The return to an ontological/cosmic perspective would eliminate the problem of the mind/body dichotomy haunting so many philosophers of the last hundred years, stated concisely way in Gilbert Ryle's famous treatise The Concept of Mind. The mind/body problem constitutes a paradigmatic case illustrating the importance of the choice of a global framework, because in the holistic or cosmic perspective of nature this problem does not exist. There is no question of identity or dichotomy, but of two parts of the same universe, correlated to each other, in constant functional interaction.
Before analyzing recent philosophical efforts to solve the problem of the unity or division of the physical and the meta-physical, it is instructive to refer to a tentative solution of temporal monism, undertaken in his study on Matter and Memory by the great French philosopher Henri Bergson at the beginning of our century.
The divergence between our perception and the non-perceived (or objective) world comes from the immediate intuition, which adapts facts to the interests of the individual, and to the exigencies of his lifeworld;
this is the reason why "pure" intuition is "that of an undivided continuity." The Kantian manifold (which mind unifies in a comprehensive picture) is, for Bergson, a refraction of the pure temporal perspective — la durée
— into space, because absolute space stands for infinite divisibility. The refraction of temporal duration corresponds, therefore, to the rhythmical periods of the individual life, successive moments corresponding to successive acts and events. But how far divisibility will be possible depends on the individual's consciousness. (The imaginary or universal homogeneous time is, in the Bergsonian perspective, a fiction.) Discontinuity in the temporal flux of reality, caused by perception, does not mean that the universe changes;
it is a purely mental phenomenon. The perceptual discontinuities are not clear-cut, either. Perceptions shade into each other gradually, through constant reciprocal actions and reactions.
This argumentation shows that there is no reductive tendency in Bergson's philosophy, though the preeminence of the mental is advocated. The real dividing line is, nevertheless, not between perception and matter, but between these two and the temporal dimension, memory. In the temporal perspective, the present is the actuality of immediate action, that is, the state of the body. The past is the possibility of action through insertion of past recollections into the actual. Recollection is thus being transformed into perception.
The brain confers materiality on the temporal, on memory, which belongs to the domain of the mental or, using Bergson's expression, the domain of the spirit.
In the recent evolution of the philosophy of science, five proposals have been created, aimed at surpassing the deadlock of the dualistic or reductionist views of mind and body. The first is due to Hilary Putnam as exposed in his 1987 Carus Lectures on The Many Faces of Realism [Putnam 1987] and in his 1988 Representation and Reality, referring back to the successive stages of his own intellectual evolution.
Putnam sums up the fundamental objectivist assumption as the view "that mental phenomena must be highly derived physical phenomena in some way," based on the distinction between properties that things have "in themselves" and properties of things "projected by us," as well as on the pretention of science that it is the only means by which we can learn the properties of things "in themselves" [Putnam 1987: 13].
A central problem of this objectivist materialism remained, however -- the difficulty of explaining the
"emergence of the mind." Putnam, in the physicalist phase of his philosophical investigations in the 1950s, formulated the theory of functionalism to explain the emergence of the mental, based on the mind's compositional plasticity by which he understood that mental events could not (perhaps as yet) be explained in terms of physical events. As propositional attitudes, emotions, or feelings cannot be traced back to brain states he therefore tried to explain them as necessary functional aspects of the human organism. Putnam's functionalism thus meant that all sorts of logically possible systems or beings, whatever their material composition, could have the same functional devices or the same functional organization. Later, he proposed
5Ray, Benjamin, "The Story of Kintu: Myth, Death, and Ontology in Buganda," in (Karp-Bird, eds. [1987]: 60-82).
VICTOR SEGESVARY : INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE DESTINY OF THE WEST
- Part One. Man and His Culture in the Ontological/Cosmic Perspective. - Chapter Two. The Ontological / Cosmic Framework -
that mental states are not only compositionally but also computationally, plastic. Through this changing conceptualization, Putnam sought to show that, in cybernetic language, each human being or group of human beings has an indefinite number of "programs," impossible to compute. Consequently, it would be unrealistic to hold that a given belief could be defined in computational and physical terms, as the mind performs billions of simple computations simultaneously, because it is capable of parallel processing, while machines perform only serial processing. It would then be irrational to think that all human beings, endowed with different bodies of knowledge and different conceptual resources and cultures, have beliefs that could be identified with a common "computational-cum-physical" feature. "The 'intentional level' is simply not reducible to the 'computational level' any more than it is to the 'physical level'" [ibid. 13-15]. The objectivist, scientific rationality tacitly presupposes intentionality, an "open texture" of all notions such as object, reference, or meaning, including even the concept of reason itself.
