Information technologies and postmodern technologies

Since information technologies are technologies as well, it is obvious that what we said earlier about the nature of technology and all of its consequences is also valid in the sphere of information technologies. What is more, if we may say, our earlier claims are valid to a greater extent. This is because we have to consider that, in the spirit of what we said above, information technologies express postmodern values (above all, virtuality); what is more, the case is in fact that information technology isthepostmodern technology. We call a technologypostmodernif it expresses postmodern values, and values of this kind are realized during its functioning.¹⁵Since the postmodern worldview as such is technological in nature, the technologies expressing postmodern values are technologies in an eminent way, that is, information technology today, in the postmodern age, can be regarded astechnology per se. Interestingly, even the names are revealing. The often used expressions “computing” and “computer” express the essence of the activity: we have an interest in the “computation” of processes. (For this reason, we do not talk about calculators but computers.) In our opinion, the emphasis is not so much on thecalculationswhich lead to the result (these are simple practices which follow rules) but on the need to make the resultcomputable, predictable through following rules. This need itself isthetechnological need, expressed in a quite obvious and clear way.

Thus, nowadays computing represents technology in its purest form. It is the technology of our age, as we say.

But let us also add that this age is the age of technology, that is, this is an age in which the technologies effective in the treatment of situations determine our worldview; that is, this is the postmodern age.

The unconcealed presentation of the problems ofcontroland thecentral positionof the maneuvers of power which permeate all technological activities can be regarded as clearly identifiable characteristics. It is easy to notice that among the social, political and ethical questions of information technologies, the question of securing the control over data, information, actions, and even whole spheres of activity and disposal plays a key role. Perhaps it is enough to refer to the fact that in many countries, they are trying to regulate the area legally, and are even estab-lishing offices focusing on data protection.

15According to Bergmann’s notable observation, modern technology is “hard” technology and the postmodern one is “soft” [Dreyfus – Spinosa 1997]. If we accept Bergmann’s opinion, we may conclude that information technologies equally utilize hard and soft components, that is, they are allpartlypostmodern by nature. But it follows from the nature of the postmodern that if something is postmodern to some extent, it is completely postmodern, since, for example, if something is partly pluralistic, it is pluralistic on the whole. In this way, our claim about the postmodern nature of information technology also seems to be acceptable on the basis of Bergmann’s definition.

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As we saw earlier, the goal of all usage of technology is control over situations, thus it is quite natural that this also pertains to information technologies. However, if we compare information technologies with traditional technologies, the differences are apparent. On the one hand, traditional technological situations are clearly identi-fiable and well defined. That is, traditional technologies operate their power within clear spatial and temporal limitations. On the other hand, traditional technologies are markedly “hard” by nature, that is, the components which create the situation, processes, and means of the technology, as well as technological products, are basically material.However, virtuality always plays a key role in information technologies.Thus, the boundaries of techno-logical situations are virtual as well; that is, the “actual” boundaries are malleable, and thesituationcan beopen.

This equally appears in spatial and temporal relations and of course in circumstances of power which become ex-tended and unstable. (As an illustration think for example of the problems of on-line banking.) To put it simply, we can initiate virtually mediated transfers or cash withdrawal within wide and variable spatial and temporal lim-itations, and thus our control over our own financial goods becomes fully fledged, while at the same time, as a result of several factors, it also becomes loaded with uncertainties unusual in traditional technologies.) Furthermore, it is also clear that as a consequence of the virtual features of information technologies, even though the creation and treatment of situations depends on material conditions (for example on computers that can be connected to the network), its essence is not this but thesimultaneousimagining of the various possibilities of these and the realization of these possibilities, that is the way of their interpretation and realization which follows the laws of virtuality. It is obvious that Tim Berners-Lee who thought about the appropriate storage and mediation of large amounts of information did not “discover” any new types of material processes or tools when he developed the idea of websites, but he created “a new world out of nothing” noticing the virtual characteristics of existing tools.

