From many aspects the 1870s was one of the most important periods in the his-tory of Southern Africa. Key events such as the mineral revolution, the discovery of the diamond fields in Griqualand West, the subjugation of the Zulu kingdom and other independent African chiefdoms, the Transvaal Rebellion (1880–1881) and the strengthening of the Afrikaner nationalism indisputably shaped the face of the subcontinent.
My hypothesis is that the British colonial policy in Southern Africa during the second half of the 19th century can be characterized by different tendencies and changes. One of these tendencies was the British intention for the unification of the divided subcontinent (colonies and states) to organize a loyal, self-governing, white (particularly British)-dominated British South African colony like Canada, New-Zeeland or Australia. This study discusses this unification, with reference to the British official political tools and methods used in the Transvaal for the inte-gration of the republic, as well as the role of this territory in various British con-federation schemes. Between 1877 and 1881 the South African Republic was un-der British rule, which (term) situation provided a unique chance for the Colonial Office to promote the confederation there. This was the main reason why I chose this period.
Concerning the historiography of the South African Confederation, I have to highlight two historians. The first is Clement Francis Goodfellow and his book called Great Britain & South African Confederation (1870–1881).1 Goodfellow examined the impact of the British statesmen’s personalities on the South African colonial policy. Unlike him, Norman Etheringhton neglected the „Imperial Fac-tor” and emphasized the importance of the local intentions (especially the inter-ests of Natal) and the labour supply.2
1 Clement Francis Goodfellow, Great Britain & South African Confederation (1870–1881), Cape Town, 1966.
2 Norman A. Etherington, “Labour Supply and the Genesis of South African Confederation in the 1870’s”, The Journal of African History 20 (1979) 235–253.
The main sources of my research were the official correspondence between the statesmen of the Colonial Office, for instance Lord Carnarvon, and the men on the spot, the Governors and High Commissioners, like Sir Bartle Frere or Theophilus Shepstone. Furthermore, I examined the Hansard’s Parliamentary De-bates and other official documents, for instance the South Africa Bill or the Con-stitution of the South African Republic.
Southern Africa and the South African Republic in the 1870s
In this period the subcontinent was economically, culturally and, above all, politi-cally divided into the British colonies (Cape Colony, Natal, Griqualand West), the Boer republics (Orange Free State, Transvaal), and African chiefdoms.
According to the theme of this presentation now I only focus on Transvaal’s political system. „The right to manage their own affairs and to govern themselves according to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British Government”3 was guaranteed for the Transvaalers by the Sand River Convention of 1852. This document determined the Anglo-Boer relations for more than the next two decades. Although the constitution of the South African Republic the Grondwet, which came into force in 1858, just like in the case of the Orange Free State, was based on the constitution of the United States, some differences can be found between the two constitutions. For example according to the former docu-ment, in Transvaal it was only the members of the Dutch Reformed Church (Ned-erduitsch Hervormde Kerk) who possessed the franchise and could bear office.4 In a comparison with Cape Colony’s political system, where the franchise did not depend on religion or race, more serious dissimilarities appear. The Africans, the colored were completely disfranchised, as the resolution of the Volksraad stated:
„ […] they [all the colored people] may never be given or granted rights of burgh-ership.”5
As the Grondwet stated: The President of the Executive Council is the first or highest official” in the republic and „[…] all public officials are subject to him.”6 The place (institution) of the legislation was the unicameral Volksraad, which was elected only by white burghers. Besides the President, the Commandant-General, who was the leader of the army, was also an influential official, and member of the Executive Council.
3 Sand River Convention, in George von Welfling Eybers, Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History 1795–1910, London, 1918. 358.