In his book published in 1988, Putnam criticizes the intimately related ontological and epistemological presuppositions of functionalism. In regard to epistemology, he affirms that reference is a matter of interpretation, an entirely holistic enterprise of knowing people use words because these practices depend on a human group's experience and its whole network of beliefs. From the ontological point of view, he criticizes the functional and objectivist premise that "there is a single system which contains all the objects that anyone could refer to" [Putnam 1988: 120], namely, the organisms and their physical environment. But if intentionality is taken into account as well as cultural and other human differences, things and objects can have different descriptions in different worlds because they are socially and environmentally conditioned.
In the same vein, though remaining more avowedly in the camp of the reductionists, John Z. Young [Young 1988] and David Hodgson [Hodgson 1991] profess that all mental events are associated with change in but not caused by, the brain. Young proposes to speak in terms of brain programs that are directed toward ends. These programs are based on coded instructions (coded in advance in some physical way). They select a mode of action from a large repertoire of possibilities in view of reaching a new state that is the aim of the program. This conception presupposes, of course, a certain correspondence between the range of mental programs and the conditions in the environment, that is, mental programs must, in a sense, represent the world. According to Hodgson, this correspondence is due to the fact that brain and mind are manifestations of the same underlying reality, the quantum reality, as he calls it. He goes, however, much further than Young in acknowledging the integrating power of the mind, whereas the latter only recognizes that no central program that supervises all other mental phenomena is known, and no explanation can be given in scientific theories of the fact that the brain initiates action. Thus, the question of human intentionality, of the purposive mind, remains unresolved.
Another similar tentative, though more daring, was recently formulated by John Searle [Searle 1992]
according to which mental phenomena, or consciousness and unconsciousness, are caused by neurobiological processes but still manifest ontologically irreducible phenomenological properties.
Consciousness (or mind) always has a definite content, and it is linked to intentionality6 (which is as much irreducible a phenomenon as consciousness), but its relation to behavior is contingent, not causal. Searle affirms without ambiguity that consciousness is subjective, though a product of biological processes, and precisely for this reason, it does not appear as real; it is itself a way in which man grasps reality, it is a representation.
This subjectivity results in a conscious action or experience as well as intentionality that is always
"perspectival" or "aspectual." Everything for a person is represented from his own point of view; on the other hand, any conscious action or experience is structured, seeing is seeing as, perceiving is perciving as. This structure is derived from what Searle calls the Background, or a compact whole of nonrepresentational capacities. The idea of the Background means that the consciousness of a person is located in the "spatio-temporal-socio-biological" complex of this person, a complex that is itself either conscious or intentional, and against which appears consciousness as such.
The function of consciousness is organizing relationships between the human organism and changing environmental conditions. Horizontal consciousness is the short-term temporal dimension of unity, and vertical consciousness the simultaneous awareness of all aspects in a given experience. In addition to this
6 "Only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious... there is a conceptual connection between consciousness and intentionality that has the consequence that a complete theory of intentionality requires an account of consciousness."
(Searle, [1992]: 132).
______________________________________________________________________________________
VICTOR SEGESVARY : INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE DESTINY OF THE WEST
- Part One. Man and His Culture in the Ontological/Cosmic Perspective. - Chapter Two. The Ontological / Cosmic Framework -
integrative function, consciousness as an evolutionary privilege assures man a much greater capacity of discrimination and creativity than possessed by other species. In Searle's perspective, consciousness becomes self-consciousness when attention is not directed at the object of experience or action, but at the process or state of the consciousness.
Following Brentano, Donald Davidson acknowledges that the distinguishing feature of the mental is not its private, subjective, or immaterial character, but its intentionality as a cultural fact. Davidson's specific variant of the mind/body dichotomy is related to the differences between the physical and the mental due to descriptions, vocabularies, and propositions made in varying languages or meta-languages. This explanation maintains the physicalist worldview, in spite of the fact that mental phenomena and processes do not fit in it.
Davidson calls his perception of the mind/body problem as "anomalous monism," because it maintains that
"all events are physical," though mental phenomena cannot be explained in purely physical terms [Davidson 1980: 214]. In his view, therefore, there is a curious ontological correspondence between the physical and the mental which interact causally; identity and causality are considered relations between individual events
"no matter how described," i.e., they are independent of their linguistic expression. In fact, "events are only mental as described" [ibid. 215], and causal interaction operates independently from the supposed mental-physical dichotomy. From the linguistic point of view, should the events falling under each mental predicate be finite or not, it is possible to suppose that there could be coextensive predicates, one mental and one physical, for each event.
