Type V includes two Bulgarian parties (the UDF and the Peoples’ Union), two Hungarian (the MDF and FIDESZ), and two Slovak (the SMK and KDH), and may be
5. COUNTRY CASES
taxable, the amounts collected by rural municipalities as a share of local income are rather small. Various central government and county council equalization transfers are meant to compensate for this lack of funds. Nevertheless, these often come in the form of earmarked transfers, which determine both the scope of funds and the amount spent on specific budget lines.
An important consequence of this is to reduce the policy space available for mu-nicipalities and the ability of citizens to influence decisions; thus, we can theorize that the higher the expenditure rigidity of municipalities, the less effective citizens are in influencing local matters. On the other hand, from the findings of the research it seems that the relationship between municipality size and revenue rigidity is substantial or very strong for each country.
all Hungarian municipalities. Still, we can track slight differences in the level of citizen effectiveness among municipalities of different sizes. From among 67.1% of respondents who consider citizen effectiveness as being limited, a vast majority (77.6%) belongs to municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. This response was selected by only 52.5% of those from municipalities with a population of 5,000 to 49,999, and 44.4%
of those from municipalities above 50,000 inhabitants. This suggests that citizen ef-fectiveness is generally low in Hungary, especially in small municipalities.
Figure 4.1
Hungary: Model Summary, ANOVA, and Coefficients
Model summaryb
Model R R square Adjusted R square Standard error of the estimate
1 0.355a 0.126 0.123 1.1056
a. Predictors: (constant), log pop size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness to influence local matters.
ANOVAb
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Significance
1 Regression 59.082 1 59.082 48.334 0.000a
Residual 409.498 335 1.222
Total 468.580 336
a. Predictors: (constant), log pop size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters.
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
t Significance
Model B Standard error Beta
1 (Constant) 0.590 0.312 1.890 0.060
Log pop size 0.261 0.038 0.355 6.952 0.000
a. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters.
These data confirm our statistical expectations: the smaller the municipality, the less effective citizens are in influencing local decision-making. However, this occurs in an environment in which citizens are found to have very little influence in municipalities of any size at all.
Table 4.3
Citizen Effectiveness in Influencing Local Decision-making in Hungary (by Size of Municipality)
Municipality size Total
Citizens’ effectiveness 0–4,999 5,000
–49,999
over 50,000
Small influence Count 156.0 62.0 8.0 226.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 69.0 27.4 3.5 100.0
% within municipality size 77.6 52.5 44.4 67.1
% of total 46.3 18.4 2.4 67.1
Neither small nor big influence
Count 22.0 32.0 6.0 60.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 36.7 53.3 10.0 100.0
% within municipality size 10.9 27.1 33.3 17.8
% of total 6.5 9.5 1.8 17.8
Big influence Count 23.0 24.0 4.0 51.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 45.1 47.1 7.8 100.0
% within municipality size 11.4 20.3 22.2 15.1
% of total 6.8 7.1 1.2 15.1
Total Count 201.0 118.0 18.0 337.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 59.6 35.0 5.3 100.0
% within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 59.6 35.0 5.3 100.0
Note: N=337.
Source: LGS 2001.
Table 4.4
Share of Municipalities in which Citizen Participation Occurred at Least Once (Hungary) [%]
Municipality size
0–4,999 5,000–49,999 over 50,000
Public demonstrations 2.3 7.3 40.9
Petitions 10.5 35.0 72.7
Requests for meetings 22.2 51.8 72.7
Challenges to decisions 3.9 13.1 27.3
Civil society proposals 33.7 82.5 90.9
Note: N=646.
Source: LGS 2001.
The data in table 4.4 show that although all types of participation take place in municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants, citizens are the least active here. In other words, depending on the type of participation considered, in municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, participation was undertaken only in 2.3% to 33.7% of the cases.
The most frequent type of citizen participation was civil society proposal writing, fol-lowed by requests for meetings between local officials and citizens.
In municipalities with between 5,000 and 49,000 inhabitants, the share in which participation was undertaken is higher for all forms than in municipalities with below 5,000 inhabitants. Civil society proposal writing was the most frequent form of par-ticipation, and was employed at least once in over 82% of the cases.
The largest share of municipalities in which all forms of participation were under-taken at least once is those with over 50,000 inhabitants. Civil society proposal writing and written requests occurred at least once in over 90% of the cases. The second most common form of participation was requests for meetings between local officials and citizens, and the third was the writing of petitions, undertaken in over 62% of mu-nicipalities.
