Niklas Luhmann’s Political Theory
The topic of this paper is Niklas Luhmann’s idea on political theory. Luhmann uses the term “political theory” in a quite special sense; thus, before expounding why I deem his ideas problematic, I explore for what this concept stands.
To understand the use of the term of political theory and its reasons in Luhmann, we need to distinguish between two kinds of descriptions of the political system.
On the one hand, politics can be described by the scientific system; this is the scientific examination of politics. Science accomplishes this from a position outside politics; this means that this kind of observation of politics has to be adapted to the logic or criteria of science. There is another kind of describing political system, namely the self-description or self-reflection of the political system. As opposed to the scientific one, the self-description of politics does not aim to comply with scientific criteria but with political ones; thus, the key of its success is not scientific truth but applicability in political practice. Luhmann calls this self-reflection of political system political theory (politische Theorie), distinguished from the former case, from the theory of politics (Theorie der Politik) (Luhmann 1990a: 24–25, 2005a: 329–330; cf. Arato 1994: 135–136; Karácsony 2000: 107–110). Thus, in what follows, we deal with the description of political system based on not scientific but political criteria, that is, with the self-reflection of the political system, with political theory.
The distinction between the two types of description means first of all that Luhmann draws a clear line between science and politics. Scientific results do not automatically and directly become part of the political practice because the two systems deal with different criteria of success. This is also true for the applied research; moreover, it is true for the case when the possibilities of practical applications of scientific research become a subject of research themselves (Luhmann 1990a: 107). By sharply separating the two systems, Luhmann emphasizes, among other things, his opposition in particular to critical theory and in general to theories that define the objective of the scientific research as a criticism and improvement of social conditions. In his view, it is impossible to realize a direct connection between science and politics because they operate according to different criteria.
55
Another important message of these thoughts is that for the efficient functioning of politics, there is a need for a theory orienting the practice; that is, there is a need for a relatively coherent idea of what constitutes politics. It is not easy to say what is exactly meant by the political theory. The political theory cannot be an explicit theory, that is, expounded in detail and written in studies or books because in this case it would be a scientific theory. Therefore, the name “theory” is a bit misleading because it suggests this kind of explicit and systematized form. By political theory we rather mean ideas on politics, that are not put in a theoretical framework, but provide a coherent notion of the nature of politics and thus determine political processes. According to Luhmann, all the most important constitutional achievements of the modern state — such as the principles of sovereignty and representation, the mechanisms of controlling power, or the human rights — have been realized with the help of such theories (Luhmann 2005a: 330).
At the beginning of the modernity, the political theory meant ideas on the absolute state, then conceptions of the constitutional, democratic state, and finally the notion of the welfare state (Luhmann 1990a: 25–27).
This already indicates that the state plays an important role in the political theory (Luhmann 1990b: 141–144, 2005c: 114–116). One of Luhmann’s definitions of the state reads that the state is a self-description of the political system, and we have defined the political theory exactly in the same way. Thus, we can mainly characterize political theories as reflections on the features and functions of the state, reflections that determine the political practice.
Luhmann examines the political theory, because he thinks that today we do not have a theory that could suitably fill this role (Luhmann 2005a: 332). He claims that a proper self-reflection of the welfare state is lacking because the recent ideas ignore the limits of political actions, which lead to the overburdening of politics (Luhmann 1990a: 105).
From this definition and characterization of the political theory it follows that it has to comply with two requirements that can be opposed to each other. The function of the political theory is to orient the political practice; that is, this theory serves as a kind of framework for the political programs. In the democracy, these programs have to compete for the electors’ votes. Consequently, political theories, on the one hand, have to underlie programs that are attractive for the voters. On the other hand, however, these programs have to be realizable and workable; that is, they have to comply with several economic, organizational, and other requirements.
While the former requirement can be regarded as popular — both in the positive and the negative senses of this word — the latter is a scientific one. The present situation of the welfare state shows the best that there is a great gap between popularity and feasibility; thus, Luhmann’s statement that a proper political theory is lacking seems to be plausible.
56
The political theory has a quite paradoxical relation to science. It needs the science in order to be able to provide workable programs, but at the same time, it cannot listen to the advices of the science completely because it has — even if not directly but through political programs —to find favor with the electors, who often do not vote in accordance with scientific criteria. Nevertheless, politics has no choice but to look for “possible advice from science” (Luhmann 1990a: 107). However, what appears as a political theory in politics is never a scientific theory but at the very most — in Luhmann’s words — a “scientifically subvented theory” (Luhmann 1990a: 110). From the point of view of science, we also face the problem of the impossibility of transition between the two systems. The fact that a theory is scientifically prominent is not a guarantee for its success as a political theory. Thus, scientists, however respectable scientific theories they may provide, cannot determine the direction of the political processes. Even in the best possible case, they can only hope that their scientific researches trigger resonances in the political system and initiate or modify certain political processes. But the question of when and how this happens is always decided by the criteria of the politics, which are incalculable for the science (Luhmann 1990a: 107).
