Remarkably few people have ever made contributions to world literature in more than one language. Beckett and Nabokov may be the only two prominent examples. Conrad, who is sometimes mentioned in this connection, is a false illustration in a glaring regard, since he never wrote in his native Polish. Quite conspicuously, expatriate authors generally continue to write in their native language even after living for decades away from home. This holds not only for poets, such as Mickiewicz and Milosz, which may not be surprising, but also for nov- elists. Mann went on composing in German during a long spell in the US. Though established in France for many years and frequently publishing essays in French, Kundera has only re- cently ventured to write novels in French rather than Czech. Brodsky also produced a moder- ate volume of poetry in English in relation to his large Russian output. In her discussion of expatriate authors, Beaujour (1989) mentions a number of writers who engaged in a fairly steady flow of creative writing in two tongues (e.g., Triolet, J. Green), but her sample is mod- est, and Beckett and Nabokov are her only examples of unquestionable international stature. 25
Cross-section studies addressing endogeneity issues by controlling for self-selection into agricultural commercialization tend to find positive impacts of commercialization on various aspects of household welfare. Using an instrumental variable technique, Tipraqsa and Schreinemachers (2009) find that integration into output markets improves farm productivity and net per capita income among the Karen Hill tribes in Thailand, and Bellemare (2012) finds that participating in contract farming is associated with an increase in household income, a decrease in its variability, and a shortening ofthe hunger season experienced by households in Madagascar. Rao and Qaim (2011), using an endogenous switching regression model, find positive effects of supplying to supermarkets on household income in Kenya, especially for households that are poor or own little land. Ogutu and Qaim (2018) use a control function method and find that commercialization significantly reduces both income and multidimensional poverty in Kenya, and that impacts are heterogeneous: while the magnitude of income gains increases with income, the magnitude of poverty reduction is strongest among the poorest households. Meanwhile, Romero and Wollni (2018) combine cross-sectional household data with longitudinal data on export market transactions. They estimate a duration model of smallholders’ entry and exit from the market for broccoli in Ecuador, and then use the predicted length of participation derived from the duration model as the treatment of interest in a least squares equation. They find no evidence that participation translates into tangible benefits for farmers.
schooling. Positive price spikes for women’s crops are thus observed to enhance child welfare .
Following this logic, rising food prices (or, for that matter, any event that enhances the productivity and income-generation potential of women’s crops) are expected to have a positive impacton female empowerment and thereafter onwelfare. However, this ad hoc demarcation of production based on gender has been shown to be blurry in practice, and policy experiments based on such assumptions have resulted in perverse behavioral responses. In Gambia, for instance, where women used to be traditional rice growers, it was assumed that the introduction of better technology for rice in the form of pump irrigation would improve household welfare through its productivity-enhancing effect on women. However, because women faced severe constraints in access to credit and hired labor, they failed to adopt the new technology and continued to farm rice using traditional practices. Meanwhile, men began to move into irrigated rice production, which led to an increase in annual per capita income and food consumption . Thus, in a dynamic setting and in a context of institutional constraints to female empowerment that blocked women’s access to complementary resources, it is plausible to assume that men are more likely than women to adopt the types of crops that become more profitable. Thewelfare implications of such behavioral changes at the household level are unclear and would need to be taken into account both in general and when assessing narrower gender issues related to the effect of price or other shocks to agriculture.
For political implications of these findings, the following should be considered. Generally, there is a trade-off between avoiding long-term unemployment and pushing unemployed towards sub-optimal employment which is detrimental to their occupational development. The trade-off can be seen from the individual’s welfare point of view, as well as from a public welfare point of view. The empirical findings on short- and long-term effects of employment caused by enhanced pressure, however, provide strong evidence that in practice, the net effect of pushing people into detrimental employment by far exceeds the advantages of avoiding longer periods of unemployment. This holds for diverse factors which increase the pressure to take up sub-optimal employment, such as exhausted benefit payments (Caliendo et al. (2013)), being legally obliged to accept job offers with lower occupational level (van den Berg and Vikström (2014) and van den Berg et al. (2016)), the ex-ante effects ofthe threat to be sanctioned (Arni et al. (2013)), andthe ex-post effects of imposed benefit andwelfare sanctions.
