forces preparIng for
? – a
crItIcal assessMentof
r
ussIan MIlItary exercIsesAfter the collapse of the Soviet Union more than a decade-long steady decline awaited the Russian armed forces. The shrinking defense budget and the rampant corruption dramatically affected both the technical and the human components of the military. In 1993 then-chief of the general staff, Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, when evaluating the few exercises conducted in the year, talked about “poor command preparation, deficient knowledge
25 KISELYEV. “K kakim voynam neobhodimo gotovit’ Vooruzhennie Sili Rossii.”
26 GERASIMOV. “Mir na granyah voyni.”
27 KISELYEV. “K kakim voynam neobhodimo gotovit Vooruzhennie Sili Rossii.”
28 GERASIMOV. “Mir na granyah voyni.”
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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of operational procedures, and an alarming buildup of unserviceable equipment.”31 Due to disastrous shortcomings, Moscow had reintroduced large-scale military training only in 2009 with the Zapad (West) strategic exercise. Since then Russia has consistently increased both the number of exercises and the participating forces. Analyzing these exercises allows us to draw conclusions about the status of the armed forces of the Russian Federation as well as to assume Moscow’s foreign policy intentions and perception of security. It should be noted that the military exercises have significance beyond the conventional purpose of training the armed forces and are an important element of Russia’s foreign policy toolset. The present analysis describes Russia’s military exercises through this lens.
Training
With focus on the conventional training purpose of the military exercises it can be said that the Russian Federation has been preparing for large-scale interstate wars, often with an escalation to the nuclear level.32 Johan Norberg in his thorough study, which analyzed Russian military exercises between 2011 and 2014, differentiates three types of exercises: strategic exercises, parallel exercises and surprise inspections. One strategic exercise is held in every year covering a major strategic direction including mostly – but not exclusively – forces of the given military district where the exercise is taking place. Parallel exercises are training events conducted in close proximity in time to the strategic exercise and in another, generally adjacent military district. While the exercises are regularly held and planned in months advance, surprise or snap inspections are meant to test the readiness of the armed forces.33
While the most spectacular elements of the exercises are beyond doubt the field training exercises, from an expert’s point of view the more interesting details lie below the surface. As Norberg concluded, training does not focus solely on the armed forces, but also tests the whole war-waging capacity of the Russian Federation. This includes – besides units of the FSB (Federal Security Service) and Interior Ministry – key departments and ministries of transportation and telecommunication as well.
31 LAMBETH, B. S. “Russia’s Wounded Military.” Foreign Affairs. March/April, 1995; p. 89 32 NORBERG, J. Training to Fight - Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011-2014. Stockholm: FOI.
December, 2015 – https://www.foi.se/report-search/pdf?fileName=D:%5CReportSearch%5CFil es%5C8e2dc822-a31c-4f6c-aecd-954375e3fe31.pdf Accessed on June 26, 2017 p. 61.
33 Ibid.
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In expert circles probably the most crucial observation as far as the exercises are concerned is the apparent fact that Moscow can move its warfighting assets surprisingly quickly from one part of the country to another via air lift and railway. Consequently, it means that assessing Russia’s force projection capabilities toward a given strategic direction by counting the units and equipment permanently stationed within the military district in question is purely wrong. It seems that Moscow is not only able to transport its military units quickly over long distances if necessary, but it clearly regards this capability as a fundamental element of its strategic thinking. This was also proven by the Vostok (East) 2014 exercise, during which strategic air transports from western Russia extended up to 6,000 km’s distance.34 All in all, Moscow likely regards the whole military as a basis of launching operations in any direction as it was underlined during the war in Ukraine as well (see later).
Deterrence, threat and the dark power
In so-called hybrid warfare the threat of conventional military forces has a key significance. In the spring of 2014 Moscow used snap exercises to threaten Kiev with a full-scale conventional war. That exercise which was the sixth surprise inspection of the year involved around 150,000 servicemen and was heavily publicized by the Russian MoD.35
Russian military exercises are well communicated and probably serve the secondary function to deter possible adversaries from attacking or pressuring Russia. The fact that the stated official numbers of participants in the exercises has grown six- to eightfold between 2011 and 2014 does not necessarily mean real growth of such a scale but rather a decreasing incentive to present the exercises as smaller than than they actually are. It testifies to Moscow’s loss of interest in complying with arms control and security and confidence building measures.36 These are sacrificed for the sake of complementing the rhetoric of saber-rattling with military might. This is another example of dark power, a notion introduced by Mark Galeotti to describe “the malign shadow of soft power” which meant to accumulate power through fear.37 This was illustrated recently by the news on the approaching Zapad-2017 exercise. In
34 Ibid. p. 45.
35 The event generated 16 articles on the website of the MoD compared to the average 1–2 and a highest number of 11 before. Ibid. p. 50.
