Evidence-based policy making World of Labor Evidence-based policy making
Initial findings on the role oflanguage in determining migration flows were mixed, in part because of limited data on migration flows and stocks. Findings have been more nuanced in recent research, since larger and more heterogeneous panel data sets have become available and a broader set of measures developed to capture linguistic distance between countries. The most basic way to introduce a measure oflanguageas a barrier to migration is to use an indicator of whether two countries share a language. Some studies find that sharing a common language increases migration flows , , whereas other studies do not , . A plausible explanation for this inconsistency is the smaller size and restricted sample in studies that do not find a positive relationship. These studies are generally limited to migration flows into a small set of developed countries . In contrast, a study of flows into the US from a large sample of 81 countries during 1971–1998 finds higher migration inflows from countries in which English is the first official language. However, this effect is no longer significant once the presence of prior immigrants from the same country in the US is taken into account . Most recent studies employ more sophisticated measures to capture the linguistic distance between two countries. One study uses the number of common nodes on the linguistic tree (a representation of a group of languages related through descent from a common linguistic ancestor) shared by the languages to measure the impact of cultural differences on the tendency of people with a higher level of education to migrate to countries with closer languages . The study finds a net positive effect oflanguage on skill selectivity, indicating that a closer relationship between languages facilitates the transferability of human capital. Individuals with more human capital thus self-select to migrate to destinations with languages that are closer to their native language.
reduced, and local agencies providing intervention for groups of hosts in apartments and centers (SPRAR), dispersed across urban and rural territories, had to change their pedagogical orientation, dismiss many educators and social workers, and take a more bureaucratic role of controllers and administrators of objectified human lives and bodies. This research had started a few weeks before this turn, as a qualitative, narrative, territory-based study funded by Fondazione ALSOS’ call “Migrationand Migrants in Italy: Places and practices of coexistence in the construction of new forms of social interaction”. We wanted to document and analyze the diffused model of reception and its transformative effects in the Province of Lecco, Northern Italy, using the insiders’ voices (Merrill & West, 2009) to chronicle informal and transformative learning of both newcomers and natives. We questioned linear and trivialized notions of integration informing EU’s policies and practices and inspired by the neoliberal agenda more than human rights (Xanthaki, 2016). In the present global context of relentless migrations and growing diversity, integration is a problematic concept for many reasons: it entails the nation as a social homogenous whole and it reifies culture (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018; Schinkel, 2018); it fails in accounting for diversity, for the voices and aspirations of those to whom the integration policies are directed (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018); it is focused on migrants’ features, needs, or skills, hence underestimating the role of relationships, interdependence, and circularity in building the concrete possibilities of ‘integration’. Pushing migrants to mere adaption, the dominant model of integration enforces neo-colonial knowledge production (Schinkel, 2018) and reduces the learning potential of adult education to implementing 'normative assumptions concerning who the citizen should be – or rather become – in order to be included in and part of society (Fejes, 2019, p. 235)'.
Talk ofand about migration, emigration, burning, visas, émigrés, embassies, queues, traffickers and the West constitutes a pervasive part of ordinary communicative interpersonal interactions among young people in Casablanca. I am not referring to the ‘public, institutional talk’ (Scannell, 1991: 7) manifest in radio or television programmes. As we learn from Scannell, broadcast talk is not ordinary per se, but is managed and organized for us so it appears as such. Instead, I refer to non- institutional talk ofand about emigration as it happens in non-institutional spaces such as the Derb. The latter is a geographic space; usually an over- populated urban space where people, largely from the working classes, share a strong sense of community and belonging. The Derb is also a sociocultural space that reflects everyday experience. It is the product of material realities inherent to Moroccan society, and its existence can be attributed to different factors. Here, I will content myself with describing two main ones: economic and cultural. The practice of standing at the top of the Derb – which is more common in working-class areas – is due largely to the problem of unemployment. Many unemployed young Moroccans from the Casablancan working classes cannot afford to go to cafés or other recreational spaces and therefore choose to stand or sit at the top of the Derb for most of the day. The second factor is cultural and inextricably linked to the previous one. Being unemployed means being dependent on parents, which in turn implies living under the same roof with them. Here the Derb as a social space offers the young, unemployed or student an outlet, a space in which cultural hegemonic practices imposed by the elderly can be, and often are, broken. The Derb is also a patriarchal space, as only men may occupy it. It is the space where the female body becomes the object of the male gaze and desire. Derb corners, as I learned from participant observation in Morocco, are busiest late in the afternoon when factory and college women make their way home. The Derb is a space where a lot of flirting between the sexes takes place. 13
2.7 Lack of knowledge about the cultureand its products
Normally, hearing persons do not have much contact with deaf persons, a situation which partly arises from the separation of the deaf and the hearing ways of living. The community of the deaf possesses a special culture, which is marked by visual characterisations: if you are deaf, you rely on vision. The use of modern communication systems like short messaging, online communication or postings in the Internet is widespread. Deaf people also share common estimations. Because of experiencing the world in a similar way, they have a common background, which determines their way of life. In this world, the grade of residual hearing is not important at all, more important is whether your parents are deaf, too, if you are integrated in the deaf community and which school you attended. It is relevant for the appreciation of others, if you have deaf family members, deaf friends and a deaf mate (see Goldschmidt 2006). Your social appraisal depends on your linking to the deaf community and your commitment for the needs of the collective. There is a strong company within the group of the deaf, a kind of alliance against the discrimination from outside. Visual access to the world generates a different view of the world with different estimations. Based on these, a special culture develops, including special visual products like visual poetry or signed jokes (cf. Beecken et al. 1999: 32ff).
