PART III. LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY
5. EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
5.1 Resource Control
The effective and autonomous control over resources is of key importance for the establishment of efficient local government.
The structure of the own revenues of the municipalities is given in Table 2.11. The constitutional provisions do not allow for independent management and control over the size of their own tax revenues, and allow only some control over revenues from local fees (within the limits defined by law). Before the passing of the Local Budget Law (MBL) the share of own revenues in the budget was relatively small—about 16%–18%. Since 1998, as the MBL changed both the definition of the types of revenues and broadened the sphere of the own revenues, the share of own revenues has tended to increase to levels above 60%.The limited fiscal autonomy of local governments, discussed previously in detail, is unanimously considered to be a substantial impediment to the planning and controlling capacity of local government.
The cooperation between local governments and NGOs is a widespread practice in Bulgaria. In 1996 the National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria (NAMB)1 was established and all municipalities are currently members. The NAMB role as legitimate representative of the municipal authorities vis-à-vis the central government institutions is legally affirmed, and it has proved to be a powerful mediator between local and central government, especially in negotiating the amount of state subsidies and in forming the part of the annual State Budget related to municipalities. The legal regulation on the interaction between NAMB and the different central government institutions needs more precision and specification in order to guarantee efficient negotiation procedures and effective partnership relations. Other important NGOs, which work exclusively within the sphere of local government, are the Foundation for Local Government Reform (FLGR), founded in 1995, and the established regional associations of municipalities.
The projects and activities of the FLFR are well known among local representatives and administrative officials. Their aim is to provide information, expertise, and financial support for local government initiatives. FLGR publishes a monthly newsletter (in print and in electronic versions) on local government innovations.2 There are a number of well developed local and regional NGOs. In many municipalities (Chepelare, Smolian, Kardjali, etc.) there are well functioning NGO centers that actively assist local governments in their policy implementation and in strengthening their interactions with citizen associations and local business.
The general objectives and specific tasks of municipal associations, as defined in their statutes, are aimed at providing additional management resources to its members:
information services, legal assistance, and management expertise. Currently there are
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twelve regional associations of municipalities. The quantitative data on the resources provided by these associations will be unreliable, as a substantial part of it is in kind (without a precise financial equivalent). The major impact of the municipal associations is the promotion of voluntary cooperation, which provides for unification and coordination of management and services, based on intensive networking.
In Bulgaria, the number of municipal administrative staff is determined on the basis of the number of inhabitants, according to a standardized ratio worked out by the central government. The municipal council considers these standards when deciding on the number of administrative staff. Only a small number of the administrative staff enjoys the status of civil servant, while the others are just municipal employees. Tables 1.34 and 1.35 show how the number of civil servants and municipal employees varies within the five groups of municipalities: the correlation between number of population and number of administrative staff is very strong.
Table 2.35
Number of Full-time Civil Servant Positions
Number of Full-time Civil Servant Positions
Type of Municipality Less than 10 11–20 21–30 More than 30 Total
Less than 5,000 13 1 14
5,000–9,999 42 3 45
10,000–49,999 59 35 1 1 96
50,000–99,999 1 9 8 2 20
Over 100,000 1 4 5 10
Total 116 48 13 8 185
Source: CAO survey.
Table 2.36
Total Number of Employees in Local Administration
Type of Municipality by Population
Total Number of Employees in Local Administration Fewer than
25
26–50 51–100 101–150 More than 150
Total
Lower than 5,000 8 2 3 13
5,000–9,999 9 29 7 45
10,000–49,999 1 30 51 13 2 97
50,000–99,999 1 15 4 20
Over 100,000 2 1 7 10
Total 18 63 62 29 13 185
Source: CAO survey.
T H E S T A T E O F L O C A L D E M O C R A C Y I N C E N T R A L E U R O P E
The competencies of municipal authorities are universally defined and do not depend on the size of the municipality. All local governments are obliged to perform these general functions, but they are assisted to a different extent by the central government depending on size, geographic location, social and demographic parameters, and economic and infrastructure specificities. The quality of the services provided also differs. Smaller municipalities usually have limited resources, but there are exceptions, such as small municipalities with profitable businesses located on their territory. When state subsidies are accounted for, only eight municipalities contribute to the state budget rather than being subsidized by it. Among them are both the municipality of Sofia with a population of 1.2 million people and the municipality of Chelopech with just 1,710 inhabitants.