Although Luhmann does not broach this topic, I think it is important to distinguish the political theory from another kind of meeting point of politics and science. I mean the cases when politics uses the scientific knowledge to achieve certain political aims. For the economic politics, one obviously needs the branches of economics; for the social politics, the social sciences are necessary; for the administration, the organization theory; and political campaigns are also based on a number of psychological researches. In my opinion, all this does not belong to what Luhmann calls the political theory. In these cases, politics uses scientific theories referring to other societal subsystems, to organizations, or to the people, while the political theory means the self-reflection of politics. The subject of political theory is the whole political system, its characteristics and options; thus, the political theory forms the aims of the politics. Scientific theories used for political aims, however, can rather be regarded as tools to achieve these political aims.
It is also worth touching upon the question of the relationship between political theory and ideologies because the kind of relation existing between them may be unclear. Luhmann does not discuss this question, but we can find some basis in his theory for reconstructing the relationship between the two concepts. In my view, the political theory is, in a certain sense, a wider category than ideology. The political theory provides a conceptual framework in which the opposing alternatives, the different party programs can be formulated. The political theory in itself is not yet a program, a guidance for the political action, but it influences the range of possible political programs through certain conceptual arrangements and suggestions. With the help of the political theory, political alternatives can be shaped more clearly, and ideological standpoints can be separated from one another. Without mentioning ideologies, Luhmann formulates that the politics’
57
“premises, options and their alternatives appear more clearly” (Luhmann 1990a:
109) with the help of the political theory. If there is no proper political theory, the ideological alternatives are also not clearly distinguishable.
At the same time, Luhmann’s findings suggest a different kind of relationship between the political theory and ideologies as well. According to Luhmann, the achievements of the modern politics, such as democracy or human rights — Luhmann has not mentioned them, but I think we can also classify the social and welfare achievements among them — were able to be realized exclusively with the help of political theories. These achievements, however, can be also attributed to ideologies. Accordingly, there is a close relationship between political theory and certain ideologies, which may be called progressive ones. Their relationship could be conceived in such a way that political theories have been introduced and stabilized in politics by means of certain ideologies. This formulation does not contradict what we said above about the relationship between the political theory and the ideologies. We can say that progressive ideologies have implemented a political theory in the political practice, and from then on this political theory did not serve only as a framework for the ideology that produced it but for other ideologies as well.
Let us now examine the role assigned by Luhmann to his own theory in this context. First, he makes clear — and I think it is obvious — that his own theory observes the society and the politics from the scientific system, so his theory cannot be regarded as a political theory (Luhmann 2005a: 333). From the beginning of his career, Luhmann emphasized that he only endeavoured to describe the society and not to change it. This served, on the one hand, as a demarcation from the critical theory, and on the other hand, for defending his theory from criticisms stating that applying systems theory as a theory of society serves conservative ideological aims. In his answer to Habermas’s criticism of this kind Luhmann mentioned humorously that “systems theory can have a good chance to remain purely academic because it is beyond comprehension” (Luhmann 1971:
403; my translation).
At the same time, however, we cannot say that Luhmann intended his theory exclusively for the scientific sphere. Although his theory is not a political theory, he expected the emersion of a political theory suitable for the recent societal requirements with its help. He is a bit skeptical whether this can succeed because anything he writes would remain a scientific theory, while the political theory has to be created by the politics (Luhmann 1990a: 115). At the same time, he clearly holds that a political theory suitable for the present society has a chance to emerge only if the wider scientific public, inspired by his findings on the theory of the society, changes its views on politics, and then, as a consequence of this change, the political system resonates and creates a political theory complying with the present requirements of the society (Luhmann 1990a: 112–114). In other words, the
58
aim of Luhmann’s work is not only to provide a proper description of the society for the scientific public, but he also holds that his theory of the society is suitable to be a basis for an emerging political theory, that fits the recent challenges and fulfills an orientation function in the political system.
In this light, the opposition between Luhmann’s aims and the endeavours of the critical theory seems to be not so sharp. According to both the participants of the debate and the interpreters, one of the most important aspects of this opposition was that while the critical theory, through the construction of a theory of society, endeavoured to change the society, that is, strove to achieve aims outside the science, Luhmann held that the exclusive objective of the theory is to describe the society. Now, however, we can see that Luhmann, in fact, expected his theory to change the political practice and to channel it in the direction he thought to be right. Although in his view this can only happen in an indirect way and beyond the control of the science, this is rather a difference in degree, and I think the adherents of the critical theory would accept this uncertainty of the practical applicability of the theories.
Thus, Luhmann’s criticism of researching the possibilities of application of applied researches also loses its radicalism. Although in his theory we can never acquire indisputable knowledge on the practical implementation of scientific theories, his thoughts presented here can be regarded as researches on this topic. The reason of his holding the theory of autopoietic systems to be an important research program is that with its help we can obtain a more exact notion of how scientific theories can be implemented into the practice (Luhmann 2005a: 333–335, 2005b: 383).
