Virtuality and reality

In this chapter, a historical and philosophical analysis of the concept of virtuality will be presented. As is well-known, one of the main themes of philosophical thinking has been the identification and characterization of reality.

Since the beginning of this tradition, a special aspect or version of reality has been considered as virtuality. Both reality and virtuality have been explored or constructed by the human senses, emotions, imagination, cognition, manipulation, etc. During the historical development of thinking, there have been two essential turning points, namely, the emergence and the decline of modernity. As a consequence, we can distinguish a premodern, a modern, and a postmodern virtuality (and reality). Characterizing these different versions of reality and virtuality, our

ana-Late modern technology

lysis will concentrate on the relationships between the different concepts of virtuality, presence, worldliness, and plurality. Applying these ideas to the present virtual reality, its three aspects will be specified.

There are numerous descriptions of virtual reality (VR for short), which intend to characterize and understand its constituents, functioning, versions, use, significance, and perspectives [Rheingold 1991; Durlach & Mavor 1994;

Isdale 1998; Yahoo! Computers and Internet; Links2Go; On The Net Resources, etc.], but there are relatively few philosophical analyses [Haraway, 1991; Heim 1993; Turkle 1995; Kramarae 1995; Nunes 1995; Lauria 1997;

Haraway 1997; Heim 1998; O'Donnell 1998; Hayles 1999; Wertheim 1999] which, for a deeper understanding of the real nature of this new phenomenon, put it into a broader historical, cultural, and social context. Due to the fundamental role of philosophical analyses in the progress of the understanding of a new technological-human-social complex, we would like to contribute to this process with the present paper. Because of their essential con-tribution to the interpretation of the phenomena connected with VR, our description is centered around the concept of virtuality with a special emphasis on the relations between the concepts of virtuality and plurality.

If we try to identify the object of our present analysis, one of the most accepted definitions of VR is the following:

"Virtual reality is a technology that convinces the participant that he or she is actually in another place by substi-tuting the primary sensory input with data produced by a computer ... The 'as-if' quality of virtuality becomes a pragmatic reality when the virtual world becomes a workspace and the user identifies with the virtual body and feels a sense of belonging to a virtual community. The definition of VR includes the three key factors of immersion, interactivity, and information intensity." [Heim 1998, 221]. On the basis of this (or a similar) definition (and incid-entally with a complete harmony of the public opinion), one can think that VR is a very new phenomenon, since it is closely linked to the computer technology of the last few decades. However, this is not completely true.

Moreover, it can be shown that in the history of culture VR has had many earlier (not computer-related) versions.

The study of these old (or at least more traditional) VRs can contribute to the better understanding of the specific nature of the present-day, computer-produced VR.

On the other hand, we can find a large number of studies not only about virtual reality, but also about virtual space (or cyberspace), virtual community, virtual self, virtual culture, virtual world, virtual activity, virtual picture, etc., and even about virtual physics or virtual computers. It seems to be a hidden presupposition that in all these cases the attribute "virtual" refers more or less to an identical concept of virtuality. Let us cite again Heim's vocabulary:

" Virtual: A philosophical term meaning 'not actually, but as if.' It came into recent vogue with the use of computer techniques to enhance computer memory ... Similarly, something can be present in virtual reality without its usual physical limitations. The ancient Roman term virtus, from which virtual derives, meant the powers of a human being. The later Christian meaning of 'virtue', as Nietzsche pointed out, inverted the Roman value system and eliminated the overtones of power". [Heim 1998, 220] This explanation is perhaps an acceptable starting point, but a further clarification of the meaning of 'virtual' seems to be necessary, and a historical and philosophical analysis of the nature of virtuality would perhaps be useful to better understand what it means to be a virtual

"something," as well as the virtuality of virtual reality.