The data seem to suggest that, although some type of citizen participation was undertaken in only 49% of all Hungarian municipalities, the larger the municipality the more intense the participation. Still, we need to keep in mind that there are only a limited number of really large municipalities. Furthermore, we cannot disregard the level of effectiveness of participation.
In Hungary, citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters is constrained by the fact that the goal and scope of government transfers determine most decisions on local matters. The degree of legal autonomy of municipalities in Hungary is defined in the Local Government Act and in sectoral laws. In accordance with the law, all municipalities have to carry out certain mandatory functions and they may provide further services on an optional basis. Interestingly enough, municipalities tend to carry out as many optional functions as they can, since this involves more central transfers.
As shown by Soós and Kálmán (Soós et al. 2002, 25), central transfers still constitute the largest source of local government revenues, although their share has been reduced from 64% to 51%–53%.
A rather large imbalance can be observed in the capacity of municipalities to raise local revenues, since this capacity depends on the level of economic development in each municipality. To equalize the existing imbalance, the central government calculates central transfers for operations, taking into consideration the business tax collected by the municipalities. Although local governments in Hungary have autonomy in deciding on their operational spending, this autonomy is constrained to a certain degree by the increasing share of earmarked grants for specific purposes (Fekete et al. 2002, 41).
According to the responses in the LGS, in 63.3% of Hungarian municipalities, over 50% of overall revenues originate from different types of government transfer. In 24.3%
of cases the transfers constitute from 30% to 50% of total revenues, and only in 12.4%
do they account for less than 30% of overall revenues (see table 4.5).
In terms of municipality size, we note that the smaller a municipality, the more it tends to depend on government transfers. This is indicated by the fact that 93.4% of the municipalities that have over 50% of their budget revenues coming in the form of government transfers belong to the group of municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, accounting for 65.2% of all Hungarian municipalities with a population below 5,000 inhabitants.
In the case of municipalities with between 5,000 and 49,999 inhabitants, 46.6%
have over 50% of their revenues originating from the government, which represents 6.1% of all municipalities with such high rigidity. The budget of 31.3% of medium-size municipalities comprises from 30% to 50% of government transfers, and 22.2% have less than 30% of their revenues coming from government transfers.
Among large municipalities (over 50,000 inhabitants), only one-third depend on government transfers to an extent larger than 50% of their total revenues. The majority
Table 4.5
Revenue Rigidity by Municipality Size in Hungary
Municipality size Total Own revenue
of municipalities
0–4,999 5,000–
49,999 Over 50,000
Below 30% Count 176.0 23.0 1.0 200.0
% within own revenue of municipalities 88.0 11.5 0.5 100.0
% within municipality size 37.4 17.7 4.8 32.2
% of total 28.3 3.7 0.2 32.2
Between 30% and 50%
Count 130.0 37.0 6.0 173.0
% within own revenue of municipalities 75.1 21.4 3.5 100.0
% within municipality size 27.6 28.5 28.6 27.8
% of Total 20.9 5.9 1.0 27.8
Over 50% Count 165.0 70.0 14.0 249.0
% within own revenue of municipality 66.3 28.1 5.6 100.0
% within municipality size 35.0 53.8 66.7 40.0
% of total 26.5 11.3 2.3 40.0
Total Count 471.0 130.0 21.0 622.0
% within own revenue of municipality 75.7 20.9 3.4 100.0
% within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 75.7 20.9 3.4 100.0
Note: N=622.
Source: LGS 2001.
of these municipalities (51.5%) rely on government transfers to a smaller degree, central transfers constituting between 30% and 50% of their total revenues. Only 15.2% of large municipalities have less than 30% of their revenues collected from government transfers.
As expected, the data show that the smaller a municipality in population size the more rigid its revenues tend to be. However, this happens in the context of a system in which transfers are significant in municipalities of all sizes.
5.2 Poland
The correlation coefficient between municipality size and citizens’ effectiveness is weaker in Poland (0.26 and significant at the 0.01 level) than in Hungary. Although this level of relationship indicates only a moderately direct relationship between municipality size and citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters, it is positive and cannot be attributed to sampling error.
Figure 4.2
Poland: Model Summary, ANOVA, and Coefficients
Model summaryb
Model R R square Adjusted R square Standard error of the estimate
1 0.260a 0.067 0.066 1.0926
a. Predictors: (constant), log population size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness to influence local matters.
ANOVAb
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Significance
1 Regression 47.147 1 47.147 39.494 0.000a
Residual 651.803 546 1.194
Total 698.950 547
a. Predictors: (constant), log population size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters.
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
t Significance
Model B Standard error Beta
1 (Constant) 0.533 0.423 1.260 0.208
Log pop size 0.277 0.044 0.260 6.284 0.000
a. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters.