Economic theory tends to view migrationas primarily a decision driven by expectations of an economic gain: higher earnings and higher wellbeing. In this paper, we add an additional factor which is likely to affect the choices of migrants: cultural norms and values in the countries of origin and destination. In particular, migrants can move because they feel ostracized in their present country of origin, or because the norms prevailing in the destination country are closer to their own than those in the country of origin, or for a combination of the two reasons. Our theoretical framework shows that such selection on cultural values may be more complex than one would expect: the relationship between individual values and the propensity to migrate may be U-shaped, hump-shaped, stepwise increasing or flat, depending on the relative degree of cultural diversity in the regions of origin and destination and on economic differences between regions. Relatively culturally homogenous countries are mainly attractive for migrants with like-minded views, while relatively diverse countries may also attract for individuals whose values differ significantly from the average in the destination. Moreover, sufficiently well-off countries and regions are attractive for all potential migrants, irrespective of their cultural values.
Hypothesis 1a Language course and exam participation in a country is positively correlated with immigration from that country to Germany.
Minority Language Concentrations
Migrant networks are often considered to improve the ability of migrants to find work in their host country and build social ties to others who speak their native language. As a consequence, speaking the host country’s language may be less important for migrants who can rely on migrant networks. Several studies find that minority language concentrations are associated with lower levels oflanguage proficiency (Chiswick and Miller 2007; Espenshade and Fu 1997; Lazear 1999; Isphording and Otten 2013). We hypothesise that these results are not exclusively based on the (self-)selection of migrants with worse language skills, but that the negative effect of minority language concentrations extends to the language learning decisions of immigrants. We use the number of citizens of a country of origin who live in Germany as a proxy for the size of the respective minority language concentration. Hypothesis 1b Language course and exam participation in a country is less strongly correlated with migration flows if a large number of migrants from that country live in Germany.
C. The Role of Widely Spoken Languages
Our linguistic proximity index does not take completely into account the importance of the use of some widely spoken Indo-European languages (particularly English) in the media (TV, music) internet, business or everyday life and the high frequency of English as a choice of second language in schools. Therefore in Table 5 the models include separate indicators of linguistic proximity for non-English and for English speaking destinations in order to examine the role of English as a widely spoken language. If there is some “proficiency” advantage from knowing English as a second language, we expect that the linguistic proximity between native languages should matter more for non-English speaking destinations than for the others. Results in Table 5 seem to confirm this hypothesis. All linguistic proximity indices are strong predictors of emigration rates toward non-English speaking destinations. The coefficients of both the linguistic proximity index (in columns 1 and 7) and the Levenshtein index (in columns 2 and 8) for English destinations are smaller, though still significant, sizable and positive, than those for non-English destinations. This gives support to the hypothesis that people may still migrate to destinations with a widely spoken language even if their mother languages are linguistically far from that language. First, even if they do not regularly speak it at home, many migrants may have previous knowledge of a widely spoken language taught at schools and used in the internet and movies, particularly English (see special Eurobarometer study on languages by European Commission (2006), and Pytlikova (2006)). Second, foreign language proficiency is an important part of human capital in the labor market of source countries (see e.g. European Commission (2002) on language proficiency as an essential skill for finding a job in home countries). Those returns to widely spoken language proficiency may
The Tiebout model has been greatly influential in shaping our understanding of political economy of public finance. 3 However, its insights can be equally applied to sorting according to preferences over other attributes: besides taxes and public goods, cultural norms and values can likewise play a role. We formulate a model in the spirit of Tiebout but extend and generalize it by making two assumptions about factors that determine migration decisions. First, individuals migrate to improve their economic wellbeing by moving to countries or regions where their expected earnings are higher. Second, migration choices are also affected by the distribution of preferences in the different regions: these preferences can be over cultural and social norms, which is the main concern of our analysis, or about taxes and public goods as in the original Tiebout model. We refer to these two driversofmigrationas comfort (higher earnings after migration allow migrants to enjoy a higher level of wellbeing) and conformity (migrants can choose to move because they enjoy living alongside other like-minded people, and/or because they dislike living alongside people whose opinions and values clash with their own), respectively.
