expression to his government’s commitment to act fully in line with its declarations.11
According to Klebelsberg’s letter of January 1926 to Becker, the Prussian Minister for Culture, during his trip to Geneva “hatte ich eine ganze Odyssee durchzumachen” in front of the League of Nations “I had to defend thenumerus clausus Act, a doubly unpleasant task for me, as at the time of its inception… I had not voted for the Act, and indeed, its wording cannot be said to be fortunate.”12
The following day, Pál Sándor, Rezső Rupert, Vilmos Vázsonyi, Pál Hegymegi-Kiss, and Béla Fábián struck out at the numerus clausus and the apparent lack of sincerity on the part of Klebelsberg, as well as the absurdity of his claims (such as the numerus clausus giving protection to Jews) in bitterly critical parliamentary speeches. Bethlen also spoke up in the course of the debate.
He emphasized that over the past four years the government had been working to
“ensure rapprochement, and a peaceful conclusion” to the Jewish question. He declared that though the numerus clausus proclaimed Jewry as a race, and a nationality, this was not the position the government took on the matter. “I consider those Jews who identify themselves as one with the Hungarian people […] Hungarians of Jewish faith, and not a separate race” (adding however that there are also Jews in the country who do not ally themselves with the interests of the nation).15
The debate about the numerus clausus calmed down in the first half of 1926. Though Anna Kéthly did submit a draft resolution to repeal Act XXV of 1920 on 17 May 1926, in the course of the National Assembly debate convened to discuss the budget for year 1926/27, in accord with the standing orders of the parliament this was not put forward for vote—as a draft resolution earlier submitted by her on the same question had already been voted down.16 Yet in the autumn of 1926, certain signs—seemingly at least—indicated a shift towards an amendment of thenumerus clausus.
The first of these signs was a degree of “moderation” brought to the numerus clausus Act in the form of two measures particularly, instituted by Klebelsberg, with Bethlen’s prior agreement, in regards to its implementation and interpretation. On 9 September he gave orders by telephone (!), for Christened Jewish applicants to receive equal treatment to Christian applicants, followed five days later by a second order, once again delivered by telephone, specifying that the 6 % of places kept for Jewish students be established not against the number of the students actually accepted to the educational institution concerned, but in relation to the full enrollment figure allotted (which meant an incremental increase in the number of places at faculties where the full bracket allotted could not be filled). An appeal for these two measures had in fact been part of a petition addressed to Bethlen in April 1926 by the Jewish Congregation of Pest.
In his press release dealing with the first of his orders, Klebelsberg emphasized, with reference to his speech in Geneva, that “according to the unequivocal premises of the law on the free practice of religion to be a Jew is a denominational matter”, and he called upon the rectors to follow courses of action in accord with this. He also mentioned that he had no intention to create
15 N.Ú. 11 December 1925, 3–4 13 December, 1. Az 1922. évi június hó 16-ára hirdetett Nemzetgyűlés Nyomtatványai [Printed documents of the National Assembly convened for 16 June 1922], Memorandum Vol. XXXVIII, 187–97, 199–224, 230–3; Haller, Harc a numerus clausus körül, 212–8.
16Az 1922. évi június hó 16-ára hirdetett Nemzetgyűlés Nyomtatványai [Printed documents of the National Assembly convened for 16 June 1922], Memorandum Vol. XLIII, 205–6, 214.
propaganda for Jewish conversion to Christianity, and therefore stipulated the lapse of one year after the conversion (in order to exclude the possibility of conversion for the sake of enrollment). The camaraderie associations and some organizations for racial defense were trenchantly critical of these orders.
