MACROECONOMIC STATISTICS
MACROECONOMIC STATISTICS
Sponsored by a Grant TÁMOP-4.1.2-08/2/A/KMR-2009-0041 Course Material Developed by Department of Economics,
Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest (ELTE) Department of Economics, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest
Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Balassi Kiadó, Budapest
MACROECONOMIC STATISTICS
Author: Gábor Oblath
Supervised by Gábor Oblath January 2011
ELTE Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics
MACROECONOMIC STATISTICS
Week 13
Summary and some issues of accession to the Euro-zone
Gábor Oblath
Outline
• Application of the concepts discussed to some current international economic
issues
• Application of the concepts to the
discussion over joining the Euro-zone
(and lessons from the crisis of some
member-countries)
Three international issues for discussion
• Competitiveness
– The renewed interest and discussion in the US over
”how to improve the country’s competitiveness”
• Fiscal sustainability
– Fiscal sustainability in the ”problem countries” of the Euro-zone: can they avoid the ”restructuring” of their public debt?
• Convergence + external sustainability
– The convergence of CEEU countries of EU:
implications of the change in ”sustainable external imbalances” for convergence
Introduction of the Euro: points to be considered
• Competitiveness, sustainability, convergence:
• On two time horizons and their juncture
– Before joining (satisfying the nominal criteria)
– The time of joining (fixing the exchange rate)
– After joining (the ”culture” of nominal stability; dangers if the latter is absent)
Accession to the EMU: main themes
• The ”mainstream” approach in the first half of 2000s in HU
• Hindsight [problems in the EMU (GIPS: EL, IE, PT, ES)]
• Problems/crisis in GIPS-countries:
– to what extent due to EMU-membership vs.
– other (domestic political, economic) factors?
• Is it possible to separate the two? Not really, but an attempt:
– EMU-membership: real interest, real exchange rate
– Domestic: fiscal developments
• Rethinking plans regarding HU’s accession
Considerations in the early 2000s
• Essentially: ”it is safer under the shelter”
– Own currency – large risks (2003: huge appreciation, followed by huge depreciation)
– Floating exchange rate: not a buffer, but a source of shocks (Buiter)
– EMU-membership ties the hands of politicians: fiscal discipline
• Solution: rapid EMU-accession
• Observe the criteria, mainly :
– Fiscal (deficit/debt: this seemed attainable at that time)
– Inflation: more difficult, but with temporary measures achievable; if we are ”in”, irrelevant
• However, choosing the ”proper” exchange rate tor accession is important (dangers of overvaluation)
Assumptions
• Inflation: if remains higher than EMU- average
• should be due to catching up;
• should not be a macroeconomic problem
• Developments in ULC (competitiveness)
• Each country does its best to avoid pricing itself out of markets
• External balance: the constraint is
removed and this can only have
positive effects
Presumed consequences
• No exchange rate risk
• Low real interest rate
• Fiscal discipline
• If no external (BOP) constraint: cheap and stable financing
• Indirect effect:
– Strong impulse to investments – Stable business environment
– Increase in potential and actual economic growth
• Al in all: no risk (win-win)
Some overlooked issues
• Inflation differentials: source of problems even if
”catching up” inflation (”equilibrium real appreciation”) negative real interest rate ->bubble
• Wage developments: wage-growth may persistently outpace productivity growth: deterioration in
competitiveness
• The BOP-constraint does not disappear; it is only relaxed
– (Ireland is not Nevada Krugman)
– Signals regarding unsustainable developments arrive with significant lags
• Exchange rate: Ø;
• Interest rates, yields: very slowly, but in a brutal way
What may have gone wrong in the case of GIPS-countries?