When I was a small child we lived in a neighborhood where there were many families from the Middle East, from Syria, from Egypt, from Lebanon. All families did their shopping in the Syrian-Lebanese store. There we supplied ourselves with tahine, with parra leaves, with zatar, with jalva, with fila and with baclawa. Also with cuajo, to prepare the laban and the cardamom for the coffee or the seeds of sesm, of burgol wheat, of baharat. Jewish Arabs and Christian Arabs were all in the same club, the older ones playing cards, and the little ones playing together. My grandparents, my uncles and my parents, all in the textile business, did their wholesale shopping in the stores of the Arabs, buying wherever it seemed right, without discrimination.
It is important to note that, despite its enormous challenges, Colombia has already made progress, legally speaking, to secure justice and reparations for the displaced populations and victims of the conflict. Clearly, Colombia is trying to use the wealth of its natural resources to sustain a fragile peace [ 109 , 110 ]. Additionally, the Colombian government is committed to reducing its emissions by 20% by 2030. International agencies are putting forth a concerted effort not just to build the peace, but also to support sustainable practices. This includes sustainable forest management, conservation areas, as well as capacity building for farmers and displaced populations. Some studies suggest that peacebuilding activities enable conditions and predispose conflict-affected farmers toward forest conservation if these are compatible with their respective livelihood priorities, including cattle ranching [ 111 ]. By the same token, many examples are written in the peace accord, such as the implementation of environmental peacebuilding practices in order to address land tenure conflicts, resettlement of migrant communities, sustainable agriculture, and access to water [ 108 ]. Thus, the Colombian case illustrates how the dynamics of the conflict affect conditions related to sustainability, such as housing, food price increases, access to land for agricultural activities, labor access, and livelihood diversification (See Table A1 in Appendix A ). Therefore, food insecurity and environmental shocks are also factors interconnected to the reality of security threats that cause migration in Colombia.
Europe might be a divided continent with numerous political, religious and lin- guistic borders, yet it is possible to speak of one European culture. In architecture, painting, music and scholarship Europe was united in spite of all its borders and barriers. These were overcome by migration. Those who created European cultureand scholarship moved all over Europe. Some of this migration was permanent and some temporary such as that of painters making a trip to Italy, students residing at a foreign university for a semester, or composers and musicians performing in one or more European cultural centres. It has often been thought that these cultural migrants were an exception during the period before 1850. Many assumed that the population of Europe must have been largely immobile as the majority was too poor to move. Many researchers were blinded by the spectacular and massive outflow of Europeans to the US , Canada, Australia and New Zealand during the nineteenth century and thus assumed that European mass migration did not start until one hundred and fifty years ago and was part of the rapid modernisation of Europe and a result of the Industrial Revolution. However, recent studies have shown that before 1800 migration was by no means negligible and confined to the elite. Europe has always had a very mobile population andmigration was not typical of only musicians, architects, scholars, and painters. There were many mobile groups in the lower income brackets and that suggests that a common culture in Europe was not exclusively limited to high cultureand had much deeper roots in society than has previously been assumed. 1
Following the increasing usage of the term in politi- cal rhetoric and media discourse, the concept of “wel- come culture” was gradually incorporated into a series of concrete measures and official declarations. For in- stance, the German Federal Office for Migrationand Refugees (BAMF) developed a government-endorsed definition on “welcome culture”. It suggests that “new migrants are welcomed with an appealing framework and thus recognised in society. Welcome culture extends to all new legal immigrants” (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2013, 20, own translation). The two cru- cial insertions are the words “new” and “legal”, which set clear parameters for the target of the new policy. It thus emphasises the importance of adhering to legal norms and the fact that such a policy constitutes a new chap- ter in German migration policy targeting future waves of migrants. The German migration institute situated “welcome culture” within a broader policy framework that aimed at integrating legal migrants in a structured and uniform fashion. The three-step model consisted of “pre-integration”, “initial orientation” and “settling in Germany” (ibid). “Welcome culture” applies solely to the first two phases and thus deals exclusively with the early stages of integration into German society. Once these are complete, a new policy system comes into force, which goes under the label of “recognition culture” (“Anerken- nungskultur”). This implied that by welcoming migrants into the country, there was not an automatic official rec- ognition of their status as equivalent to that of other German citizens (ibid).
