Promotion of an eff ective foreign policy
5.6. Special topic: Rethinking relations with Russia
181 Such as the Main political treaty (November 2001), frequent high-level contacts, involvement of Russia in the resolution of the Trans-nistrian confl ict by means of the well-known „Kozak” Plan etc.
182 Two declarations regarding principles of democratisation and demilitarisation of the Transnistrian region and the appeal regarding the Iuscenko Plan on resolution through democratisation of the Transnistrian confl ict.
Promotion of an effective foreign policy Russia introduced restrictions on imports
of vegetal and animal goods from Moldova as a sign of the punitive economic measures that followed shortly.
Th e Voronin-Putin meeting in Kazan in August 2005 was the fi rst step to stop the regress and resume dialog in the Moldovan-Russian relations. Starting with October 2005, the Moldovan and Russian experts started intensive consultations in many ar-eas (political, economic etc.).
Th e period between August 2005 and August 2006 is marked by mitigation of the “unfriendly” rhetoric between Russia and Moldova and by inertia in the bilateral relations. Nonetheless, a number of events happened that aff ected the economic and trade relations between the two countries.
Firstly, the Republic of Moldova felt the new price policy of “Gazprom” regarding the gas exported to the CIS countries. In 2006, the price of gas imported from the Russian Federation183 increased in two steps from 80 USD per 1,000 cubic metres up to 160 USD, and will continue to increase over the next years up to 230-240 USD. Secondly, in March 2006 the sanitary authorities of Russia put an embargo on the imports of Moldovan wine products, invoking quality problems. Although the quality of Moldo-van wines imported to the Russian Federa-tion was not unquesFedera-tionable at all times, it is clear that this decision was the result of the strained political relations between the two countries.
Starting with the Voronin-Putin meet-ing in Moscow (August 2006), Chisinau attempts to rapidly improve relations with Russia, and expresses optimism in relation to acceptance by Moscow of an agreement package off ered by Moldova, which would, in parallel with the resolution of the Transnis-trian confl ict, ensure an improvement of the Moldovan-Russian relations and the resolu-tion of certain issues unresolved since the proclamation of independence: presence of the Russian troops in the Eastern rayons, economic and trade cooperation, guiding lines for Moldova’s foreign policy.
Th e package submitted by Moldova in-cluded off ers on all directions: neutrality, guaranties that the Russian troops will not be replaced by foreign ones aft er their
with-drawal, recognition of Russian property in Transnistria, a privileged regime for Russian investors on the right bank of Nistru river, joint investment projects. In return, Chisinau expected Russia to support Chisinau’s eff orts to solve the confl ict on the basis of territorial integrity of the country, where Transnistria would be granted an autonomy status.
Besides that, Moldova gives up its right to veto Russia’s accession to WTO (Novem-ber 2006), and at the beginning of 2007 signs an agreement thereon with Russia. In September 2006-January 2007, a group of Moldovan experts negotiate in quasi-secret conditions with their Russian counterparts, but do not reach any agreement.
Th ese negotiations raise suspicions with the Western partners, speculations in the lo-cal and international media, and the attempt of President Voronin to test with the politi-cal partners the idea of early elections leads to the dissolution of political consensus and strained relations between the government and opposition.
Although in June 2007 Voronin had three meetings with Putin, details on the substance of these discussions and provi-sions of resolution proposals are not known, except for the pledges of the Moldovan lead-ers that these proposals fall within the exist-ing legal framework and that any solution would be negotiated within the 5+2 format.
It is clear though that the price claimed by Moscow is higher than the one proposed by Chisinau.
In this context, claims made by the Mol-dovan leaders that all problems, except for the Transnistrian one, have been solved are not true. Russia would not accept any for-mula that does not include guaranties that Moldova will not leave its area of infl uence.
Accordingly, Moscow expects from Moldova concessions in the area of foreign policy as well. No progress was recorded in relation to the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transnistria. Moreover, Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty. Due to the beginning of the election cycle in Russia, it is diffi cult to believe that Moscow would change its position.
183 Starting with 2006, the Republic of Moldova imported 100% of con-sumed natural gas from Russia. The only supplier is the State com-pany „Gazprom”.
Promotion of an effective foreign policy
In the economic area, exports of the Moldovan wine to the Russian market have been resumed. However, this does not mean that all problems of the Moldovan wine-pro-ducers have been solved or that our exports will reach the previous levels. From a practi-cal point of view, the resumption of exports to the Russian Federation is not necessarily a success. Th e illusions of a fast return on the Russian market and occupying again a com-parable market share slowed down the pro-cess of modernisation of the industry184 and reorientation of exports to other markets.
Although Russia does not display any signs of readiness to make concessions in the most sensitive issues, the Moldovan leader-ship seems prepared to propose a higher price (such as facilitating the access of Rus-sian investors to strategic areas), hoping that this will convince Russia to respond sym-metrically. Nevertheless, such logic, along with a policy towards Russia built based on unrealistic expectations represent the main risks for Moldova in its relations with Rus-sia. Moreover, in the near future, Moldova’s relations with the Russian Federation will be subject to a number of serious risks.
Unresolved Transnistrian confl ict. Th e Transnistrian confl ict plays a central role in defi ning the Moldovan-Russian relations, similarly to Russia playing a key role in the resolution of this confl ict. As long as this situation does not change, the bilateral rela-tions will be shadowed and will not achieve normality. In this respect, Moldova takes of-ten a defensive position in its relations with Russia and perceives its dependencies as se-rious risks and vulnerabilities.
