Iran, acting as a Patron, experienced some success in executing proxy warfare against a Target group (anti-regime rebels in Syria) as a result of having a shared religious background with its Proxies, maintaining clear strategic aims, and through frequent use of a capable Intermediary/Partner (Hezbollah) when necessary.38 At times, the Proxy’s successes were curbed by the Patron’s focus on other regional activities.39
During Syria’s Civil War, Iran used proxy warfare to support the regime.40 Using both Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias, Iran worked to support Assad against attacks by opposition forces and regain control over his country.41 While Iran was limited by its own competing strategic goals and changing dynamics (e.g., ISIS gains in Iraq) that required it to shift levels of support to its Proxies in the region, it was successful in its use of proxy warfare in Syria because:42
Shared religious affiliation: Iran and its Proxy are linked by their shared belief in Shia Islam, which enables strong links and commonalities.43
Enduring strategic goals and assured continuity of Patron’s leadership.
Capable Intermediary: Hezbollah filled multiple roles for Iran that were supportive of Iran’s goals (i.e., Proxy, Intermediary, Partner/Co-Patron).44
Flexibility: The Patron deployed its own military advisors when necessary into the operational area.45
Experience: The Patron had decades of experience using proxy warfare throughout the region, particularly with Shia militias.46
38 KNIGHTS, Michael. “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria,” The Washington Institute, PolicyWatch 2096; 27. June 2013 – http://washingtoninstitute.org; BERTI, Benedetta. “Proxies, Partners-State and Non-States,” Presentation at the IDF Dado Center, 16.
August 2016.
39 MCINNIS, Matthew. “Iran’s Strategic Thinking: Origins and Evolution,” American Enterprise Institute, May 2015; ii, 4, 15–17, 20 – https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Irans-strategic-thinking.html.
40 SMYTH, Phillip. “How Iran is Building its Syrian Hezbollah,” The Washington Institute, Poli-cyWatch 2580; 8. March 2016 – http://washgintoninstitute.org.
41 BERTI. “Proxies, Partners-State and Non-States.”
42 DAOUD, David. “Meet the Proxies: How Iran Spreads its Empire through Terrorist Militias,”
accessed 10. August 2016 – http://www.thetower.org/article/meet-the-proxies-how-iran-spreads-its-empire-through-terrorist-militias; MCINNIS. “Iran’s Strategic Thinking.”
43 BERTI. “Proxies, Partners-State and Non-States.”
44 DAOUD. “Meet the Proxies.”
45 KNIGHTS. “Iran’s Foreign Legion.”
46 MCINNIS. “Iran’s Strategic Thinking”; DAVID DAOUD, “Meet the Proxies.”
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mAtthew domingos is Lieutenant Commander in the US Navy. Between 2002 and 2015 he served in a variety of naval operational and staff billets as well as positions in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. He was awarded the Bronze Star, the Joint Commendation Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal (two awards) and the Air Force Commendation Medal. LCDR Domingos Since 2015 he has worked as an analyst supporting the Joint Staff J7’s Joint Lessons Learned Division’s Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis branch.
Kerin winiArz has directly and indirectly supported the Department of Defense since 2007. She has worked as an analyst for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) since 2015, supporting the Joint Staff J7’s Joint Lessons Learned Division’s Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis branch. In 2007, Ms. Winiarz worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), focusing on political-military issues and foreign influence. Additionally, Ms. Winiarz has been awarded two Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) awards; in 2013, she received the ODNI’s National Intelligence Professional Award in recognition of her contributions to a major cross-agency project.
lAzAr bermAn holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. His thesis examined Israeli military innovation from 2000-2009. He was an editor at The Times of Israel, and taught at Salahuddin University in Erbil, Iraq. He previously served as an infantry officer in the IDF.
YAniv FriedmAnholds an MA in International Relations and History from Haifa University. His thesis examined Israel’s security concept under Golda Meir. Friedman worked as a researcher in the National Security Studies Center at Haifa University, and is currently writing his doctoral dissertation at Tel Aviv University on the Eshkol Administration’s security policies. He previously served as a reconnaissance squad commander in the IDF.
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