Even some very big municipalities have more than half of their budget subsidized by the state (see 2000 UNDP Human Development Report).
The competence of the administrative staff may be assessed on the basis of the LGA survey. The number of years’ experience within the municipal administration, especially of the chief administrative officers (CAOs), is usually considered to be an indicator for his or her competence. The usual practice is that each newly elected mayor dismisses all chief administrative officials (the secretary of the municipal administration and the heads of departments). Unfortunately, this practice has been reaffirmed despite the passage of the Public Service Act, which gave the CAOs the status of public servants. Despite having legal guarantees, the municipal secretaries affiliated to the previous mayor either resign or are dismissed for a variety of reasons. This means that the principles of continuity and professionalism are seriously curtailed; currently, more than 60% of the municipal secretaries have less than four years of experience in their current position (see Table 2.37). Only 13.8% of the CAOs have kept their position for more than two mandates.
In eleven municipalities, there is the extreme case of people having worked as CAO even during the communist regime. The only professional requirements for the appointment of municipal secretary are educational, and even these are rather general—a university degree, with no specific preference for the type of education. The forthcoming local elections will be a genuine challenge to such practices, as these will be the first elections after the implementation of the public administration reform.
Table 2.37
Number of Years in Present Position as Chief Administrative Officer
Frequency Percent
Less than 4 118 62.4
5–8 34 18.0
9–12 26 13.8
More than 12 11 5.8
Total 189 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
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Most municipal secretaries are totally integrated into the life of their local communities, because they were either born there or have lived there for a very long (see Table 2.38). Six respondents claimed that they have never lived in the municipality where they work, but these are newly established municipalities, that have only recently acquired autonomy from a nearby big town. It can be said of CAOs in general that they are familiar with municipal problems even at the everyday level and are deeply entrenched in the local community.
Table 2.38
Length of Residence in Municipality
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Always 101 53.4 53.4
For a long time 70 37.0 37.0
For a short time 12 6.3 6.3
Never 6 3.2 3.2
Total 189 100.0 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
According to a survey carried out in 2002, fewer than half of the sample of 164 municipal secretaries had no experience in the municipal administration before their appointment as CAO, while 54.7% had some experience. The same survey provided information about the education of CAOs. The greatest share of municipal secretaries (39.1%) had a general humanities education; a similar proportion of councilors (37.9%) had a degree in engineering or another technical specialty; 14.6% of the interviewed secretaries had an economic degree; fewer than 1% of the respondents (six persons) had law degrees and only two were graduates in public administration. Two-thirds declared they had no specialization or secondary qualification in the field of public administration.
As a whole, the municipal secretaries seem to have a low level of specific qualification for their administrative position.
Despite their educational background, almost 70% of the municipal secretaries consider rules and procedures to be a priority in their work (see Table 2.39). Second comes the accomplishment of specific tasks; general satisfaction with the decision-making process seems to have little if any priority for the interviewed CAOs.
The chief administrators see the basis of their authority as coming from, first, promotion and increase in salary, and second, formal power and authority. Least significant was personal relations based on trust and confidence.
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Table 2.39
Chief Administrative Officers’ Priorities at Work
First Priority Second Priority Third Priority
Fre-quency [Per-cent]
Fre-quency
[Per-cent]
Fre-quency
[Per-cent]
Priority Consideration—rules 132 69.8 46 24.3 11 5.8
Priority Consideration—task accomplishment 40 21.2 97 51.3 52 27.5 Priority Consideration—general satisfaction 17 9.0 46 24.3 126 66.7
Leadership priority—motivation 78 41.3 66 34.9 45 23.8
Leadership priority—formal power 59 31.2 72 38.1 58 30.7
Leadership priority—personal relations 51 27.0 52 27.5 86 45.5 Source: CAO survey.