4 Constitution of the South African Republic, in ibid., 368–369.
5 Resolution of the Volksraad, 21 Nov. 1853, in ibid., 362.
6 Constitution of the South African Republic, in ibid., 376.
Basically, with respect to the relationship with Great-Britain and the British colonial policy, Transvaal had two disputed questions. The first issue was a terri-torial debate in the Keate Award area (in the Western border of the Transvaal) and the plan for a railway between Pretoria and the Delagoa-Bay, which would provide an outlet for Transvaal to the sea and it would certainly open up the re-public for other powers (for example Germany). To prevent the building of this railway was a vital question for the Colonial Office.7
The British Colonial Policy and the Transvaal
in the Light of the Confederation Schemes, 1850–1881
The history of South African Confederation can be easily traced back to the 1850s when the third Earl Grey was Secretary of State for the Colonies. The idea of the South African unity and the federal transformation of the subcontinent, a major pattern of the British colonial policy in this region in the 1870s, were born during his term of office, between 1846 and 1852. In order to understand the Transvaal’s role in these plans, it is necessary to have a short, schematic review of the various British South African confederation schemes, 1850–1881.
In a chronological order the first was the third Earl Grey who planned the uni-fication of the subcontinent on official level. He visioned a great South African colony, the extension of the British control to the hinterland and the introduction of the free trade as well. From his point a view the confederation would defend the Africans from the encroachments committed by white settlers, it would also provide better conditions for the civilization of the tribes and spreading the Chris-tianity among them. From his point of view Britain had a great responsibility by the possessing of the colonies and had great and dignified duty: “I conceive that, by the acquisition of its Colonial dominions, the Nation has incurred a responsi-bility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw off. The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under Provi-dence, of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the earth, and thereby assists in diffusing amongst millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity and civilization.”8 Lord Grey was convinced about the “civilizing in-fluence of commerce”, which with the work of the missionaries, within the bor-ders of a confederation would civilize the native tribes.9 Although Earl Grey’s
7 Cornelis Willem de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, Cambridge, 1937. 106.
8 Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell’s Administration I., London, 1853. 13.
9 Earl Grey to Sir H. G. Smith, 12 Nov. 1850. In Correspondence with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope relative to assumption of sovereignty over the territory between the Vaal and Orange Rivers [1360], 94.
scheme, which was based on his humanitarian and philanthropic attitude, was re-jected probably by the Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, he permanently ex-posed his views about the South African politics during the next decades.10 Lord Grey published three pamphlets which concerned with the South African Confed-eration and the problems of the unification of the subcontinent which indicate the importance what that question meant for him.11
The next proposer of the confederation was Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner (1854–1861). This was the first, but not the last time that the confederation policy was elaborated in South Africa, which caused conflicts in some periods between the Governorship and the Colonial Office. In Sir George Grey’s case there were huge differences between his plans about the confederation plans and the South African policy of the Colonial Office (the Sec-retary of State for the Colonies was Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton).12
The concept of the South African Confederation was in some parts similar to Earl Grey’s scheme when the Duke of Buckingham and Earl Granville were the heads of the Colonial Office. Both of them were convinced that the protection of the Africans was the Imperial Government’s duty, but in order to reduce the Im-perial responsibilities, the white settlers had to defend themselves. It meant that Earl Granville started to withdraw the Imperial troops from South Africa.
For Lord Kimberley, the leader of the Colonial Office during Gladstone’s first Premiership from 1870 to 1874, the consolidation of the Diamond Fields crisis was the main South African issue. He was hoping that the ownership dispute about the Diamond Fields would be easily solved within the Confederation. The cornerstone of Kimberley’s scheme was Cape Colony and the colonial initiation, the desire for the unity, which he found the most important preliminary necessity for forming the Confederation but the unwillingness of Cape political leaders de-termined the fall of the liberal plan.
The British confederation schemes of the period before 1874 can be divided into two groups:
To the first belong the Earl Grey’s plan and those which viewed the Confed-eration from a humanitarian and philanthropic aspect. Others emphasized the fi-nancial advantages of the united South African colony, namely the reduction of the Imperial expenditures and responsibilities.
10 John Ward, The Tird Earl Grey and Federalism, 1846–1852. The Australian Journal of Politics and History 3. (1957) 28.
11 Earl Grey, “Past and Future Policy in South Africa”, The Nineteenth Century 5 (1879) 583–596..; South Africa, The Nineteenth Century 8 (1880) 933–954.; The Prospect in South Africa, The Nineteenth Century 21 (1887) 428–451.
