Bureaucracy: Ideal-type and Reality

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It may be questioned why the organizational form of bureaucracy is dealt with in a study concerning the dialogue of cultures. However, it is without a doubt the organizational form that dominates the national as well as international scenes today and plays a more and more criticized role in the relations of different civilizations. This is not to say that bureaucracies are not at all necessary; the evolution of the modern world made them unavoidable. But even the large, contemporary bureaucracies are, simply unable to handle the problems of the multitudes produced by the demographic explosion. They are also unable to deal with the questions raised by technological evolution, which makes management of the collectivity's life incredibly complex and unwieldy. What is truly remarkable is that all functional theories of bureaucracy repeat the Weberian definitions and explanations of the necessity and efficiency of bureaucracy in the modern world.

Though many describe bureaucracy's numerous shortcomings and deviations from the Weberian ideal-type and assume a critical attitude toward the bureaucratic phenomenon, no one even tries to investigate how the functioning of bureaucracies over the course of the last half century could be remedied in view of their catastrophic performance. It therefore appears necessary to examine the bureaucracy's functions and its shortcomings (not always admitted) and their harmful effects on the civilizational dialogue as well as on economic and social development.

The problem of bureaucracies is not new. The bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire was well known by its

"ossified functionalism,"³ long before contemporary mushrooming bureaucracy was extensively studied by Max Weber at the turn of the century [Weber 1978, Vol. II: 971-972]. As the main factors operating in the direction of bureaucratization, Weber noted society's desire for order and protection as well as the need to implement social and economic policies such as welfare policies in the interest of the collectivity. He knew that one of the most important reasons for growing bureaucratization was the rapid development of modern means of communication, including the creation of a necessary infrastructure which, through a feedback effect, also represents the essential prerequisite for "the possibility of bureaucratic administration" [ibid. 973].

Weber was surely impressed by the performance of the Prussian state's bureaucracy, but also modeled his description of bureaucracy's function on what he saw in the United States. He appears convinced that a bureaucracy offers the optimum solution for: "specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations," assuring the respect of the principle of impersonality in recruitment and

3 This expression was used by Peter Sugar in Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804, quoted by (Ash, Timothy Garton, The New York Review of Books, Vol. XXXV, No. 14, [29 September 1988]: 56).

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VICTOR SEGESVARY : INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE DESTINY OF THE WEST

– Part Two. Disjunction Between the Western and Other Cultural Worlds – Chapter Seven. Political Action and the State -

functioning, as well as in leveling of social status or class differences; and functioning on the basis of calculable rules demonstrating consequently a purely technical superiority [ibid. 975]. In fact, Weber praises the monocratic form of bureaucracy, that is, the total control of the bureaucracy by its head, a type of new despotism. He is, however, lucid enough to note that although the formalism, formal rationality, and rule-bound coolness of bureaucracy satisfies in principle such requirements as "equality before the law of all citizens" or "guarantee against arbitrariness," if people are ethically motivated and ask for substantive justice, then the bureaucratic administration must be on a collision course with them [ibid. 78-80]. Bureaucracy, in the Weberian perspective, is a corollary of mass democracy and is antithetic to self-government; but it is an inevitable instrument to ensure, "through the abstract regularity of the exercise of authority" [ibid. 83], indispensable efficiency and equality before the law, and to avoid all the sins committed during the ancien régime. For Weber, democracy could not exist without bureaucracy, and even if sometimes democratic forces oppose bureaucratic rule or create impediments to its functioning, they are unavoidably yet unintendedly increasing bureaucratization, because democracy cannot exist without it.

Weber recognizes that the bureaucratic official is chained to the organization economically and ideologically, and identifies himself with his colleagues in defense of their common interests. He knows, therefore, that to destroy a bureaucracy is difficult [Weber 1978, Vol. II: 1401] due to the resistance of those who have a vested interest in it, either officials who have acquired a certain mentality, or politicians, groups, or parties who make use of it. Weber clearly thinks that the economic or social effects of a functioning bureaucratic organization are not visible and concretely experienced; it is therefore an instrument that can be used to promote any interest, to serve any power [ibid. 987 and 1402]. The common man, the ruled, cannot oppose bureaucracy, nor can he try to modify its underlying principles, rules, and regulations, as his own existence depends on the smooth functioning of the administration, on the latter's expertise, specialized work, and action in maintaining an orderly state of affairs.

