PART III. LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Country
After almost fifteen years of transition, Bulgaria is now a “consolidated democracy”
(Freedom House 2002). In spite of the many challenges encountered during more than a decade of building and strengthening democracy, Bulgarian society has proved in practice its maturity and adherence to the values of freedom and democracy. It has consistently conducted elections assessed by observers as free and fair, and the transfer of political power from one governing party to another has always followed legally established procedures. Fundamental freedoms and rights are guaranteed by the constitution and other supporting legislation, and the media are free from political control. The absence of nationalist, irredentist, and xenophobic political agendas appears to be one of the most stable and enduring elements of Bulgaria’s democracy. A vibrant civil society has come into existence.
Bulgaria has made progress in establishing the rule of law, but further improvements are needed. After a period of poor performance, the economy has recorded six years of robust growth. Economic reforms have advanced considerably, with more work remaining to improve the institutional framework and the business environment. The European Commission’s 1999 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession declared that “Bulgaria fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria,” demonstrating that the country has achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for the protection of minorities.” The country’s accomplishments in establishing democracy and a market-oriented economy have laid the foundation for its successful integration into the EU. The negotiation chapters with the EU have already been finalized and an accession target date of January 2007 has been confirmed. An exceptional achievement for Bulgaria’s foreign policy is the fact that in 2004 the country joined NATO.
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Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic, based on a clear division of powers and a set of institutional checks and balances within the political system. Supreme power resides with the legislative branch—the National Assembly. As Bulgaria has signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 1993, the National Assembly has been put under enormous pressure to bring the Bulgarian domestic legal system into conformity with the acquis communautaire of the EU. Draft preparation is transparent and is effectively communicated to the public by means of the Internet; important sessions are broadcast live on national television. The executive—the Council of Ministers—is appointed by the National Assembly after the president has handed the mandate to form a government to the individual nominated by the National Assembly to form a cabinet. The recent history of Bulgaria has offered quite a few opportunities to test this system and the constitutionally established procedures have been strictly followed. The president is both head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Several acute crises in Bulgaria have proven the potential of the presidential institution to unify different positions around a constitutionally sound consensus. The legislative branch is counter-balanced by an independent judiciary, including the public prosecutor’s office, and also by a constitutional court that has the power to turn down legislation judged to be unconstitutional. Weaknesses in the Bulgarian judicial system have been a focus of criticism, and remain an area of increasing concern with respect to the strengthening of democracy and the protection of rights.
Bulgaria’s population was 7,973,671 at the time of the 2001 census, and has been rapidly decreasing for the last ten years. Between 1990 and 2000 it decreased more than 7% (see Appendix 1). Of the general population, 83.6% are ethnic Bulgarians, 9.5%
ethnic Turks, and 4.6% Roma. In terms of religious affiliation, the National Statistical Institute reports Eastern Orthodox Christians at 83.8%, Muslims at just over 12%, nonreligious persons at 3.9%, and others at 0.2%.
The economic transformations since 1989, which have been of a controversial nature, fall into four fairly distinct periods. Initially, a stumbling and cautious policy of liberalization and debt default led to economic stagnation. Next came a period of inconsistent economic reforms and feckless privatization policies, that led to a brief period of uncontrolled profiteering and the mass bankruptcy of banks. This resulted in a deep economic and social crisis and a brief hyperinflation cycle. The beginning of the forth period was marked by the introduction of a currency board in 1997, followed by speedy privatization and reforms in all spheres, including public administration, social policy, and the health insurance system. This is the only period that saw stable economic growth, low inflation, a gradual improvement in the standard of living, and a decrease in the shadow or gray economy. In 2001, Bulgaria was recognized as a market economy with good prospects for economic growth and for increase of foreign investments. The dark side of this development has been persistent low consumption, high unemployment, and low incomes, still about one quarter of the average income of EU member states.