12 C. F. Goodfellow, Great Britain, 21.
Lord Carnarvon’s Confederation Policy, 1874–1878
Disraeli’s second government brought about various changes in the British colo-nial policy, particularly in South Africa. Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had great experience in the process of the colonial unification.
During his first Secretaryship of State, in 1867 the British North America Act was introduced which brought federal unity for the British colonies in North America.
The Canadian model was in many parts an example for Carnarvon in the case of South Africa.13
Carnarvon’s confederation scheme can be summarized by its three main ele-ments:
The first, which was his primary motive, was to secure the hinterland of Simon’s Bay and its military and naval station which had a high strategic impor-tance in Imperial level. Simon’s Bay, from his point of view, even in the case of the Confederation, had to be retained under Imperial control. In favor of the better protection of this second Gibraltar (that is the second point) Carnarvon knew well that the colonists’ loyalty was indispensable. To attain this purpose it seemed nec-essary to give them self-government. The third main point of his plan and strategy concerned with the native relations. Carnarvon hoped that the shadow of the anti-white black alliance and the independent tribes would convince the anti-white com-munities about the necessity of the intercolonial common policy affecting Afri-cans, which could be the first step on the road to the South African Confederation.
Nevertheless, he and other leaders of the Colonial Office found essential to main-tain some control over the South African native policy.
In addition, there were other patterns which highlight Carnarvon’s policy from others. Unlike his predecessors, who had only concentrated on the remedy of the actual conflicts, Lord Carnarvon had a colonial and imperial perspective and be-lieved that the Confederation would determine the future of the British interests in the subcontinent for a long time. The South African Confederation, being the way to guarantee the security of Cape’s naval station, was a cardinal part of his impe-rial perception.
In contrast with Lord Cardwell or Lord Granville Lord Carnarvon did not care about the financial burden of the British colonial policy in South Africa and unlike Kimberley, he did not wait for the South African initiation to propose the confederation.
Although his successors, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach (1878–1880) through Sir Bartle Frere, the Governor of Cape, and for a short time the liberal Lord
13 Carnarvon to Barkly 15 Nov. 1875, in Further correspondence relating to the colonies and states of South Africa [C. 1399], 28–29.
ley attempted to maintain the confederation policy (after the British defeat in Isandhlwana just the sham policy), Carnarvon’s scheme failed during the summer of 1880 because of the resistance of the colonies.
The Annexation of the Transvaal
It is necessary to emphasize the fact that between 1877 and 1881 the Transvaal was under a direct British rule. The roots of the British annexation can be found in the South African Republic in 1876.
The failures of the war with the Pedis in North Transvaal as well as the empty Treasury induced the Volksraad to ask Her Majesty’s Government to undertake the governing of their country.14 It seemed a unique and historical chance for the Colonial Office to neutralize the Sand River Convention of 1852 and carry out a bloodless annexation. In his letter to Sir Henry Barkly, the Governor of Cape and High Commissioner, Carnarvon exposed his opinion: „It would then, in any case, be necessary for Her Majesty’s Government to insist upon this war being brought to a speedy close, and to take sufficient guarantees against any similar danger to British interests in future. There can be no doubt that the safety and prosperity of the Republic would be best assured by its union with the British Colonies, when no occasion for local wars would continue to exist. […] But the course which events have taken leave me no longer in the same position, and it is obvious that my inclination in favour of continuing to co-operate with the Transvaal as a sepa-rate State may have to be modified.”15
Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who entered to the Transvaal on 4th January 1877, was sent to the South African Republic as a Special Commissioner.16 His mission was to convince the Volksraad about the necessity of the annexation, but when President Burgers and the political leaders showed unwillingness, Shepstone pro-claimed Transvaal a British colony on 12 April 1877.
14 C. F. Goodfellow, Great Britain, 114.
15 Carnarvon to Barkly 22 Sept. 1876, in Correspondence respecting the war between the Transvaal Republic and neighbouring native tribes, and generally with reference to na-tive affairs in South Africa [C. 1399], 103.
