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Communication and language

In document Philosophy of the Internet (Pldal 57-61)

3. Communication in the late modern age

3.1 The nature of communication

3.1.2 Communication and language

Language is obviously the most importanttoolof the community building technology of communication. Commu-nication usually draws on language or languages, but language also has capabilities not related directly to commu-nication. We can define language as a system of rules of using signs based on a consensus, where the rules (in a written or unwritten form) fix the relations between the signs of the language, as well as the relations between the signs and the entities denoted by them.Speechis the concrete usage of the system of rules of language.Writingis also the usage of the system of rules of language and thus it is similar to speech, but it is different from speech in several respects (Goody 1998; Flusser 1997). Because of the circumstances of their formation and functioning, it is practical to differentiate betweennatural and artificial languages. The formation of the rules of natural languages is not connected to specific aims and particular persons but develop in the way they do in accordance with the general life conditions of a given linguistic community.4The system of rules of natural languages is usually more complex than the systems of artificial languages, which are developed with a specific strategy, and it also includes several contingent elements. The evolution of natural languages unfolds similarly to other evolutionary processes;

on the other hand, artificial languages are specific creations of “engineering” which are developed as tools that

4It is not our intention with our seemingly emphatic statements to commit ourselves with regards to basic questions in the philosophy of language.

Instead, we are only trying to define and consistently use the concepts utilized in this book. This endeavor, of course, cannot go without a certain degree of assumed, but not explicitly discussed, background in the philosophy of language.

Communication in the late modern age

make it possible to achieve particular goals, as for example we can observe in connection with the creation of programming languages for computers. In these cases the method of “consensus” which is used in the development of the rules of the language is obviously different as well. At the same time it can also be interesting that not only the rules of a language, but the signs used in the construction of languages are conventional as well.

In linguistic and semiotic discussions, natural signs5which are developed independently of anintention to inform (as for example perceived smoke being a sign of fire) are often regarded as different from linguistic signs. This is because it is not as a result of the consensus of the community that we regard smoke as the sign of fire, and con-sequently it is not a linguistic sign (Kenesei 1984, 35-59; Voigt 1977). However, it would be difficult to dispute that a certain kind of system of rules is valid in the case of natural signs as well. However, this is not provided by the usual linguistic conventions, but a (mythological, religious, scientific, artistic, everyday, etc.) worldview.

Despite depending on the observed phenomena of nature while developing our worldview, it is by all means re-markable that we do make use of conventions here, too, as for example in the case of a commitment regarding evidence, and in many other questions. We can understand the meaning of linguistic signs on the basis of the ac-cepted linguistic conventions; we bestow meaning on the perceived natural signs. It is true that natural signs do not serveinformationbutorientation, that is, they are not the product of some kind of intention to inform but an intention to orientate oneself. However, it is in no way negligible that man, wanting to find his way in the world, interprets natural events and processes not only in themselves and for themselves but in connection with others and as signs of others. Man is capable of this practice as a result of the mind’s activity of secondary representation.

The ability of secondary representation is also centrally important for human tool use and abstract thinking, and also, neither the so-called double articulation of language (Kenesei 1984; Andor1980) nor the existence of meta-languages would be possible without secondary representations. In this way, natural signs can also beregarded as linguistic signs in some sense, and the connections between them as linguistic rules. From this point of view a worldview is the objectifying grammar of the signs and phenomena of the world and grammar is the subjective worldview of linguistic signs. In the end, this connection leads to the problem of the classic relationship of language and thought, but we cannot discuss this problem here.

On the basis of the above it seems that besides natural human language – with certain limitations – we can talk about the“language of nature as well”. Of course, it is not nature that talks to us in the “language of nature”;

rather it is us who “get nature to speak”, for example, we “ask questions” and nature “replies” sensibly to sensible questions. In reality, we can talk about a practice of interpretation: man, with the help of for example his scientific worldview, interprets the phenomena of nature. In this situation there are no communicating parties, so this isnot acommunication situationbetween man and nature – we can only call it that way metaphorically. The “language of nature” does not serve the communication between man and nature, but it makes the orientation of people in the world possible, that is, a function of language reveals itself here which is not connected to communication, but which we can call a representational or explanatory function. We can generally observe an aspiration to categorize natural phenomena in systems of worldview. One of the natural consequences of this is that the number of the

“signs” of nature – similarly to natural languages – is finite and closed. The language of nature is considerably complex and structured; for example in different natural sciences they follow its different “dialects”. In this way we can talk about the language of physics, the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, or even immunology, nerve physiology and many other disciplines as well. At the same time the language of a discipline should not be mistaken for the language of published essays of a given discipline, that is, for thelanguage of scientific publications. Pub-lication languages necessarily contain components of natural language; more precisely, it would be better to say it the other way round: publication languages are natural languages which necessarily contain many components of the language of the given discipline. In our view the language of a discipline (just as the language of nature in general) does not serve goals of communication, rather, it is the publication language of a discipline which is spe-cifically created for this purpose.6Using the language of science, we do not develop any kind of community between man and nature but we do through scientific publications (and other similar activities that are involved);

publications are obviously important factors in the organization of scientific communities. Thus, the “language of nature” is a human artifact, but one which is not created because of the need to orientate ourselves in this or that

5Certain artificial signs – created without an intention to inform – pose similar problems, as is demonstrated by semiotic trains of thought in connection with symptoms.