The deficit of administrative competence is considered to be a general problem for all levels of public administration in Bulgaria, outlined in all annual reports for the accession of Bulgaria to the EU. This is a common problem for all new democracies.
The building of administrative capacity is a key priority both for the legislature and the executive. However, careful monitoring shows no signs of substantial improvement in the desired direction—towards a professional, competent, politically independent, and transparent public administration.
On the whole, the perceptions of the local representatives confirm these general assessments. Table 2.40 presents municipal councilors’ evaluation of the competence of the local administrative staff (1 stands for “poor” and 7 for “excellent”). The results do not correlate to the size of the municipalities, which contradicts the natural assumption that big municipalities have greater resources (human resources included). It is also important to point out that local representatives consider administrative staff members to be politically biased, which undermines the available administrative capacity and is a serious impediment in achieving the general goals of administrative reform.
Table 2.40
Councilors’ Assessment of Local Administration’s Competence and Partiality
Size of Municipality by Population Partiality of Local Administration Competence of Local Administration
Less than 4,999 3.00 3.61
5,000–9,999 3.95 4.13
10,000–49,999 3.46 3.91
50,000–99,999 3.30 3.68
Over 100,000 3.31 3.79
Total 3.49 3.88
Source: LRS 2002.
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5.2 Decision-making Capability
Decision-making capability provides a genuine test for the effectiveness of cooperation between the different branches of local government (the council and the mayor); between the different party fractions represented in the council; and between politicians and administrative officials.
The law requires each municipal council to hold at least six sessions per year, but the number of sessions needed for effective decision-making is much higher. As shown in Table 2.41, a clear majority of the councils (74.8%) held at least one session per month in 2003, if the holiday season is excluded. In 14.3% of municipalities, the councils held sessions more often, but in at least nineteen municipalities (10.9% of respondents) the legal requirements for at least six sessions were not met and the decision-making process was consequently blocked.
Table 2.41
Number of Assembly Sessions in Municipalities (2003)
Number of Assembly Sessions Frequency Percent
Less than 6 19 10.9
6–12 131 74.8
More than 12 25 14.3
Total 175 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
The municipal councils are supposed to meet regularly and in accordance with a set schedule. The number (share) of extraordinary sessions is one of the indicators of inefficiency in the councils’ work. During the last year there have been extraordinary sessions in more than half of the Bulgarian municipalities (120 out of the 263). In fact, the total number of extraordinary sessions is comparable to the number of regular sessions. It is normal to have one or two extraordinary sessions per year, and there are some extreme cases with more than six (reported by three CAOs in the LG survey). There is no reliable information about the cause for these unplanned sessions (we can only guess whether emergency issues or lack of quorum at the regularly scheduled sessions led to the calling of an extraordinary session). We may also presume that there is a correlation between the existence of an unstable majority in the councils which blocks the decision-making process and the other indicators of inefficiency in decision-decision-making included in Table 2.42. Irresolvable conflicts and unproductive debates, which are time consuming, often provoke “failing quorum” as one of the main reasons for the low performance of municipal councils. Lack of quorum was cited as a cause for early dismissal of a council session by 42.9% of the local government officials interviewed.
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The postponement of decisions on certain issues is another indicator for low performance of municipal councils (Table 2.42). The data show that approximately half of the municipalities (55.5%) perform very effectively, while just 7% have very low performance. The other two indicators—budget promptness and mutual trust between the mayor and the council—are consistent with this tendency. The mayors in more than one-third of municipalities enjoy a permanent consensus with the council majority;
just 9.4% face irresolvable conflicts. A distinctive feature of mayor−council relations in Bulgaria is the opportunistic strategies of both parties—56.9% of the respondents indicate that the support for the mayor depends on the issue and is given ad hoc.
On the basis of the performance index, we can conclude that the inefficiency of a limited number of municipal councils (about twelve) has been so destructive that they have ceased to function as they approach the end of their election term.