As with the case of Hungary, the score of R square is low, which indicates that municipality size is not the best predictor of citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters for Poland either. Still, municipality size explains 8% of the total variation.
Table 4.6 shows that 50.9% of all respondents consider citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local decision-making to be very, fairly, or slightly low. Of these, 21.5% are from municipalities with a population below 5,000, 72.4% from municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 49,999, and 6.1% from municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants. Only 20.5% of the respondents say that citizens have a big influence on local decision-making.
The distribution according to size of municipality is 16.6% when there are fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, 71.0% with 5,000 to 49,999, and 12.4% with a population over 50,000. About one-fourth (28.6%) of the respondents claim that citizen effective-ness is neither low nor high. Of these, 13.4% are from municipalities with below 5,000 inhabitants, 68.2% from municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 49,999, and 18.5% from municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants.
Table 4.6
Citizen Effectiveness in Influencing Local Decision-making in Poland (by Size of Municipality)
Municipality size Total
Citizens’ effectiveness 0–4,999 5,000
–49,999
Over 50,000
Small influence Count 60.0 202.0 17.0 279.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 21.5 72.4 6.1 100.0
% within municipality size 65.9 51.9 25.0 50.9
% of total 10.9 36.9 3.1 50.9
Neither small nor big influence
Count 21.0 107.0 29.0 157.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 13.4 68.2 18.5 100.0
% within municipality size 23.1 27.5 42.6 28.6
% of total 3.8 19.5 5.3 28.6
Big influence Count 10.0 80.0 22.0 112.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 8.9 71.4 19.6 100.0
% within municipality size 11.0 20.6 32.4 20.4
% of total 1.8 14.6 4.0 20.4
Total Count 91.0 389.0 68.0 548.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 16.6 71.0 12.4 100.0
% within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 16.6 71.0 12.4 100.0
Note: N=548.
Source: LGS 2001.
These data seem to indicate that, although citizen effectiveness in influencing local decision-making is generally low, in 32.4% of the municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants the influence is found to be large. Yet differences appear not only among municipalities of different sizes, but also among municipalities with similar size. This suggests that in addition to size there are some other variables with a systematic effect on citizens’ level of influence on decision-making in municipalities.
In addition to having the highest average municipality size, Poland also has the largest share of municipalities in which citizen participation was reported to have oc-curred at least once during the year 2000. According to table 4.7, the most preferred forms of citizen participation were civil society proposals and meetings between local officials and citizens. This general trend remains valid for municipalities of all sizes. The data show that the larger a municipality, the more opportunities it provides for civil society proposals and written requests. For instance, the share of municipalities with a population below 5,000 inhabitants, where civil society proposals were introduced at least once in the year 2000, amounts to 49.0%. Compared to this, in municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 49,999 inhabitants, civil society proposals were introduced at least once in 55.0% of the cases, while in large municipalities this share reached 62.7%. In the case of the second most preferred form of participation, i.e., requests for meetings between local officials and citizens, the trend is similar.
Although public demonstrations were reported in fewer than 10% of small and 15%
of medium-size municipalities, there was at least one public demonstration in almost 41.2% of large municipalities. A large increase can also be observed in the case of petition writing and challenging local government decisions at court or a higher authority.
The independence of local authorities in executing public tasks assigned to them is guaranteed by the Constitution. Municipalities need to execute public tasks of local importance. In accordance with the Local Government Act, the tasks consist of those aimed at satisfying the collective needs of the community as well as commissioned tasks.
Both categories include mandatory and optional public tasks.
Table 4.7
Share of Municipalities in Which Citizen Participation Occurred at Least Once (Poland) [%]
Municipality size
0–4,999 5,000–49,999 Over 50,000
Public demonstrations 9.1 14.7 41.1
Petitions 24.5 29.0 43.1
Requests for meetings 50.0 50.1 69.0
Challenges to decisions 34.5 40.4 60.4
Civil society proposals 49.0 55.0 62.7
Note: N=570.
Source: LGS 2001.
Municipalities have autonomy in deciding over the method of implementation, provided that their decision is in compliance with the law. To implement commissioned projects, municipalities are provided with earmarked grants from the state. According to Aldona Okraszewska and Jacek Kwiatkowski (Soós et al. 2002, 197), in 2000 the share of earmarked grants for Polish municipalities was 13.7% of the total income. This share is considerably lower than that of the own income of municipalities (52.5%). As a result, we can say that the share of own income in the case of Polish municipalities is relatively high compared to Hungarian ones. However, this varies with the size of municipalities.
