elec-tions. The percentage of Slovak deputies who ran as independents (i.e., neither members of parties nor recommended by any party) dropped from as much as 16% in 1990 to 9% in 1998 (Bernatova et al. 2001). A parallel situation is not observed among mayors in direct elections in Slovakia, where LDI project data suggest that the proportion of mayors who are members of political parties has remained relatively stable. Also, if we disregard those councilors who are recommended by political parties but are not members, the membership rate dropped after 1990 and has remained relatively stable during the last two elections.
In Hungary, also, the partisan affiliation ratio of mayors dropped after the extension of the direct election system to all local governments in 1994, while for councilors it remains at a relatively stable level. To be more precise: the ratio of independent councilors seems to slowly increase in small local governments (with a simple majority electoral system), while there is a slight opposite tendency in larger cities. This is illustrated by table 1.8.
Summing up, an increase in party involvement of local politicians is neither obvious nor common for all countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A summary of available survey data on the recent situation is presented in table 1.9.10
Table 1.8
Proportion of Independent Mayors and Councilors in Hungary [%]
Mayors Councilors
Total Simple majority system (local governments below 10,000 residents)
Mixed system (local governments above 10,000 residents)
1990 80 NA NA NA
1994 84 69 81 9
1998 85 74 86 9
2002 85 73 87 6
Source: Az önkormányzatok döntéshozói, 1990–2002 (2003), Budapest: Hungarian Statistical Office.
Table 1.9
Changes in Party Membership Rates—Councilors and Mayors [%]
1991 1997 2000–01 2002–03
Mayors
• Hungary
• Poland
• Slovakia
26
— 48
— 27 40
18 46 48
23 37 48 Councilors
• Hungary
• Poland
• Slovakia
34 8 67
—
— 40
—
—
—
34 35 45 Source: 1991, 1997—LDI Project, 2000–2003—ILDGP surveys.
If our comparison across countries is limited to local governments of a similar size, the results are slightly different. Bulgaria remains the country with the strongest influ-ence of parties, confirming the opinion that Bulgarian local governments are the most politicized. But it is more complicated to identify the countries where parties are seen as the least influential. If we consider small local governments (below 2,000 citizens), the least influence is found in Hungary and then in Slovakia. In both of these countries the local election system is based on the majoritarian principle, and this may contribute to the noticeable difference from Estonia, which has a proportional electoral system (although the results in Poland, where councils in small municipalities are also elected on this basis, do not quite fit with this explanation). If we consider big local governments (with populations above 10,000), the influence of parties is lowest in Estonia, followed by Slovakia, i.e., two countries with different electoral systems.
Table 1.10 Councilors’ Perceptions of the Influence of Parties on Local Decision-making [%] (2002–2003) BulgariaEstoniaHungaryPolandSlovakia Very high influence
Very low influence Very high influence Very low influence Very high influence Very low influence Very high influence Very low influence Very high influence
Very low influence Mean22.413.59.043.511.053.716.229.46.052.9 Size-standardized mean20.322.310.541.612.647.514.838.812.238.5 Correlation between perceived importance of parties and popula- tion size
**************** Note: * Means correlation significant at 0.05 level, ** at 0.01 level, *** significant at 0.001 level, and **** significant at 0.0001 level. Source: LDGP survey of councilors (2002–2003). Table 1.11 Parties’ Influence on Local Decision-making as Ranked among Fifteen Possible Actors BulgariaPolandHungaryEstoniaSlovakia Total410111014 • Below 2,000 citizensNANA151214 • 2–10,000713121114 • 10–50,000412787 • over 50,00035576 Source: ILDGP survey of councilors (2002–2003).
We also expected that the influence of parties might be larger in countries with a collective form of leadership where the mayor is nominated by council (Estonia) than in countries with direct, popular elections (the remaining four countries in tables 1.9 and 1.10). However, such a relationship is not supported by our data.
Finally, we expected that the influence of political parties has grown gradually during the last decade, together with clarification and stabilization of the new political map.
We may only partially verify this opinion thanks to LDI surveys conducted in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in 1991 and 1997. Since mayors responded to the LDI surveys and councilors were included in our newer data sets, the data are not fully comparable.
We need to be careful in drawing conclusions; nevertheless, our hypothesis seems to be confirmed to a large extent.
The change is clearer in Hungary, where parties’ influence ranked 14th in 1991 but 11th in 2002, and in Poland with a ranking of 15th in 1991 and 1997, but 10th in 2003. The former case mainly applies in bigger towns, and the latter predominantly in smaller municipalities where parties have gradually come to play a role in local decision-making. In Slovakia the increase of party influence is less visible (a ranking of fourteen in all three surveys), but it may be noted in medium-size and big cities as well (a ranking of eight in cities over 50,000 in 1997, but six in 2002).
