Definitions and descriptions

In a similar vein as in the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic commentary tradition, Avicenna maintains that individuals cannot be defined. Aristotle insists in numerous passages that there is no demonstration of perishable things, and there is no knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of them simpliciter, but accidentally.³⁵⁹ Since sensible individuals have a matter, they undergo change, and they can be otherwise, whereas demonstration and proper knowledge may hold only for necessary, and unchangeable truths. Thus, we only may have an opinion (δόξα) of particulars.³⁶⁰ Avicenna reiterates this Aristotelian position that individuals can be known only accidentally.³⁶¹ First, because the demonstration must consist of universal and eternal (dā’im) premises, and if an individual, like Zayd, is the subject of the minor premiss, it is no longer universal, nor eternal. In consequence, the conclusion would be equally individual.³⁶² What Avicenna may have had in mind, is a syllogism like this:

Every human is animal Zayd is human Zayd is animal

359 Aristotle, Post. An. I.8, 75b 24–25. Tr. by Barnes, 1993, 13.

360 Aristotle, Met. Z 14, 1039b27–1040a7; Met. (a 1), 993b27–31; Post. An. (I.8), 75b 21–36.

361 Burhān, 171, 6.

362 Burhān, 171, 6–10.

89 Therefore, there is no demonstration of perishable things. They can be only a subject of temporal syllogisms.³⁶³ Furthermore, even if the conclusion “Zayd is animal” is true, it is not true always, because if Zayd disappears from our senses, it is no longer sure whether his features are still predicable of him, not even the essential ones: there is no guarantee that he is still an animal. If he dies, he is no longer an animal.³⁶⁴

Since definition may be either the principle of demonstration, or its conclusion, or a whole demonstration, or just a reverted demonstration, the parts of a definition are practically parts of a demonstration.³⁶⁵

Besides, Avicenna adduces a new argument that perishable things cannot be defined. Perishable things differ either from instances falling under another species or from instances of their own species. In the first case, when Zayd differs from Bucephalus, the horse, the distinction may be attained by essential predicates, like being rational – since Bucephalus is not rational. However, being rational is not proper to Zayd, insofar as he is this individual, but it is due to his species, human, which is common to all human beings. Thus, this is not Zayd’s definition insofar as he is this individual, Zayd. On the other hand, when Zayd is compared to ʽAmr, another human being that is another individual subsumed under the same species, they differ from each other by accidents, potentially by an infinite number of accidents. Since this proposition consists of accidents, it obviously cannot be a proper definition.³⁶⁶

In this second argument, Avicenna starts from the possible ways how perishable individuals would differ from each other. It seems that he had taken granted that individuals have no definition in the proper sense, in such a way that definition signifies the very quiddity of the given object. Instead, he implicitly suggested that the only possibility left is to draw a distinction between individuals, taken that individuals have no differentia specifica under a certain species.

Avicenna used the terms mufāriqa and mumayyiza respectively to indicate the difference between them.³⁶⁷ As he reports, for some people, even the scope of definition was similar,

363 Burhān, 171, 1–5. Note that for Avicenna, propositions may be conditionally necessary, that is, on the condition of the existence of the essence (mā dāma mawjūd dhāt), or on the condition of predicaton (dawām kawn mawḍūʿ mawṣūf-an bimā wuḍiʿa maʿhu). See Ishārāt I, (al-Ṭūsī), 265. But these propositions do not produce certain knowledge, only accidental one, because the relation between the predicated elements is temporal.

364 Burhān, 171, 4–5. Apparently, probably for the sake of the argument, Avicenna did not take into consideration the survival of the individual human soul.

365 Burhān, 171, 12–14.

366 Burhān, 171, 13–18.

367 Burhān, 171, 14–18; 20.

90 namely, the distinction by essential features, or, concise sentence that distinguishes the goal essentially.³⁶⁸

In the Logic of the Dānishnāma-yi ʽAlā’ī Avicenna highlights that description indicates things of which we have no definition. To indicate it (nishān dādan) means to single it out from others (judā kardan).³⁶⁹

Avicenna is consistent that accidents count for the distinction between existents – and actually, this is what descriptions consist of. The perfect definition serves to indicate the quiddity of a thing, that is, its perfect reality by which it is what it is, and by which its essence (dhāt) comes to be realized.³⁷⁰ The imperfect definition is that which does not cover the perfect reality of the thing; it only may serve to distinguish it (tamyīz) from others by essential attributes. As far as the distinction by accidents is concerned, it is a description: while the imperfect description is that which does not distinguish it from all the other existents,³⁷¹ the perfect description is that which distinguishes it with accidents from all the others, especially if it contains the genus proximum.³⁷²

Thus, apart from definition taken in the strict Aristotelian sense, all the other forms of definition and description have the distinction as to their scope. However, he concludes that even if perishable individuals may be distinguished from each other, they have no definition. First, because the essential attributes do not distinguish them under the same species, and second because the essential attributes are not predicated on account of this individual, but of the nature of the species. In this sense, perishable individuals may be defined only accidentally: Zayd is rational, but not because he is Zayd, but because he is human, and the human is not necessarily Zayd, but only contingently. It is only the accidents that may distinguish it from others, but they might be potentially infinite.