Guillén et al.  further point out that the buffer level in Denmark in 2012 is lower for most ofthe life insurers than assumed in the paper and, thus, results would have to be worse than calculated in the paper. In addition to this, Guillén et al.  decompose the sources of underperformance ofthe with-profits contracts in three components denoted as the “law ofthe triple blow”: (1) underperformance arises from the mechanism of participating in surplus; (2) risk premium for the interest rate guarantee has to be paid; and (3) policyholders become more risk averse after a relative loss compared to a benchmark. Mahlow, Schmeiser, and Wagner  analyze the performance of three types of pension schemes with focus onthe German Riester products that are subsidized by the German government. First, they consider Riester life insurance contracts with a minimum interest rate guarantee andthe right to receive surplus (cliquet-style guarantee); second, they include Riester fund products comprising a full money-back guarantee (point-to-point guarantee); and third, non-Riester fund products without any investment guarantee are considered. In order to compare the performance of these three types of pension schemes, they conduct a simulation analysis, where the contracts’ specific cost structures are modeled in detail with a parameterization based on market data. While default risk is ignored, their model further takes surrender and mortality into account in the form of specific surrender and mortality rates that are applied for each year and which are also taken from market data. Since the focus is laid onthe accumulation phase (pension period is ignored), the contracts’ payoff distributions at the end ofthe accumulation phase are calculated under the real-world measure P and are compared via performance measures, namely the Sharpe ratio and Sortino ratio.
multidimensional well-being indicators observed at the household level using the first order dominance approach developed by Arndt et al. in 2012. This approach allows welfare comparisons without making any assumptions about the relative importance ofthe indicators. Analysis ofthe 2010 Census of Population and Housing data has generated information onthe poverty status of provinces and districts in Zambia and has ranked them from the relatively well-off to the worse- off. This information has been presented on a map showing the districts according to their poverty status. It is expected that this paper will contribute to fine-tuning geographic poverty targeting efforts in Zambia. The rationale is that with the availability of such analysis, it will be possible to make budgetary provisions that allow for the equitable distribution of public resources. The overriding objective ofthe government should be to channel public resources based onthe spatial distribution of poverty.
facturers or the Chamber of Commerce. These corporations are variously referred to as thewelfare capitalists, the corporate liberals, or the corporate moderates (Berkowitz/ McQuaid 1978; Jacoby 1993; Gordon 1991).
Simplifying greatly, one can summarize the empirical narrative in these accounts as fol- lows: the Great Depression andthe fiercer cost competition it created had turned com- pany welfare from an asset into a burden for the “welfare capitalists” and had induced a preference among them to shift the costs ofwelfare provision to the state. Such a shift to public programs allowed them to cut back their own programs and created a level playing field with non-welfare firms. Before the Great Depression, thewelfare capitalists had invariably defended their company welfare programs against state intervention and had opposed public social programs: they insisted that welfare is the responsibility ofthe firm, not the state, and saw company welfare as a strategy to halt the advance ofthewelfare state (see, for example, Tone 1997: 7–8, 17). Some welfare capitalists were also anti-union: “welfare capitalism killed unions with kindness,” as Jacoby put it (1999: 7). The Great Depression changed thewelfare capitalists’ cost-benefit calculations. The De- pression made many company welfare programs financially unsustainable and cutthroat competition from non-welfare firms became stronger. Thus many welfare capitalists did cut back their programs and promoted the adoption of public programs to spread the costs ofwelfareand to level the playing field. Many of them intended to continue to provide company welfare, but with reduced benefits. Company welfare now became a supplement to public welfareand could thus be cut back. Supporters of this view point to the involvement in the drafting ofthe SSA of a handful of individual welfare capital- ists, as well as policy experts linked to them, in particular through the Business Advisory Council set up by the Roosevelt administration (for example, Gordon 1994: 240–279; Berkowitz/McQuaid 1978: 135; Domhoff 1996: 117–176; Jacoby 1993; Swenson 2002: 191–213; McQuaid 1982: 54–61). According to these studies, the involvement of these actors played a key role in the passing ofthe SSA.
The content ofthe agreement
The trade agreement between the EU and Georgia is called the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area ( DCFTA ). The name indicates that Georgia should be gradually integrated into the European Market. The agreement includes much more than agricultural trade liberalization. Nevertheless, we focus only on this policy change because the agricultural sector in Georgia is still the most important for overall employment. Article 26 , “Elimination of customs duties on imports” ofthe association agreement, says: “The Parties shall eliminate all customs duties on goods originating in the other Party as from the date of entry into force of this Agreement except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article and without prejudice to paragraph 4 of this Arti- cle” ( EU , 2014 ). The Agreement entered into force in July 1 , 2016 .