Perhaps the careful reader has noticed an apparent contradiction: on the one hand, we said that the postmodern is against powerand only accepts a power over one’s own self, on the other, we also claimed that information tech-nologies which express postmodern values are eminentlyoriented towards power. How can we solve this dilemma?

In our opinion it is possible and in reality the case is thatinformation technologies are technologies which are always tied to certain subjects, that is, to certain communities or individuals. Think for example of the fact that while the technological components and tools used in traditional technologies are usually given by objective natural regular-ities, that is, they are essentially inter-subjective by nature, the components and tools of information technologies – above all, information itself – are necessarily based on subjective interpretations.¹⁶We (or I) will interpret a given material process in such and such a way; of course, natural regularities or the points of view of other subjects can be featured in this interpretation process, but the final result is createdonlywhen a subject commits himself to something and he holds on to the interpretation which he regard ashis own. Without this, information and all tools built on it become unclear or are lost.Thus, interpretation, that is, the personal participation of those who operate and use the technology in a given process of interpretation, is indispensable.In this way, power appears in information technologies as the power of someone (an individual or a community) overhis owncircumstances.

This is because the boundaries of the postmodern personality (and community) are virtual; that is, they are discon-nected from “physical” boundaries, extended, malleable, apparent, uncertain, and weightless. The postmodern personality involved in information technologies can regard the whole technological situation and the tools operated in it ashis ownsituation andhis owntools. This is understandable since he creates them through his own interpret-ation. No one else has anything to do with it – his creation is his property. If someone visits a distant website and understands somehow the contents presented there while looking at it and reading it, he “acquires” it. That is, he will use what he saw according to his own understanding and not that of the creator of the website.

The case is similar toworks of art: they become the “property” of the audience; the creator, once he has presented his work to the public, cannot prevent this anymore. In the case of works of art, it is also personal interpretation which creates the work of art in the audience. The boundaries of a member of the audience become virtual, extended, weightless, and apparent. Thus, we could also say that information technologies can be interpreted most easily according to thelaws of aesthetics,and not those of the philosophy of science and the philosophy of technology.

Recall the Greek concept of “techné”: technology and art are relatives, and their laws of creation are similar (Heidegger 2004). Of course, some aspects of the similarity already appeared in earlier technologies as well, but they are presented in a clear and pure form in the technology “per se”, that is, in information technology.

The extended and endless discussions taking place in the world of information technology about the rights connected to the products and procedures of the technology (personality rights, copyright, property rights, right to use, etc.) are to a significant degree derived from this situation, that is, from the fact that people who become “worldwide”

16In connection with the interpretation of signs, Frege already noticed the difference between themeaningof the sign and the “idea” connected to the sign [Frege 1980, 161]. According to him, the idea is necessarily subjective, individual and has several meanings – in contrast with the meaning of the sign which can be objective, intersubjective and unambiguous.

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virtually can regard any information created by themselves (that is, created through their own interpretation), and anything constructed of them as their own without any doubts. How could something which I experienced and understood personally belong to someone else? However, the various virtual people often come into conflict with each other since they are sailing on the same sea of information and a need for extending personal boundaries and for trespassing actual boundaries are part of the form of life here. A “hacker” or a friend who cracks copy protection is proud of his own expertise; they are proud of understanding things better than someone at the company entrusted with protection. As a result of having knowledge of information technology and interpreting the intentions of the protection, he acquires this knowledge and uses it as his own, and finally his intentions are effective and he can extend the boundaries of his world and his personality.

