Residents of different regions have much similar in assessment of the development priorities while separating issues are comparatively less important

According to the public opinion polls the majority of Ukrainian citizens do not support the idea of federalization. The Razumkov Center and KMIS data prove that in May 2005 only 12.6% of the respondents supported the idea of federalization²⁰. Moreover, the same Center’s survey hold in the days of Orange Revolution, when propaganda for federalization and establishment of the "Southern-and Eastern Autonomy" has reached its peak, this idea was supported by only 30% of respondents in Donbas and less than 25% in the Eastern and Southern oblasts of Ukraine ²¹.

It’s worth mentioning that alongside with national identification we can speak about local self-identification. In late 2005 the Razumkov Center undertook a poll and respondents stated that they feel they were more the citizens of definite settlement, village, town and city more strongly than citizens of the region and even the country 38,2% against 20,4% and 30,7% correspondingly with minor differences in responses between the regions.

Generally Ukrainians are unsatisfied with the situation and procedures in their communities (49%

of unsatisfied respondents against 13% of satisfies ones), and thus they put clear claims as to the local governments²². Such measures as establishment of conditions and institutions for addressing the most acute problems and public involvement to these institutions are recommended by the experts as a necessary step to consolidate different groups at local level that will promote formulation of joint agenda capable to smooth differences and create positive practice of problem solution.

2. Residents of different regions have much similar in assessment of the development

In line with a research hold in September-October 2005 by the National Sociology Office the official status of Russian language was an issue of concern for only 10% of respondents (this was 15^th top-priority among the 19 possible options).

Speaking about rather low value given to the Russian language status it should be noticed that explains great difference in the obtained results of the surveys. The responses mainly depend on the context of formulating the issue in its relation with the everyday life. Naturally standing in a line with social problems the language problem is taken as less important as the language of communication is not oppressed and in a range of risks its rating is among the most negligible ones.

However if the question is raised about the change of its status, for example, about supporting a party that stands for giving official status to the Russian language or for the change of the language status "in principle" , then responses are quite different.

The Razumkov Center surveys in fall and winter 2005 19.6% of respondents are ready to support the party whose objective will be to give official status to the Russian language; 37% are ready to support the official status of the Russian language "in principle" (35% believe that the Ukrainian language has to be the only official language while the Russian should be used only in everyday occurrence; an only 20% think that alongside with the only official Ukrainian language the Russian language may be used as the official only in some regions)..

Thus, among all the problems the importance of the language issue is negligible, despite the fact that it is one of the most politically engaged among all the self-identity issues in Ukraine. However, under conditions of political address to this problem with simultaneous calls to change the status quo, then many advocates of the higher Russian language status appear. Such "contextual dependence" on the issue provides grounds for discrepant interpretations.

At the same time there are reasons to suppose that if nobody raises the issue of the language status at political level, then the absence of language oppression in practice gradually will decrease the acuity of the disunity due to language issues. Sociologists indicate an interesting phenomenon: the majority of Ukrainian citizens believe their native language is Ukrainian even if they communicate in Russian in everyday life (or even the mixture of both languages). The data supplied by the

"Democratic Initiatives" Fund in January 2006 show that 60% of respondents stated their native language was Ukrainian, 73.3% said their native language was Russian. At the same time 36.1% of respondents said they communicate mainly Ukrainian at home, 33.3% indicated they communicate in Russian, and 29.5% said they use both Russian and Ukrainian depending on the circumstances”²³.

This self-identification phenomenon "translated" through the elections to the Verkhovna Rada actually prevents from introducing changes to the constitution and granting the Russian language the status of the second official language throughout the whole territory of Ukraine.

However the abovementioned regional differences allow politicians to play another game: to raise the issue of so called "regional languages’. During the election campaign-2006 there were some events like decision of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea about "the status of the Russian language as the second official state language” (without indication of this state), and the decision of the Kharkiv City Council about the Russian language as the "regional official language" in the city of Kharkiv, - which caused extremely negative reaction of the official Kyiv establishment. Thus, those regions challenged the political situation and the response to it should be provided after the elections: the status of the languages has to be harmonized with the European Charter of the

23 Громадська думка населення України - січень 2006 року. / Результати соціологічного дослідження. - К.: Фонд

"Демократичні ініціативи", лютий 2006. - С.12-13.