Recent research shows missionary activity of different denominations matter in their affect on economic outcomes within a developing country, but the economic impactof missionary denomination on outcomes of immigrants from those countries remains largely unexplored. Lutz (2007) notes that missionaries that focused on Western education increased the local populace’s perception of economic mobility—especially in India and China where people were enrolling with no intention of converting, but only learning Englishand studying Western knowledge. Woodberry (2004, 2007, and 2012) found that missionary activity could have a positive impacton economic development— especially in terms of education, gender equality, and democracy—when the missionary activity focuses on investing in the human capital ofthe populace. In Ghana and Nigeria the introduction of missionary schools led to educational enrollment increases to 97 percent ofthe total relevant population as students enrolled in missionary schools (Berman 1974 and Nunn 2012). Any investment missionaries make in the education of people within a developing country has been shown to persist over a long period of time (Woodberry 2004).
Semiconductors consist of memory chips, microprocessors, and application-specific integrated circuits. SRAMs are memory chips designed for the purpose of storing and retrieving informa- tion. The chips are classified into generations according to their capacities of information storage. A higher capacity of SRAM chips requires advanced technological improvements along different dimensions, i.e., different architectures of transistor cells which allow for smaller transistor and cell sizes, an increase in the die area, lower temperature for performing operations, lower en- ergy consumption, advanced masks and lenses to improve etching processes. The most critical issue in the advancement of semiconductor technology is the feature size. The next generation memory chips often require finer feature sizes. For instance, the minimum feature size for 256K DRAM chips was 1.6 microns, while the same figures for the latter 1M and 4M DRAMs had been improved to 1.2 and 0.8 microns. In addition, each new generation also require one or two more mask layers. [These new manufacturing requirements drive demand for new equipment or new fabs. For example, in 2004, Samsung, Hynix, Toshiba, Intel and Micron announced a capital spending between 2 and 4.5 billion U.S. dollars. Note that these numbers are rarely reported and also represent averages only.] It should be noted that firms introduce generations successively, and do not skip one generation to achieve an early headstart onthe successive generation.
It is the aim of this paper to provide a detailed discussion on how opening up to trade aﬀects the distribution of proﬁt and wage income. For this purpose, we set up a general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model along the lines of Neary (2009), with a continuum of industries, a small and exogenous number of ﬁrms within each sector, Cournot competition, and labor as the only factor of production. To account for rent sharing, we extend the Neary framework and consider union wage setting, similar to Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009). Although our analysis builds onthe key insight from Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) that the trade eﬀects on a unionized oligopoly change substantially when general equilibrium feedback eﬀects are accounted for, there are several important diﬀerences between the two approaches. Most importantly, we do not restrict union activity to a subset of sectors but instead assume that it is equally relevant for all industries. This gives rise to involuntary unemployment, which is an important aspect of inequality. 1 Furthermore, we assume that proﬁts are not distributed to workers but rather accrue to ﬁrm owners, who do not work. This assumption allows us to disentangle income inequality between two key groups of economic agents – ﬁrm owners and workers – from income inequality within these two groups of individuals, thereby providing a comprehensive picture of how economic rents are distributed. Finally, we account for productivity diﬀerences across industries, in order to analyze how and to what extent industry-speciﬁc factors govern the distributional eﬀects of trade liberalization. Despite clear supportive evidence for the idea that the interaction of industry-speciﬁc factors and rent sharing between ﬁrms and unions is an important driving force behind changes in income inequality, this channel of inﬂuence has so far not been at the heart of interest in trade theory. 2
endogeneity problem. Instrumental variable estimation—which requires an exogenous variable that affects road development but has no direct effect onthe outcome variable of interest—is one approach. For example, the straight line approach pioneered by Banerjee et al. (2012, 2004) uses the distance between the sampled household andthe nearest straight line between major cities as an instrument for road access. The location ofthe major cities is assumed exogenous, as are the straight lines between them. Where panel data is available, an alternative approach to address potential endogeneity in road placement is to use time-invariant village or household fixed effects (Khandker et al. 2009, Khandker and Koolwal 2010) to assess theimpactof road investments over the period covered by the panel. The fixed effects account for endogeneity caused by time-invariant characteristics ofthe location. The availability of multiple time periods further allows instrumentation using lagged outcomes (Dercon et al. 2009, Khandker and Koolwal 2011). Another technique often used when the road variable is binary (project road or not) is difference in differences (DID) estimation, often with propensity matching to allow the
Pigou complements Aristotle's view on moral education, albeit through a completely different approach. Pigou divides total welfare into economic and non economic, concluding that it depends on society to promote one or the other. Moral education aimed at promoting non economic welfare, while fostering skills, promotes economic welfare. Specifically, Pigou argues that: «A man close to nature and art is moral and contributes to the non financial part ofwelfare. A man who is a perfect machine operator contributes to economic welfare. Furthermore these people can use machines but cannot write a poem. The inner world is blind and deaf. Their whole life is an infinite reflection on promises that were not inspected and conclusions that are not estimated. This is the picture of your culture in my imagination. All your dedicated efforts to produce people who are good instruments, leading to an inability to produce good people.» (Pigou, 1920.) Aristotle's view on moral education is accompanied and complemented perfectly by Pigou’s view onthe simultaneous and balanced promotion of economic and non economic welfare.