First, accepting a rather naive and flexible concept of virtuality, we shall outline a (very) brief history of VR. In this history three different versions of virtuality (premodern, modern, and postmodern) will be distinguished and characterized. Referring to these historical versions of virtuality in the second part of the paper, we shall present a short philosophical analysis to show the special role of presence, world-making, and plurality for a better under-standing of virtuality. Finally, applying the results of our analysis, we shall conclude with a characterization of the scientific, art-related and philosophical aspects of present-day VR.

It can be stated without any doubt that one of the main themes of philosophical thinking has been the identification and characterization of reality. In this tradition reality can be described as the complete collection of beings, as the realm of existence, as the world, or as a specific realm of beings in the world which is discovered (or created) by human senses, emotions, imagination, cognition, manipulation, production, etc. Of course, our choices between these (and many further) alternative approaches and perceptions of reality depend on our value systems, i.e. on our ideological preference. The nature and the borders of reality, a valid demarcation between the real and the non-real (apparent, imaginary, unnon-real, fake, non-existing, meaningless, etc.) as the fundamental questions of ontology have been the permanent sources of ideological and philosophical debates. The specificities of virtuality and virtual beings can be originated from this intellectual context. The fundamental problem is the right characterization of the versions of the reality-virtuality relationships.

It is quite obvious that reality can be considered as the totality of beings. In this case, we have to understand the nature of beings and the nature of totality. For this understanding we have to make a decision about the appearance

Late modern technology

of unity and plurality in and of the beings, and in their totality, as well. Based on these presuppositions, every single being and its unique universe can be described as a specific unit, as a complete whole, as an organized system, especially if we are able to disclose their appropriate organizing principles, the organizing principles of reality.

However, if we accept the Heideggerian criticism of the above mentioned metaphysical tradition, and prefer the existence of Being to that of the beings, our task will change, but not in every respect. After this turn it will also be necessary to find a description for the structure and organization of Being as reality.

In search for the organizing principles of reality, we shall follow a partly hermeneutic and partly social construct-ivist approach. According to this view, in a specific historical period, all the characteristic elements of a specific world system of a period are imbued with almost the same system of values and interests (ideology, for short).

These ideologies emerge from the socio-historical situation of the given society and they define in large part the essential aspects of the construction of different kinds of entities. [Berger & Luckmann 1966] Considering and comparing the different regions of beings in a society, it is possible to identify and describe the common rules of construction and find the preferred organizing principles of the age. Of course, this is also valid in the cases of reality and virtuality and their relations. In short, we could say that we shall try to contribute some ideas to the social construction of virtuality.

However, in this construction process there have been two essential historical and ideological turning points at the emergence and at the decline of modernity, so we can speak about premodern, modern and postmodern reality and virtuality.

2.3.1 Premodern virtuality

The premodern period had many, although slightly different ideas concerning the reality-virtuality problem. In the magic world view it is not very easy to point out a significant distinction between reality and virtuality. The magic reality was constructed by will, in this way the mere construction of interrelations between the observed phenomena or between the experienced situations had an absolute primacy, without making any distinctions between different kinds of interrelations (these distinctions appeared later on, in the mythical world views). In the magic views, the possibility and the actuality of a relationship are coextensive with each other, reality and virtuality overlap each other, and they are indistinguishable aspects of the world. In other words, the indistinguishability of reality and virtuality is a fundamental feature of the magic world view. The magic virtuality is virtuality as reality. As an illus-tration, we could recall the praxis of the Shamans. According to some interpretations, the Shamans’ activities can be compared to the activities of certain artists in cyberspace. [Jones 1997].

