complex system i.e. one characterized by a tight interrelation between parts and the collective behavior ofthe system. In order to disentangle such complexity an agent-based methodology proves to be particularly relevant since it explicitly allows investigating specific features ofthe overall system emerging fromthe interaction of agents and their behaviors. In this respect, the model allows for a comparison of two opposite scenarios depending upon the degree of severity in terms of required technology performance and upon the timing ofregulation: the high stringency scenario and the low-stringency scenario. The low-stringency scenario combines soft targets and late timing while the high stringency scenario combines tight targets and early timing. Results show that substitution that brings radical technological change and significant pollution reduction is possible only if regulation is stringent enough but after many sacrifices, especially in terms of market concentration and number of failures. The model’s findings are consistent with the empirical evidence – though rare – on the impact ofREACH on innovation such as displayed in the CSES report (2012). In the present work we aim to pursue the formal analysis of policy mechanisms by focusing on the role ofcredibility. Indeed credibilityof policy commitments to future standards is part ofthe relevant aspects of design and implementation to consider regarding the development of eco-innovation (Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011). Being a complex, ambitious and sequential regulation, credibilityofREACH may be a vital element of intertemporal decisions where actors adapt and learn over time. As discussed in the first section, the level of perceived credibility by a firm is important to take into account when assessing the efforts carried out by firms to cope with environmental regulation. In this work we aim to address this very point gaining ground on theABM developed in Arfaoui et al (2014), investigating how credibility influences technology transition. Section 2 summarizes the model developed in Arfaoui et al. (2014) since we restart from it to analyze the impact ofcredibility. The simulation allows for an analysis of two credibility parameters: one attached to suppliers and another to clients. Results are displayed in section 3.
The sheer size, reach and pervasiveness of a small number of digital platforms has sparked an intense global debate about the “power” of these platforms. This “power” extends far beyond traditional notions of market power that are debated and discussed by economists, and extends into areas such as “fake news” and political representativeness, censorship, national security and child protection. Of course, besides these concerns there is also a traditional market power concern—that platforms are prone to “tipping”, that indirect network effects and economies of scale can entrench dominance, and that the creation of vast ecosystems of complementary products provides an opportunity for platforms to entrench their dominance. These concerns, as well as concerns about privacy, data use, censorship, and the like are translating into regulatory enforcement and rulemaking. For example, the UK competition authority is looking at digital platforms and the advertising market, while the EC has launched a string of high-profile antitrust actions against Google and is currently consulting on a new competition tool focused squarely on digital platforms. Regulatory thinking is moving towards a set of special measures that include specific regulatory institutions, changes to merger control procedures, data portability and interoperability requirements, among other things. It is thus an opportune
At the time of its creation, the Appellate Body was considered as a kind of ‘afterthought', 84 ‘a kind of safety valve against a rare panel ruling that was seriously anomalous in terms ofthe general institutional understanding ofthe legal norms at issue’. 85 Initially, the WTO membership expected that recourse to the AB would be required infrequently so as to correct the findings of a recalcitrant panel. 86 With the AB deciding 155 cases since its inception thus far, 87 making it one ofthe most used international dispute resolution mechanisms, recent history has demonstrated otherwise. As Howse explains, the AB has established its independence from other organs ofthe WTO by various rulings. The AB has: adopted a textualist and formalist approach to its decisions guided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969; developed a doctrine of implicit judicial powers (for example, it has allowed amicus curiae briefs); emphasised the precedential weight of AB reports; allowed representation by private counsel; adopted a practice of consensus rulings; etc. 88 Therefore, the AB has clearly established itself as a judicial body. Despite the presence of certain atypical features for a judiciary, such as the requirement that AB reports must be adopted by the DSB (a political body) in order to be binding (an issue I will shortly return to), that the AB (and perhaps even WTO panels) (together referred to as ‘WTO tribunals’) constitute a judicial mechanism. As has been said, in ‘determining claims, WTO Tribunals act independently, much like international courts. They fix the boundaries ofthe dispute before them, marshal the evidence, determine the appropriate law, apply that law to the facts, and reach a decision.’ 89
airports appears to have artificially stimulated demand fuelling the rationale for capacity expansion. A well organised and vocal airline industry lobby ensured, in the first place, that RPI-X was the preferred model of economic regulation. This has provided them with the opportunity to extract considerable economic scarcity rent from their Heathrow route networks for at least twenty years. Their very persuasive hold on the direction of UK government policy towards air transport means that proposals to reform economic regulation in the UK are invariably shelved. Their considerable influence prompted the competition authority investigations into BAA’s alleged dominance ofthe airport market with the aim being to liberalise ownership of London’s principal airports. It is unlikely that a liberalised London airport market will be able to deliver capacity expansion. Highly leveraged independent operators will be constrained by a complex, lengthy and onerous planning system and resistance from highly organised, well connected and vocal pressure groups. BAA’s ownership ofthe three London airports should be maintained as this represents the only credible option of delivering additional capacity. The UK could also benefit from light handed economic regulation with BAA and its airline customers encouraged to reach an agreement on what level of capacity is needed for the future and how this should be remunerated.
