Algeria
“There was no mass emigration from Algeria, neither labour-driven, despite constant un-employment, nor forced, notwithstanding the tragic events in that country in the 1990’s in the last three decades.”63 In that period, French family-reunification caused some migration movement. A new wave of Algerian labour emigration has been observed since 2000 as a consequence of the gradual liberalisation of the Algerian economy. However, there still has been high unemployment, especially among the highly-skilled workforce.64
According to the MPC Migration profile in 2012, 961,850 Algerian migrants resided abroad, that is 2.6% of the population residing in Algeria.65 “The majority lived in France (75%) and Spain (6.4%) and in other countries (7.6%), particularly in Canada (3.5%).”66
In OECD countries Algerians are more likely to have a low level of education (51.9%) and an intermediate occupational profile (30.7% are employed as technicians or profes-sionals, 24.4% as craft and related trade workers or as service and market sale workers and 14.1% in elementary occupations).67
60 BAMF Brief Analysis 05/2016.
61 Ibid.
62 Bommes–Fassmann–Sievers (2014): op. cit.
63 European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre (MPC), Migration Profile: Algeria, 2013.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
Most recent data on outward flows confirm an upsurge in Algerian emigration in the 2000s. Growing numbers are found in Algerian flows directed to Spain, France and Canada.
The phenomenon of harragas68 is on the rise, meaning that increasing numbers of Algerians are being exposed in the Mediterranean. They risk not only death, bit also risk the collapse of their health en route or jail and exploitation on arrival.69
Morocco
According to the statistical data from September 2014 only 0.2% of the total Moroccan population (33,848,242) were foreign immigrants. First generation, Morocco-born migrants residing abroad stood at 2.8 million and were in Europe as of 2011. Moroccans Residing Abroad (first generation, born-abroad second and third generations) are estimated between 4 and 4.5 million.70 In comparison with other North African countries Morocco has the highest share of its population living abroad.
Emigration flows to Europe have been continuous. The first labour migration to Western Europe was in the mid-1970s, and Moroccan workers went mainly to France. At that time Morocco pursued an active policy of labour export and control of expatriates.
“From the 1980s to the late 2000s the profiles and destinations of Moroccan migration flows diversified.”71 Established Moroccan communities increased through family reunification.
The accession of Spain to the European Union in 1986 and the development of labour-in-tensive activities through the 1990s attracted large flows of low-skilled, often irregular Moroccans either to Spain or to Italy. Tertiary-educated students and highly-skilled workers have mainly migrated to the United States and Canada.72 This migration pattern is similar to the other North African countries.
In addition to this, Morocco has been an immigration country since the 1990s and even more, it has become a transit country for Sub-Saharan African migrants stranded at its border or territory of Morocco.
Morocco was put under pressure to control irregular migration to the EU; on the other hand it faced the need to facilitate mobility for its citizens, so Morocco signed the Mobility Partnership as the first Mediterranean country with the EU and nine Member States in June 2013. The Partnership covers migration question such as: mobility facilitation of Moroccan nationals; support of Moroccan diaspora, cooperation in the field of human trafficking and asylum.73
As to the migration profile, more than half of Moroccan citizenship holders live in France (57%) and Spain. Beside these large communities in Europe, small communities of Moroccan expatriates are also formed in North America and in the Gulf States. Most Moroccan migrants are males (54%) and 46% belong to the working age group; still, there
68 Harragas are North African migrants who attempt to illegally migrate to Europe or to European-controlled islands in makeshift boats. The word harraga derives from Algerian Arabic, designating those who burn.
69 European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre (MPC), Migration Profile: Algeria, 2013.
70 European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre (MPC), Migration Profile: Morocco, 2016.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
are some differences among destination countries. France hosts older age groups: 55% of the Morocco-born are 45 and above. “The second typical profile is found in Italy and Spain with male predominance and an above-average share in working age groups (50 and 52%
in the age group of 25 to 44).”74 The third profile of Moroccan migrants can be found in Canada. Migrant gender distribution is more balanced and age group distribution suggests some degree of family reunion.75
As regards education levels, Moroccan migrants have mostly low education (59% of those aged 15 and above). Only 17% of them are highly educated.