We run eight different regression models in order to take into account the contribution of each category of explanatory variables. In model 1, we run a probit model controlling only for factors that strongly correlate with wealth (roominess, financial support from parents, and upper social class). Model 2 adds mobility and adaptability factors (belong to political party, living in same place where born, and been abroad). Model 3 adds the unemployment variable, while model 4 considers the same variable but with control for institutional factors (No confidence in the legal system, no confidence in the European Union, no confidence in elections, belief in democracy). Next, in model 5 we replace the unemployment variable with a dummy variable indicating whether the youth is available to work. In model 6, we consider other labor market factors (working in the private sector and job insured by the social security system), while model 7 has the same specification as model 6 but with the addition of institutional factors. The final model adds to model 7, the type of contract (indefinite and fixed term) in addition to two variables on economic and political exclusion pre- and post-Arab Spring. All eight models control for a set of socio-economic variables that include gender, age, marital status, vocational training, and education.
be killed, the other ordains that no member of Israel may marry his daughter to a Benjaminite. So, the excessive violence of the rape and murder is not only answered by an excessively violent war of retaliation, but also by an excess of pre-legal bonding. In fact, these oaths exert an exorbitant binding power. They are treated as absolutely inviolable by the people of Israel—to the extent that they threaten to destroy the very corporative unity they are intended to con- stitute. Having slain the entire population of Benjamin save for 600 men, the avenging tribes suddenly realize that they are about to desintegrate their own commonwealth. Therefore they decide to spare the last surviving Benjaminites, to procure them women and to re-integrate their tribe into Israel. However, the oath obliges them to continue in the path of excessive violence in order to do so. First, they fall upon the expedient of destroying the city of Jabes, the only community outside the tribe of Benjamin which had refused to partake in the campain of vengeance. So they kill the men of Jabes and transfer their women to the Benjaminites—“comme une proye qu’on venoit de ravir pour eux.“ 53 Still,
While civil society activities were comparable in Germany and Austria, the Austrian tabloid press has embraced a less pronounced pro-refugee approach at the peak of the crisis. The Austrian Broadcasting Coop- eration ORF launched a support campaign for refugees – “Help. Like We Are” (“Helfen. Wie Wir”). No other media outlet adopted such a marked stance. According to Fritz Hausjell, a media specialist, the “Kronen-Zeitung”, Aus- tria’s highest circulation newspaper, had an “ambivalent approach” during the peak of the refugee crisis, oscillat- ing between “alarmist resentments and tolerant empa- thy” (quoted in Der Standard 2015, own translation). Asof October 2015, the Krone reported with more nega- tive undertones on the situation of migrants, verging on open hostility. A publically salient case was an op-ed of Christoph Biró, editor-in-chief of a regional branch of the Kronen-Zeitung, who drew an apocalyptic pic- ture of masses of migrants storming local supermarkets and committing “aggressive sexual assaults” (Die Presse 2015, own translation). The op-ed caused 40 complaints with the Austrian Press Council and an investigation of the Austrian public prosecution office for incitement (ibid).
According to Deretic (1983) the stories that are known about Cyril and Methods, about their life and creating are in some way like fairytales and legends. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that they gave huge contribution in literacy of Slavic people. Constantine-Cyril and Methods were brothers, they were erudite Greeks, who learned the Slavic language from Slavic people from the surrounding of Thessaloniki. They started their missionary work at Moravia in the year 863, and spread it to Pannonia. The brothers acted together, until Cyril’s death (869.). However, the main role had Cyril, as he was the creator of the Slavic script and the literary language. That moment of creating the Slavic script and the Slavic literacy was somehow unbelievable and mythical, but still real, documented and supported by two main world centers, Rome and Tsarigrad (Constantinopolis). After Cyril’s death, Methods continued the missionary, and afterwards their students. As it is known there were five students, and the most important were Naum and Climnet. The work of Thessaloniki brothers and their students was not just important for literacy of illiterates, the script and the literacy were powerful weapon for the Moravian ruler prince Rastislav in struggle against cultural, political and religious dominancy of foreigners.