internationally recognised as an independent state (as Slovenia and Croatia in 1991), but at this stage the internal conflict between the three ethno-national groups (44% Muslims, 31% Serbs and 17% Croats) had already turned violent. Neither Serbs nor Croats accepted Bosnian statehood, both groups and, in particular, their para-military forces were strongly supported by Croatia and Serbia. The war was characterised by extreme human rights violations, torture, rapes, massacres and "ethnic cleansing" which was deliberately used as an instrument to conquer territory and to destroy all mixed ethnic structures. The international community made several attempts to stop the war, for example by deploying UN peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR). But all negotiations and cease-fires eventually failed, and the war continued on a lower scale (see Calic 1996, Gow 1997). In March 1994, external pressure, particularly fromthe US, led to the establishment of a Muslim-Croat federation in order to counter-balance the self-proclaimed Serb Republika Srpska (regime of Pale). But only after the Serb side had suffered severe defeats by the combined Croat-Muslim forces and NATO air strikes around the besieged city of Sarajevo in August/September 1995, were the Serb president Milosevic and the Pale regime willing to negotiate a peace accord. The Dayton Agreement of 14 Dec. 1995 provided a new constitutional and territorial structure for Bosnia-Hercegovina. The state was subdivided into two "entities", the Serb republic and the Muslim-Croat federation, both based largely on the borders drawn by warfare. Each part was granted its own president, government and parliament as well as substantial competencies in all policy areas (except foreign policy, foreign trade, monetary policy, refugee matters and all- Bosnian infrastructure). Moreover, each "entity" was allowed to introduce its own citizenship and to maintain "special parallel relationships"
As the food crisis unfolded in 2008, many countries responded with changes to their trade policies with respect to agricultural products. In some cases, import restrictions or tariffs were lowered or removed so as to allow for additional food to reachthe country. Steps in this direction should help glob- al markets respond to the pressures on price. But some countries responded by placing limits on exports, in an effort to retain more food for their population. These actions introduce new distortions, create gaps between domestic and world prices, and lessen the incentives for farmers in the country imposing the restriction to increase their production. Trade in agricultural products has been manipulated by the industrial and the developing countries for decades, driven by artificially elevated prices in advanced countries and the desire of world produc- ers to have access to markets. With the fundamentals of food demand and supply now changing, and prices responding more sharply to demand shifts, it should be possible to do away with the old distortions and find ways to let food be produced efficiently and traded globally. Unfortunately, the Doha Round of trade negotiations, which had agricultural trade as a major element of its agenda, ran aground. At pre- sent, there is little likelihood that trade liberalization in the agricultural sector will happen anytime soon. Policy officials need to find a way to address again mutually beneficial moves that could contribute to the efficiency of world food production, benefit some ofthe world’s poorest people, and lessen the risks of another episode of a spike in food price inflation.
In view of these problems, this paper introduces a representative online survey of Ger- man citizens that is designed to measure thecredibilityofthe ECB’s inflation target. Using the exact wording ofthe ECB’s definition of price stability, we measure thecredibilityofthe inflation target directly and on a daily basis from January 2019 until May 2020. Our empiri- cal results suggest that thecredibilityofthe ECB’s inflation target has decreased significantly during this period. The largest drop in credibility, observed in March 2020, could be related to the economic disturbances stirred by the coronavirus pandemic. However, it is worth emphasizing that even though inflation rates in Germany have been clearly below 2% for several years, we find that thecredibilityofthe inflation target has declined mainly because Germans increasingly expect that inflation will be clearly above 2% over the medium term.