Table 2.42
Indicators for Decisional Performance
High Performance Medium Performance Low Performance
Quorum (N 182) Always
a quorum—55.5%
Lack of quorum—44.5%
Postponement of decisions (N 182)
Very rare or no delays—55.5%
Delays from time to time—37.4%
One or more delays per session—7.1%
Mayor–council relationship (N 181)
Supportive of each other—33.7%
Depending on the issue—56.9%
Confrontation
—9.4%
Budget promptness (N 179) Yes—90% No—10%
Extraordinary sessions Less than 10%
or none—82%
10–20%
—5.8%
More than 20%
—12.2%
Source: CAO survey.
One of the fundamental reasons for the low performance (delayed decisions) of the municipal councils is the general lack of information—see Table 2.43. This is symptomatic of the ineffective communication between the municipal administration and the council and in some cases may be caused by the low administrative competence of the mayors, who often set the agenda of the council meetings without proper assessment of the available information and the preparatory work done by the administration.
The other substantial reason for delay and/or postponement of decisions is the difficulty in achieving consensus among various party fractions. Given the relatively low level of bargaining skills of local representatives and the unstructured and inefficient communication among party leaders and groups, shifting majorities appear to be counterproductive in many cases.
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Table 2.43
Most Frequent Reason for Delay in Council Decisions
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Lack of information 67 35.4 39.0
Lack of time 4 2.1 2.3
Obstruction 23 12.2 13.4
No agreement 46 24.3 26.7
No firm opinion 18 9.5 10.5
Other reason 14 7.4 8.1
Total 172 91.0 100.0
Missing 17 9.0
Total 189 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
Table 2.44
Planning and Programming in Local Policy by Sector [%]
Type of Document (Program, Action Plan, or Regulation) Exists Does Not Exist
Work schedule for the municipal council and its committees 74.1 25.9
Long-term economic development program 87.4 12.6
Long-term program for local government investments 50.9 49.0 Public sanitation or environment protection program 73.6 26.4
Program on public education 38.1 61.9
Sports program 41.0 59.0
Cultural program 46.3 53.7
Plan for the financial supervision of local government institutions 47.7 52.3 Guidelines for CAO reports for the mayor and the councilors 21.9 78.1
Public safety and crime prevention program 69.8 30.2
Health protection program 28.9 71.1
Housing program 19.0 81.0
Program to develop mass transportation 31.8 68.2
Communication strategy 56.0 44.0
Citizens’ appeals and petitions 48. 9 51.1
Public procurement regulation 50.8 49.2
Source: CAO survey.
The CAO interviews confirm that in all cases prescribed by the law, municipal councils have adopted detailed rules of procedures, statutes of the municipal
T H E S T A T E O F L O C A L D E M O C R A C Y I N C E N T R A L E U R O P E
administration and regulations, as well as long-term economic sector programs.
As seen in Table 2.44, the majority of municipalities have developed long-term economic programs, work schedules for the activities of the municipal council and its committees, public sanitation or environment protection programs, and public safety and crime prevention programs. Relatively new on the local agendas are public procurement regulations, communication strategies, and citizens’ appeal and petition regulations, adopted by the majority of municipalities. In the sectors heavily regulated by central regulations (education, health care, culture, etc.), the local councils are least active.
Municipality size also influences sector activities. In small municipalities it makes little sense to have a long-term program in education and school programs. Housing is the most neglected sector of local policy.
5.3 Output Control
Output control is the crucial test for government efficiency and is symptomatic of the ability of local authorities to mobilize the appropriate and available human, financial, and material resources. The key indicator in the implementation of local government projects is the correspondence between the goals and objectives on the one hand and the produced outcomes on the other. According to the CAOs’ assessment (Table 2.45), local authorities in Bulgaria still need to improve their effectiveness in the implementation of their projects and to tighten control over their performance.
Cost planning is effective in one-third of the municipalities. The share of cases with bad planning is the same. Projects are completed by the deadline in half of the municipalities, while the majority of answers suggests that there are few or no difficulties with operating costs.
Table 2.45
Municipal Planning Capacity [%]
Most of Them
Half of Them
Some of Them
Do Not Know
Total
Projected and real budget costs are
similar 31.7 15.3 37.6 15.3 100.0
Projects are completed by deadline 43.9 23.8 26.5 5.8 100.0
Great Difficulty
Little Difficulty
No Difficulty at All
Difficult to pay for current
operating costs 32.8 36.0 17.5 13.8 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
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Cost reviews occurred in approximately half of the municipalities (Table 2.46).