It is most noteworthy that Weber realized that even officials of the bureaucratic administration, if not in the highest grades, cannot influence the evolution of their organization (except in defending the common interest), and he did not deny the fact that among officials, there is always a "mostly silent critique," not observed by outsiders, or a "profound scepticism about the wisdom of appointments" [ibid. 1449]. But powerholders' influences and the bureaucracy's usually monocratic structure rule out any changes initiated from inside the organization.

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All recent conceptualizations of the ever-growing bureaucratic system throughout the world are built on the Weberian foundations. For example, a pathbreaking study was carried out by Blau and Meyer in the fifties [Blau-Meyer 1971]. Their critical comments on the function of bureaucracies' can be grouped as follows:

Policy-making and policy-implementation: A major dysfunctional factor in bureaucracy's operations is the completely blurred distinction between policy-making and policy- implementation. It is normal, in fact, that bureaucrats make decisions not only of a technical nature, but related to political issues or, rather, guiding the organization's activities ("organizational policies"). In many cases, guidelines and action-frameworks allow officials to decide between alternative courses of action, though they nevertheless generally proceed in consultation with the organized interests most directly concerned. It is, of course, always possible that what the public or its representatives want or request becomes what the public or its representatives are expected to want or request. Therefore, according to Reinhard Bendix's formulation, a sort of interaction between national bureaucracies and society takes place [Bendix 1977: 165], though Merton's remark concerning the conflict of the public with bureaucratic authority is more to the point, any bureaucrat, whatever his position in the hierarchy, represents the power and prestige of the organization, he feels vested, and is considered vested with authority, which entitles him (or so he thinks) to a domineering attitude [Merton 1968: 257-258].

Authority and submission to the organization: Authority appears, as an observable pattern of interaction and not an officially defined social relationship, partially constituted by complementary role expectations of superiors and subordinates. Officials depend on the good will of their subordinates and the public [Bendix 1977: 24]. Even if authority partially rests on sanctions, frequent resort to such sanctions weakens it disproportionately, in comparison with the sanctions' positive effects. It is true, as Blau and Meyer point out, that officials and employees frequently internalize rules, regulations, or other normative standards of the

VICTOR SEGESVARY : INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE DESTINY OF THE WEST

– Part Two. Disjunction Between the Western and Other Cultural Worlds – Chapter Seven. Political Action and the State -

bureaucracy, in order to unconsciously convince themselves that they carry out tasks corresponding to their own convictions and to the community's shared values and norms. This, of course, amounts, in many cases, to nothing more than self-deception. Often, a brutal change in the orientation of the bureaucracy provokes a total collapse of the internalized normative and value-systems (e.g., in the former Soviet Union, where old party cadres are unable to adjust to changes).

Staff and technical responsibilities: A new internal contradiction developed in the bureaucratic organizations with the increasing role of experts, whose professional competence and activities lead to a collision with staff responsibilities. This is easily explained by the traditional concept of gradation of levels of authority corresponding to similar degrees in competence. Higher officials are presumed to be more competent than their subordinates, whereas the head of an organization is expected to possess the most impressive technical knowledge, in addition to its managerial capabilities. The increasing use of specialist experts familiar with advanced technology which staffers and high officials do not even understand eliminates the presumed identity between expertness and hierarchy. This discrepancy between expected and actual authority thus constitutes one of the most potentially destructive conflicts in a bureaucratic organization. Such contradiction between professional expertise and bureaucratic staff was underlined in the last decades when the latter category started to be called administrators, as if this term could have meant a special professional skill (contrary to the professional managers). This term, in fact, covered staff who was making their whole career, or a good part of it, within the organization.