This solution runs along Aristotelian lines, in the sense that individuals cannot be defined. They are only the object of sense perception, and, as such, can only be characterized by description.

Besides, Avicenna adduces a more general descriptive tool, the exposition of the name, the sharḥ al-ism, or al-qawl al-shāriḥ, or al-ḥadd al-shāriḥ li-maʽnā al-ism (a definition that

368 Burhān, 52, 13; 18.

369 Manṭiq-i Dānishnāma, 25.

370 Burhān, 52, 18–20.

371 Burhān, 52, 3–10.

372 Burhān, 52, 10–11.

91 explains the meaning of the name) in which the existence of the thing is not considered.³⁷³ Namely, that the expression does not indicate the essence of the thing as it exists, but only enumerates the features predicable of it. Avicenna refers to the “definition” of the equilateral triangle at the beginning of Euclid’s Elements that it has three equal sides.³⁷⁴ The explanation of the name indicates those names too, whose meaning (maʽnā) has no definition.³⁷⁵ In the al-Manṭiq al-Mashriqiyyīn, Avicenna simply lifts the qawl shāriḥ above the definition and description, being the broadest category of concept formation.³⁷⁶ In other words, this is where the description of individuals pertain.

In this Avicennan context, definitions consist of descriptive (nāʿit) terms, which do not contain any indication to any definite item; because if it contained indication, it would be a name or some other reference.³⁷⁷ In every definition, there are only universal notions which can narrow down its reference, but still, remains universal, in the sense that it is capable of referring to many things. Therefore, individuals can only be grasped by testimony (mušāhada).

If what is referred to is an individual among others under a certain species, there is no way to that but by testimony, and the intellect cannot grasp it, but by means of sense perception.³⁷⁸

To sum up, Avicenna aims to describe an individual notion in the mind. One nature – be it humanity – taken along with individuality – in the sense that its meaning cannot be shared – becomes an individual human in the mind. This means that there is an individual, the meaning of which cannot be shared. This seems to be only a consideration, along with absolute genus and absolute species, which specializes the quiddities in the mind. Individuality is similar to unity in this respect, by having only one relation to one given existent. However, they are not identical to each other. Individuality is a general universal concept which applies to the concrete, externally existing particulars. It signifies the content of the concept “being not capable of being shared by many.” Unity, although equally applicable to individuals, means a different aspect that is implicitly included in the concept of individuality: the “not capable of being shared by many” and “a reference to only one” are extensionally identical. When we will

373 Najāt, 159; see al-Fārābī, Alfāẓ, 89.

374 Najāt, 159. Euclides, Elementa, 3, 13-14: ῶν δὲ τριπλεύρων σχημάτων ἰσόπλευρον μὲν τρίγωνόν ἐστι τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἴσας ἔχον πλευράς.

375 Burhān, 292, 1–2.

376 Manṭiq al-Mashriqiyyīn, 10.

377 Ilāhiyyāt, 246, 14–16.

378 Ilāhiyyāt, 246, 14–16.

92 turn to unity in Metaphysics, which, for Avicenna, means that whatever is one has an indivisible existence, we shall explain its implications further.³⁷⁹

Once we got here, the question arises, how can we explain this uniqueness that the logical accident individuality implies?

Avicenna seems to suggest that the existence and a sort of mental demonstration to an individual concept could single out – or determine it. While thinking about humans – at least this is my intuition – Avicenna refers to some sort of individual content, coming from sense perception – or memory. In this case, my concept of Zayd would not be intellectual because it is still not abstracted from every changeable feature. Alternatively, another solution is the description, which can refer to an individual – but given that it will perish, its knowledge will change as well. Even if I know the period of its existence, it would not be a definition.³⁸⁰

When it comes to this unique reference to one exact object, it presupposes a determined spatial spot and spatial accidents. In Avicenna’s theory of abstraction, the representation of individuals needs an extended bodily organ to mirror their spatial distinctness. This is in accord with the idea that individuals cannot be identified nor defined by intellectual, universal features.