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Table 2.1
Key Economic Indicators
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Growth in GDP [%] 2.9 –10.1 –7.0 3.5 2.4 5.4 4.1 4.8
Inflation [%] 34 310 579 1 6.2 3.5 11.3 3.8
Unemployment rate [%] 11 12.5 14 12 16 18 17.9 16.3
Monthly wages [US$] 130 56 108 128 122 122 118 139
Total revenues [% of GDP] 36 32 33 39.7 40.7 41.4 39.8 38.7 Total expenditures [% of GDP] 41 42 36 38.4 40.6 42.0 40.4 39.4 Fiscal balance [% of GDP] –5.6 –10.4 –3 1.3 0.2 –0.6 –0.6 –0.6 Source: World Bank (1999) and national statistical data.
1.2 The Local Government System
The tradition of local self-government in Bulgaria dates back to the 17th century, when the taxation and judicial systems within the Ottoman Empire were based on local community notables. Later in the 18th century, the local self-government functions were extended to the spheres of education, public utilities, and church wards. The early municipalities included only the population of one village or town. The tendency since then has been towards decreasing the number of municipalities and consequently increasing the average number of residents per municipality as seen in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2
Number of Municipalities in Bulgaria
Year 1880 1934 1944 1946 1949 1959 1979 1981 1987 1992 2003
Municipalities 1,354 1,211 1,771 2,113 2,178 979 291 300 273 255 263 Average
population
1,483 5,019 3,936 3,359 3,319 7,997 30,400 29,685 32,880 33,283 30,987
Source: H. Stanev et al. 2000.
Modeled after the French system, the modern Bulgarian state is characterized by a highly centralized administrative and governmental system. Even though local government autonomy may have increased from 1888 to1934, during the decades that followed, from 1935 to1990, the tendency toward increasing centralization is indisputable.
Local government (LG) reform was initiated in 1991, when free and competitive local elections were held. These elections were preceded by the adoption of a new, democratic
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constitution that provided stable guarantees for individual rights and freedoms. However, the new constitution reaffirmed the existing strong tradition of centralized government.
As a result, certain rigid constitutional provisions have blocked one of the substantial elements of LG reform—the decentralization process—and especially its vital aspect, fiscal decentralization. For example, since 1991 the requirement for a three-quarters or two-thirds majority has been an ongoing impediment even for minor constitutional amendments.
Another distinctive feature of Bulgarian local government reform has been its inconsistency. According to the 1991 Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act (hereinafter the LSGLA Act), the administrative structure must be tri-level:
regional, district, and municipal. But the district level was never introduced and was legally abolished in 1995. A similar reversal occurred with the decentralization of city municipalities with a population above 300,000. In 1995, self-governing city districts were introduced with elected district councils and mayors, but four years later the districts were abolished, perhaps because these representative bodies had never acquired real powers (the LSGLA Act envisaged no delegation of competencies, as it stipulated that “the district councils should assist the municipal council”). There is an intrinsic link between the ineffective decentralization efforts and the frequent reversals of local government reforms. Certain constitutional amendments will be indispensable for the furthering of local government reforms.
The current local government system may be briefly characterized as follows.
According to the 1991 Constitution, “The Republic of Bulgaria is a unitary state with local self-government” (article 2, paragraph 1). Chapter 7 of the Constitution deals exclusively with the local self-government and the local administration. It regulates the separation of powers between the legislative body (municipal council) and the executive (mayor) and gives the Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court the authority to decide, respectively, on disputes over competencies between municipal authorities and between the municipal and central authorities. The 1991 Constitution gives the municipality the status of a juridical person/legal entity with respective property rights and the right to independently dispose of its autonomous budget. The municipality is defined as “the fundamental unit of local self-government.” Two tiers of territorial division are introduced: municipal (obshtina) and regional (oblast). The regional level has never been considered a part of the local government, but rather a subdivision of the central government. While the municipal authorities are to be elected by free and competitive elections, the region has no elected bodies: the Cabinet appoints the regional governor, who is authorized to appoint the regional administration. The constitution also stipulates that in addition to the municipal and regional tiers of territorial administration,
“other administrative territorial units and bodies of self-government shall be established by law.” Table 2.3 provides a good illustration of the changes in the tiers of administrative and territorial division during the last 65 years.
