There is no magic elixir that will guarantee success in war, and while proxy warfare is far from one, it remains an especially relevant tool in a state’s kit.
While it is fraught with dangers and challenges, proxy warfare can be an extremely advantageous method of damaging one’s enemy and promoting one’s own interests. The major adversary of the West in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran, understands the importance of proxy warfare and has employed Proxy organizations to great effect against American and Israeli interests. At the same time, the United States and Israel seem reticent to properly study and employ Proxies in a systematic fashion—a result of past traumas. This imbalance is a major advantage for Iran; without the possibility of carefully planned and managed proxy campaigns, the United States and Israel will continue to face an uphill climb against Iranian interests in the region.
As Western countries consider returning to a broader use of Proxies in the Middle East, their leaders and thinkers will look to the existing body of literature in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. If they do not take into consideration the ways in which proxy warfare has changed, they will be employing a tool in a way that does not match the times. This project is part of the effort to create a relevant body of literature for today’s challenges.
The key is to understand when to use Proxies, how to manage the relationship, and how to properly exit the relationship. These are some of the questions this work seeks to address—to provoke critical thought about proxy warfare and ask crucial questions at each stage of proxy warfare execution. This research attempts to identify the recurring challenges Patrons face in their use of Proxies, the inherent risks, and the means of addressing those problems.
Principles of Hybrid Warfare
The fundamental principles of warfare have not changed since man organized into communities that competed for resources. Warfare, as defined here, is a method of political coercion through violent acts. Warfare is not carried out through military power alone. Other tools of the state have always played an important role as well, particularly through diplomatic, informational,
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and economic means. The directly attributable use of state military power is typically the means of last resort to achieve a nation’s ends.
Within the last several years there has been an increased focus by Western powers on the idea of deliberate management of conflict thresholds, using all of the regional powers’ available means to achieve their goals without provoking a major war. This idea has been called several things, from “grey zone,” to “hybrid warfare,” to “irregular war.” However, a nation’s use of indirect tools to gain a strategic advantage without provoking all-out war is nothing new for Western nations. As the Finnish scholar Raitasalo notes,
“Hybrid warfare is the [reintroduction] of the traditional Great Power logic within shared Western understandings of international security. Hybrid warfare is a Western construction—not a Russian one.”5
What may be novel is a reinvigoration of the pursuit of strategic objectives through hybrid means, which is free from the fear of reprisals from an international community that seeks to avoid confrontation at all costs. Hybrid warfare represents a return to Machiavellian pragmatism, where the state takes indirect advantage of conflict to achieve political objectives. Proxy warfare is a sub-element of hybrid warfare, and like hybrid warfare, it is still a risky bet—one fraught with the danger of escalation beyond the control of the Patron that initiates it. If the result of proxy warfare action is the initiation of open warfare, then the proxy war failed. If, however, a nation achieves its goals without shedding its own blood, the risk may be worth it.
Principles of Proxy Warfare6
Before identifying elements that detract from or contribute to successful proxy warfare, it is important to define the term and identify key principles that shape its use.
Definition of Proxy Warfare
Carelessness in defining the term proxy warfare may result in misleading or vague conclusions, as discussions of the subject often fall victim to vague definitions or sloppy ones that include related, but different, modes of warfare.
While proxy warfare is undoubtedly a type of partnership, it is a specific type
5 RAITASALO, Jyri. “Some Finnish Findings on RU-UKR War Focusing on Grey Zone and Hy-brid Warfare” (Lecture, 2016).
6 The remaining sections of text present original concepts, from the combined JLLD / Dado Center team or JLLD alone, that were developed through extensive research and analysis of historical, open source case studies.
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of partnership. Not all alliances are proxy relationships, nor are all outside interventions in local conflict. The authors define proxy warfare as:
A relationship between two entities, be they states or organizations, in which the more powerful actor (“Patron”) uses the other to accomplish its foreign policy goals; the less powerful actor (“Proxy”) is fighting in a local armed conflict that the Patron wants to influence while limiting its own direct involvement. The two share a common enemy; both envision benefits coming from the relationship; and they coordinate activity during the conflict.
At its most basic, proxy relationships involve a Patron who works through a Proxy to harm the Target. But there are often other players: There can be two or more Co-patrons working directly with the same Proxy. A Patron often works through an Intermediary country or organization to reach the Proxy.
A Proxy can even have its own Proxy through which it harms the Target.
Oftentimes, more than one of these possibilities are present simultaneously.
Key Principles that Help Define Proxy Warfare
Underlying the concept of proxy warfare are seven key principles that help define its basic characteristics:
Community. The strength of the underlying, unifying strategic goal between the Patron and Proxy is dependent on the strength of community association between the two. Community can involve a shared social, tribal, ethnic, religious, caste, or racial connection that makes the relationship between Patron and Proxy stronger.
Purpose. If multiple Patrons are involved in a proxy warfare campaign against a Target nation, all the Patrons will have a unifying strategic goal. Even if Patrons have secondary goals, there must always be a primary, powerful, and unifying strategic goal.
Aggregation. As the number of Co-patrons increase, the effectiveness of the proxy war in the near term improves, especially if the underlying, unifying strategic goal (described above) is strong and clearly defined.
Time. The Patron’s ability to predict the implications of its proxy war decreases over time.
Negative Effect. Proxy warfare is optimal when the desired effect is negative (e.g., to damage a Target nation’s assets, degrade government-supported Targets, destabilize a regime). Positive effects such as “nation building”
or post-conflict reconstruction by the Proxy should be avoided.
Space. The strength of the relationship between the Patron and Proxy increases when there is a geographic “safe zone” in which the Proxy
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can train, plan, work, and recuperate with an Intermediary and/or Patron without fear of attack.
Scope. The likelihood of Patron success improves when the end goal is specific and the proxy warfare campaign scope is limited.