36 Ibid. p. 62–63.
37 GALEOTTI, M. “It’s the Russians Wot Done It.” The Moscow Times. June 20., 2017 – https://
themoscowtimes.com/articles/its-the-russians-wot-done-it-58228 Accessed on June 27., 2017.
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November 2016 Ukrainian sources noticed a tender announced by the Russian MoD for 4,162 railway wagons for shipments to and from Belarus in 2017.38 The information was quickly connected to the planned Zapad 2017 exercise and led Lithuanian president, Dalia Grybauskaitė to call it a preparation for war with the West.39 A number of analysts also concluded that this might be the largest military exercise since 1991 with an estimated 30,000 Russian military personnel deployed to the territory of Belarus.40 Moscow was not quick to dissipate concerns and clarified the news only two months later upon the request of the newspaper Novaya Gazeta.41
Maskirovka
The most worrisome function of Russia’s military exercises is to disguise (maskirovat’) real military maneuvers. It has already been widely suspected that Russia exploited the Kavkaz exercise to cover its military build-up against Georgia in 2008. In 2014 it was factually proven that Moscow transferred military units to the Crimea under the disguise of an ongoing surprise inspection taking place in the western and central military districts.42 The possibility that Russia might be preparing the ground for a military invasion under the cover of military exercises apparently worries Minsk as well.
Therefore, Belarus is trying to make the exercise as transparent for the West as possible, thus increase the political costs of a potential aggression for Russia.43 Minsk published the exact extent of the exercise that is going to take place on
38 BOHDAN, S. “The West-2017 Belarus-Russian Military Exercise: Smaller Than Anticipated”.
Belarus Digest. March 24., 2017 – http://belarusdigest.com/story/west-2017-belarus-russian-military-exercise-smaller-anticipated-29513 Accessed on June 27., 2017.
39 “Dalia Grybauskaitė: ‘West-2017’ military drill worrying.” Belsat. February 10., 2017 – http://
belsat.eu/en/news/dalya-grybauskajtse-vuchenni-zahad-2017-chakaem-z-nepakoem/ Accessed on June 27., 2017.
40 KOWALIK, T. K.; JANKOWSKI, D. P. “The dangerous tool of Russian military exercises.” Cen-ter for European Policy Analysis. May 9., 2017 – http://cepa.org/EuropesEdge/The-dangerous-tool-of-Russian-military-exercises Accessed on June 27., 2017.
41 The Russian MoD clarified that the number of 4,000 railway wagons is actually only 2,000 as the tender calls for „round trip” transportation. Also, the ministry disclosed information on the quantity of wagons used during previous exercises, a number higher in all two cases than in the case of the upcoming exercise (6,000 in 2009 and 2,500 in 2013 respectively). BOHDAN, S.
“The West-2017 Belarus-Russian Military Exercise.”
42 Forty Il–76 military transport aircraft were observed departing the exercise area, and were lat-er obslat-erved in Crimea. DUGAS, M. E. Between Georgia and Crimea: The Social Dimensions of War for the Russian Military. Wellesley: Wellesley College. April, 2016 – http://repository.
wellesley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1432&context=thesiscollection Accessed on June 27., 2017; p. 66.
43 KOWALIK–JANKOWSKI “The dangerous tool of Russian military exercises.”
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Belarusian territory. Approximately 3000 Russian military personnel and some 280 vehicles are going to exercise on Belarusian territory. This is significantly smaller than the preceding Zapad 2009 exercise was,44 and is indeed not enough for occupying Belarus – unless significant reinforcements are sent in under whatever pretext.
Hence, Minsk also invites approximately 80 external observers as well to increase transparency of the whole Zapad 2017.45 This is done in order to ensure the protection of Belarus against Russian informational measures and military operations based on them. For example, the presence of objective, international observes during the exercise would make it a lot harder for Russia to make groundless claims and use them to justify a military aggression.