Interpreting the way the EU deals with the crisis

In the end, regardless of all difficulties, including the lack of flexibility when it comes to decision-making in the field of external relations, which is based on the consensus of 28 member states, the EU has emerged as the agenda-setter in Europe, including the continent’s Eastern part. It was the EU’s actions for the Western Balkans over the last two decades that made it the key international actor in/for Europe. The Western Balkans case illustrates the very nature of the EU as an international actor. The measure of the EU’s strength in European affairs is not found in the number of its tanks and military aircrafts. Instead, what makes the EU the strongest foreign policy actor in Europe is the offer of modernization and access to the EU market it extends to neighboring countries.²¹ Before the Russian-Georgian crisis in 2008, the group of countries between the EU and Russia could hardly hope for anything even remotely similar to what the Western Balkans had received. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 came as a shock to EU leaders. The military operation lasted only a few days and the result was

19R. Olearchyk, “Russia accused of triggering trade war with Ukraine”, Financial Times, August 15, 2013. Available online: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/99068c0e-0595-11e3-8ed5-00144feab7de.

html#axzz3Re0Z6Oym (accessed on February 14, 2015).

20Y. Mostovaya, T. Silina, “Russkiy plan, osmyslennyy i besposhchadnyy”, Zerkalo nedeli, August 16, 2013. Available online: http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/russkiy-plan-osmyslennyy-i-besposchadnyy-_.html (accessed on February 14, 2015); “O komplekse mer po vovlecheniyu Ukrainy v yevraziyskiy integratsionnyy process”, Ibid. Available online: http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/o-komplekse-mer-po-vovlecheniyu-ukrainy-v-evraziyskiy-integracionnyy-process-_.html (accessed on February 14, 2015).

21For an overview of the existing theoretical conceptualizations of the EU as an international actor, including the EU’s capacity to project power in the international realm (as a civilian power, normative power, and/or market power), see Ch. Hill and M. Smith (ed.), International Relations and the European Union. Oxford University Press, 2008, 2011.

Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The EU did not apply sanctions against Russia. Instead, it revamped its Eastern policy. In September 2008 the EU member states authorized the European Commission to draft a new ambitious offer for Georgia but also for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.²²

In December 2008 the European Commission proposed to launch the Eastern Partnership program. Among many other new programs and instruments aimed at expanding the EU’s cooperation with Eastern Europe, this program offered the respective countries the possibility to conclude AA/DCFTAs (hereinafter agreement).²³ Let us recall that the essence of this proposal was on the table already in March 2008, when it was presented to the other EU members by the foreign ministers of Sweden, Carl Bildt, and of Poland, Radek Sikorski.²⁴ In the period before the Georgia crisis their aim was to balance an initiative of Nicolas Sarkozy, then-president of France, to launch the Union for the Mediterranean during the French Presidency of the EU Council in 2008. In other words, they tried to make sure that Eastern Europe is not lost to EU policymaking.

It is questionable whether the Eastern Partnership, with its offer for deeper integration with the EU, would have ever seen the light of day had it not been for Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008.

Based on the association agreements offered to the Eastern partners, the latter will adopt about 95 per cent of the EU’s economic and trade related legislation and commit to respecting democratic rules and political freedoms.²⁵Successful legal harmonization under AA/DCFA will in fact make them a part of the EU single market. The Association Agreement with the Eastern partner countries was designed based on the model of the European Economic Agreement (EEA) that the EU had concluded with Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. Thus for example the signatory countries are not member states, but they are nevertheless part of the EU single market.

There were strong signals from the EU capitals that the association agreement with Ukraine may be signed at the Vilnius summit in November 2013, despite ongoing differences between the EU and the Yanukovych government concerning the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.²⁶Russia was shocked as it

22“Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 1 September 2008. Conclusions”, op. cit.

23“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Eastern Partnership”, COM(2008) 823 final, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, December 3, 2008. Available online: http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/com08_823_en.pdf (accessed on February 14, 2015).

