Mutual individuation of form and matter

Finally, Avicenna turns to the interdependence of form and matter. Since form and matter presuppose each other in existence, neither of them can be the absolute real cause of the other.

As saw above, matter and form are parts of the composite substance; they enter the subsistence (qiwām) of the individual. In the case of the material substances, they depend on each other:

there is no matter without form, and there is no form without matter. Their case is similar to the relation – like being a son and being a father, because neither of them may exist without the other. However, Avicenna quickly omits this parallel, leaving only a specific case of it: matter, insofar as being prepared for a form is related to it, but only given their preparedness. In themselves, form and matter may not be represented in terms of relation.⁷⁴⁰ To put it simply:

they are related to each other either as cause and effect, or as homologous elements in existence,

740 Ilāhiyyāt, 80, 7–13.

172 where neither of them is the cause of the other, but at the same time neither of them may exist without the other.⁷⁴¹ Avicenna rules out this possibility and shows that form is part of the cause of the subsistence of matter.⁷⁴² After a long discussion,⁷⁴³ he ends up saying that form is the cause of matter but is not constituted by the matter, even if it cannot exist apart. Instead, it is constituted by its giver of existence that emanates it into the matter.⁷⁴⁴

The form is prior to matter, but essentially, not temporally: it does not exist as an individual before getting attached to the matter. However, it is essentially prior because of its actuality.

Matter, as considered in itself, is a pure potentiality, even if it never happens to be so: it is never devoid of form in its existence.

As Olga Lizzini also notes, the sublunary form-matter compound is reminiscent of the celestial form-matter relation.⁷⁴⁵ During the process of emanation from God, the celestial body – celestial matter needs an intermediary: it cannot be directly emanated from the Necessary of Existence. What primarily is emanated is the First Intellect, which is a separate substance, that is, a form in itself. Celestial matter emanates by the intermediary of the intellect: insofar as it intellects itself as Possible of Existence, this second intellection produces a relational multiplicity, which ends up in the coming to be of the celestial body.⁷⁴⁶

The form also in the sublunary realm plays an intermediary role, but in another way:

[In the case of] forms that separate from matter to be succeeded [by other forms], that which places [the successive form] in [matter ] perpetuates it by rendering that form the successor. In one respect, then, form becomes the intermediary between [this] retained matter and that which perpetuates it, and [in another respect it becomes] the intermediary in substantiation (taqwīm). For its essence is first rendered subsistent, then another is rendered subsistent by it in an essentially prior manner—[the latter] being the cause that is proximate to the thing retained in existence. If the [first form] is rendered subsistent by the cause that perpetuates matter through [the form's] mediation, then subsistence, deriving from the [celestial] first principles, belongs to [the form] first, then to matter. If the form is not subsistent through that cause but [is subsistent] in itself—matter becoming subsistent through it thereafter—then [form's priority to matter] becomes more evident.⁷⁴⁷

Here Avicenna attributes a twofold mediator role to form. In case of material composites that come to be and cease away, there is always a succeeding form that substitutes the former one – since no matter stays formless. In a sense, the former is the intermediary form, because, I think

741 Ilāhiyyāt, 81, 2–3.

742 Ilāhiyyāt, 405, 5–6.

743 On the details of the argument see Lizzini, 2004, 179–183.

744 Ilāhiyyāt, 88, 13–89, 5.

745 Lizzini, 2004, 180.

746 Ilāhiyyāt, 406, 17–19.

747 Ilāhiyyāt, 87, 14–88, 3, tr. by Marmura, 2005, 69.

173 it determines to a certain degree, which forms may come after it. If a human being dies, the form humanity ceases to be in that piece of matter, and it is no longer a human, but a deceased body, which slowly becomes something else, like the rotting elements of the corps, all having a proper substantial form. In this sense, the previous form predetermines the next ones.

The form is an intermediary in the constitution – substantiation of the composite. Here Avicenna envisages two possibilities: form, as part of the efficient cause, is originated by separate causes first, and then it actualizes matter. This is an emanationist reading of becoming.