6Hermeneutics applied as philosophy of science is sensitive to such differences. Two diverging views have developed in this area. According to one approach, hermeneutics can primarily be used successfully in the natural linguistic environment of sciences (essentially in the analysis of publications), while supporters of the other point of view argue that it is worthwhile to work in thehermeneutics of science; that is, the her-meneutical analysis of the functioning of sciences in a broad sense (the examination of the “language of science” of course belongs here) is useful as well. A more detailed discussion of the question can be found in the debate between Márkus and Heelan [Márkus 1992; Scwendtner – Ropolyi – Kiss 2001] and in certain works of Heelan [Heelan 1997; 1999] Ihde [Ihde 1998; 2001] Eger, Apel, Follesdal [Schwendtner – Ropolyi – Kiss 2001; Fehér – Kiss – Ropolyi 1999] and crease [Crease 1993; 1997].

Communication in the late modern age

situation, but, “thrown into the world”, for the sake of orientating ourselves in the world, that is, the language of nature is in fact a very prevalent artificial language, a real “world language”.

It is an interesting question in connection with artificial languages whether we can regard all coherent systems of signs as languages. What is the case for example with natural numbers, the abstract system of signs of a given geometry or with signs used in digital technology? In the case of using numbers, geometrical shapes, and similar mathematical concepts we can certainly talk about “the language of mathematics”. The language of mathematics is developed similarly to the languages provided by worldviews. We can probably also say that mathematics is one version of worldviews – capable of representing relations of quantity among entities. In this way, a situation can arise in which the natural language of phenomena used in sciences can be strongly motivated by the mathem-atical approach, while other natural languages, as for example the variations used in everyday life or artistic practice, are determined by dispositions of worldview. In information technology and related areas the expressions “pro-gramming language” or “machine language” are widely used instead of, or together with, the expression “the language of mathematics”. Do these expressions refer to actual languages or can we only talk about metaphors here? The languages in question are, without any doubt, creations of artificial language; however, as opposed to the languages of scientific disciplines, they specifically serve the purpose of communication. With the help of commands formulated in these languages, we want to influence the “behavior” of the machines used, what is more, we try to do it in a way which makes it more favorable for us. The case is somewhat reminiscent of animal com-munication, since communication situations between humans and machines are limited as well. For example we cannot communicate emotions directly. But, unlike in animal communication, the situations that can be created are “generative” enough, that is, we can reproduce the communicated contents in infinite variations. A peculiar homology of programming languages and natural languages is expressed in our own, this time apparently useful, version7of the famous Church – Turing Thesis: we can program clearly formulated algorithms in (natural languages).

It seems that communication in programming languages takes place between humans and machines. However, in reality it is chiefly a specific form of human communication in which the programmer meets the human intentions delegated to the computers and communicates – in an indirect and often asynchronous way – with the engineers who constructed the computer. It is the people who wrote the program and manufactured the machine who parti-cipate in the sharing of mental states created by communication; it is primarily them who are the members of the community created in the process. Insofar as we agree with the claim that technology is loaded with values, that is, if we assume that computers contain their own values, we can widen the circle and complement it with further participants of the social environment. Programs created in “machine code” or “machine language” work in similar communication situations as programs formulated in programming languages of a higher level. However, perhaps it is worth listing a few differences. The expression “machine language” already implies that machines or their subsystems “understand” this language, that is, we are talking about messages that are understandable for the ma-chines directly, without translation. This situation consolidates the impression mentioned above even more and it presents machine language as the appropriate tool of communication between machines. At the same time, it is of course not machines but humans who communicate in machine language – in an indirect, significantly automated way and with a restricted content. Certain commands formulated in machine language show similarities with speech acts that can be generated in natural languages. They are similar in the sense that the “understanding” of a command in a machine language can be the execution of the command at the same time.