With regard to literature, evidently business models are viewed in different ways (Boons & Lüdeke-Freund, 2013, p. 10; Lüdeke-Freund, p. 13; Teece, 2010, p. 175). Consequently, there is no clear uniform description. Osterwalder’s business model concept is commonly referred to in literature, as it is explained in detail in section 3.1. The model contains one of the first comprehensive definitions and is based on four pillars (see Table 1) according to Lüdeke-Freund and Schaltegger et al. (2012, p. 106). Thus, this Master Thesis uses the concept of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2013, p. 14) who provide the following definition of a business model: “a business model describes the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers and captures value.” Antikainen and Valkokari (2016, p. 7) further explain that sustainable business models and CBMs can be seen as subcategories of business models and are closely connected in literature. Furthermore, they describe that business model innovation is the new type of the value creation approach which is made possible by changing one or more elements of the business model. Within their applied framework for the categorization of sustainable business models, Florin et al. (2015, IV) go further and classify CBMs as a subgroup of sustainable business models. Such CBMs have to be focused on production and consumption stimulating efficiency and sufficiency in their opinion. In particular, to define and categorize business models, this Master Thesis follows the approach of Geissdoerfer et al. (2018, pp. 713–714) who “consider business models for the circular economy as a class of or generic strategy for sustainable business models”. The concept of the authors is explained in more detail in chapter 3.2 where their created model is illustrated as well (see Figure 4).
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues that differences in the amount and nature of personal assets, or capital, give rise to differences in the way people value and perceive the world. Bourdieu distinguishes between three kinds of capital: economic, social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1999). Economic capital is capital in the traditional meaning of the world, e.g. money, but it can also be capital transformed into a more material form, e.g. a private company or real estate. Social capital is embedded in the relations between people. It can be constituted of relations to relatives, friends, acquaintances as well as work related contacts. Capital can also be of a more symbolic nature, i.e. more related to the skills and knowledge of a person. The value of symbolic capital is to a greater extent than other capital depending on being acknowledged as valuable by groups in the society. Symbolic capital can be divided into sub categories, e.g. cultural, political and educational capital. The amount and nature of the capital produce similar actions, thoughts and values in different areas, e.g. in leisure activities, political engagement, taste in cloths, participation in voluntary non-profit
high economic growth weighing down credit constraint will stimulate migration from South Asia. While in SSA, youth bulge and persistently large income dif- ferentials between that region and OECD destinations will enlarge the pool of potential migrants (those who would like to migrate). This represents a rising indirect migration pressure on OECD countries. However the slow economic growth in SSA could not lift up the problem of credit constraint therefore the volume of effective migrants (i.e. the direct pressure) will still be limited. The results of this study could be compared to the most recent papers by Hatton and Williamson (2003), Hanson and McIntosh (2016), Docquier and Machado (2017) and Dao et al. (2017). All the four papers provide projec- tions of future migration in the 21st century and come to the same conclusion of a high migration pressure from SSA. Hanson and McIntosh (2016) call the Mediterranean sea the “new” Rio Grande. The authors predict a fall of immi- gration to the US because of demographic stagnation in Mexico, while Europe would face high migration pressure from the neighboring SSA and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) because of their bulging population and low growth prospect. In comparison with these four papers, this study provides a short- term projection of the period 2010-2020 due to the lack of accurate prediction of income of a longer period. Even though the considered period of time is short, the conclusion of this paper is somewhat in line with those studies. By the end of this decade, migration volumes from Mexico and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to the US are still high however the sign of sluggishness is apparent. Migration pressure from SSA and MENA will be on the rise at very high speed. In addition, one extra element developed in this study will help to refine this conclusion in the existing literature. The four aforemen- tioned papers only consider the wage gap as the main driver ofmigrationand consequently reach the conclusion that migration pressure from SSA will be the most intensive. This paper however also brings into play the capacity to realize migration. Due to the fact that population growth will not go hand in hand with economic growth in SSA, the volume of its people who would like to emigrate will increase but at the same time these individuals will continue to face high financial constraint to realize their migration intention. Therefore, the direct migration pressure (i.e. the volume of effective migrants) will be lower than the indirect migration pressure (i.e. the volume of potential mi- grants) from SSA at least in the short and medium terms when its economy does not show any sign of taking off. 4
This chapter will discuss the role ofcultureandlanguage learning in the classroom. Variations in cultural, ethnic, and national characteristics within and among individual students affect classroom dynamics and therefore influence the decisions which teachers need to make in order to provide an optimal learning environment for all learners. Culture is not an easy concept to define, and is especially difficult to disentangle from concepts such as ethnicity and nationality. Individuals define and interpret these terms differently depending on the socio-cultural context they are situated in (Lantolf, 2000). There may be differences of the perceptions of self and others within a given socio-cultural context (Finkbeiner, 2006; Kramsch, 1993, 1998), while surface phenomena (such as skin colour) are often mistakenly related to