In this scenario, the form is part of the efficient cause, since it endows matter with actuality as if it was one of the engines of the ship.⁷⁴⁸ In this reading, existence, and form emanate from the Dator Formarum, being the same, but they explain different aspects: existence explains the in re existence, and form explains what it is. On the other hand, if form subsisted by itself, then its priority to matter is even more clear.

As to the exact role of form and matter in individuation, the texts are unanimous. In a material composite, form and matter need each other, the matter cannot exist without form, and a material form also needs matter to exist. However, they are not causes of each other, because – to put it briefly – it would entail circularity. In Avicenna’s solution, a third thing is their cause, and form is the prior element.

In a passage, where Avicenna shows that matter is not the cause of form, perhaps for the sake of argument, he makes clear that matter may not be the cause of form in any way (bi-wajhⁱⁿ min al-wujūh).⁷⁴⁹ One of Avicenna’s argument against matter being the cause of form rests on diversity (ikhtilāf). Since matter in itself is not different, if matter were the proximate cause of form, nothing would explain the diversity of forms. If diversity is due to something else, an external factor, then these factors, being material states, are also forms. If it is matter along with something external to matter, in such a manner that if another external factor being with matter caused another form, then the diversity is due to the external factor, while the matter is only responsible for the receptivity.⁷⁵⁰

In this argument, Avicenna seems to understand by matter the prime matter: he denies every positive feature of it. He goes so far as to admit that matter (taken in itself) has no role in the particularity (khāṣṣiyya) of the form.⁷⁵¹ Instead, the particularity of the form is due to external

748 Ilāhiyyāt, 259, 6–8.

749 Ilāhiyyāt, 85, 2.

750 Ilāhiyyāt, 84, 3–12.

751 Ilāhiyyāt, 84, 15.

174 causes – that is features that prepare and indicate, and in consequence, pick up and delineate a piece of matter. In other words, the matter has no role in the particularity of the form, unless it is needed to receive the form, which is the particular property of the receptive cause.⁷⁵² However, as Avicenna makes it clear at the beginning of the chapter, his main aim is to investigate form and matter in themselves, not the already prepared proximate matter, which may be considered as correlative to the corresponding form.⁷⁵³

However, in other passages, Avicenna admits that matter indeed has an influence on the form.

In brief, even though the material form is the cause of matter in that it actualizes and perfects it, matter also has an influence in its existence—namely, in rendering it specific (takhṣīṣuhā) and making it concrete (taʽyīnuhā).⁷⁵⁴

Here Avicenna seems to have the determinate matter in mind, which renders the form specific (takhṣīṣ – compare it with the khāṣṣiyya of the former passage) and concrete (taʽyīn). This latter term refers to the mādda muʽayyana, the determinate piece of matter. In this passage, the mutual relationship between form and matter becomes evident: form actualizes matter and perfects it, whereas matter specializes the form and renders it concrete. It is true that what is at stake here is not prime matter, as in the passage above, but the matter endowed with a corporeal form that is endowed with dimensions and in consequence occupies a specific spatial position. Here matter in a sense individuates form. However, Avicenna quickly admits that even though the principle of existence for the form is not matter, both of them is a cause of the other in a certain thing, but not in the same respect.⁷⁵⁵ Thus, the matter is responsible for the determination of the form, while the form is responsible for the actualization of matter.

In the Ishārāt, Avicenna expressis verbis admits that matter and form individuate each other:

This [priority] is only possible in one if the remaining divisions. That is, matter exists due to a primary cause and a determinant (muʽayyin) of the succession of forms. When these two things unite, the existence of matter is completed. Then, by means of matter, the form is individuated and, by the form, the matter is also individuated in a manner whose evidence merits a discussion beyond this summary.⁷⁵⁶

It is clear that what Avicenna has in mind is the determinate matter – mādda muʽayyana – which owes its existence to the primary cause – celestial intellects and the succeeding substantial