Most often they dealt with contracted-out or privatized municipal property. Others tracked administration costs. Least troublesome are the services provided by the local government via independent agents and municipal firms.
Table 2.46
Cost Reviews by Sphere [%]
Yes No Missing Total
Review of administrative costs 56.6 38.6 4.8 100.0
Review of the costs of local government institution services 42.9 48.1 9.0 100.0 Review of the costs of local government services 48.7 43.9 7.4 100.0 Functions privatized or contracted out 66.7 28.6 4.8 100.0 Source: CAO survey.
Bulgarian local government is highly autonomous in the area of provision of services.
The process of privatization of municipal assets started in 1991, right after the passing of the new constitution. At that time there was a legislative vacuum, which allowed for a high degree of discretion. Later, with the passing of the 1996 Law on Municipal Property, the central government introduced unified procedures and specific regulations for privatization and contracting out of services. The administrative services are still exclusively within the competence of the municipal administration, while all other services (refuse collection and disposal, public transport, water supply, central heating, construction, reconstruction, and maintenance of roads and infrastructure) are provided by a variety of public and private agencies. In fact, private companies are increasingly involved in contracting out services, which are within the sole competence of municipal governments.
Privatization deals or deals for contracting out of services were finalized in 66.7%
of municipalities in 2002. The local government administrators were asked to evaluate how successful the deals were, and also to what extent they have reduced the number of local government employees. As Table 2.47 shows, they rated the success factor much higher than the effectiveness in terms of reducing the number of employees. Privatization of municipal assets in Bulgaria is obviously driven by the lack of investment capacity and not by concerns over high cost of operation. Also, the assessment of success may prove to be very unrealistic. The long investment cycle usual for infrastructure projects makes it difficult to judge their efficiency during the initial stage.
The lower result for municipalities with a population of 50,000 to 100,000 reflects several controversial water deals that ended with municipalities pulling out of the privatization contracts after waves of public protests over price policy.
T H E S T A T E O F L O C A L D E M O C R A C Y I N C E N T R A L E U R O P E
Table 2.47
Assessment of Outputs from Privatization and Contracting Out (7-Point Scale*)
Type of municipality
How Successful is the Privatization/Contracting Out
Effect of Privatization/contracting Out in Reducing LG Employees
Less than 5,000 5.38 3.33
5,000–9,999 3.68 2.60
10,000–49,999 4.36 3.00
50,000–99,999 3.81 3.69
Over 100,000 4.60 3.44
Total 4.26 3.07
Note: * 1—total failure; 7—total success.
Source: CAO survey.
5.4 Conclusion
At the moment, fiscal decentralization is the main challenge for Bulgarian local self-government in its efforts to further the public administration reforms. The transfer of responsibilities and competencies has made necessary the transfer of resources to fund the new mandate, but for a variety of reasons, this crucial phase of fiscal decentralization has been slow to operate. The lack of effective and autonomous control over resources—
crucial to the efficient running of local government—is considered a substantial impediment to the planning and controlling capacity of local government. The human factor is also significant in planning, allocating, and managing the otherwise scarce financial resources, as well as in the provision of public services. Yet in spite of the legal and administrative changes made, the principles of continuity of services and professionalism are seriously curtailed. There is an overall deficit of administrative competence and professionalism. The many capacity building programs notwithstanding, monitoring has not yet shown much progress towards the goal of a professional, competent, politically independent, and transparent public administration. The decision-making capacity of local governments is undermined by the frequently opportunistic character of mayor–council relations, insufficient information, the poor administration skills of some mayors, and the lack of bargaining skills of the various party fractions that makes a consensus difficult to reach. Following the October 2003 local elections, the composition of local governments shows a diversity of parties and coalition patterns that will challenge their decision-making capacity. It remains to be seen whether pressure from the EU accession requirements for decentralization, and the declared political will of the Bulgarian government to implement effective and autonomous control of resources by local governments, will be sufficiently strong influences to move the agenda of change along.
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