Regional Languages and Language Minorities that took force for Ukraine since January 1, 2006 and actually has no implementation mechanisms in Ukraine.

After parliamentary and local elections the "fight of jurisdictions" between Kyiv and local Radas with regard of the language issue is very probable, and the Constitutional Court should resolve this problem.

Comparatively low priority of self-identity issues for the citizens provides the idea that is very important for the stability of Ukrainian society: discussed opposition remains the intrinsic problem of political elite and has a chance to be resolved through acceptable trade-off, especially taking into account that the these elections open the longest intra-election period in the new Ukrainian history, that will decrease emotional tension in the society).

3. The society is disposed to peace and mutual understanding: people in the regions to whom the "disunity" apologists appeal are not eager to take action

Disposition of Ukrainian society to peaceful settlement of all the disputes is fixed by many surveys.

Thus, the Razumkov Center survey hold in October-November 2005 shows proves that although 56% of respondents agree that " the society is divided into two conflicting parties’, but 47% prefers those political forces that aims to unite the society even if this will make them loosing to their political opponents. Only 31% support those parties that will stand upon their viewpoint at any price²⁴.

Conflict potential of the self-identity issues is low because of differences in values of different social groups and their attitude to the ways of expressing and defending their viewpoint. Groups of electors whose rights are supposed to be protected by politicians concerned with self-identity issues are comparatively less ready to take action. The Institute for social and political psychology, NANU, on the eve of the second round of presidential elections Viktor Yanukovych’s supporters was ready to strike on the streets while among Viktor Yushchenko’s followers there were only 53%

of such people. Before the second round of presidential elections the number V.Yushchenko’s supporters ready to stand for their choice has increased by 75%²⁵.

The underlying reasons for such metamorphosis are worth being studied separately, but practical output of it is the low possibility of mass strikes and protest actions supporting the idea of the Russian language as the second official language, integration with Russia, which are capable to translate the "disunity" from the level of ideas to the level of reality and direct confrontation.

Disposition of the Ukrainian society to peaceful settlement of all the contradictions is also proved by the readiness to conciliation reflected in many surveys. For Ukraine both Spanish and German models of "forgiveness and unity" would be understandable and acceptable. The Razumkov Center survey proves that 51.6% of respondents (with minor regional deviations) agree that “It is necessary to forgive each other and accept that there were neither right not wrong people” in all the wars and conflicts separating Ukrainians. Under this conditions only 29.7% insist that those guilty should be persecuted even after many years passed’²⁶.

These social moods make any escalation of the conflict around self-identity issues politically hopeless and bring hope for gradual and constructive resolution of the "disunity" issue. If the

24 Опитування Українського центру економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, 2005 р.

25 Бурковский П. “Протестантская” этика для новой Украины // Компаньйон. - 2004. - № 50.

26 Регіональні особливості ідейно-політичних орієнтацій громадяни України. “Чутливі” теми в контексті передвиборної кампанії // Результати соціологічного дослідження. - К.: Український центр економічних і політичних досліджень ім. Олександра Разумкова, лютий 2006 р. - С. 6.

citizens realize that raising the self-identity issue will result in a conflict they will substantially decrease the support of political forces raising the issue.

Interim conclusion: the Ukrainian society preserves strong integration potential and implementation of this potential will require concentrated effort contributed to the "growth points’.

Thus, we may state that integration degree of the Ukrainian society is assessed with that famous approach to a glass that is half-filled with water. Optimists believe the glass is half-full, while the pessimists think it is half-empty. By now this balance prevented the society from real disunity and conscious manipulations of politicians with self-identity issues were unsuccessful.