752 Ilāhiyyāt, 84, 16–85, 2.

753 Ilāhiyyāt, 80, 11–13.

754 Ilāhiyyāt, 405, 1–2; Tr. by Marmura, 2005, 329.

755 Ilāhiyyāt, 405, 2–4.

756 Ishārāt II. (al-Ṭūsī), 235–238; Tr. by Inati, 2014, 72.

175 forms. As prepared, a new form comes to be in it, and it actualizes – individuates matter, as matter individuates it by determining it.⁷⁵⁷

What we find in the later, spurious Kitāb al-Taʽlīqāt is very similar. Here the author attributes and individuating role to matter, as matter individuates form, whereas form is the cause of matter in its actual existence.

[252] The form is the cause of matter in its subsistence and actual existence, and the matter is the cause of form in its individuation, even if it is not the cause of its existence. If the form is separated from the matter, its individuation perishes, and itself perishes [as well] because its existence became determined (taʽayyana wujūduhā) in that matter. ⁷⁵⁸

Here, the author expressis verbis attributes different roles to form and matter in their mutual

“individuation.” This is clearly in line with what we saw just above: matter and form are the causes of each other, but not in the same respect.⁷⁵⁹ Form actualizes matter and perfects it, whereas matter is the cause of the individuation of the form. Here matter is the real cause of individuation, since as Avicenna admits, after the separation, individuation ceases to exist, that is, it keeps to the well-known Avicennian principle that the cause is with its effect. At the same time, the passage echoes the Ishārāt, where Avicenna highlighted the importance of the determinacy of existence, which is always necessitated by a cause – which, in this case, is the designated matter. What is at stake here is the individuation of form and matter, not the individuation of form-and-matter, that is, the compound. The author of the Kitāb al-Taʽlīqāt attributes different aspects to form and matter. It is clear throughout these texts – the former,

“authentic” ones included – that designated matter is the source of individuation, because it is the principle that receives diversity and it is the source of differentiation. As he makes it clear elsewhere, the matter is the cause of multiplicity, that is, it is in virtue of matter that the individuals of the species human are multiplied on the one hand ⁷⁶⁰ and that a given individual is other than the other individual.

A similar passage elaborates on practically the same issue:

[200] (...) (The form is similar to the accident) in another thing as well, that it becomes specified by its bearer (ḥāmil), which means that it is among the essential concomitants of the form that its existence be attached to

757 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī admits that matter is not the actual cause of the individuation of the form, only insofar as it is receptive of individuation. The real individuators are accidental features inhering in matter, like position, place, time and so on. Ishārāt, II. (al-Ṭūsī), 238.

758 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 67, (M) 172 [252].

759 Ilāhiyyāt, 405, 2–4.

760 Taʽlīqāt, (B) 58, (M), 144, [197].

176 matter, but to a matter with a certain property. Because the existence of this form cannot be but in this matter.

Then, it cannot be individuated by something else. (...)

[201] This matter is part of the individuality of the form because it is constitutive of its individuality. since the possible existence of the form is in the matter, in such a manner that its existence in itself is its existence in matter, the matter became necessary in the existence of the form, and [matter became] constitutive of its individuality and its determinant (muʽayyina). (...).⁷⁶¹

These passages elaborate on practically the same thing. Not only matter but this matter that individuates. The indexical “this” clearly implies that it is the designated matter.

Avicenna or the author of the Taʽlīqāt is clear on the role of matter in the individuation of the form: it is designated matter that particularizes the form. However, the “this matter” or designated matter is more than prime matter, which is pure potentiality in itself. As we saw, the fact matter is designatable is due to the corporeal form. However, this seems to correspond to the Peripatetic proximate matter, which is more than potentiality, it must have actual determinacy, at least an actual spatial position.

Scholars already noticed the problem that matter and corporeal form as a prerequisite of the generation of the substantial form seems to jeopardize the substantial form’s actualizing role. It is as if the substantial form would inhere in the designatable matter as an accident inheres in the subject. In the following, we will consider this problem, and what Avicenna has to say about it.