perceived – there would be no need for expressions.²⁵⁰ Or, if we would know a trick by which we could let others know what is in our souls, then we would be able to dispense with expressions. However, take the fact that we use language to communicate, it endows our mental contents with special properties; thus, in some parts, logic must deal with expressions.²⁵¹

247 Madkhal, 15, 1–7.

248 I borrowed this expression from McGinnis, 2007, 170.

249 Madkhal, 23, 5–6. On the famous debate between al-Sīrāfī and Mattā Ibn Yūnus, see Adamson and Key, 2015.

250 Madkhal, 22, 14–17.

251 Madkhal, 22, 19–23, 3.

62 It is an interesting question to which extent does language affect our thinking, taken the fact that when we think, formalize a statement, we do it in a language. Avicenna accepts the Fārābian idea about the universal grammar that some universal aspects of language, like having a subject and a predicate in a sentence, are the same for all languages.²⁵² Accordingly, Avicenna’s major concern is about the logical accidents that classify and organize our thinking.²⁵³

As it appears, Avicenna rejects the common belief, that the subject matter of logic is only expressions, insofar as they signify meanings.²⁵⁴ He makes clear instead, that expressions are not of great interest to a logician, because they are used only for the sake of communication.

As such, expressions are necessary because their states correspond to the states of mental concepts.²⁵⁵ Al-Fārābī uses an analogy between logic and grammar, in the sense that what grammar is for the language, is logic for the right thinking.²⁵⁶

This is a clear indication that Avicenna focuses mostly on the concepts in the mind. Thus, those things which are in the mind are either borrowed from outer reality through the process of abstraction or are things attached to these, inasmuch as they are in the mind, not corresponding to anything in the outer reality. Actually, the subject matter of logic consists of the investigation of the latter²⁵⁷ such as universality, particularity in predication, genus, species – the quinque voces – namely, the second intentions.

3.2.2 The status of the quinque voces – genus as an accident

The idea, that genus is an accident is already to be found in the Greek philosophy. As far as I am aware, the earliest example of this idea was held by Alexander of Aphrodisias. In his Questiones I.11, he already distinguishes between the quiddity and universality – in the sense that universals exist only while being thought.²⁵⁸

252 Adamson - Key, 2015, 85.

253 ʽIbāra, 26, 8–12. As for the question whether the specifics of several languages, like Arabic, would affect thinking, be it as interesting as it may be, it is almost impossible to answer in Avicenna. Even in case of special linguistic phenomena, like the maṣdar, Avicenna is at pains to interpret it in terms of the Aristotelian subject-predicate / substance-accident distinction: the several meanings of the maṣdar are all accidents in the substance, because they signify accidental relations in the substance to what happens to them or comes from them. Like

“hitting” is an accident in Zayd, if he hits someone - denoting an activity of his.)

254 See for example Yaḥyā Ibn ʽAdī from the Baghdad school: for him, the subject matter of logic is expressions that signify universal things, while its scope is the composition of the expressions that corresponds to how the signified things are. (Maqālāt Yaḥyā Ibn ʽAdī Falsafiyya, 421, 4–7; 422,9; 423, 14–15.)

255 Madkhal, 22–23.

256 al-Fārābī, Manṭiqiyyāt, (Dānishpazhūh) 11; (ʽAjam) 55–56. Quoted by Street, 2004, 537.

257 Madkhal, 23.

258 See, Galluzzo, 2008, 339; Tweedale, 1984; Sharples, 2005. Chiaradonna, 2013, 320. It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in discussing the consistency of Alexander’s view, but it is worth to notice, that the idea was not a new one in Avicenna’s time. Moreover, the same idea appears - according my knowledge - in another context too: it could be found probably in Alexander’s lost commentary to the Categories, regarding

63 Al-Fārābī, following the footsteps of this tradition, had already developed the theory further. In the Book of the Letters, he also addresses the question of the secondary intelligibles.²⁵⁹ Al-Fārābī adds, that these are concepts (maʿānī), being also intelligible things, but, in contrast to other intelligibles, are not images of the sensibles; they exist only in the mind. As such, they can be predicated of each other, each one being a universal concept in itself.²⁶⁰

