Implications for the Eastern Partnership

The only possible direction for an effective EU policy, including potential upgrades to the Eastern Partnership as a consequence of the Russian–Ukrainian crisis, is the expansion of the single market and, ultimately, the enlargement of the common space where the four fundamental European freedoms apply. The EU cannot give up on what it is nor on the way it has been dealing with European crises in the past or the way it has implemented the European integration process for over three decades. The EU most certainly cannot stop its enlargement policy towards those Eastern European nations that are willing to join the project. The only force that can stop the enlargement of the EU in Eastern Europe might be the incapacity of the partner countries’ societies to accept the painful but necessary reforms, and/or the failure of their political elites. Russian tanks absolutely cannot stop this process. Further upgrades in the Eastern Partnership should be identified in the same way as it has been done in the past, by resetting contractual arrangements or sets of arrangements with Eastern neighbors in a way that facilitates the expansion of the EU single market in Eastern Europe.

When it comes to tactics, the key issue that should be discussed in the EU capitals concerning the fourth Eastern Partnership summit in Riga in 2015 is member states’

position on trilateral talks with Russia and Ukraine over the Ukrainian AA/DCFTA. First, the EU and Ukraine should not give up on the substance of the association agreement, or accept any changes of any previously agreed upon provision of the AA/DCFTA. The EU cannot afford any deal with Russia at the expense of the sovereignty of partner countries. This should be the clear redline for EU diplomacy. The political aspects of AA should not be at issue in any trilateral talks. What might be up for discussion, assuming Russia presents reasonable concerns with respect to trade, social and/or economy-related issues, is to extend transitional periods in case of select trade commodities included in the DCFTA. Sanctions against Russia should continue until solutions are found for the Donbass and Crimea that the Ukrainian party also deems

30The author was inspired by the metaphor of “the EU as an elephant on the international scene” by the writing of M. Emerson with N. Tocci, M. Vahl and N. Whyte, The Elephant and the Bear. The European Union, Russia and Their Near Abroads. Brussels: Centre for European Policy, 2001. Available online:

http://aei.pitt.edu/32565/1/4._The_Elephant_and_the_Bear.pdf (accessed on February 14, 2015).

acceptable. The EU could recognize Crimea as part of Russia only on the proviso that Ukraine does so first. Nevertheless, the EU should consider the possibility of promoting talks between Russia and Ukraine on resolving the technical infrastructure problems of people living in Crimea, especially since the electricity, natural gas and water supply of the peninsula completely depends on Ukraine and its resources. Moreover, such efforts ought to keep in mind that Russia should needs to compensate both the moral and material losses of the Ukrainian state, as well as of Ukrainian nationals and companies in Crimea. A normalization of relations with Russia should not occur unless the latter halts her military aggression and ceases any military threats against other Eastern Partner countries.

Second, the challenging task for EU diplomacy is to use trilateral talks for bringing a more realistic perspective to the FTA talks that will be launched with Russia/Eurasian Union. The task should be two-tiered, e.g. the EU has to be able not only to sustain the association agreement with Ukraine, but also to motivate Russia to engage with the EU on the FTA deal. The EU can do anything except for behaving in a way that runs afoul of its basic character. In other words, it should come up with an agenda that includes positive offers to Russia. This should only happen however, within the broader framework of moving Russia closer to an agreement with the EU that might facilitate the expansion of the EU single market. Furthermore, the EU should also consider a combination of AA/DCFTA with partner countries with an option for concluding sectoral agreements, should Ukraine or any other partner country be willing to proceed more quickly with the harmonization of the EU acquis as it pertains to a given sector. The full implementation of AA/DCFTA will take considerably longer for EaP countries than it did in case of the Visegrad countries, when the process lasted seven to eight years. If realistically it will take around ten years to harmonize Ukrainian law with EU law, then that is too much time. It would be a strategic mistake for the EU if in the meantime it did not strengthen its contractual relations with partners via sectorial contracts aimed at achieving the main goal, i.e. the implementation of the comprehensive AA/DCFTA.

When it comes to the EU’s strategy, the main objective concerning the AA/DCFTA should be twofold: First, to upgrade the agreement with an offer that includes the prospect of potential EU membership for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, that is the partner countries which are in the process of implementing their association agreements. Second, there needs to be a focus on the implementation of the agreements, including more robust assistance funding following at least the model of the PHARE program offered to the Visegrad countries in the 1990s. The EU should invite non-association partner countries, e.g. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, to engage in sectoral cooperation, following the model of the ENP Plus tools as proposed by Germany on the eve of its Council’s Presidency in 2007, including the prospect of concluding sectoral agreements that would

facilitate the integration of the non-association partner countries into given sectoral parts of the common area of the EU’s four basic freedoms.³¹

And, finally, the EU should upgrade the Eastern Partnership by adding a missing security component, even if that does not include military terms specifically. First, it should expand the Energy Union it started to develop with the aim of strengthening its energy security by involving Ukraine and Moldova, which have joined the European Energy Community.

The second element of a security component of the Eastern Partnership might include the protection of state borders of associated partner countries as a part of efforts to promote their territorial integrity and sovereignty. Anyway, the EU has to come to realize that the Eastern Partnership should be more of a policy driven process than a purely technocratic exercise in the area of harmonizing national legislation with the acquis communautaire. The EU’s capacity to sustain its fundamental character as a European integration project is being tested by the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. The current crisis definitely raises not only the question of what Europe will look like 20 years hence, but also the issue of assessing what the EU has achieved within the last two decades.

There is too much at the stake.

31For analysis of the ENP Plus proposal, see A. Duleba, L. Najslová, V. Benc, V. Bilcík, The Reform of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Tools, Institutions and Regional Dimension. Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2008. Available online: http://www.sfpa.sk/dokumenty/

publikacie/217 (accessed on February 14, 2015).

SVETLANA GLINKINA