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Table 2.3
Type and Number of Territorial Units (1949–2003)
Type of Units 1949 1981 1992 2003
Municipalities 2,178 300 255 263
District 117 — — —
County* 14 28 — —
Regions — — 9 28
Note: * In 1987 nine regions replaced the existing 28 counties.
Source: M. Stefanova 2003.
In order to make possible the constitution of democratic and autonomous local government, the parliament passed the LSGLA Act immediately after the promulgation of the new constitution on September 6, 1991. The law defined the competencies of the municipal authorities broadly, as a separate branch of power. On the other hand, the parliament did not abolish the existing legislative acts; hence, the freedom of municipal authorities to decide and act autonomously was substantially restricted. In order to resolve some of the existing legislative inconsistencies, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed the property rights of the municipalities vis-à-vis the state (Decision No. 14 of December 1993) and with the same interpretative decision defined “public property” in a way that favored citizens’ rights and public “needs.” These vital local government issues came to be regulated by a specific law three years later, when the Law on Municipal Property was passed (May 21, 1996). The Law on the Municipal Budget was passed even later—in 1998, followed by a new Law on the Municipal Budget, enacted in 2003.
According to the 1991 model of separation of powers, the citizens directly elect both the mayor and the councilors, but the mayor is not a member of the municipal council. The council meetings are presided over by a chair elected from the councilors, who determines the agenda and calls the sessions of the council. The mayor, on the other hand, as the head of the executive, is the official (legal) representative of the municipality.
The process of democratization in all post-communist countries has been charac-terized by a rapid increase in the number of municipalities. This would have been the tendency in Bulgaria too, as more than 1,000 requests for the establishment of new municipalities were filed at the Council of Ministers in 1991, when the introduction of the right of municipal self-differentiation was discussed. However, driven by the presumption that Bulgaria is a unified and centralized state, the legislators decided to set a threshold: in the 1995 Law on the Administrative and Territorial Division of Bul-garia, a minimum requirement of at least 4,000 inhabitants for a newly differentiated municipality was set, which later was raised to 6,000. These restrictions substantially
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slowed down the increase in the number of municipalities (see Table 2.4). The table also reflects the changes in the adopted classification of the municipalities by size.
Table 2.4
Breakdown of Municipalities by Population Size
Population of Municipality Number in 1997 Number in 2003
< 5,000 23 29
< 10,000 58 68
< 20,000 78 73
< 30,000 33 34
< 50,000 26 26
< 75,000 — 12
< 100,000 24 9
> 100,000 12 11
Capital Sofia 1 1
Total 255 263
Source: M. Stefanova 2003.
1.3 Internal Structure of Local Government
Local elections have been conducted regularly since October 1991. The term of office of elected officials is four years. Following this cycle, local elections were held in 1995 and 1999; in 2003 the most recent local elections took place. Mayors of municipalities and of mayoralties and members of municipal councils are elected by popular vote. By-elections are held for mayoral positions that have fallen vacant before the term of office expires. Local elections are administered in accordance with international standards for a free and fair election process, but they usually attract fewer voters than national elections.
Municipalities are subdivided into mayoralties (kmetstva) and/or city wards (rayoni). Following the tradition of local self-government, the Law on Administrative and Territorial Division of Bulgaria stipulates that all settlements with the status of mayoralty elect their mayors, and those settlements not having such status have no mayor and are under the jurisdiction of a nearby mayoralty as defined by the Law on Administrative and Territorial Division of Bulgaria. The status of mayoralty has not been defined in any formal way and is mainly considered to be the outcome of former administrative decisions or of self-government acts. Hence, it is appropriate to define it as “based on common law.” The formal distinctions and requirements were introduced in 1999: settlements (villages and towns) with more than 500 inhabitants could elect
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their mayors, while those with fewer than 500 and those with the status of mayoralty had lieutenant mayors elected by the municipal council. The big cities have warrant mayors, responsible for the local self-government in the city districts.