Such acts can of course be judged “from the outside” as well, that is, from the legal and moral position of modern society. In the modern understanding, information can be owned as anything else, say for example as a bicycle can be. According to this value system, someone who acquires some information in an “unauthorized” way, that is, someone who steals it, can be blamed both from a legal and a moral point of view. Theft is blameworthy, but is this theft? Can we regard downloading and playing mp3 files as theft? If yes, this gives the worst character ref-erence to millions of Internet users. Are we so bad morally? In reality, in questions like this, theethicsof inform-ation technology and thetraditional ethical point of view of the social environment of information technologyare opposed to each other. They understand good and bad differently. The ethics of technology is more understanding and lenient and it often pays respect to the achievements or even greatness of those who crack codes and evade prohibition. However, those who follow the value system of the social environment would use the evaluations of rights and illegality successfully used in other spheres of society here as well, but in doing so they would ignore the peculiarities of information processes. It seems that currently this is also an important battlefield: we are talking about a battle between the postmodern value system and ethics of information technologies and the modern value system and ethics of the social environment in which many battles have already been fought with alternating luck but the war is still going on.

Another important factor in comparing traditional and information technologies might be that in the case of inform-ation technologies, the role of theintentions delegatedto the technological tools increases to an extreme degree.

In fact, it is not only thesignificanceof the delegation which increases but itscomplexityas well. Thus for example a computer program can mediate intentions complex to any degree and realize them in the appropriate environment.

It is notable that computers are different from traditional machinery in this respect. Other machines are automatons with a special goal and definite characteristics, but computers are automatons with universal aims and indefinite characteristics. The indefiniteness and universal nature of computers becomes definite and special through pro-gramming the concrete task. The presence of human intentions delegated to technological tools appears in the clearest form in programming computers.Interactivityplays a role in numerous information technologies. This method makes possible the continuous expression of our intentions, their adjustment to changing circumstances, their correction, change, and withdrawal. In this way, technological situations come close to real life situations, which is naturally an important development in many respects.

If the interactive representation of our intentions is continuous, we can talk about “online” presence. It is the “online”

usage of information technology which makes participation in virtual communities possible (chat channels, news groups, discussion lists, games, etc.). Virtual communities have a peculiar political, psychological, and moral order;

the norms of presence and behavior especially contain many special rules. These are mostly declared and written down, but there are many unwritten norms as well. Essentially, behavior has to be regulated because of the con-sequences ofanonymitywhich is made possible by the virtual nature of presence. Anonymous presence obviously permits evading the consequences of our (virtual) actions and statements and can even provide us with an excuse from responsibility for the consequences of our intentions. This practice is quite widespread and essentially permeates the whole of “information society,” from the companies that fill our electronic mailboxes with unwanted “spam,”

through students acting in the name of various imaginary persons, to agents who manipulate political surveys with messages using pseudonyms. All these often make online life uncomfortable, but essentially only the online com-munity is willing to do something against them; the “offline” world, the wider society, is not interested in it very much: there is no money involved in it, unlike in copyright and so on. Certain information technology managers (system administrators, post masters etc.) occasionally invent various “semi-official” solutions to regulate those who are too annoying, but currently libertinism dominates. It seems that this is an open question and nobody has an idea about how to solve the problem (Wallace 1999).

Of course, something essential is expressed by this libertinism: some of theanonymous guiltthat permeates the whole of modern society is revealed through the deeds of those hiding behind anonymity (fraud, the use of violence,

Late modern technology

lying, abuse, etc.) (Ancsel 1981). Interestingly, it is not the ethos described by Ancsel which helps us in the iden-tification here, but information technology.

Of course, information technology not only makes it possible to evade taking responsibility, but also generates a higher degree of responsibility which would not be possible without this technology. The problem of the so-called digital chasmbelongs to this category. We are talking about the problem that information technologies make de-veloped countries and regions even more advanced while the underdede-veloped can expect an increasing lag which will eventually lead to the technological (and economical) split of the world. In fact, even 15 years ago, there were more telephone lines in Tokyo than in the whole of Africa. Since then, the chasm has obviously become even deeper. A future without a perspective and the responsibility for the fate of our fellow humans keeps the problem on the agenda worldwide, and civil organizations and state aid programs are being organized for bridging the chasm.