Nevertheless, these aspects are not making me consider Luhmann’s views on the political theory as problematic. My critical remark refers to Luhmann’s idea that his theory can stimulate the birth of a new political theory. In my opinion, his theory is not suitable to be the basis of an emerging new political theory adequate to the recent societal conditions.
Let us first examine what the main characteristics of a political theory based on Luhmann’s theory of society would be. On the one hand, Luhmann provides some instructions for this question; on the other hand, this can be deduced from his theory. According to Luhmann, a proper political theory should take into account that the modern society consists in autonomous, closed, and uncontrollable functional subsystems. From the point of view of the politics, this means that it cannot steer the other subsystems. Political intervention will never reach the effects intended because the results of the intervention depend on the regularities of the other subsystems. The most important characteristic of a political theory based on Luhmann’s theory of the society should be that it limits the range of politics to the issues in which politics is competent, that is, to the production of collectively binding decisions. Luhmann holds that we need a political theory showing that
59
politics cannot remedy the problems which solution depends on other subsystems.
These problems include, in his view, that the economy exhausts the natural resources, that the education system does not produce suitably motivated people, or that some people have problems with the way of living. He characterizes his own standpoint as approximately coinciding with the liberal views on the roles of the state (Luhmann 1990a: 113–114). In what follows, I examine the question whether this kind of political theory would be operable.
As we have seen above, the political theory has to comply with two requirements:
it has to make possible the elaboration of political programs that are, on the one hand, technically realizable and workable, and on the other hand, attractive for the public. In my opinion, Luhmann’s theory can only comply with the first requirement. His systems theory thoroughly examines and explains what can and what cannot be realized in the modern society. He, however, does not discuss how a political program declaring that we have to renounce most of our welfare, ecological, or other claims on the state could be presented as attractive.
In his works on the welfare state, Luhmann regards the formation of newer claims on the state as a necessary consequence of modernity and democracy. And now he expects to give them up. How could these claims be silenced? In the democracy, the only possibility is to convince people of the indefensibility of their claims, that is, to expect people to become aware of certain regularities of the modern society and to vote in the elections accordingly. A faith like this in people’s rationality, however, would be very contrasting to Luhmann’s ideas. As we have seen, when reinterpreting the key concepts of politics, Luhmann endeavoured to replace the explanations based mostly on people’s rationality by sociological conceptions. An argument based on the rationality is completely understandable on the part of the liberals because this is one of their most important methodological presuppositions.
This argument can be supplemented by the liberals’ faith in progress, that is, by the idea that if people have enough freedom, it will result in a development that is advantageous for the whole society.
Liberals can be considered consistent regarding the relation between these presuppositions and their proposals for the political practice. Luhmann, however, does not only reject the ideas on people’s rational capacities but also the liberals’
faith in progress. He does not think that a free functioning of subsystems would result in a development beneficial to the whole society; for example, he does not hold that the free functioning of the economic system would produce beneficial effects for everyone. Luhmann should reinforce his liberal-style proposals for political practice in such a way that — as opposed to the liberals — he cannot use arguments like people’s rationality or the generally advantageous effects of the free functioning of the economy or other subsystems.
60
The fact that Luhmann’s theory is not suitable to be the basis of a proper political theory follows, in my view, from its peculiarity that can be called the
“disenchantment” of societal phenomena.7 The disenchantment consists in the fact that Luhmann endeavours to demonstrate that our most important political institutions fulfill completely different functions than it is commonly — or even in the scientific discussions — thought. The supposed and the real functions can be described by the two levels or two aspects mentioned in connection with the legitimation process, that is, by distinguishing between symbolic and operative levels. For example, in the case of the procedure of election, the symbolic level is the declaration of the will of the people, but on operative level, one of the functions of election is to ensure the separation of the political system, that is, to ensure that politicians can govern undisturbed while the citizens’ discontents are channeled by filling out the ballots in every four years. Or taking another example, on the symbolic level the basic rights embody our unalienable universal rights, while on the operative level they fulfill the function of preventing the ceasing of the autonomy of the functional subsystems. On the symbolic level we can find approximately the same ideas by which the tradition of Enlightenment described
“disenchantment” of societal phenomena.7 The disenchantment consists in the fact that Luhmann endeavours to demonstrate that our most important political institutions fulfill completely different functions than it is commonly — or even in the scientific discussions — thought. The supposed and the real functions can be described by the two levels or two aspects mentioned in connection with the legitimation process, that is, by distinguishing between symbolic and operative levels. For example, in the case of the procedure of election, the symbolic level is the declaration of the will of the people, but on operative level, one of the functions of election is to ensure the separation of the political system, that is, to ensure that politicians can govern undisturbed while the citizens’ discontents are channeled by filling out the ballots in every four years. Or taking another example, on the symbolic level the basic rights embody our unalienable universal rights, while on the operative level they fulfill the function of preventing the ceasing of the autonomy of the functional subsystems. On the symbolic level we can find approximately the same ideas by which the tradition of Enlightenment described