16 D. M. Schreuder, The Scramble for Southern Africa, New York, 2009. 13.
Political Tools and Methods
Lord Carnarvon, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach and Lord Kimberley, the Secretaries of State for the Colonies between 1877 and 1881, operated with numerous political tools and methods in order to involve the Transvaal to the South African Confed-eration.
The Colonial Office sought to organize a conference, presided by the Secre-tary of State for the Colonies, where the delegates of the South African states and colonies would make a decision in favor of the confederation and would negotiate about the details of the unity. Although year by year the conference appeared in the sources as a potential solution for the conflicts, the Colonial Office could not convene all the delegates.17
Moreover, especially in period between 1874 and 1875, Lord Carnarvon at-tempted to bind Transvaal and President Burgers closer to Britain by promises.
The Secretary of State tried to exploit the Transvaaler’s land shortage and the de-sire to expand in the Keate Award Area and in the Zulu territory, exactly in the Utrecht region.
Furthermore President Burgers’ long-cherished dream about the railway be-tween Pretoria and Delagoa Bay, which would provide a sea outpost for Trans-vaal, a link to the world and a chance to break out from the British encirclement, was also an important but less effective element of Carnarvon’s stratagem. In a case of Transvaal’s willingness to take part in the Confederation, he promised British capital to Burgers and contractors to build the desired railway as well as a possibility to expand the borders of the South African Republic within the Con-federation.
During the negotiations in London 1875 Burgers seemed to be openminded about Carnarvon’s plans. As Lord Carnarvon notced in his diary Burgers accord-ing to the Confederation: “approved of every word and that he would give me every support and assistance in his power”.18 Although the promising signs, the attempt to make the Transvaalers enthusiastic supporters of the federal unity in this way was unsuccessful. The efforts to bind the Boers closer by the British con-structed railway also failed – the Boers tried to find investors on the continent, for instance in Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and Germany.19
17 Barkly, Letter addressed to the Presidents of the Republics and to Lieutenant-Governors of South African Colonies 25 Jun. 1875, in Correspondence respecting the proposed con-ference of delegates on affairs of South Africa [C. 1399], 13.; Carnarvon to Bulwer 14 Oct. 1877., in Further correspondence respecting the proposed confederation of the colo-nies and states of South Africa [C. 1980], 29.
18 Peter Gordon (Ed.), The Political Diaries of the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, 1857–1890.
Colonial Secretary and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, London, 2011. 250.
19 De Kiewiet, The Imperial, 97–98.
Lord Carnarvon and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach relied largely on the British co-lonial officials, the Governors and High Commissioners, the men on the spot. It is worth to highlight two officials from that factor: Anthony James Froude and Sir Theophilus Shepstone.
Froude, historian and the editor of Fraser’s Magazine, was Carnarvon’s eye and ear in South Africa in the period between 1874 and 1875 without any offi-cial power, before the Secretary of State launched his new policy. In Clement Francis Goodfellow’s opinion he was the primary source of information about the subcontinent for Carnarvon, who based the confederation scheme upon Froude’s experience.20 Froude was an enthusiastic advocate of colonial federa-tion and was definitely against any policy which purpose was to get rid of the colonies. He criticized hevily the colonial policy of Gladstone and Lord Kim-berley: “Gladstone and Co. deliberately intend to shake off the Colonies. They are privately using their command of the situation to make the separation inevi-table.”21
In March 1874 Froude informed Carnarvon about his plan: travelling to Aus-tralia to scrutinize whether the colonies could be drawn closer to Britain. Lord Carnarvon offered South Africa instead of Australia. For Carnarvon Froude as a well-known supporter of the idea of the colonial federation, seemed to be the most suitable and reliable person for gathering secretly informations about the chances of the unification of the South African colonies and states. Carnarvon no-ticed in his diary the objects of Froude’s secret mission: “I explained what I wished him to give his attention to in South Africa, specifying three subjects in particular:
1. generally Federation
2. relations of Free States and Nations and ourselves
3. Natal in reference to recent insurrection. Agreed on this head that if
3. Natal in reference to recent insurrection. Agreed on this head that if