Identity

In the Mubāḥathāt material, we find many, rather scarce passages that pertain to this problem:

this is about thubāt, which I translated as identity although the passages are not easy to interpret:

either because they are somewhat elliptic, or because in some cases, they represent only the questions posed by Avicenna’s pupils, while the answers are missing from the text. What is interesting for us that later in Avicenna’s carrier, a considerable amount of questions were directed to identity. Some problems were related to the problem of self-awareness, which has a

774 Kawn, 142, 1–5.

775 Kawn, 143.

776 Philoponus, in de Gen, 107, 12.

777 Philoponus, in de Gen, 314, 9–22.

778 That is, (1e) and (3e) in our theoretical approach. See chapter 1.1.1.

182 prominent role in Avicenna’s psychology. The Flying Man thought-experiment is amongst his very classical arguments.⁷⁷⁹ Self-awareness plays a crucial role in the individuation and identity of the human rational soul, the investigation of which lies out of the scope of this dissertation.

Both the Taʽlīqāt and the Mubāḥathāt contain numerous passages that examine self-awareness.

The Taʽlīqāt passages insist that self-awareness (al-shuʽūr bi-al-dhāt) is essential, primary, and is immediate for the soul, being independent of any external condition.⁷⁸⁰ In the Kitāb al-Mubāḥāthāt, we also find passages showing that self-awareness is about the inniyya, but it does not pertain to the whole individual; just like in the Flying Man argument, the body has no part in the awareness; even if some bodily parts were cut off, the awareness would be still the same.

It represents an individual unity (waḥda shakhsiyya).⁷⁸¹

Accordingly, the Kitāb al-Mubāḥathāt deals extensively with the topic.⁷⁸² In short: the claim that self-awareness is a constant, primary, and independent, helps to explain the individuation of the human rational soul after death. Since this kind of awareness is immaterial, it continues after the decease of the body and provides one feature that explains the individuality of the soul.

Nevertheless, in the Mubāḥāthāt material, other questions are dealing with identity. Avicenna’s disciple, Bahmanyār Ibn Marzubān is credited with several questions [36–40] [399–403] [464–

474] and there is an unknown fragment, included in the Appendix in Bīdārfar’s edition, [1001–

1003; 1012], amongst which [1012] seems to be earlier than Bahmanyār’s earlier notes found in [462].⁷⁸³

Bahmanyār’s question and Avicenna’s answer is worth quoting. Bahmanyār starts asking for an apodeictic proof for the identity (ithbāt) of one individual, because as he sees, material individuals change, along with the change of their mixtures. Eating, digestion, but perception, and intellectual perception is also changing since the healthy person is more adapt to these perceptions than the sick. He also adds that he finds the argument from self-awareness unconvincing and sophistical, then asks Avicenna for another proof to elucidate individual unity.

779 It has received a considerable scholarly attention: Marmura, 1986, Black, 2008, Kaukua, 2015, 43–51, Alwishah, 2013.

780 Taʽlīqāt (B) 79–80, (M) 210–213 [326–327; 329]; (B) 147–148, (M) 440–442 [807–809]; (B) 160–161, 480–

483 [882–887].

781 Mubāḥathāt, 59–61 [62].

782 Mubāḥathāt, 58–62 [56-65]; 117–125 [278–298]; 146–147 [399–403].

783 Reisman, 2004, 248–249.

183 Avicenna’s answer sounds as follows:

The thabāt of a thing [as] one in number is not its thabāt one in number in virtue its quality or quantity; but in virtue of its substance.

Then, my being one (thabātī anā wāḥid^an) is by my substantial existence (inniyya), and the existent yesterday has not perished, it is not non-existent, and no other thing has come into being instead. And I see what I saw yesterday, and I remember what I forgot yesterday, and this is in which I do not have doubt. And I do not come into being today, and my body was not other – being perished yesterday – and I do not cease to exist tomorrow, and my “individual” does not perish if my last day delay tomorrow so that another substance would come into being instead of me.