• Unhappy families: different stories (Tolstoy)
• Problems related to EMU-membership
– Accession at an overvalued exchange rate (and getting ”stuck”) – Domestic inflation + common monetary policy ”real interest
rate misalignment” (bubbles)
– Domestic wage and productivity changes + common exchange rate real exchange rate misalignment (competitiveness)
• Domestically generated problems
– Lack of fiscal responsibility
– Loose handling of macroeconomic risks in the banking sector (related to the interest rate problem – bubble)
– Temporary fiscal revenues from the bubble considered as permanent
Accession at a ”wrong” exchange rate
• Joining the EMU at an overvalued exchange rate (according to most indicators)
• Portugal’s case
A concern justified: joining the EMU at an overvalued exchange rate may result in prolonged stagnation – Portugal (1999–2008)
Relative (GDP/cap) and the relative price level (RPL) of GDP, goods and services (EU15 =100)
92 96 100 104 108 112
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
V_GDP P_GDP
P_GOOD P_SE RV
de
76 80 84 88 92 96
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
V_GDP P_GDP
P_GOOD P_SERV
es
65 70 75 80 85 90
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
V_GDP P_GDP
P_GOOD P_SERV
gr
100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
V_GDP P_GDP
P_GOOD P_SE RV
ie
65 70 75 80 85
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
V_GDP P_GDP
P_GOOD P_SERV
pt
GDP/capita
RPL – GDP RPL – goods
RPL – services
GIPS: indicators of macroeconomic
developments/performance and competitiveness*
• Inflation
• Real interest rate
• Real exchange rate changes
• External market share
• Relative growth performance
• Net international investment position (NII): debt vs. non debt (FDI)
• Public debt and deficit
*Source: AMECO, Eurostat
Inflation (2000=100) GIPS vs. DE, EA
100 105 110 115 120 125 130
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 EA-12
DE IE EL ES PT
100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 EA-12
DE IE EL ES PT
CPI GDP-deflator
GIPS: persistently higher inflation
Real interest rates: GIPS vs. Germany (DE) and EMU (EA)
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 EA-12
DE IE EL ES PT
-2 0 2 4 6 8 10
1995 1996
1997 1998
1999 2000
2001 2002
2003 2004
2005 2006
2007 2008
2009 EA-12
DE IE EL ES PT
-3,0 -2,0 -1,0 0,0 1,0 2,0 3,0 4,0 5,0 6,0 7,0 8,0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 EA-12
DE IE EL ES PT
Long term; GDP-deflator
Short-term: GDP deflator
Short-term: consumption deflator The point: in DE real interest never became
negative; but it did in in GIPS
Real exchange rate changes
(vs. main trading partners, 1999=100)
( : deterioration; : improvement in price competitiveness)
90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Germany
Greece Spain Ireland Portugal
80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 DE
EL ES IE PT
REER-CPI REER-GDP deflator
ULC-based REER indices (1999=100)
80 90 100 110 120 130 140
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 DE
EL ES IE PT
Manufacturing
80 90 100 110 120 130 140
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 DE
EL ES IE PT
90 95 100 105 110 115 120
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 DE
EL ES IE PT
Total economy
Wage share – total ecomomy Real ULC-based REER
Cost competitiveness: large increases Indicate problems
Change in external market share in real terms (2000=100)
80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Germany
Ireland Greece Spain Portugal
Downward trends may indicate problems with competitiveness: GIPS vs. DE
Relative growth performance: GDP growth over major partners (2000=100)
70 80 90 100 110 120 130
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 IE
EL ES PT
Net international investment position (NIIP)
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Ireland Greece Spain Italy Portugal
Total
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Ireland Greece Spain Italy Portugal
FDI
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Ireland Greece Spain Italy Portugal
Non FDI debt
1. Removal of BOP constraint 2. Why IT faces less trouble
Fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP)
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Ireland
Greece Spain Portugal
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Ireland
Greece Spain Portugal
Balance Debt
EL, IE: seemingly OK
Hindsight: non-OK
Implications
• Countries where the collective aspiration for stability is missing, may loose by joining the EMU
– Feedbacks regarding unsustainable policies may arrive with excessive lags
– Hope: everybody draws his/her conclusions from the latest crisis, but not likely
– General assumption: ”this time is different”*
* Carmen M. Reinhart–Kenneth Rogoff :This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly
Summing up: substantive requirements for joining the EMU
• Join only after having fulfilled the formal (Maastricht) requirements
– (forget ”scraping through”)
• Needed: clarification of domestic requirements
– see ”five tests” in the UK, but more seriously
• In HU a possible solution: a domestic
”stability pact” (to preserve jobs)
– Mechanisms to align/coordinate the increase in wages and productivity
Five Tests (UK)
• Is there sustainable convergence between the UK and the EURO zone economies?
• Is there sufficient flexibility to cope with problems as a member of EMU?
• What effect would membership of the EURO have on investment?
• What effect would membership have on the UK financial service industry?
• What is the overall impact on growth, stability and jobs?
A possible test in HU
• Is inflation sustainably low vs., the Euro-zone?
• Is the fiscal position of the government
sustainable – does include buffers for worse times?
• Where do we stand in establishing the culture of stability?
– Where does the government stand?
– Where do organizations of
• employees
• employers stand?
– Do we have institutions for correcting (ex post) excessive wage increases?
• Further suggestions?
ELTE Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics
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