However, existence of mutual negative stereotypes among people living in different regions and disproportions in regional development considerably hinder sustainable development of the country and prevents comprehensive implementation of its potential.

The majority of Ukrainian people believe that rallying Ukrainian people to united community is possible on the social and economic and political and legislative, but not on the cultural and mental grounds.

Relative majority of respondents in all the regions said that striving for increased welfare of Ukrainian people is the main factor for unification (37% in average). The Central Ukraine has shown interesting phenomenon, when supporters of social-economic unity were only 25% and supporters of unity based on political ideas and principles amounted to 19.5%). The second place by the number of supporters is occupied by the equal rights of citizens and con-existence within one state (28.2%). Finally, the support for knowledge and understanding of the Ukrainian culture and language as a consolidating factor is substantially different in the Western and Eastern regions (20.3% and 3.3% correspondingly)²⁷.

Eventually, an immediate task of the government is to promote integration of the society by all possible political means, and establish more rational model of interregional relations.

ІІІ. To make the necessary things you should begin with the most feasible things

As the "disunity" problem is not new, possible solutions are described in many research works and publicity materials. The programs of main political parties also contained provisions about strengthening consolidation of the Ukrainian nation. It’s worth noting that both before the elections of 2004 and after them all the parties speak about "unity’. The only difference is that after the elections-2004, when the "implicit moratorium" on the exploitation of self-identity issues was broken, the ideas about "unity" coexist with the slogans to federalize the country and other ideas that obviously will not strengthen the declared unity.

In the view of prospective politicization of the self-identity issues after the elections-2006, Ukrainian authorities might do some steps aimed at neutralization of the biggest risks born by

"disunity" and make use of the opportunities suggested by diversity of life in the regions.

1. External pressure mobilizes the society and do not create preconditions for long-term union External pressure may become a specific factor that may unite a society. In this case, the shift of priorities forces to forget about internal disputes and quarrels. At the time this situation may not last

27 Ibid.

long and after some short "splash of emotions" the society will immediately recollect unresolved problems.

The brightest illustration of such mobilization under external pressure was the dispute between Ukraine and Russia about Tuzla Island in fall 2003. At that time Russia began construction of a dam from Russian Taman Peninsula to Ukrainian Tuzla Spit Island without any coordination with Ukrainian party. The Russian party grounded its position by the indefinite status of the island of Tuzla Spit, but it was unable provide documents supporting the Russian Federation title for the island.

Under these conditions Russia was taken by Ukrainian society as an external aggressor. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Foreign Affairs declared this action to be unfriendly and violating the Ukrainian territorial integrity. The response of the Ukrainian government was supported by the half of Ukrainian people. This conflict has decreased the number of Ukrainians supporting union of Ukraine with Russia by 6%, and increased the number of people believing that both countries have to be independent and friendly nations by 5%²⁸.

But the conflict around Tuzla Island was quickly forgotten by the society and did not remove the contradictions that came to a background during the "Tuzla conflict’. Later the most active became issues about the status of the Russian language as the second official one and about recognition of the UPA veterans as warriors defending the country from aggressors in the Second World War; this practically did not change the percentage of those who supported the entry to the "Single Economic Space" Union.²⁹.

This effect resulted from such actions of the Russian Federation as increasing the gas prices and a ban of import of cattle-breeding products. Social opinion polls prove that 26.2% of respondents declared their attitude to Russia got worse, while 41.7% have not changed their opinion. ³⁰ Immediately after the gas crisis sociologists have registered increase of support to the President and pro-President political parties³¹.

However, even in these assessments one could see regional differences: people take external irritants in the light of their personal values and expectations, and, moreover, consider the comments and viewpoints of the political forces that they support. Accordingly, unlike the "Tuzla conflict’, the gas conflict was accepted with great regional differentiation: Russia is seen as guilty side by 5% of respondent in the Eastern Ukraine and by 41% in the Western regions³².

Thus, without finding internal ways to smooth the regional differences external factors will not bring the country to sustainable consolidation of the society.

2. The authority of the nation in international affairs helps to create internal base for