Administrative reform in Bulgaria aimed at introducing a transparent and accountable public administration and civil service had a very late start—the Civil Service Act and the Law on Public Administration were passed only in 1998. These laws introduced a unified structure, status, and coordination between the three tiers of government—central, regional, and local. The process of implementation of the Civil Service Act at the local level began in 1999 and is not yet finalized. According to the 2002 Annual Report of the Cabinet, the administrative reform has not been implemented (not completed) in nine municipalities.
Although the municipal councils may decide on the structure of the local administration and the number of administrative staff, the Cabinet is authorized to determine the maximum number of administrative positions according to the municipality size (number of inhabitants).
Not all members of the municipal administration have the status of civil servants.
In most municipalities the number of civil servants is restricted to one or several—the Chief Administrative Officer and the Directors of the Directorates. Hence, there is currently no reliable data about the total number of civil servants. The results of the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP show that the number of administrative staff per municipality varies from 11 to 585, while the number of civil servants ranges from zero to 91.
The council is the most “authentic” municipal actor, as all its competencies are derived only and entirely from its status as local/municipal authority. While the mayor is an actor both in the municipal and central governments, a substantial part of his or her competencies is delegated by the central government or the state authorities.
The council has both legislative and executive functions as defined in article 21 of the LSGLA Act. They are:
• to adopt the budget of the municipality, exercise control over its implementation, and approve the relevant report;
• to set the size of local taxes and fees within the statutory limits;
• to decide on the acquisition, management, and disposing of municipal property, and to define the powers of the mayor, the ward mayors, and other mayors;
• to decide on the formation, reorganization, and termination of municipal companies and firms, and to designate its representatives in such companies;
• to decide on bank borrowing, interest-free lending, and municipal bond issues under terms and procedures provided by law;
• to decide on the design and approval of general and detailed territorial development plans for the municipality or parts thereof;
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• to adopt municipal development strategies, projects, programs, and plans;
• to define the requirements governing the activities of natural and legal persons within municipal boundaries as they arise from the environmental, historical, social, and other characteristics of the inhabited places, and from the condition of the existing technical and social infrastructure;
• to decide on the establishment and termination of municipal foundations and on the management of donated property;
• to decide on the municipality’s participation in local authority associations in this country and abroad and to designate its delegates to such associations;
• to create districts and mayoralties under terms and procedures provided by law;
• to propose changes in the administrative and territorial divisions, when these affect the territory and the boundaries of the municipality;
• to make decisions to name or rename streets, squares, parks, engineering facilities, zones, recreation areas, and other places of local importance;
• to consider and adopt decisions on the advice of the mayors, within its terms of reference;
• to decide on the holding of referendums and general meetings on issues within its terms of reference;
• to approve the municipality’s coat of arms and seal; and
• to confer honorary citizenship on Bulgarian and foreign individuals.
The competencies of the mayor are within the sphere of the executive, and she or he has a key role in:
• management of the human resources of the municipal administration—she/he is personally authorized to make all personnel appointments and dismissals, with the exception of the appointments of vice-mayors, which are to be approved by the municipal council. Currently the Civil Service Act sets strict requirements for the appointment and promotion of those administrative officials that have the status of civil servants;
• management of the economic and financial resources of the municipality—
she/he manages the municipal property and the municipal budget. The mayor works out and proposes the budget, which has to be approved by the council;
she/he is also solely responsible for the implementation of the budget. The Law on the Municipal Budget introduces clear procedures for the division of competencies and responsibilities between the council and the mayor so that conflicts may be avoided or productively resolved. The Law on Municipal Property also regulates effectively the interactions between the council and the mayor—the council decides, while the mayor is entitled to represent legally the municipality in disposing of municipal property; and
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• decision-making on municipal policies—the mayor has the broad ability to make proposals in all spheres and may participate in all sessions of the municipal council (debating without the right to vote); the mayor has weak veto powers—
she/he may veto any decision of the council, and the council may override the mayor’s veto with a qualified vote of 50% plus one of the votes of all members.
