Bős-Nagymaros as a Geopolitical Issue

Based on the excellent source analysis of János VARGHA, the politicization of the dam was in the initiative from the very beginning, the far-reaching effects of which are still present in both political and professional discourse. Many believe that the movements organized to protect the Danube play a significant role in promoting regime change in Hungary, while in Slovakia the barrier is seen as a matter of prestige, in which, among other things, the direct involvement of the Hungarian minority plays a role. On the third hand, the European Commission, acting as a mediator between the two parties, set as a norm for the acceding countries that Hungary and Slovakia used the International Court of Justice in The Hague to resolve the conflict between them, noting that Hungary's argument building on its rules, it has failed to draw attention to one of the newest and most dynamically evolving areas of international law (based on VARGHA 1997; SZTANCS 2008). However, in a diplomatic matter that spans government cycles and political systems, neither party has actually been able to take meaningful action (HORVÁTH 2009; VARGHA1997).

The issue, which now dates back about a hundred years, has always been fundamentally political-geopolitical. At the beginning of the 20th century, the use of hydropower was closely linked to national politics. As far as it is known, it was believed that the establishment of hydropower plants in areas inhabited by nationalities would facilitate the assimilation processes by creating new centres for the Hungarian population.

As part of this, they wanted to strengthen the Hungarian population in the region by diverting a part of the population of the Great Plain to the north, but the development of the

111 Danube waterway from a military point of view also appeared as an important argument during the First World War.

Based on the principle of the unity of socialism, the formerly open geopolitical interests of the Hungarian People's Republic and Czechoslovakia, which came into the bloc from the 1950s, came to the surface, where they assumed the same political character on both sides, completely taking into account the suggestions of working professionals. At the same time, it should be noted that environmental interests at that time still had very little influence on decisions, despite the fact that the case of the Rhine was already floating in the eyes of experts as an example to be avoided. In 1978, the year the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian interstate treaty on the Danube dam system came into force, when Hungarian television presented the film The Dying Rhine, and in 1979, Hungarian experts travelled to the Rhine to study the effects and consequences. Already at this time, the dam became a symbolic investment, in which ecological, but even broader economic aspects were relegated to the background in the centralized decision-making mechanism, which was characterized by the merging of public administration and industrial production. The central planning mechanism has often been extremely unreliable due to scientific constraints and conflicting information, as well as professional lobbying, in which, individual sectors have tried to carve out as much of the resources centrally allocated as possible due to megalomaniacal projects and proximity to power. Its design and construction were activities envied by many within the water profession.

On the other hand, Woldemár LÁSZLÓFFY, the renowned hydrologist urged that water management should vigorously develop its relations with all branches of the natural sciences, but at the same time the spatial approach should prevail and examine the interaction of technical facilities and hydrological phenomena within a river basin (VARGHA 1997).

The power balance of each sector was also influenced by subjective considerations.

Hydropower parties, for example, have previously been able to successfully refer to the "Great Soviet Hydropower Plants", in which any criticism may have received a higher level of political influence. It had long urged the construction of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Danube dams in the Danube Commission, and the development of the waterway was primarily in the interest of the Soviet Union, as his ships transported most of the goods on this area of the Danube (VARGHA 1997).

On the other hand, the basic idea that Czechoslovakia should be a Danube state is much older. The Czech national movement argued, among other things, for the unification of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, that this would provide a free path to the sea and connect Czechs surrounded by Germans with Slavic related peoples. The Danube border was a vital issue for

112 the Czechoslovak Republic, in which the unilateral claim to the right to exploit hydropower followed the French example, who, after occupying Alsace during the war and thus extending the country's border to the Rhine, demanded all the Rhine's hydropower (VARGHA 1997).

From the Czechoslovak point of view, one of the most important gains was that the diversion of the Danube on the affected section fundamentally changes the nature of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian state border, which, although formally unchanged, essentially does.

