CITIZENS’ POLITICAL CULTURE

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strategies, plans, and projects. Such cooperation presents both serious challenges and extraordinary opportunities. The nongovernmental sector in Bulgaria is calling for the intensification of transfer of experience, resources, knowledge, and personnel in the sphere of civic initiative. The rather disproportionate development of the NGOs (in terms of territoriality and the priorities of their activity) highlights the necessity of establishing working mechanisms for overcoming the “center–periphery” gap. An appropriate organizational frame is needed to successfully institutionalize contact between local representatives and CSOs. Even though the most active NGOs have already started to specialize (rather than chase all possible funding), they still continue to work in more than one field and lack coordination of their efforts. On the other hand, the opportunities are outstanding. A remaining challenge is the CSOs’ capacity to manage effectively the incoming EU accession funds in support of the civil society democratic agenda.

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peasants who held on to traditional, group-focused patterns of communication and life-style, nor the weak political parties that were periodically dissolved by the Tzar, managed to formulate a coherent and stable political vision for society. After 1944, the mass political culture promoted by the communists further weakened the formation of modern democratic attitudes and values. Indeed, the dynamic transition from totalitarian socialist rule to democratic governance since 1989 required new skills of governance and political attitudes that had never been part of the country’s “mentality” (Kapitanova and Minis 2003). In the changing context of dramatically modified relationships between political parties and governing institutions, people were left to formulate for themselves their new responsibilities as citizens. This process was especially difficult at the local level where there was not only one party that completely dominated policymaking, public opinion, media, trade unions, etc., but also one vision of how political life functions.

In general, the breakdown of the old system not only changed the matrix of economic and political power in society, but was a true cultural revolution as well (Kapitanova and Minis 2003).

The ongoing battle to establish a new type of political culture in Bulgarian society is beyond the scope of this chapter. To do justice to Bulgaria’s achievements, however, requires the highlighting of some significant changes in political attitudes. The shift in attitude towards market economy reforms is illustrative in this respect. Following the initial post-communist enthusiasm of 1992, 53% of Bulgarians supported the transition to a market economy, while 36% preferred a state-directed economy. By the spring of 1993, disappointment with the government led to a massive retreat from the reform agenda, and support for a market economy shrunk to just 13% in one year. In the summer of 1994, nostalgia for the communist past was reflected in 42% of Bulgarians preferring a state-run economy. But following the severe economic crisis of 1996, 63% stood for rapid privatization and market reforms (Mitev 1998). A number of studies conducted after 1996 confirm the formation of a new political value system, evolving away from dependent attitudes and rejecting the “entire package of socialism—human, reformist, or otherwise”(Dainov 2001). By the end of 1999, “most Bulgarians categorically understand that the European and, more specifically, the West European international context is best suited to the interests of the country. They also believe that Bulgaria should become an integral part of the community of those European countries that possess stable democracies and embody the most modern civilization trends” (Sofia: UN Development Program and the Friedrich Schtiftung Foundation 1999). According to the results of the study, about 83% of Bulgarians support integration into the EU and 63% support membership in NATO.

The newly established political value system has already passed some serious tests.

The most challenging were the difficult choice to support NATO in the Kosovo crisis of 1999 and the firm position to join the war on terrorism in 2001. A textbook example of the sustainability of Bulgaria’s democratic political value system was the events related

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to the victory of the former king-in-exile, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (or Simeon II) and his National Movement Simeon II (NMSS) in the parliamentary elections of 2001.

The former tsar did not succeed in sweeping away the rules of the multiparty game and found it impossible to escape the burden of being a prime minister after having won parliamentary elections in a republic. He had to follow the rules of the multiparty democracy in its political decision to transform the National Movement Simeon II into a political party, announced at the end of 2001. The fact that in the presidential elections of 2002 the movement failed to nominate its own candidate, but instead backed the UDF candidate like all center-right parties, indicates the resilience of the established political system. In the words of one analyst, Bulgarian political culture managed to survive the “populist onslaught,” and its political infrastructure, being

“the country’s greatest achievement since 1990, had survived its greatest challenge”

(Dainov 2001).

Notwithstanding these considerable achievements, there are issues to watch for in Bulgarian political attitudes. One important concern is the growing gap between popular expectations of the democratic system and the political elite’s own agenda (Ivan Krastev 2003). Antiparty sentiments are growing among Bulgarians. Currently, only 20% claim to trust political parties and to consider them instruments of change (Freedom House 2003). At the local level, trust in local representatives is decreasing. According to the results of a 2004 poll, the majority of local residents are more interested in their own businesses than in the activities of their local government. Other important concerns mentioned by analysts are “the residual fascination with the state,” particularly among citizens over 40 years of age, and the “feeling of dependency” sensed in the 2001 massive election victory of the tzar, who won on the election platform of “care” for everybody (Dainov 2001).

However, the above concerns are elements of the same positive political environment Bulgaria has managed to create and sustain. This includes a solid and stable democratic system, fair and free elections for more than a decade, peaceful post-election transition of power, etc. Developing a strong democratic system is not just a matter of creating the right political and legal framework, but also a matter of educating citizens in their rights, responsibilities, and opportunities. In this respect, creating a political culture guarantees the sustainability of the democratic process.