Here Avicenna refers to a so-called inniyya jawhariyya – substantial inniyya, which is not an easy task to interpret. The term inniyya, as we have seen above, usually means a particular existence. The passage and the usage of the adjective “substantial” indicates that Avicenna has the accidental-substantial division in mind here. That is, only the substance explains my being the same individual, as one in number through a certain amount of time. This is actually the traditional Peripatetic teaching, as we have seen in the introduction. On the other hand, this is what we are aware of in a primary and constant way during our self-awareness.

This answer is clearly in line with the essential – accidental dichotomy as it is elaborated in the logical discussions: only the essential features count for the substance, and it is what explains its being the same through a certain amount of time. What is more, it is clearly in line with Avicenna’s insistence that it is the substantial form, as inhering in a certain piece of matter that persists during the process of growth.⁷⁸⁴

784 As for the identity of plants and animals, Avicenna himself admits that he engaged in its discussion in his treatise entitled The Eastern Principles (al-Uṣūl al-Mashriqiyya). (Gutas, 2014, 120–121.) However, there is a short section entitled Li-kull hayawān wa-nabāt thabāt that has preserved as an independent work in the manuscript tradition and was included in the Abū Saʽīd correspondence as well.( Reisman, 2004, 139; Gutas, 2014, 429.) What is of greater importance that, as far as the identity of animals is concerned, Avicenna makes clear that he has raised doubts and then solved these questions at great length (lī (…) ḥawḍ ʽaẓīm fī al-tashsakkuk thumma fī al-kashf).

(Mubāḥathāt, 51 [37].) However, directly afterward also admits that the identity of plants is much harder to solve.

This is an anonymous correspondence, probably with Bahmanyār, whose authenticity is incontestable. (Reisman, 2004, 139.)

Here Avicenna does not say anything about the identity of animals; he restricts himself to that of the plants.

However, we do not find a conclusive solution, only tentative propositions introduced by “perhaps’ (laʽalla). At the end of the passage, Avicenna expressis verbis admits that these problems are nets and traps, if the intellect gets entangled in them, may only hope that God will grant him salvation. (Mubāḥathāt, 53 [41].)

The most crucial point is what Avicenna may have intended by plant – nabāt. It gives the impression as if the apples of the apple tree or the new shoots of a plant were numerically distinct individuals.( Mubāḥathāt, 52 [40]:

„because [the plant] is divisible into parts, every single one of which may be independent in itself.”) Then, highlighting that he only expresses his doubts, he quickly eliminates the element, as the permanent feature, and goes on to the form. This is the classical interpretation in the Aristotelian tradition, and as we have seen, Avicenna endorses this view himself. However, he leaves us without an answer. This hesitation is equally attested in other questions and answers, like in [296]. In [354–355] he suggests that the persistent feature is not in a body; however,

184 3.4.5 Summary

To sum up: matter is the principle of multiplicity, matter endowed with the spatial position is the principle of particularity, whereas form is the principle of persistence.⁷⁸⁵ The idea that matter is the principle of multiplicity goes back to Themistius, whereas the tenet that form is the principle of identity may be linked to Alexander Aphrodisias, as he elaborated it in the argument on growth. This is not to say that these tenets were exclusively held by them. Instead, they were influential thinkers in the commentary tradition, and we only highlight that these authors provide textual evidence about it that was available in Arabic.

Form and matter mutually individuate each other, and both constituents, being parts of the substance, explain different aspects of individuation. In this approach, Avicenna roughly follows the Peripatetic tradition, but he has much to add, especially when it comes to the elaboration of the spatio-temporal reading of particularization.

The spatial position is of crucial importance in the context of coming to be and passing away.

It helps to single out a subject, which can be described as having a determinate spatial position in an instant, in the very instant of substantial change. Based on the differentiating role of spatial position, it is the necessary condition of the generation of every particular material thing.

Therefore, it is the third principle. Whereas matter is the principle of multiplicity, the form is the principle of identity; spatial position is the principle of particularity.