An interesting fact is that Moroccans in Spain and Italy are less educated than non-mi-grant Moroccans in the same age group. The vast majority, meanwhile, of the 58,000 Moroccans in Canada are highly educated and unsurprisingly, they perform highly-skilled professions in general.76
Concerning flows, it can be stated that the propensity to migrate remains high in Morocco: in 2011–2012, 42% of the population between 18 and 50 expressed the intention to migrate. Among young people aged 18 to 29 years, 69% desired to migrate.77
Tunisia
According to the statistical data from April 2014 only 0.5% of the total Tunisian population (10,982,754) were foreign immigrants. “First-generation, Tunisia-born migrants residing abroad stood at around 543,000, of whom 81% were to be found in Europe that year.”78 The first-generation migrants and born-abroad second and third generation Tunisians numbered about 1.2 million, therefore the country is primarily an emigration country.79
Tunisian migrants in Europe, mostly originating from the urban coastal region, rapidly integrated to local trade facilities and services. In addition, as oil exploitation was taking off in Libya, it emerged as a major destination for Tunisian migrant workers. In the mid-1980s 85,000 Tunisians worked in Libya; they originated mostly from the border areas and from the poor, steppe regions in west-central Tunisia (Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, Kairouan).
They were overwhelmingly employed in construction, infrastructure development and agriculture.80
In the 1980s Italy became a new outlet for Tunisian workers, due to its geographical proximity to Tunisia and to new opportunities in the country’s informal economy. From the time Europe restricted its visa regime and strengthened border controls in the 1990s, irregular entry and overstaying increased among Tunisian migrants in addition to permanent settlement. “Tunisian migration destinations further diversified towards the Gulf states, after bilateral agreements for technical cooperation were signed with Saudi Arabia, Qatar
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre (MPC), Migration Profile: Morocco, 2016.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
and UAE.”81 Tunisians are mostly skilled and highly skilled (e.g. teachers, engineers). More recently, new flows of students and tertiary-educated, highly-skilled Tunisians found new outlets in Germany and North America.82
Tunisia’s migration policy under the presidency of Bourguiba and Ben Ali (ousted in January 2011) had two principles: encourage migration and monitor the migrants. The Tunisian governments rapidly acknowledged that the economy was unable to absorb all the available labour force and that remittances from abroad were an indispensable source of foreign currencies.83
In the 2000s the socio-economic and political tensions grew. The younger Tunisian generation have benefitted from the generalisation of higher education, but the employment venues drastically decreased, especially in the government sector, a traditional employer of university graduates. In addition to it the wage stagnation and predominantly low skilled, low value-added activities on offer were becoming less attractive for educated youth. In Tunisia in 2010, 23% of graduates were unemployed; as of 2012–13 ILO estimated that around 32% of Tunisia’s youth aged 15–29 were neither in employment nor in education or training.84
The 2008 financial crisis further reduced both job prospects at home and legal migra-tion opportunities for youth in Europe.85 The start of the Arab uprising, in December 2010, spurred an immediate but moderate emigration from Tunisia through irregular channels.
However, an accelerated repatriation agreement signed between Italy and Tunisia at the time curbed the Tunisian emigration to the European Union by 92% in 2012.86
As to the migration profile, most migrants are males; 77% are in working age groups (15 to 65 years and 32% in the 25 to 44 age category). However, these aggregated figures cover the Tunisian migrants’ diverse demographic and socio-economic profiles by the country of destination.87
Summarizing the migration profiles of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, it can be estab-lished that they show similarity. Taking advantages of the geographic proximity, the low-skilled migrants emigrate to South Europe and high-low-skilled persons mostly settle down in North America. The other common point is that the remittances create an important source of revenues.
Conclusion
In the North African region, migration is partly driven by fleeing from political conflicts and crises, and partly by the demand for labour and search for livelihoods, jobs, and bet-ter opportunities. Furthermore, natural disasbet-ters and environmental degradation are the other factors of migration, while the high level of population growth and socio-economic
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
shortages might further increase the migration potential, as well. Moreover, the next new, educated and aspiring generation being frustrated by mass unemployment, dictatorial rules and corruption has also increased both emigration and the revolutionary potential of the Arab societies.
North African countries are a region from which international and domestic con-flicts trigger migration and refugee movements currently and in the foreseeable future, as well. Therefore, the governments of the North African states must deal with the political, economic, social and cultural factors of migration. Persistent reforms and measures for the North African development need to be implemented in an efficient way, since only a developmental policy can open future opportunities for the youth and would be the only reasonable alternative to emigration. However, successful political and economic reforms will not lead immediately to the downturn of emigration.
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