In this way, when protectionist ROOs are combined with bilateral cumulation, the result is higher profit for EU-based intermediate good producers (cloth makers in this case). The bilateral cumulation plus ROO acts like a Hungarian tariff on Polish cloth—a tariff that provides EU producers with an advantage in the Hungarian market. By contrast, diagonal cumulation—which would allow the Hungarian shirt-makers to use Polish cloth in meeting the ROOs—would not shift sales to EU cloth makers. The main point is that the same ROO can boost EU cloth-producers’ profits much more when it is combined with bilateral cumulation. Of course, the bilateral cumulation harms the Polish cloth-makers, but they have little political economy leverage in the EU-Hungary FTA negotiations. In a nutshell, supply switching is the driving force behind bilateral-cumulation aspects ofthe spaghetti bowl.
panel data set of 548 banks from 45 countries over the period 2005-11: banks with a higher cost of capital and better growth opportunities were more aggressive in reducing risk weights.
(iii) Banks used securitization to reduce regulatory capital, exploiting the lower risk weights that regulators attached to asset-backed securities than to the underlying loan pools: before the financial crisis of 2007-09, they increasingly relied on securitization methods that allowed them to retain risks on their balance sheets and yet achieve a reduction in regulatory capital, as documented by Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2013) for asset-backed commercial paper conduits. Notably, these regulatory arbitrage activities were performed mostly by large banks, which were better equipped to engage in them than smaller ones: for instance, they had the technical expertise to develop and tweak internal risk models. Moreover, large banks had the greatest incentive to do so: given their scale, achieving even a small reduction in the leverage ratio without affecting their regulatory capital ratio would translate in a massive increase in assets, more than sufficient to cover the costs ofthe quants and lawyers required to plan and carry out the regulatory arbitrage. As a result, especially for large banks, the regulatory capital ratio has become less and less useful as an indicator of future distress probability (Danielsson, 2002). Figure 7 crystallises this notion: Tier 1 capital ratios in 2006 were uninformative about the respective banks’ true default probabilities. Several large banks with high regulatory capital ratios in 2006 subsequently failed; conversely, several banks with low regulatory ratios in 2006 did not.
One benefit of information dissemination that has been less studied is that public information about firms’ emissions allows the victims to take more appropriate defensive measures (Evans, Gilpatric, and Liu 2009). For this purpose, the most important piece of information is the ambient pollution levels, rather than emissions from individual firms. Firms have a number of incentives to undertake voluntary measures to reduce their emissions. Lyon and Maxwell (2008) list demand-side forces due to the public’s increasing awareness and valuation of green products and practices, supply-side forces due to product differentiation and potential cost savings, and public policy forces due to current and potential regulation. Ambec and Lanoie (2008) show that firms can gain from improving their environmental performance through several channels, including better access to more environmentally demanding markets, being able to differentiate their products from others, gaining competitive advantages in pollution control technologies, and savings on materials and energies. Albertini (2013) reviews 52 studies over a 35-year period and finds that there is a positive relationship between firms’ environmental performance and their financial performance, and this relationship is influenced by the specific performance measures used. Earnhart (2018) reviews the empirical literature on the effects of environmental performance on firms’ financial performance, and finds that in general there is a positive relationship but it is sensitive to how the financial performance is measured. However, voluntary programs do not always create win-win situations for the environment and for the firms’ bottom line. Fisher- Vanden and Thorburn (2011) find that firms suffered reduced stock returns after they joined the US EPA’s Climate Leaders, a program of voluntary greenhouse emission reductions.