The Treaty of Trianon designated the Danube Shipping Main Line as the border between the two states on this section. With the construction of the side canal on the designated section of the Danube, the border will not be the main line of navigation of the river, but an irreversible river meandering in the middle of the abandoned riverbed. Thus, the bank of the Danube owned by the Hungarian state will be 31 kilometres shorter, while the section of the river under exclusively Czechoslovak sovereignty will increase by 25 kilometres (VARGHA 1997).

Another political consequence of the side channel is that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is isolated from the Hungarian border in the affected section, and the economic sustaining power of the countryside decreases due to changing natural conditions, so they legally promote emigration on both sides (based on DURAY 1987). Compared to river hydropower, the construction of a side channel does not provide any significant energy, shipping, or flood protection benefits, but it exacerbates environmental damage and increases river maintenance costs. There were also dedicated Slovak interests in the construction of the dam within the Czechoslovak state, as these huge investments were financed by the federal government, so the Slovak government could have used roughly 40 billion crowns, mainly in the Czech-Moravian part, without the common coffers. that this would appear in the Slovak budget (DURAY 1987).

The use of political arguments also plays an important role in the construction of dams on the common section of the Danube, instead of completing the river regulation previously planned and started and then abandoned, which could have fully met the needs of shipping.

Politically indifferent river hydropower plants could never have been accepted by the water sector as opposed to the much more influential energy sector, because in that case the economic assessment would have been decisive.

Political goals related to the construction of the side canal, which are roughly the same age as the Czechoslovak Republic, already played a significant role in the tug-of-war around hydropower plants.

113 6. Long-term Consequences of Bős-Nagymaros

The unresolved Bős-Nagymaros issue also left its mark on bilateral relations between the independent Slovak Republic and Hungary in the 1990s. One of the reasons for the fundamentally bad relationship was the situation of the Hungarians in Slovakia, and the other was the disputes over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system (MITROVITS 2013). Although we can now witness the consolidation of Slovak-Hungarian relations, the issue of the dam is still determining the possibilities of utilizing water energy in Hungary. Despite the fact that several of our domestic river sections could be suitable for the construction of smaller power plants, e.g., a power plant could be established at Adony and Fajsz as well, which would be suitable for generating 1TWh / year of electricity individually (MÉSZÁROS 2014).

The biggest obstacle to the construction of hydropower plants in Hungary is still the case of the Nagymaros dam. The Hungarian professional groups are extremely divided on the issue, while the representatives of the water management profession basically believe that the utilization of water energy would be necessary in Hungary, and the Danube would be suitable for this, while environmental circles believe that the dam would cause unacceptable changes.

Professional disputes between the two camps seem insoluble, and since the failure of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system, with the exception of marginal political forces, no one in Hungary has dared to raise the issue of building additional dams. The main reasons for this, in our opinion, are the creation of a strong environmental lobby group who oppose similar investments, the prevention of the construction of the dam has become a symbolic cause of regime change, and the protest against the dam creates strong nostalgic feelings also in part (MÉSZÁROS 2014).

Of course, the resentment of environmentalists is completely understandable, as to date we only have estimates of the damage caused to the flora and fauna of the Szigetköz by the Gabcikovo power plant and the diversion of the Danube at Cunovo. According to research led by Sándor Kerekes at the Corvinus University of Budapest, the value of natural capital in Szigetköz decreased by 800-1300 billion HUF at 1997 prices (KEREKESet al.1998).

7. Summary

In the case of the dam, we can see a multi-layered, active use of symbols, which interweaves both the conflict and the issue of the utilization of hydropower. The clash of economic and social visions with ecological thinking has long thematized the issue of hydropower utilization, which today, once sustainability has come to the forefront, may once

114 again be the scene of heated debates. We believe that the issue of the dam was beyond itself in all political eras and as a result, its politicization was coded into it, as in the case of most large investments and international large investments. In the debates around the dam, the issue of hydropower utilization, landscaping, social and national politics, identity policy, military and defence policy, and countless layers of long-term development strategies and interstate cooperation collide in an arena. Most of the time, they shape the issue according to the current public and policy discourse, opening the debate towards the specific character, so we are sure that the issue of the dam will remain with us for a long time to come.

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