Asymmetry in economic relations. Th e Republic of Moldova depends totally on the gas supplied by “Gazprom”, a company controlled by the Russian state. Th e Russian capital represents 11.3% of foreign invest-ments into the Moldovan economy and has a quasi-total control over the economy of Transnistria. In addition, the Russian mar-ket continues to be very important for
Mol-dovan exports, with 17.4% of the total. Th e portion of the Russian market will probably increase due to the resumption of exports of the Moldovan wine to this country.
Migration fl ows. According to some cautious estimates, the Russian Federation hosts around 59% of temporary Moldovan migrants (190,000 persons)185. At the same time, revenues sent by the Moldovan mi-grants from Russia amount to some 50%
of the remittances sent by banks. Since this represents 36% of the GDP, it is diffi cult to underestimate the role of these resources for the economic growth of the country. Th e Russian policy towards the Moldovan mi-grants could pose therefore a serious risk for the Republic of Moldova. Russia could in-fl uence the situation in two ways: a) through a policy of migrants’ assimilation through governmental programmes – in this case, the Republic of Moldova would loss irre-versibly human resources and gradually the amount of remittances will decrease with the migrant families settling on the territory of Russia; and b) by expelling the migrants to Moldova – in this case, the Republic of Moldova loses unexpectedly remittances and has to accept back hundreds of thou-sands of active citizens, while the economy is not ready to absorb this labour force. Such a situation could generate serious social ten-sions in Moldova.
Infl uence of media. Th e Russian Fed-eration maintains its huge media infl uence over the Moldovan population, in particular through TV channels, but also newspapers and other information channels. In this re-spect, the results of the Barometer of Public Opinion of November 2007 are quite indica-tive: the Russian president Vladimir Putin is the most trusted politician for Moldova’s population, easily outrunning the president of Moldova, but also of Romania, Ukraine and USA186.
Reliance on models of direct negotia-tions. In its political negotiations with the Russian Federation, Moldova prefers to use models of bilateral non-transparent negotia-tions. Th is situation limits the opportunities of international community to get involved and places the Republic of Moldova in a very vulnerable position of a small state depen-dent on the Russian Federation. In this
re-184 By modernisation, we mean both improvement of the technological process and issues connected to quality certifi cation, management, and marketing strategies etc.
185 „Models and tendencies of migration and remittances in the Republic of Moldova”, Matthias Luecke, Toman Omar Mahmoud, Pia Pinger, IOM, 2007.
186 Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2007, Institute for Public Policy, www.ipp.md.
Promotion of an effective foreign policy spect, the reduced or negative international
visibility of the Republic of Moldova as compared to other CIS countries should not come as a surprise (see also section HOW WE ARE SEEN IN THE WORLD). A re-duced or negative visibility can also favour a
“backstage” agreement between Russia, the West and other regional powers that would disregard the interests of Moldova.
Internal situation in Russia. Th e Rus-sian Federation becomes gradually more assertive in international politics and eager to regain its image of a global player. At the same time, Russia is going though a period of reconsidering its existential reasons and its place in the world. For the time being, Russia is not able to off er an alternative and attractive vision for the neighbouring coun-tries and to effi ciently use soft -power in-struments, nevertheless, the situation might change aft er a while.
Th e relations of Moldova with the Rus-sian Federation will continue to be of ma-jor importance in the near future. On one hand, the Russian Federation is and will continue to be a major player in the region.
On the other hand, due to the geographical and historic “limitations”, the Republic of Moldova is bound to maintain with Russia at least pragmatic relations, and not neces-sarily a “strategic partnership” as claimed in a triumphant manner nowadays. As a result, the development of a realistic and multi-di-mensional long-term policy towards Russia remains a priority for the decision-makers in Moldova. Such a strategy should take into account the following recommendations:
Th e Transnistrian confl ict will remain the apple of discord which will largely shape the nature of Moldovan-Russian relations. Th e resolution of this confl ict is a distinct issue, however a fair solution thereto can be found easier in an
inter-national context, with a pro-active involvement of the major actors of international politics. At the same time, the resolution of the confl ict sho-uld be placed in the context of the process of Eu-ropean integration, an objective proclaimed as a strategic one for the Moldovan foreign policy.
Energy dependency on Russia cannot be avoi-ded, but can be diminished. Reducing this de-pendency implies not only identifi cation of other suppliers (transportation of gas from other sour-ces needs to be accepted anyhow by “Gazprom”
for the use of its pipe network), but also increase in the gas use effi ciency by reducing losses and a greater use of renewable energy sources. As to the price and security of supplies of the gas bought from “Gazprom”, the best solution would be to adhere to transparent negotiations based on the clear and predictable principles for price review, which would prevent Moldova from be-coming vulnerable in the negotiation process.
In order to reduce the trade dependence, a di-versifi cation of export markets is needed thro-ugh negotiation of advantageous agreements with other partners and an increase of the Mol-dovan products competitiveness. At the same time, the Moldovan authorities and companies should make stronger use of the international legal instruments and media to protect their trade interests. Concomitantly, the Republic of Moldova would benefi t from Russia’s accession to the international trade and economic organi-sations (e.g. WTO), which involve multi-lateral mechanisms for ensuring the observance of un-dertaken commitments.
Th e Republic of Moldova needs a great Euro-pean advocate. Such a partner should assist Moldova in promoting its legitimate interests and ensure a greater attention from the Euro-pean Union to the problems faced by Moldova.
Th e development and application of a strategic approach in relations with the Rus-sian Federation would allow building of a strategic and pragmatic partnership that would ultimately serve both parties.