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(Echevarria (2004): S.i) und argumentiert dabei, dass der erfolgreiche Sturz eines autoritären Herrschers nicht über den Erfolg einer Demokratieförderungsmission, wie sie etwa im Irak unternommen wurde, entscheiden könne. Dabei zeige sich am Beispiel des Iraks, dass das amerikanische Militär durchaus einen gelungenen Regimesturz herbeiführte, nun sei es jedoch an der amerikanischen Regierung eine demokratische Ordnung zu etablieren (vgl. Echevarria (2004): S.10). Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt im Zuge von Demokratieförderungspolitik also eine erste Möglichkeit für liberale Staaten dar, etwa im Rahmen multilateraler Bündnisse ihre liberale Pflicht erfüllen zu können, das heißt beispielsweise nach einer militärischen Intervention den Wiederaufbau einer gesellschaftlichen Ordnung voranzutreiben (vgl. Cushman (2007): S.54). Aufgrund dieser Tatsache, dass durch das Militär im Irak erfolgreich die Option geschaffen werden konnte, den Staat zu demokratisieren und ungeachtet der vermeintlichen Fehler, welche danach seitens der amerikanischen Politik begangen wurden, gelte also: „[…] the use of force should not be ruled out a priori because the Iraq War has been so problematic“ (Cushman (2007): S.54). Der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt zum Zwecke der Demokratieförderung sei also nicht per se abzulehnen, denn dieser eröffne die Möglichkeit zu einer positiven Veränderung in einem anderen Staat beitragen zu können, während allein das Bestreben Stabilität aufrecht erhalten zu wollen nur dazu führe, tyrannische Regierungen und Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu dulden (vgl. Cushman (2007): S.54). In diesem Zusammenhang ergibt sich folglich der Schluss, dass also bislang noch keine Aussage über den ganzheitlichen Erfolg oder Misserfolg des US-Einsatzes im Irak getroffen werden kann, vielmehr sei es notwendig die Überzeugung, die Intervention im Irak sei gescheitert, fallen zu lassen und weiter zu investieren, um den Krieg nicht doch noch zu verlieren.
Accordingly, the government should focus on developing and executing well-balanced, comprehensive policies, taking into account the differences in the role ofthe private sector and government, and the trade-off between standardization and innovation and between information security and convenience. E-commerce encompasses a wide range of areas, involving several government ministries. There are doubts, however, over how well the respective authorities will be able to formulate and execute their policies in a comprehensive, organic and rigid manner. For instance, in September 2005, the then Ministry of Information and Communication (abolished in 2008) announced comprehensive measures to strengthen the security of electronic financial transactions, which allowed credit card companies to decide on whether to demand digital certification for online credit card purchases, based on the possibility that merchants may suffer from decreased sales. However, in the second revision ofthe Detailed Regulations on the Supervision of Electronic Finance on December 28th 2006, Article 31 paragraph 4, only online credit card purchases of less than 300,000 won were granted exemption from digital certification. In a further revision on May 20th 2014, Article 4 was amended to add debit card purchases to the exemption. Also, in 2008, the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) mandated that telecommunications service providers authenticate servers for the purpose of protecting consumers from online scams such as phishing. This, however, was not extended to financial institutions, who are most in need of such a mandate.
Apart from demand stabilization, short-time work has a distributive eﬀect, which is illus- trated in Fig. 10e and Fig. 11. Fig. 10e presents the absolute diﬀerence in average proﬁts on the ﬁrm-level between baseline and policy scenario. They are measured in nominal terms. As mentioned above, the short-time work program starts at period 8. The graphs of Fig. 11 show the distribution of sales (Fig. 11a) and proﬁts (Fig. 11b) among ﬁrms, expressed in terms ofthe Gini index, the median sales and median proﬁts (Fig. 11c and 11d) of ﬁrms, and the mean sales on the ﬁrm-level (Fig. 11e). Sales are measured as the amount of sold goods. The variables mentioned are shown before (period 0) and during the application of short-time work (periods 1 to 4). As noted above (Fig. 10), output further drops after the application of short-time work. However, since output decreases mainly because of a reduction in hours worked, instead of a lack of demand, the situation on the goods market improves. As it can be seen in Fig. 11c and Fig. 11a, reducing output does not imply that the amount of sold goods drops per se but the sales become more equally distributed among ﬁrms. The Gini index for sales drops signiﬁcantly while the median level of sales increases. In other words, the coordinated reduction of goods, supported by a (relatively) stable demand, implies that opportunities to sell goods improves for individual ﬁrms. This is an external eﬀect, a distributive eﬀect, in which the ﬁrm sector beneﬁts as a whole fromthe application of short-time work of some ﬁrms. Since ﬁrms can increase their sales, less ﬁrms realize losses and the majority even increase their proﬁts (Fig. 11d) such that the proﬁts also become more equally distributed among ﬁrms (Fig. 11b). The widespread growth of proﬁts and sales improve the expectations of a large number of ﬁrms and, thus, increase labor demand. The distributive eﬀect is particularly strong in the ﬁrst period, the introduction of short-time work. The mentioned variables hold a certain median level and level of distribution in the consecutive periods, as the median and Gini index do not reverse after the introduction. In addition, the distributive eﬀect is further analyzed econometrically in the Appendix (Tab. 5 and Fig. 19). The results of a ﬁxed eﬀect model are presented in Tab. 5. Keeping the
export duties as an environmental policy instrument requires a non-discrimination between exported goods and domestically-consumed goods.