3.2.3 Avicenna’s logical genus

Avicenna equally has a clear-cut view about the status of mental accidents that adhere to concepts in the mind. In the Madkhal of the Shifā’, he reiterates the threefold distinction of quiddities that can be either natural (ṭabīʿī’), intelligible (ʿaqlī), or logical (manṭiqī), or echoing Late-antique tradition that may be labeled as before multiplicity, in multiplicity and after multiplicity.²⁶¹

As for the „logical genus,” it is simply the intention/meaning (mafhūm) of the genus that it may be said of many [things], that differ in species to the question what it is? This notion does not signify anything, say an animal or the like.²⁶² It is only a mental concept that means a certain relation.²⁶³ In a like manner, broader concepts like „general” (ʽāmm) has a clear meaning in the mind having relations to many things, namely that a general concept applies to many instances.²⁶⁴

predicability of the genus. Actually, we have a fragmented passage in ancient Armenian, which quotes Alexander, translated by Ernst Günther Schmidt into German.²⁵⁸ The author quotes some parallels from the late-antique commentators, as from Ammonius and Dexippus. According to the former, in commenting on Aristotle’s Categories 1b10 (ὁταν ἕτερον καθ ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται) one could raise the following objection: if someone predicates genus of animal, and animal of man, then he should conclude, that genus would be also predicated of man. But, according to Ammonius, this is not the case, because Aristotle means those predicates which can be said essentially, and really, not those, which are predicated only accidentally, or relatively. See, Ammonii, in Cat., 30,25–31,12.

259 al-Fārābī, Ḥurūf, 64: “Also, these intelligibles, which come to be in the soul from the sensible existents, if they are in the soul, have accidents attached to it, inasmuch as they are in the soul, by which some of them become genus, some species (…)”

260 According to Al-Fārābī’s pupil, Yaḥyā ibn ʽAdī, universals occupy a clear ontological status – they have logical existence – i.e. they are only in the mind, as opposed to natural existence, which means the existence in outer reality, and divine existence, which is restricted to concepts in themselves.Yaḥyā Ibn ʽAdī, Maqālāt, 154.Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī drops a hint about the logical existents. Every universal concept is composed of the notion of something plus universality. He proves this by drawing a parallel with the accident “writing”: Because “writer” is a name, which points to Zayd for example, by means of “writing”, which exists in him, and is derived from its name. It is clear, that our utterance universal is from this kind (the second among names. And this is because it is derived from the name universality). On this topic see Rashed 2004, Adamson 2007.

261 Madkhal, 65, 4–6. The before, after and in multiplicity is already to be found in the commentators, like in Ammonius, in Isag., 41, 17–20.

262 Madkhal, 66, 11–12.

263 Madkhal, 66, 18.

264 Madkhal, 66, 5.

64 These mental properties have a hierarchy, according to generality and specificity. Taking the Tabula Pophyriana, it is based on the subordination of logical technical terms. However, these technical terms are accidental to the quiddity in itself. As to their status, Avicenna’s answer runs parallel to an ambiguity that goes back to the Antique philosophy that clearly shows their accidentality: the problem occurred as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias’ time. The fallacious syllogism sounds as follows: genus might be predicated of animal, animal, in turn of human, which gives an apparently false conclusion that human is a genus.²⁶⁵ Ammonius formulates this fallacious syllogism as follows:²⁶⁶

The animal is a genus The human is animal The human is a genus

As Ammonius points out, the genus is predicated of the animal only accidentally and by relation, and whatever is predicated accidentally is not necessarily predicated of the subject of the conclusion.²⁶⁷

Avicenna reiterates the same syllogism.²⁶⁸ In solving this difficulty, accordingly, he distinguished between two sorts of predication. First, genus may be said of its species, insofar as it is a genus (that is, it is considered as a logical genus), and second, genus may be said of the species of its subject in which it inheres as an accident. Here, genus is considered as a natural genus, i.e., as a quiddity that may be genus if conceived in the mind).²⁶⁹

As for the logical genus, it gives its name and definition to its species – like summum genus, or genus proximum: in this case, “genus in itself” is inevitably more general than its species. This plan works strictly on the mental level: the genus is predicated essentially of its subject, i.e., it gives its name and definition to its subject.