The perceived importance of parties relative to other actors in decision-making is not the only way we can learn about their influence. Respondents—councilors and mayors—were also asked whose opinion they usually take into consideration when making important decisions. They were asked to assess the impact of eight different groups, of which parties were one.
The results are summarized in table 1.12. As we might expect, Bulgaria confirms its opinion of having the most partisan local government system. But in the remaining countries respondents (perhaps with the exception of Slovak mayors) declare consid-eration of parties’ opinions more often than one might expect, judging on the basis of the answers on the relative influence of parties on local decision-making. The largest difference is in Estonia, where the perceived influence of parties is relatively modest, but most of the respondents admit to serious consideration of parties’ opinions when making important decisions. This difference, which is especially big in small munici-palities, could be related to the proportional system of elections (while in Hungarian or Slovak villages of identical size, elections are based on the majoritarian principle). If the chances of a councilor in the next election depend to a large extent on his or her position on a party list, then considering party opinion while making crucial decisions is a highly advisable strategy. A comparison of the answers of Estonian, Slovak, and Hungarian mayors also suggests that consideration of parties’ opinion is more frequent if mayors are nominated by the council (as in Estonia) than when they are elected directly by all citizens (as in Hungary and Slovakia). Bulgaria does not quite fit with these conclusions, but as Bulgarian local governments are much more politicized than
those of other countries, a large part of the difference may lie in political culture, not in institutional factors.
The observation on the impact of the formal position of mayor on the consideration of parties’ opinions is quite similar to the observation made by Mouritzen and Svara (2001, 71) about Western Europe and America: “Relatively few mayors emphasize the promotion of the party program and the interests of the party members... one out of five is characterized as a strong partisan leader.” Mouritzen and Svara notice a close relationship with the form of government. They classified 70% of mayors in council-manager systems (which in our research is relatively close to the Hungarian system) as “weak partisan leaders,” but only 38% in strong-mayor systems (close to the situation in Slovakia or to a lesser extent in Bulgaria) and 29% in committee-leader systems (characteristic in Estonia). On the basis of Mouritzen and Svara’s theory we might expect that mayors would consider party opinions most often in Estonia, followed by Bulgaria and Slo-vakia, and least often in Hungary. With the exception of Bulgaria (the country most dominated by partisan politics), the variation between the remaining countries largely fits with our theoretical expectations.
As we might expect, consideration of parties’ opinions is more significant in bigger local governments.
Finally, councilors and mayors were asked where they seek information. They were asked to assess the importance of ten different sources, political parties being one. A summary of their answers is provided in table 1.13.
The conclusions from table 1.13 are similar to those we have already discussed, and may be summarized as follows:
• Parties are usually not seen as an important source of information for local politicians. They are closer to the bottom than to the top rank of the various sources considered;
• Bulgaria is the clearest exception to this rule, and even more so in the in case of councilors than mayors. Perhaps an institutional factor does play a role here:
Bulgarian mayors are directly elected while the council electoral system is pro-portional, which strengthens the party links of elected representatives;
• Poland is at the other extreme. While it is not rare to consider parties’ opinions, Polish local politicians indicate parties as a source of information considerably less often than their colleagues in other countries. This is especially visible when local governments from the same size cohort are compared;
• The importance of parties as a source of information grows with the size of lo-cal governments. Having a population above 50,000 or sometimes even above 10,000 makes a big difference. With Hungarian, Estonian, and Slovak councilors this is particularly obvious.
The same question was asked in a 1997 mayors’ survey in Poland and Slovakia. In Slovakia the difference between 1997 and 2002 is very slight. In Poland, however, the
Table 1.12 Importance of Party Opinion in Decision-making Ranked among Eight Possible Influences (2002–2003) BulgariaHungaryEstoniaSlovakia MayorsCouncilorsMayorsCouncilorsMayorsCouncilorsMayorsCouncilors Total33844484 • up to 2,000 citizensNANA884476 • 2–10,00033664485 • 10–50,00033443384 • over 50,00033NA3NA3NA4 Source: ILDGP survey of councillors and mayors (2002–2003). Table 1.13 Parties as a Source of Information—Rank among Ten Different Groups (2002–2003). BulgariaEstoniaHungaryPolandSlovakia MayorsCouncilorsMayorsCouncilorsMayorsCouncilorsMayorsCouncilorsMayorsCouncilors Total85101010101010109 • below 2,000 citizensNANA10101010NANA1010 • 2–10,00095101010101010109 • 10–50,000851010871010106 • over 50,00085NA6NA498NA5 Source: LDGP survey of councilors and mayors (2002–2003).
role of parties as a source of important information has significantly decreased. Most likely this shift is associated with a change in the way mayors are nominated (by the council before 2002 and in popular elections since then).
4. THE ROLE OF PARTIES IN LOCAL POLITICS: A SUMMARY MODEL