According to the responses in the LGS (table 4.8), the budget of 60.31% of munici-palities came from a given form of government grants. Municimunici-palities with a population below 5,000 inhabitants represent 23.6% of the total municipalities with over 50% of revenues coming from government transfers. The budgets of 11.6% of small munici-palities derived from 30% to 50% of revenues from central transfers, and only 13.5%
of municipalities claimed to have budget dependence below 30%.
Table 4.8
Revenue Rigidity by Municipality Size in Poland
Municipality size Total Own revenue
of municipalities
0 –4,999 5,000–
49,999 Over 50,000
Below 30% Count 32.0 73.0 7.0 112.0
% within own revenue of municipalities 28.6 65.2 6.3 100.0
% within municipality size 32.7 18.3 10.4 19.9
% of total 5.7 12.9 1.2 19.9
Between 30% and 50%
Count 42.0 133.0 29.0 204.0
% within own revenue of municipalities 20.6 65.2 14.2 100.0
% within municipality size 42.9 33.3 43.3 36.2
% of Total 7.4 23.6 5.1 36.2
Over 50% Count 24.0 193.0 31.0 248.0
% within own revenue of municipality 9.7 77.8 12.5 100.0
% within municipality size 24.5 48.4 46.3 44.0
% of total 4.3 34.2 5.5 44.0
Total Count 98.0 399.0 67.0 564.0
% within own revenue of municipality 17.4 70.7 11.9 100.0
% within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 17.4 70.7 11.9 100.0
Note: N=564.
Source: LGS 2001.
In the case of municipalities with a population of between 5,000 and 49,999 in-habitants, 55.8% reported their dependence on government transfers to be over 50%, which represents 72.9% of all municipalities with such high dependence. A dependence rate between 30% and 50% was reported by 23.2% of municipalities with a popula-tion between 5,000 and 49,999 inhabitants, which accounts for 82.3% of all sizes of municipalities with this dependence rate.
Large municipalities (above 50,000 inhabitants) also show considerable dependence, as 53.5% of these municipalities reported that more than 50% of their budgets came from government transfers. Of the large municipalities 25.6% have between 30% and 50% of their budget originating from government transfers, and 20.9% have less than 30% from transfers.
Based on the above, we can conclude that in the case of Poland municipality size does have an effect on the level of citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters. But the direct relationship is very weak and is attributable to a large extent to the specific features of local policy resulting from the economies of scale that local administrative units confront. Concerning revenue rigidity, the data show no strong relationship be-tween municipality size and rigidity level.
5.3 Romania
The Romanian data show a correlation between municipality size and citizens’ effective-ness of .285 and this is also significant at the 0.01 level. This indicates a moderately strong, direct relationship between municipality size and citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters. The correlation and significance results are reported below.
In the case of Romania, too, the low score of R square indicates that municipality size is not a strong predictor, and just as in the case of Poland, it explains only about 8% of the total variation in citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters.
In Romania (see table 4.9) 67.1% of all respondents consider that citizens have only very little, small or slightly small influence on local decision-making. Of these respondents, 41.6% are from municipalities with a population below 5,000 inhabitants, 23.6% from municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 49,999, and 2.0%
from municipalities with a population over 50,000.
Only 14.2% of all respondents consider that citizens have a big influence over lo-cal decision-making, of which only 4.4% come from municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, 7.3% from municipalities with a population of 5,000 to 49,999, and 2.4% from municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants. As regards the “neither small nor large influence” response, which constitutes 14.2% of the total, 4.4% fall in the category of municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, 7.3% in the 5,000 to 49,999 category, and 2.9% in the over 49,999 category.
Figure 4.3
Romania: Model Summary, ANOVA, and Coefficients
Model summaryb
Model R R square Adjusted R square Standard error of the estimate
1 0.285a 0.081 0.079 1.2763
a. Predictors: (constant), log population size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness to influence local matters.
ANOVAb
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Significance
1 Regression 64.669 1 64.669 39.699 0.000a
Residual 729.784 448 1.629
Total 794.453 449
a. Predictors: (constant), log population size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters.
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
t Significance
Model B Standard error Beta
1 (Constant) –0.267 0.469 –0.569 0.569
Log pop size 0.227 0.054 0.285 6.301 0.000
a. Dependent variable: citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters.
These results show that citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local decision-making is limited in municipalities of all sizes. Nevertheless, there is a clear differentiation among municipalities of different sizes. According to the answers of the chief administrative officers, in the case of 76.0% of municipalities with a population below 5,000 inhabit-ants, citizens have only a small influence over local decision-making. In 60.9% of the municipalities with a population of 5,000 to 49,999, citizens’ effectiveness is considered to be small. Where the population is over 50,000, the share of citizens with a small influence over local matters is only 30.0%.