On the other hand, as Avicenna stresses, if the genus is said of animality, this is not an

“essential” predication (ḥaml ʽalā), since the nature of animality is not a genus in itself: it is not true that every animal is a genus. This statement is true only of a specific sort of animals, namely, universal animals that exist in the mind. In this case, the subject is not the animal in

265 Schmidt, 1966, 280–281; Dexippus also brings up the same aporia in Dexippus, in Cat., 26, 13–16.

266 Ammonius, in Isag. 31, 2–12.

267 Ammonius, in Isag. 31, 10–12.

268 Maqūlāt, 38, 17–18.

269 Madkhal, 67, 15–68, 1.

65 itself, but the animal is taken in a certain consideration, that is on the condition of abstraction (bi-sharṭ al-tajrīd), insofar as it is possible for it to be predicated of others, that is, it is possible for it to refer to many.²⁷⁰ This consideration is more specific than its consideration in itself since it might be accompanied by a condition that it is abstracted from the accidents.

Thus, the fallacy of the syllogism lies in the fact that the first premise is taken under the condition of abstraction, in other words, it refers to animality as existing in the mind, not to animality taken in itself, whereas the second premise ([every] human is animal) refers to the things in themselves.

These logical concepts help to classify the logical terms that in turn, describe the relation of quiddities to each other. One of these logical concepts is individuality itself, and it is in this framework that Avicenna treats individuality at considerable length: an animal is not an individual by itself, only accidentally so; if we say “individual animal” it means the animal in itself and individuality, as a superadded meaning. On the epistemic level, it classifies our mental concepts.

3.2.4 Arabic philosophers on individuals

Before we turn to Avicenna’s solution, we shall briefly take into account the views of his predecessors. Actually, unlike Aristotle, Porphyry has already allowed the predication of individual terms – that among predicates some are said of only one thing, as individuals, like Socrates, this man, and this object.²⁷¹ Even the description of individuals (the individuals are constituted as a proper complex of characteristics) implies that individuality started to enjoy a sort of mental status. Later in the tradition, among medieval Arabic thinkers like in al-Kindī, the term individual appears beside the quinque voces as if it was a vox sexta:

Every utterance has a meaning: they are either genus, or species (ṣūra), or individual (shakhṣ), or difference, or proprium or general accident. Two things connect all these: the substance and the accident. The genus, species, individual, difference are substantial, and the proprium and the general accident are accidental.²⁷²

Thus, al-Kindī treats the term individual as if it would belong to the quinque voces; al-Fārābī, according to his general account of secondary intelligibles,²⁷³ might have included it among them, although – to my best knowledge – we have no textual evidence for that. However, in his paraphrase of the Eisagoge, he has pretty much to say about individuals: starting from simple,

270 Maqūlāt, 38, 17–39, 5.

271 Porphyrius, Isagoge, 2, 17–19.

272 Kindī, Rasā’il, 62–63.

273 al-Fārābī, Ḥurūf, 64–66.

66 signifiable meanings, he insists that universal notions are those in (regard of) which two or more (things) may be similar. In contrast, he insists that the individual notion is that in (regard of) which no two (things) may be similar at all.²⁷⁴ Then, al-Fārābī comes up with the usual distinction between universal and individual/particular that relies on the predicability on the terms: universal is that which may be predicated of more than one, and individual is that which cannot be predicated of more than one.²⁷⁵

However, the first description goes back to the notions (maʽānī) themselves, and their relationship to their significations. To reiterate: the individual notion (maʽnā) is something in which no two things may be similar; thus, it is a notion that may not be shared except by one item. Al-Fārābī does not clarify the issue more, whether this meaning is a simple one, an unshareable element, that is, a notion that is per definitionem unshareable; or it is a composite notion, as the notion of Zayd, which refers to a designated individual. However, this articulation seems to echo a sort of a learning method: while teaching the notions of „universal” and

In document Individuation of Material Substances in Avicenna’s Philosophy (Pldal 59-0)