24“Polish-Swedish Proposal, Eastern Partnership, 23 May 2008”. Available online: http://www.msz.gov.pl/

Polish-Swedish,Proposal,19911.html (accessed on February 14, 2015).

25Author’s interview with the representatives of the DG Trade of the European Commission, who had been a member of the EU’s negotiating team for the AA/DCFTA talks with Ukraine. The interview was conducted in Brussels on December 5, 2012. For an analysis, see A. Duleba, V. Ben?, V. Bil?ík, Policy Impact of the Eastern Partnership on Ukraine. Trade, energy, and visa dialogue. Bratislava:

Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2012. Available online:

http://www.sfpa.sk/dokumenty/publikacie/372 (accessed on February 14, 2015).

26See Y. Mostovaya, T. Silina, “Russkiy plan, osmyslennyy i besposhchadnyy”, op. cit.

had believed that neither Ukraine nor Georgia or Moldova would ever be willing to sign this agreement with the EU. Moscow responded by imposing trade sanctions against Ukraine in August 2013, with the aim of persuading then-President Yanukovych that signing the agreement with the EU is not a good idea.²⁷In November 2013, President Putin agreed to provide a loan of 15 billion USD and lower gas prices to Yanukovych if he decided not to sign the agreement.²⁸Finally, Russia began its military invasion of Crimea at the end of February 2014, a few days after Yanukovych was overthrown by the Maidan revolution. It is important to keep in mind that the protests in Ukraine first started in November 2013 because the leaders of the Ukraine at the time had decided not to sign the agreement with the EU.²⁹ Russia has shown that she is willing to use any means necessary to stop the economic integration of Ukraine with the EU.

The EU prime ministers, including those who opposed EU sanctions on Russia in response to the recent crisis, keep stressing that they have but one key objective: more jobs for their voters. More jobs could be achieved through more trade and investment.

It might happen that the prime minister of Portugal would fully disagree with the prime minister of Poland when it comes to the evaluation of various political aspects of the EU’s relations with Russia or Ukraine. However, the prime minister of Portugal and the prime minister of Poland agree that if there is any possibility in the EU’s external relations with third countries for an agreement that facilitates the expansion of the EU’s single market, e.g. if an agreement brings more trade, investments and jobs, then it is a good deal. In other words, the offer to Eastern Europe was made based on an underlying assumption that the deal is a win-win and would benefit everyone.

The prime ministers of all EU member states agreed that Eastern European countries should be offered association agreements coupled with DCFTAs. There are always groups of member states that securitize this or other issues in international relations, trying to put it on the common EU agenda. However, the actual practice of EU decision-making in the field of external relations shows that in terms of setting the agenda, the most successful members tend to be those who manage to link the issue of security with economic benefits for all member states. As a result, it is often the case that the expansion of the single market becomes the key common ground for finding a consensus among member states in the area of EU external relations.

The EU looks like a clumsy elephant on the international scene, and might be best

27 “Ukraine and Russia. Trading Insults”, Financial Times, August 24, 2013. Available online:

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21583998-trade-war-sputters-tussle-over-ukraines-future-intensifies-trading-insults (accessed on February 14, 2015).

28“Ukraine suspends talks on EU trade pact as Putin wins tug of war”, The Guardian, November 21, 2013.

Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact (accessed on February 14, 2015).

29“Ukraine’s revolution and Russia’s occupation of Crimea: how we got here”, The Guardian, March 5, 2014. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/ukraine-russia-explainer (accessed on February 14, 2015).

characterized with the following image: It takes a while for it to start moving, once it gets going, however, it is very difficult to stop it.³⁰The EU responded to Russian tanks in Georgia in 2008 with a consensual decision to expand its single market to the post-Soviet area. In other words, the EU elephant decided to move into the post-post-Soviet area after the war in Georgia. And that is why the EU is directly engaged in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, and should adjust both its institutions and policies to tackle the problem.

This will definitely take some time, but it will happen the same way as it has been happening over the last two decades.