Participation in municipalities with a population below 5,000 is rather small. The most frequent form of participation, i.e., requests for meetings between local officials and citizens, was reported to have occurred in fewer than 18% of municipalities. Among the other forms of participation only petition writing and civil society proposals reached over 10%. Public demonstrations were reported in 6.8% of the municipalities and chal-lenges to government decisions in only 3.4%.
In municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 49,999, the share of those in which some form of citizen participation occurred increases compared to the score
Table 4.9
Citizen Effectiveness in Influencing Local Decision-making in Romania (by Size of Municipality)
Municipality size Total
Citizens’ effectiveness 0–4,999 5,000
–49,999
Over 50,000
Small influence Count 187.0 106.0 9.0 302.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 61.9 35.1 3,0 100.0
% within municipality size 76.0 60.9 30.0 67,1
% of total 41.6 23.6 2,0 67,1
Neither small nor big influence
Count 39.0 35.0 10.0 84.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 46.4 41,7 11,9 100.0
% within municipality size 15.9 7,8 33,3 18,7
% of total 8.7 19.5 2,2 18,7
Big influence Count 20.0 33.0 11.0 64.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 31,3 51,6 17,2 100.0
% within municipality size 8,1 19,0 36,7 14,2
% of total 4,4 7,3 2,4 14,2
Total Count 246.0 174.0 30.0 450.0
% within citizens’ effectiveness 54,7 38,7 6,7 100.0
% within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 54,7 38,70 6,7 100.0
Note: N=450.
Source: LGS 2001.
for small municipalities. In this category the most frequent form of participation was, again, requests for meetings between local officials and citizens, occurring in 30% of municipalities. Petition writing and civil society proposal writing were reported to have happened at least once in the year 2000 in 14.0% and 26.0% of municipalities, respectively. Measures taken to challenge local government decisions in court or at a higher authority more than doubled in terms of the number of municipalities in which they occurred, thus reaching a share of 9.0%.
The largest share of municipalities in which citizens’ participation occurred at least once is that of units with a population over 50,000 inhabitants. The increase in the share of municipalities in which civil society proposal writing was used is substantial compared to smaller-size municipalities. The same is the case for formal requests for meetings between local officials and citizens, which occurred in more than twice as many large municipalities as in middle-size ones. All other forms of political participation were reported to have occurred at least once in around 25% of large municipalities.
The decentralization of local governments in Romania is established by the Local Public Administration Act. However, financial decentralization and autonomy still re-main limited. Municipalities are assigned certain mandatory tasks in all fields of public action by the central government and ministries. The autonomy to implement these is to some extent constrained by quantitative and/or qualitative regulations. The mandatory tasks imply that certain compulsory expenditures are imposed on municipalities. Some of these expenditures need to be covered from equalization grants and earmarked revenues provided by the state, which constrain municipalities’ fiscal autonomy. What is consid-ered to be a similarly important problem lies in the fact that additional funding is not always ensured when new compulsory expenditures are imposed on municipalities.
From the responses of local officials we learn that in Romania 46.6% of all mu-nicipalities obtain over 50% of their revenues from government transfers, with 13.2%
receiving from 30% to 50%, and 40.2% receiving less than 30% from transfers.
If we contrast this data to the three categories of municipality size, we find that municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants make up 82.5% of all municipalities with more than 50% of their revenues coming from government transfers, a share which accounts for 53.8% of all small municipalities (table 4.11). The share of medium-size municipalities with over 50% dependence rate on government transfers is 29.1%, and that of large municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants is even less, amounting to 20.8%. Of these, 66.7% have government transfers amounting to less than 30%, while for middle-size municipalities the share is 51.3% and for small municipalities it is 35.6%.
The above table shows that in the case of Romania there is a relationship between the population size of municipalities and the level of citizens’ effectiveness in influencing local matters. Peculiar to the Romanian case is the relationship between municipality size and revenue rigidity, as there is a mismatch between the most dense municipality size cluster and the lowest level of transfer dependence.
Table 4.10
Share of Municipalities in Which Citizen Participation Occurred at Least Once (Romania) [%]
Municipality size
0–4,999 5,000–49,999 Over 50,000
Public demonstrations 6.8 8.5 23.5
Petitions 11.5 14.0 26.5
Requests for meetings 17.6 30.0 30.6
Challenges to decisions 3.4 9.0 32.4
Civil society proposals 11.5 26.0 76.5
Note: N=557.
Source: LGS 2001.