When philosophy emerged from the mythological world view, the early distinctions in the evaluation of the rela-tionships of experienced situations had a more fundamental significance. In addition to this development, the structure of human experiences, the composition of beings, the complicated functioning of cognition, the levels and hierarchy of existing entities were studied and disclosed by the first philosophers. This progress produced the ideas of the plural world (inhabited by essentially different beings, which may even exist at different levels of Being) or a plurality of worlds (each of which is inhabited by fundamentally different beings). The different kinds of modes of existence have become a topic of intellectual debates. In this context some definite differences between the different kinds (or levels) of reality can be established and treated. The fundamental question is: how can we identify and reach the parts of our experience or knowledge which are unquestionable, which are real in full, which yield to doubtless certainty. These parts of knowledge refer to the inner core of reality, which is surrounded by less valuable spheres of reality. These outer spheres seem also to be a part of reality for the people who are not learned enough or who are not critical enough in their observations and/or thinking. For a philosopher their full reality is only appearance, which can be destroyed by careful observations or the right arguments. The sphere of reality whose full reality is proved to be ephemeral in light of philosophical investigation is the sphere of virtuality itself. The ancient reality should be an eternal reality; whereas the ancient virtuality is the kind of reality which is able to lose its full reality. (It is quite obvious that the significance of ephemera can also be observed in present-day versions of VR.)

Already in early ancient Greek philosophy, two main traditions were formed to investigate the phenomena of our life, to criticize them, to produce certainty, and to approach the real in full. These are the traditions of the ancient

"materialism" and that of the Parmenidean one. According to the "materialist" tradition, reality can be based on the testimony of our perception. In this tradition the main problem is the right coordination and evaluation of the different sensual experiences. In ancient literature there are many interesting argumentations and debates around this problem, e.g. in the works of Heraclitus, Aristotle, or Theophrastus. As Paul Feyerabend emphasized, there

Late modern technology

happened a radical turn in the human culture with Parmenides, who rejected the testimony of senses in the question of reality and proposed the use of right (and contradiction-free) thinking as a judge in this respect. Because of the perceptual illusions and the ephemeral feature of any perception, Parmenides declared all the sensual experiences to be appearances. Since that time there has been a dual tendency in Western culture: reality can be constructed following the tradition of compared sensual experiences or the tradition of right thinking. These traditions yield to different kinds of realities and virtualities.

As an illustration, it is perhaps interesting to recall some problems from ancient natural philosophy, namely, the different interpretations of motion, void, or atoms. Within the framework of the Parmenidean tradition, for example, supposing the real existence of motion, Zeno presented contradictory consequences. In this way he rejected the reality of motion. However, this result does not get confirmed by our everyday perceptual experiences, so this radical disharmony between the realities created by thinking and by perception is called paradox. Paradoxes can be considered to be the signs of the appearance of virtuality in the Parmenidean tradition.

There is not enough room here to discuss the contributions of the philosophical systems of Plato and Aristotle to this problem in detail. However, they are very significant.

Plato's two worlds (the imperfect sensual world and the perfect world of ideal Forms) represent the spheres of virtuality and reality in a very clear form. The sensual world is a realm of change and impermanence. It is a complete world, but it has a lower value compared to the true, fully real world of Forms. The world-forming Platonic virtu-ality is an ephemeral and contingent revirtu-ality which is an imperfect copy of the true revirtu-ality. In this world knowledge has a strict limitation. If we are restricted to use our experiences we can only form different opinions about the sphere of virtuality, and it is impossible to reach the absolute truth here.

Aristotle's main contribution to the problem was perhaps his teaching about the clear distinction between the two levels of Being, namely between the actuality and the potentiality. The actual being is a being in full, and the po-tential being lacks fullness, so they are good candidates for the Aristotelian reality and virtuality. However, according to Aristotelian thinking, both the actual and the potential being are due to every entity, which means that reality and virtuality are distributed among the beings of our world instead of their concentration into completely separate worlds. In this way the Aristotelian virtuality is an individual property of entities. On the other hand, Aristotle described and analyzed the transformation of potentiality to actuality and vice versa and he interpreted the concept of motion in this way. This means that both the Aristotelian reality and virtuality have a dynamism, they can transform into each other, so the Aristotelian virtuality has a changing nature.