In contrast, the non-discrimination requirement prevents countries from using export duties to ensure food security or subsidize domestic industries because the effectiveness of export duties to achieve these goals requires a discrimination between exported goods and domestically-consumed goods. In this way, a country can reduce upward price pressures in domestic markets or provide domestic industries with raw materials that are cheaper than those in the international market. The objective to subsidize domestic industries may be achieved under a specific exception provided by EU–Côte d'Ivoire (2016) which permits Côte d'Ivoire to impose export duties on a temporary basis for ‘protection for infant industry’. That RTA together with EU–Cameroon (2014) also permit Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon to impose export duties for environmental protection, which does not require a non-discrimination between exported goods and domestically- consumed goods. Under these exceptions, it might be necessary to adopt complementary domestic policies in order to avoid the increased domestic consumption that undermines the effectiveness of export duties to achieve environmental goals.
This is by the way one ofthe only insights Debord gives us in his childhood, which explains why my psychoanalytical chapter will be very short. Born "virtually ruined", Debord is obviously not ready to leave any (unconscious) inheritance for would-be psychoanalysts ofthe formerly leading figure of situationism. The childhood chapter is definitely missing here, in accordance with its proclaimed ruin. However one has to ask oneself what an absent heritage might mean in this case, because it is not so much a matter of money - up to his twenties, Debord has never been really poor - than a symbolic matter, a family matter. The "ruin" Debord emphasizes - but also covers with a mere financial problem - has more to do with the death of a father when he was five years old, with a mother who has never really taken care of him after the death of her husband and who has had two other children with an already married Italian man before marrying a rich notary in Cannes, kind enough - or old enough - to adopt the two last children of Madame Debord, but not her first son.
Transparency, Communication, and Evaluation
– There were some members of Congress who were very concerned about CBO becoming a policy spokesman for the Congress. Some of Rivlin’s many ini- tial public appearances highlighted this concern. But because Rivlin and sub- sequent CBO directors made their public appearances more technical than political, and because CBO did not make recommendations, this concern was mostly alleviated. Although some recent CBO directors have assumed very political positions after leaving CBO, generally all CBO directors have recog- nized the importance of emphasizing CBO’s technical work. In this regard, CBO directors strive to supply the budget committee chairmen and other members with CBO work that assists political officials – not CBO directors or staff – in making policy statements.
while learning in undergraduate and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of tutoring demonstrated in free drawings constructed by the students during the training of nursing students. Method: A qualitative research. The scenario a private college in Rio de Janeiro. The subjects 87 students from 1st to 7th periods in nursing. The ethical and legal procedures were present and the authorization ofthe Ethics in Research-Protocol n.º 581-11. Results: The analysis of data collected contemplated the thematic analysis. From reading the drawings we obtained an understanding that students value the mentoring, to having to build learning based on responsibility. Conclusion: The study aims to encourage students and teachers in achieving the best quality training. Descriptors: Education nursing, Preceptorship, Drawings.
The disastrous effects ofthe current crisis is the situation in which both sides ofthe conflict – the Tribunal supported by the majority of constitutional law experts and networks of legal professionals, and the ruling party allegedly supported by eight constitutional law experts – claim to act in accordance to the law. Paradoxically, both sides waive the flag ofthe rule of law but apply very different standards of interpretation. The situation may not stabilize without a compromise as long as there is always a counterargument based on the same legal norm subject to interpretation. Yet, one should emphasize that only some interpretations are in line with the tenets of constitutionalism as a prescriptive concept. Clearly, the unconstrained rule by the people is in essence the antithesis of constitutionalism.
By scrutinizing cross-sectional data, aerial photos and flow discharge records, this study shed some new light on the causes ofthe morphological changes in the lower reachofthe Tenryu River. The attention was placed on in-channel vegetation that is considered as a second order effect of dam construction. As a result, a vegetation-related erosion mechanism along the river course was identified.