Thus, insofar as we do not emphasize the differences between natural and artificial languages and we accept the definition of language suggested above, we can call the “language of nature” a language created through the inter-pretation of natural signs, as well as the language of scientific disciplines and mathematics. These are artificial languages which we do not create with an intention to communicate, unlike programming languages of different levels which, in certain situations, include a linguistic system of artificially created signs and systems of rules with an intention to communicate. In some cases, the autonomy, arrangement, and openness of artificial languages is reminiscent of natural languages, but they are usually effective only in a relative or partial way. The language of nature, sciences, or mathematics is not spoken by anyone. We can maybe say that experts translate and interpret for us the messages that can be told in these languages. Or perhaps we can put it this way: experts “read” and

“make speak” these languages, as readers in antiquity added their own voice to the text found in a book (Cavallo – Chartier 2000, 19). This is because “written texts” are obviously also created in these languages: the ordered multitude of the phenomena of our world is a text to be read. Today, we can already “speak” in programming language or machine code, but this “speech” essentially takes place exclusively in a written form. In the case of programs, writing and reading are the key practices.

7Many other versions of the thesis in question are presented by [Hofstadter 1999].

Communication in the late modern age

Hopefully, we managed to show above that not all language use is communication, as well as that languages do not only function as tools of communication, but they can have different functions as well. For example, besides the representative and explanatory functions mentioned so far, we can also regard agency as a function. In speech act theories, speech is understood as acting (Pléh – Síklaki – Terstyéni 1997). But as regards the communication situation, speech acts and meta-communication completed through actions and gestures show an interestingly symmetrical structure: they represent the opposites ofspeech as agencyandagency as speech. Communicative action theory (Habermas 1995), among other things, undertakes the dialectical treatment of these opposites. Perhaps it is also worthwhile to note that we can observe non-communicative functions not only in language use but in sign usageas well, that is, not all sign usage is communication. As an illustration we refer to the practice of creating and interpreting signs connected to persons. We can clearly ascertain that these are not directly communicative acts, since while operating them we do not share any views. At the same time, it is also evident that such activities can be a part or element of communication.

If we characterize communication as a technology of building communities and language as a tool of communication, we may face the following dilemma in connection with the relationship between language and community: on the one hand, language is atoolof building communities, on the other – as we mentioned earlier – it can also be a product of a community. Do we have to decide whether language or community is the key determining factor, and which one shall we choose? Or perhaps we should accept that language (as well as community) can both be a tool and a product? The dilemma can easily be avoided if we share the point of view widely accepted in different versions in the philosophy of language according to which language is essentially not a product of the community. In this case, the usage of language as a tool of building communities can still be asserted without any difficulty. Neverthe-less, the thesis of the tool nature of language can be defended together with the determination of language by a community. In this case, we need to regard both languages and communities of an inconstant nature and to understand their development as a consequence of their coexistence. In such a process of organization the causal connection between the coexistent entities is often obscure,8at the same time, a connection of this kind is much more penet-rating than simple causality. Simple causal relations preserve many of the differences between the objects regarded as cause and effect, but in the process of coexistence, the cause and the effect role is occasionally switched (what is more, in several respects both can be the case at the same time), and consequently the coexistent entities become

“closely connected”. In philosophy, we try to describe and understand the process through dialectics, but since this form of organization is very frequent in the human world, it is discussed in many scientific disciplines. We can also clearly observe this in the relation between languages and communities, but we can rightly regard it as a relation which is generally true of human tool use. Perhaps the characterization that fits into the present train of thought does not demand that we deal with any further general interpretation of this type of organization, but we will come back to its concrete versions later on.

We have already mentioned that human communication can make use ofother toolsbesides languages. Play of features, mimesis helping the expression of emotions, or clothing and certain patterns of behavior can for example be regarded as such tools. At the same time, we call the use of such tools language use as well, thus for example we can talk about the language of acting, music, film, or clothing. It seems to be beyond doubt that sounds, images, movements, pieces of clothing, behavior, and sets of similar things do not possess the features expected from lin-guistic systems and thus they are not languages. However, fit into a communication situation the case is different.

Certain communication situations – as a type of communicative synesthesia – can add the missing elements to the system of signs, and, fit into the situation, non-linguistic systems can still be regarded as languages. This situation is presented for example by the institutions of theater, cinema, concerts, or fashion. Thus, certain well defined (for example by following traditions), stable communication situations can institutionalize or “embody” the rules of sign use and the given system of signs can essentially function as a language in this framework. In a certain sense we can consider writing and reading as such situations.

The relationship betweenlanguage and communicationreminds us of the relationship betweenscience and tech-nology. Similarly to technology, communication can be regarded as mastery of a given situation. Technology treats natural and artificial objects as tools that can be fit into a given situation. Communication regards natural and

The relationship betweenlanguage and communicationreminds us of the relationship betweenscience and tech-nology. Similarly to technology, communication can be regarded as mastery of a given situation. Technology treats natural and artificial objects as tools that can be fit into a given situation. Communication regards natural and

In document Philosophy of the Internet (Pldal 57-61)