The initial design of the local government system was “weak mayor−council,” but the practice during the last few years has led to a gradual evolution towards “strong mayor–council.” In 1999, there were legislative amendments strengthening the councils’ powers to dismiss the mayor. Immediately after their promulgation, at least three councils attempted to dismiss their mayors. The mayors appealed the decisions of the councils to the Supreme Administrative Court, which declared the procedures null and void. In 2000, new legislative amendments reinstated the autonomy of the mayor vis-à-vis the council and thus reaffirmed the tendency towards strengthening the mayors’ powers to decide on municipal policy.
The Bulgarian model of separation of powers between the central, regional, and local levels is usually defined as a “fused system” (Leemans 1970; Benet 1997), and is characterized by elected local authorities and very strong central government control.
This system is undergoing a substantial reform, but the dominance of central government is still very strong. Article 144 of the 1991 Constitution stipulates that state authorities and their territorial offices “shall exercise control over the legality of the acts of the bodies of local government only when authorized to do so by law.”
The regional governor exercises administrative control over the acts of municipalities.
According to the Public Administration Act (article 29), the regional governor is the sole executive governmental official within the region to be given power by the central government to guarantee consistency between national and local interests through the implementation of regional policy. The governor is appointed by the Council of Ministers. The governor has veto power over the decisions of local government: he/she may block the execution of acts of municipal councils by appealing them to the regional courts. The governor may also annul acts of the mayors, who in their turn may appeal the annulment to the Supreme Administrative Court. It is important to emphasize that the mayor may not convene the municipal council, while the regional governor is empowered to do so.
1.4 Project Indicators in Bulgaria
The current analysis is based on a systematic comparison of statistical and polling data;
in addition, it draws extensively upon the results of two parallel empirical surveys carried out specifically for the purposes of this study.
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The first survey was a face-to-face interview with Local Chief Administrative Officials (CAOs). The fieldwork was carried out from October 2002 to December 2002. All 263 municipalities (one was constituted during the second half of 2002) were targeted and face-to-face interviews were conducted with individuals holding the administrative position, “secretary of the municipal administration.” Where the position of secretary was vacant at the time of interviewer’s visit, the persons holding the position of “acting secretary” were interviewed.
The return rate was 72% or 189 interviews. The secretaries of the larger municipalities (regional centers in particular) were more difficult to reach and more often refused to be interviewed. They were approached several times (at least twice). The other considerable group of refusals came from position holders with less than a year of experience. A number of administrators were not available as they were on leave for business trips, vacation, or illness during the time of the fieldwork. The survey was carried out with the support of the National Association of the Secretaries of Municipalities (NASM), and the interviewers reported easier contacts and fewer refusals when association members were contacted (80% of the 263 secretaries are members of the NASM).
The survey indicators were adapted to the specifics of the Bulgarian local government system—all questions about the regional level were omitted and the specifics of the local government constitution were taken into account.
The second survey was a mail interview with local representatives—municipal councilors and mayors—conducted during the period of December 2002 to May 2003.
The total number of councilors elected in 1999 was 5,252, but in December 2002, the number of serving or acting councilors was 5,244. A sample of 134 representative municipalities with regard to size, geographic location, ethnic composition of the population, and level of economic development was designed. All local representatives from the sampled municipalities were addressed—2,575 councilors and 134 mayors.
The return rate was 35.7% for the councilors (920 cases) and 32% for the mayors (42 cases).
The sample is representative with regard to the basic characteristics of the general population of councilors as seen in Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
Table 2.5
Representativeness of the Sample by Gender
Gender Male Female Total
General population of councilors 4,141 79.0% 1,103 21.0% 5,244 100%
Sample of interviewed local representatives 759 78.8% 204 21.2% 963 100%
Source: National statistical data.