There exists evidence from qualitative studies indicating that strong sanctions might bring about negative effects for the sanctioned individuals that are usually not captured in studies focusing on job finding rates. G¨ otz, Ludwig-Mayerhofer and Schreyer (2010) report that caseworkers are rather skeptical about strong sanctions. While caseworkers state that strong sanctions can change the behavior in a desirable way, they additionally stress poten- tial adverse consequences for the sanctioned individuals. For example they might accept jobs that are low paid, unstable and that provide very little training. Schreyer, Zahradnik and G¨ otz (2012) conducted a survey in one job center among young sanctioned welfare recipi- ents. The respondents’ statements suggest that sanctions lead to restricted nutrition. Some respondents reported that they lost their apartments and had to temporarily move into a hostel for the homeless. Many respondents reported increased debt problems. Moreover, the responses provided some indication that due to the sanction, welfare recipients took up jobs without declaring them to thewelfare agency or engaged in criminal activities in order to earn some money. Results onthe United Kingdom by Machin and Marie (2006) also point to a positive relationship between crime and benefit cuts or sanctions.
The micro-level institutional theories emphasize the effects ofthe institutional design ofwelfare state programs on social capital. In other words, the particular design ofwelfare state programs may explain the kind of influence they conduct on social capital. Crowding- out is expected in the case of means-tested schemes while universal non means-tested schemes usually assign a positive influence on social capital levels. Rothstein and Uslaner (2006) for instance argue that unlike selective social schemes, universal ones may enhance trust. This happens first of all due to the fact that such programs are much better at reducing inequality than simple redistributive schemes that imply selective policies. Moreover, the authors insist that apart from economic equality, one should also take into account the equality of opportunities as a determinant of social trust. The universal programs again may ensure this since they possess a number of specific characteristics. First, they are delivered with less bureaucratic hassle and control. Second, they may create a feeling of social cohesion in society. And finally, high quality universal programs may increase the feeling of optimism and equal opportunity among large segments of population. This idea is further developed in Kumlin and Rothstein (2007). They suggest that welfare states exist along several dimensions: one is the level of social spending as proportion of GDP and another is a proportion of citizens that are covered by various social programs. A third dimension has to do with the many different situations and phases in life in which average citizens are in personal contact with public services andwelfare state programs. According to them, contact with universal welfare state institutions tends to increase social trust, while experiences with needs-testing social programs undermine it. Their analysis explicitly shows the negative relationship between the number of needs-tested institutional contacts andthe levels of social trust based onthe Sweden SOM survey.
Cockburn et al. (2018) conclude that these changes in the innovation process have policy implications in terms of ensuring access to data and keeping competition open. "If there are increasing returns to scale or scope in data acquisition (there is more learning to be had from the “larger” dataset), it is possible that early or aggressive entrants into a particular application area may be able to create a substantial and long-lasting competitive advantage over potential rivals merely through the control over data rather than through formal intellectual property or demand side network effects". They draw attention to the need to look again at the laws of data ownership and access. Bessen (2017) looks at the role of demand in the relationship between technological innovations and employment. Sometimes productivity-enhancing technology increases industry employment. In manufacturing, jobs grew along with productivity for a century or more. Only later did productivity gains bring declining employment. He attributes these changes to output demand saturation in markets. While theliteratureon structural change provides reasons for the decline in the manufacturing share of employment, few papers can explain both the rise and subsequent fall. Using two centuries of data, a simple model of demand accurately explains the inverse U-shaped curve of rise and fall in employment in the US textile, steel, and automotive industries. He speculates that there may be hierarchical consumer preferences for different products as income rises and prices fall. He estimates a model of demand for outputs as a function of labour productivity. It fits well with textiles and automotive output patterns. The model also predicts that computer technology should generate relatively greater job growth in non-manufacturing industries today. Estimates show computer use is associated with declining employment in manufacturing industries, but not in other sectors. Bessen (2018) suggests that his (2017) model can be applied to AI as well. Apart from the question whether AI complements or substitutes human labour, the price effect of AI on services, and related price and income-driven demand effects, will have to be investigated.