The Middle Ages presented a further version of premodern virtuality. While in the ancient time the construction of reality and virtuality was performed by the senses or right thinking, in the Middle Ages reality and virtuality were created by emotions, primarily by religious belief. In this era both perception and thinking played a subordinate role. Perception was considered a typical source of illusion. The most perfect reality, God, had no perceptible aspects (however, the idea of the Trinity as one God created a rather complicated situation in its details); he was accessible only by strong emotional efforts. The world was inhabited by creatures at different levels of perfection and in the hierarchy of beings (e.g. think of the arguments of the realism-nominalism debate). The life of human beings is performed in the "vale of tears", in the shade of the world. In this way medieval virtuality had many features in common with the Platonic one, but it had a more complex structure arranged along a gradual hierarchy of perfectness.

The complete earthly life takes place in the realm of virtuality, or in other words, everything is virtual in some sense - the only exception is God. From this point of view, the miracles (similarly to the ancient paradoxes) had a very specific ontological state: they were considered as a direct appearance of the divine will, that is, they disclosed the full reality in the realm of virtuality.

In summary, we could say that the different versions of premodern virtuality were the dominant components of premodern ontologies. The typical premodern ontology depicted a plural world or the plurality of worlds. In both cases reality is a structured construction, and its constituents have different grades or measures of certainty, per-fectness, contingency, permanence, value, etc. A constituent, a part, or a version of reality, which has no maximal measure in socially given reality-determining factors, or which is able to lose its maximal value, can be considered as virtuality. Premodern virtuality is a kind of reality; it can be an uncertain, or an imperfect, or a contingent, or a changeable, etc. reality. The premodern reality is an open reality, it is open for constructing many possible worlds by virtualizing different components of reality.

Late modern technology

2.3.2 Modern virtuality

The emergence of modern ideology and world view created a radically new context for ontological thinking. This is the age of the formation of the modern individual, the autonomous personality. Because of the historical conditions of this process, the fundamental aspiration of the modern individual was to gain the ruler position over his world [Fromm 1969]. The medieval God-world relation has been reproduced in many individual forms. However, the modern individual wanted to wield a real, unquestionable, certain, effectively functioning power, that is, he/she wanted to rule over a full reality. As a result of these developments, the basic structural elements of the power situation have been considered as reality in full, such as the individual, his/her power, and the object of this power (nature, other individuals, property, etc.). For the other constituents or aspects of the collection of beings a lower reality-measure was allocated, they constituted the sphere of virtuality around "the secret object of desire". (Thanks to Buñuel.)

During the development of modernity the distinction between the objective and the subjective reality became possible and significant. The distinction between these possibilities, i.e. the declaration of the full reality of the 'external' or the 'internal' world of perceptive human beings, lead to the second fundamental schism in the ontolo-gical tradition (similarly to the emergence of the Parmenidean tradition in the ancient time). These controversial tendencies created the formation of modern materialism and subjective idealism, which are two different positions in many respects. However, the most important feature for our current analysis is the fact that in these traditions the active, determinant elements of the power structure are different. In the materialist tradition the 'external' world, nature, society, the body, the objects of our power, are the active agents of the situation, while in the subjective idealist tradition the 'internal' world, the individual abilities (perception, intentionality, thinking, will, etc.), play the determinant role. However, the intermediate element in the structure of modern power, the acting power, is common in both traditions.

It is rather evident that the active, determinant compositions of the basic structures of modernity can be considered as reality in full, so from this point of view some aspects of the modernist traditions can be different. The creatures of both of these active power-elements (the constituents of the mental world or from the point of view of the other tradition, the constituents of the 'outer' world) without any doubt have a contingent nature, so they only have a contingent reality, i.e. they belong to virtuality. However, the modernist, active reality can only appear in operation, so the active elements and the acting power are definite parts of reality.

The modern personality has a plural nature. Following the materialist tradition, this plurality seems to be the realm

The modern personality has a plural nature. Following the materialist tradition, this plurality seems to be the realm