Efficiency: It is a good question whether highly praised bureaucratic efficiency refers to the effectiveness of the services rendered by a bureaucratic organization to the public or to its clients, or if it relates to the cost-efficiency of its operations. As Beetham said, measurement of effectiveness consists of nothing more than qualitative and political judgements in relation to the definition of the objectives and the distinctive practices and operations of the administration concerned [Beetham 1987: 34-35 and 39]. Most authors recognize that hierarchical supervision is not enough for effective coordination, but a rigorous discipline is needed; this is established by the rules and regulations that govern the organization's operations.

Coordination: Merton called attention to both functional and dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracies, one factor enhancing their efficiency, but another counter-balancing this effect by reducing it. This vicious circle has best been explained by Herbert Simon who juxtaposed the requirements of specialization and the division of labor based on specialization, and those of coordination necessitated by overlapping functions or conflicts due precisely to specialization and the division of labor, but which, in practice and not only in principle, are incompatible with specialization.

Communication: Another shortcoming of bureaucracy, evidenced in its long history, is the one designated in organization theory as the problem of two-way communication, that is, the necessity of communication between organizational levels from bottom up and not only downwards from the head. Heads of large organizations, including the state, are frequently ill- informed of events because information originating with those who are in touch with operational problems daily tends to be neglected for the very reason that it comes from a subordinate. Formal rules and regulations, by stating the goals of the organization and setting performance criteria for the whole staff, are much more important in a decentralized model combined with multiple levels of hierarchy (vertical differentiation). They are assumed to guide decision-makers and to ensure that decisions are made which are consistent throughout the whole organization.

Blau and Meyer are certainly correct in saying that Weber's ideal-type of bureaucracy is built not only on conceptual definitions but also on implicit assumptions and generalizations such as, for example, the hypothesis that the imparted characteristics of a bureaucratic organization enhance efficiency. Those hypotheses have been falsified since Weber wrote about bureaucracy, but the Weberian reminiscences still predominate and no efforts were really made to correct those failures and adopt the lessons learned from the past.

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According to Weber and most sociologists and political scientists succeeding him, social rationality does not often coincide with individual rationality. In fact, it often suppresses it. Bureaucratic rationality is closely tied to the impersonal character of bureaucratic activity as it relates to the clearly- defined pattern of activities in which every series of action is functionally related to the purposes of the organization. This functionally-______________________________________________________________________________________

VICTOR SEGESVARY : INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE DESTINY OF THE WEST

– Part Two. Disjunction Between the Western and Other Cultural Worlds – Chapter Seven. Political Action and the State -

related nature of an administrative organization is expressed by the hierarchical linkage of status and the more or less integrated setup of offices for which the rules and regulations specify obligations and privileges, rights and duties. Thus, the Weberian conceptualization of bureaucracy itself represents what one generally considers as the bureaucratic or administrative rationality. In a narrower sense, Weber's idea of social rationality concerns the application of general rules to particular cases; it constitutes a clear-cut example of instrumental-purposive rationality aiming at safeguarding public interest from encroachments of subjective values and desires, of egotistic convictions and actions because values and valuations are deemed non-rational.

In this perspective, bureaucratic rationality is specific in the sense that, first, it is bound to rules which can be analyzed and argued on objective grounds in public discourse; and, secondly, it is expected to show a high degree of consistency or, by reversal, to reduce to a minimum discrepancies between decisions and operations due to personal idiosyncrasies and interests. It is generally considered that discretionary decisions not responding to criteria stated and discussed in public cannot be assessed reliably and objectively. However, the major problem in respect to the functioning of bureaucracies is that, despite the principle of separation of policy-making and policy implementing in the rational bureaucratic structure, the interests of the state and the interests of the bureaucracy became identical in the affirmation and praise of bureaucratic rationality. In consequence, then, one can say that the Weberian conception of bureaucratic rationality is dysfunctional because it imposes successive examination and evaluation of general principles and rules on which criteria and corresponding decisions are based. This procedure must lead to a regress and, most importantly, back to value-judgements, beliefs, and interests motivating the assessment of principles and rules.