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Similar to the theoretical literatureon policy-induced innovation, the empirical literature analyses the effect of different policies and their design and thus policy choice. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) compared 17 countries including the US, Japan and Germany and found that increases in pollution abatement costs and expenditures (PACE) induce increased patenting activities in environmentally-friendly technologies. Similar results based on studies using PACE are found in Hamamoto (2006) for private R&D spending in Japan and in Brunneimer and Cohen (2003) for environmental patents in several US industries. Focusing on environmental technology patents, Hasics et al. (2012) find that private PACE leads to increased environmental patenting, contrary to public abatement spending. But they also show that governmental R&D appropriations lead to an increase in environmental patents. Specifically, several studies compare the effect of market-based approaches with command-and-control measures. Jaffe and Stavins (1995) test the influence of mandatory and voluntary building standards, energy taxes, and subsidies onthe diffusion of energy-saving technologies in US households between 1979 and 1998. They find that energy price expectations have a positive but diminishing effect. They conclude that price-based instruments such as energy taxes and technology subsidies may strongly stimulate adoption as they help to overcome technology cost disadvantages. They also show that the implemented building standards did not affect investment decisions about insulation, which suggests that these command- and-control instruments have been ineffective due to their non-binding character and setting criteria below existing standards. Hasset and Metcalf (1995) show that tax credits were effective in inducing insulation retrofits in the US. With respect to policy choice, the study of Newell et al. (1999) is of interest because it compares the effect of energy price-based policies, efficiency standards, and labelling. It shows that the effect of price changes on innovation is significant, especially after the introduction of energy-efficiency product labelling, while regulation via standards does not induce innovation. Similarly, Crabb and Johnson (2010) find no effect of efficiency standards and thus conclude that a gasoline or carbon tax may be a particularly effective regulatory tool to induce climate-friendly innovation in the automotive industry as this enhances the price effect. Analysing policy choice, several studies focus onthe change in sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ) regulation in the US marked by the Clean Air Act in
3. When proprietary software competes with both community and commercial open source software
This section assumes that commercial open source software, which is provided by another software producer, appears in the market. Thus, proprietary software competes with both community and commercial open source software substitutes. In contrast to community open source software, its commercial version is owned by an entity with the purpose of reaping profits from the software. When commercial open source producers build software products based on publicly available source codes, they need to follow the corresponding open source licenses. The General Public License (GPL) is the most common open source license (Laurent, 2004). This License requires that software developers must open their development of features. However, they can keep their usability enhancements private under this license. For example, Red Hat Inc makes great contributions to Linux Kernel, Linux X Windows System and others, which must make publicly available under the GPL. Moreover, it provides users with additional services (includes extensive documentation, installation and maintenance, and technical support) that are available to users who buy its commercial product (Software Development Times, 2008; Kumar et al., 2011). This study only considers the case t h a t commercial open source producer develops commercial software products based on community open source software under the GPL.
to investigate the performance and adaptation of corporate governance systems (Kole & Lehn, 1997). Banks have a number of specific characteristics that “alter” the agency problems and require a different view of corporate governance. For example, banks are organized in a variety of ways, from stand-alone corporate entities and single bank holding companies to multiple bank holding companies and diversified holding companies (Macey & O’Hara, 2003). Banks’ assets are more opaque, which makes it harder for the owners to monitor their bank`s ac- tivities. Banks also have the ability to take on risks very quickly, in a way that is not immediately visible to directors or outside investors (Becht, Bolton & Roell, 2012). Moreover, banks are subject to stricter regulation by regulators and de- posit insurance, which has important implications for the risk-taking incentives of bank managers and moral hazard problem in banks. The existence of regula- tors and deposit insurance ensures that the core source of funding which comes from the depositors is protected since this group of stakeholders (depositors) pay less attention to the bank’s risk profile. Rapid developments in technology and increased financial sophistication have challenged the ability of traditional regu- lation and supervision to foster a safe and sound banking system (Furfine, 2001). Deposit insurance is a two-edged sword that provides the safety net to one class of stakeholders (depositors) in the event that governance bodies fail to properly identify and manage risk taking in a bank’s activities, while at the same time, as stated, it can create the “moral hazard” of motivating bankers to take on higher risk.