12.2 Local Political Participation

Citizens’ participation in local politics depends on a variety of conditions, including their level of political culture and political awareness, the quality and quantity of information available, citizens’ education and training, as well as their genuine interest in local affairs.

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Most Bulgarian citizens exercise no other form of public participation in local political life than taking part in local elections. The LGS research established that the most popular action taken against decisions of local governments is to debate them in public meetings. Such meetings occurred in 60% of municipalities, and in almost two-thirds of the cases they were held at least three times. However, given the fact that such public meetings are usually ad hoc and often lack a structured framework, planning, and follow-up assessment, their potential to influence the local political agenda in a meaningful way remains limited. The second favorite method of showing public disagreement with local government is the collection of signatures. This action was taken at least once in 27.2%

of the municipalities, but the practical effect of petitions remains weak, as there is no real machinery by which they could effect change. The results of the survey confirm that, in general, residents are not used to challenging decisions of local governments directly.

Thus, challenges occured in 20% of the municipalities assessed. Demonstrations and protests are the least popular actions against decisions of local governments.

Table 2.80

Percentage of Municipalities Where Actions against Local Government Decisions Occur

No Action Once Twice Three and

More Times

Demonstrations 83.6 5.3 5.8 5.3

Collection of signatures 72.8 7.9 6.9 6.3

Protests 85.2 9.0 4.8 1.1

Public meetings 39.2 9.0 12.2 39.7

Challenges to decisions 79.9 9.0 4.8 6.3

Source: LGS 2003.

The low participation of citizens in local politics has been confirmed by polls and other surveys. Informal channels for lobbying the mayor, municipal councils, or the administration on particular personal interests are generally considered the most pro-ductive. Face-to-face contact regarding administrative procedures, rules, and sanctions is still the preferred route, becoming an integral part of the culture. Such practices not only invite corruption, they also jeopardize institutionalization of the rule of law and effective administrative and judicial processes. Citizens are less likely to believe they might get institutional support from civil organizations or political parties on their particular concern. Mass media are also generally not thought of as a tool for exercising some influence on local political life.

The relative lack of public participation in local political life apart from electoral activities demonstrates that knowledge and experience in using the tools of direct local democracy are still underdeveloped.

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12.3 Political Efficacy

The form of participation of citizens in local politics discussed previously has led to a low level of political efficacy. Thus, only 15% of respondents from a 2004 public opinion poll think that local residents can influence the local decision-making process. One-third are not interested in local affairs, as they are convinced that this will not change their personal situation. The majority is unaware of the opportunities available for participation in local political life beyond elections. Generally, respondents differentiate between the local and national political agendas only on specific issues. The central government is considered to be the focus of all problems related to unemployment, poverty, the inefficient legal system and rights protection, the high level of criminal activities, and so on. Local governments are blamed for not providing sufficient infrastructure, maintaining roads and streets, providing housing for the needy, and similar failings. It is widely believed that most public servants are corrupt. The majority of Bulgarian citizens believe that most politicians and administrators are corrupt (Vitosha 2003).

The general lack of information and experience with local politics partially accounts for these views. Most citizens are not aware of the possibilities they have to influence local political life and to provide some corrective to decisions or actions. They remain external observers to what happens in the community, as the information they get is mostly from the central media and concerns central government. In this way a vicious circle is perpetuated. One way forward is to involve the media, civil society, and businesses in a more vibrant discussion. Public discourse needs improved information and communication channels. The challenge now for both local governments as service providers and citizens as major stakeholders is to structure and intensify this dialogue.

12.4 Conclusion

Political culture remains a major challenge for the development of democratic processes in Bulgaria. The community of Western nations has recognized the political stability of Bulgaria and the country’s progress in establishing democracy and a market-oriented economy, by including it in NATO and setting a target date of 2007 for its accession to the EU. Therefore, the time has come for Bulgarian citizens to realize their own crucial importance in the further development of the democratic process. Political activism beyond participation in elections or mass demonstrations requires a qualitatively new discourse. Even where local representative democracy dominates over direct participatory democracy, the opportunities and tools for citizens’ involvement exist. The recent political profile of Bulgaria provides us with clear examples of more advanced forms of political culture. The discussion is no longer an abstract discussion of the democratic potential of Bulgarian citizens. Rather, it has become a concrete debate on how to

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strengthen citizens’ political culture in order to achieve the set goals of a political democracy. A major achievement of the transition so far is the fact that democratic institutions in Bulgaria have already recognized their enormous responsibilities with regard to strengthening citizens’ political culture. But this alone does not suffice. Now there must be an intensified and structured dialogue between citizens and institutions that allows for setting concrete and measurable goals and is based on the clear allocation of roles, responsibilities, and tasks on both sides. The degree to which the government succeeds in improving the quality of life of Bulgarian citizens will be very important, as it will set the conditions for upgrading the political landscape with new incentives, new entrants, and new ideas.