e x a MPl eS Fr o M t h e l a n g u ag e Sc ie n c e
1. INTRODUCTION
In the present paper, I will point to some aspects of metaphor use in scientific discourse, taking the language science as my immediate example. My discussion is inspired by Kövecses’ recent notion of ‘context’ and by current work within cognitive linguistics on the discursive development of metaphors. I will start with some general considerations on the role of metaphor in scientific theory building and on different attitudes that have been taken towards metaphor in science (sec-tion 2). Then, I will focus on the specific case of the language science (sec(sec-tion 3) and sketch, in an exemplary way, some familiar, influential metaphorisations of language proposed by 20th century key authors. In section 4, I will point to some recurrent patterns in the use and development of metaphors in scientific discourse, with a focus on the impact of zeitgeist on metaphor use. The immediate example chosen for illustration will be the languages as organisms/species metaphor in 19th century linguistics. The revival of this metaphor and, more globally, the biological model of language in the field of sociolinguistics towards the end of the 20th century will be the subject of section 5. There, I will point to some prominent examples of the recourse to the biological model by critics of global English, with a focus on the underlying ideologies of their accounts. In my conclusion, I will take a more global perspective and relate my discussion to a well-known notion in the philosophy of science, namely Kuhn’s concept of “paradigms in science”, and some perhaps lesser known notions with a similar or related scope.
* University of Heidelberg
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2. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ROLE OF METAPHOR IN SCIENTIFIC THEORY BUILDING
It is an old observation that metaphor is omnipresent in scientific theorising and discourse, and the role of metaphor in science has been a debated issue for centu-ries. The various stances that have been taken range between two opposing poles:
At the one end, there is the view that metaphors in science are at best redundant, at worst deceptive and an indicator of “unclear thinking”. The historical standard reference for this negative view is Locke, based on often-cited statements as the following one:
“If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passion, and thereby mislead the judgement, and so indeed are perfect cheat […] they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them.”1
A recent example of a highly sceptical stance towards metaphor in science comes from one of the key figures in sociolinguistics, namely Fishman:
“To some extent, our tendency to mystify and metaphorise our endeavours derives from our embarrassment that ‘language’ is not yet a fully understood variable, not even in the so-called ‘Language sciences’. […] It is doubly difficult to precisely investigate and conceptualise the relationship between language and culture, for example when both variables are substantially metaphorised and thereby simplified, if not even more basically misunderstood.”2
At the other end, there are authors that take a positive perspective on metaphor in science, acknowledge its capacity to illuminate the target of scientific investigation and emphasise its heuristic and stylistic value. Here, one may cite Black
1 Locke 1996 [1689]: 214–215.
2 Fishman 2002: 5.
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“No doubt metaphors are dangerous – and perhaps especially so in philosophy.
But a prohibition against their use would be a wilful and harmful restriction upon our powers of inquiry.”3
and Weinrich
It is not justified to blame language for its figurativeness and to merely regard this figurativeness […] as an indicator of ‘unclear thinking’. […] The writ-ings of those who try to do without metaphor are just more boring, not more accurate. Dry sentences do not always mean correct sentences. Poor style is not a precondition of truth. (my transl.)4
From a cognitive-linguistic perspective, it is of course a completely odd question whether metaphor should be “avoided” in scientific theorising and discourse or not: Metaphor is one of the fundamental conceptual devices of the human mind and thought, and scientific theorising, as any other product of the human mind, is hence metaphoric to a significant extent. What is needed, instead, is awareness of the limits of metaphoric models in science and their highlighting-and-hiding effects. Here, the crucial point is that one must clearly distinguish between the heuristic function of metaphors and the non-metaphoric entailments that can be drawn from them.
Metaphor, after all, is a perspective-setting device in that it views and accesses its target from the angle of its source domain. Metaphors permeate all levels and aspects of scientific theory building and one cannot fail to notice that authors deliberately choose, propose and elaborate on a set of key metaphors in order to convey and delineate the specific perspective they take on their target field. In the following section, I will illustrate this point with well-known examples from major theories of language exposed in the 20th century.
3 Black 1981: 79.
4 “Es ist […] unberechtigt, der Sprache ihre Bildlichkeit vorzuwerfen und in dieser nur […] ein Indiz eines ‚unklaren Denkens‘ zu sehen. […] Wer um jeden Preis ohne Metaphern auszukommen sucht, schreibt nur langweiliger, nicht richtiger. Die Richtigkeit ist nicht immer mit den trockenen Sätzen.
Schlechter Stil ist kein Wahrheitskriterium.” Weinrich 1976: 324.
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