In his argumentation on the nomological or lawlike character of causality, Davidson's considerations are generally compatible with the ontological/cosmic framework exposed here. First, recognizing that the nomological character of causality is not applicable in all cases, Davidson makes a great leap toward the differentiation of the mental and the physical: he accepts that the mental is nomologically irreducible, true, but affirms that only general statements relating the physical and the mental are possible. In attributing a belief, a desire, a goal, an intention or a meaning to a person, one must take into account his total system of concepts determined, partially at least, by his beliefs and desires. That is, we have to discover a coherent and plausible pattern in the attitudes and actions of the agent because his verbal behavior does not indicate the guidelines required for the explanation of his global attitude.
Davidson's theory is complemented by his reliance on the constitutive ideal of rationality. In opposition to the physical, the holistic character of the mental necessarily entails the consideration of conditions of coherence, rationality, and consistency, especially in the cognitive field. The concept of acting on reason implies that reason is a rational cause. Therefore, attributing intelligible attitudes and beliefs to a human agent is to find in his pattern of behavior, beliefs, and desires, a large degree of rationality and consistency.
This fundamental idea serves to justify why one can explain human behavior without really knowing how it was caused, without being obliged to single out one of the many causal factors or to avoid testing whether some antecedent conditions hold, as is indispensable in the case of stringent physical laws [ibid. 233-234].
Davidson's reasoning leads to a conclusion vital for the cosmic perspective: the nomological causality in the physical world is derived from the concept of a particular physical domain as a comprehensive, closed system expected to yield a standardized and unique description of every physical event as expressed in a lawlike vocabulary. The mental world does not constitute a closed, but an open system, as it is affected by many influences that are not part of it. Its main features are expressed in heteronimic generalizations [ibid.
219]. In consequence, there are no strict laws on the basis of which one can predict and explain mental phenomena.
Roger Sperry proposed another attempt to surpass the deadlock of dualistic or reductionist views.
Sperry's concept of the relationship between the brain and the mind (or subjectivity or consciousness), is a particular version of holism. Mind, or consciousness is an "integral dynamic property of the brain process itself,"7 a central constituent of the brain's action, a causal determinant of the brain's functioning. The regulating influence of mind over the physico-chemical processes of the brain, that is, its causal determinant role, is derived from its power as a whole over its parts. In the hierarchical continuum of the brain structure, operations from subnuclear particles to the brain cells are carried out without any intervention of the mind (this is the mind in physicalist theories), whereas in Sperry's view, cerebral processes are ruled by consciousness.
7 Sperry, Roger, "Bridging Science and Values: A Unifying View of Mind and Brain," in (Eccles, [1985]: 296). See also Eccles, John, "A Critical Appraisal of Brain/Mind Theories," (ibid. 51-57).
VICTOR SEGESVARY : INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE DESTINY OF THE WEST
- Part One. Man and His Culture in the Ontological/Cosmic Perspective. - Chapter Two. The Ontological / Cosmic Framework -
In this respect, it is helpful to refer to Sherrington's famous example [Sherrington 1947: 262] that sets out to explore what the "I" means when I move my hand. This "I-doing" cannot be a perception, but only awareness. He concludes that my awareness and myself are one: the "I-doing" is awareness of myself in the motor act. The "I" is therefore the self.
Sperry's new approach to consciousness also concerns the latter's relationship to the external world because it implies that the qualitative pattern properties of entities are as real and causally potent as the quantitative data, measurements and abstractions, which are properties of the entities' parts or elements. In consequence, values (qualia) and the multiple and differential richness of reality are recognized and preserved.8
The last view explaining the mind-body dichotomy in non-reductionist terms is linked to Niels Bohr's complementarity principle in quantum physics. Complementarity, in Bohr's sense, refers to the dual nature of micro-entities, which are both particles and waves, therefore, their precise measurement at the same point in time is not possible; thus, no incompatibility can arise between them. On this basis, Bohr thought to develop an analogy concerning the mind-body problem, explained as the complementarity of the mechanistic and conscious nature of the mind. Testing of the brain as a physical object manifesting physical processes would preclude the observation of its conscious character, and vice versa; the mind's two distinct aspects, as brain, a physical object and as a conscious entity endowed with a free will, cannot be simultaneously displayed.
The two separate levels of observation are, in these two modes of description, complementary.9