Klebelsberg held consultations first with the faculty members of the Large Committee for Youth (Hekler, Szily, Teleki, Vámossy), and then with the leaders of the camaraderie associations, amending the orders as a result, to state that every faculty independently determines in each case whether the conversion took place
“in fraudem legis”, that is, in order to subvert the law. This amendment meant a retreat in comparison to the measures of 9 September, leaving it a discretional decision vested solely in the authority of admissions committees at individual faculties. (According to the statement given by Dezső Baltazár, the democratically disposed bishop of the Trans-Tisza diocese of the Calvinist Church: “It is impossible for anyone to arbitrate what spiritual motives may have led someone to convert to another religion.”) Nevertheless, this manner of “mitigation” in respect of the numerus clausus Act—by the declaration of Jewry as a denomination—
meant the first breach in Act XXV of 1920 had been made. This interpretation of the orders also appeared in Jenő Rákosi’s lead article of 17 September 1926.17
As pointed out by Vázsonyi in his earlier mentioned speech to the Parliament, the Hungarian Act only regulates conversion from the religious denomination, but how is it possible to leave race behind? Vázsonyi also cited the fact that the stipulations of the Act with regard to the proportions according to race and nationality were only applied with regard to Jews, and were never taken into account for those of German, Slovak, or other ethnic backgrounds. (It should be noted here that according to the 1920 Census, the proportion of Germans was 6.9 %, and 5.5 % according to the 1930 Census, while Slovaks came to 1.8 % and 1.2 % respectively, and at the same time the proportion of their places in higher education during the 1920s was around 0.6 % for Germans, Slovaks not even coming to 0.1 %.)18
The question of the numerus clausus also came up in relation to the parliamentary elections of December 1926. In order to insure that the numerus clausus did not become an election slogan, in his letter to Bethlen, dated 19 October 1926, Lóránt Hegedűs (ex-finance minister, and chairman of the Hungarian Trade Bank) proposed: let the leaders of Hungarian Jewry turn to Wolf with a request that the numerus clausus is not tabled by the League of Nations
17BME L138/1926-27. R;Egyenlőség (4 September 1926), 14Egyenlőség (25 September 1926), 1–2;Pesti Hírlap (17 September 1926), 1–2; P.N. (16 September 1926), 3; P.N. (28 September 1926), 1–2; Pécsi Napló (29 September 1926), 1; Újság (16 September 1926), 1, 3 P.N. (17 September 1926), 1, 6 P.N. (18 September 1926), 2 P.N. (28 September 1926), 1.
18Az 1922. évi június hó 16-ára hirdetett Nemzetgyűlés Nyomtatványai [Printed documents of the National Assembly convened for 16 June 1922], Memorandum Vol. XXXVIII, 219; Kovács Alajos, A németek helyzete Csonka-Magyarországon a statisztika megvilágításában (Budapest:
1936), 35, 45; Kovács Alajos, A tótok helyzete Csonka-Magyarországon a statisztika megvilágításában (Budapest: 1936), 25, 35.
before the elections. Klebelsberg—who was forwarded Hegedűs’s letter by Bethlen—did not agree with the course of action proposed by Hegedűs, and at the same time, outlined his plans for amendments to the numerus clausus “in strictest confidence”.19
Klebelsberg’s approach, and position on thenumerus clausus—as apparent from the foregoing—was rather conflicting. His political duplicity—often referred to by his opponents, both left- and rightwing—also manifested itself in this matter. He himself professed his political views contradictorily. (Thus, for example, he took a stand against both left- and rightwing extremism in his electoral speech of 14 May 1922 in Sopron saying, “I serve the politics of the middle course”, while at the meeting of the League of Nations, held on 26 November 1926, he positioned himself unequivocally in support of conservative, right-wing politics.) However, his position on the numerus clausus was also motivated by obvious tactical considerations, the balance of political forces, as well as the political aims prioritizing the support of the middle class that stood for
“a racial profile matching historical traditions” (in Bethlen’s words), and not lastly by an attention to the role and weight of university student organizations under the sway of extreme right forces. For this reason, the contents of his reply on 3 November 1926 are important, and may be seen to express his actual position. In this letter he set down that phrased as § 3 of the numerus clausus was, “the Cour Permanent of the Hague could not be approached with any hope of success […]
The Act must therefore be revised, but not so as to inflict thousands of Jewish university students upon the nation, but in order to save the essence of the institution at the cost of easing it to a well-defined rational degree.”20 He did not however think it would be right to introduce the changes prior to the elections. In his opinion the objective was that the League of Nations does not set the matter on the December meeting’s agenda, and that an amendment be only introduced after the elections.
Bethlen, however, believed that it would be expedient to raise the need for modifications to the numerus clausus Act in the run up to the elections, primarily in order to divide the liberal opposition, and win as many Jewish voters over as possible, while also appeasing the Christian middle class by framing it in a suitably cautious way. In his electoral speech of 16 November 1926 held in the Vigadó, he stressed that the legally guaranteed equality of the Jewish religious denomination must “be protected from the slightest impairment by all means”, and the government is duty bound to persecute and suppress any agitation against those belonging to the Jewish faith. In this context he also addressed the numerus clausus. He repeated Klebelsberg’s Geneva declaration of December 1925, defining the institution as a transitory one, and went on to mention the two sides of the question: the sense of resentment on the Jewish side stemming from the
19 Szinai Miklós és Szűcs László (eds.) Bethlen István titkos iratai, (Secret papers of István Bethlen), Budapest, Kossuth, 1972. 256–257
20 Szinai Miklós és Szűcs László (eds.) Bethlen István titkos iratai, (Secret papers of István Bethlen), Budapest, Kossuth, 1972. 256–257
unjust treatment, “which will not be spirited away by any type of dialectic or formula however anyone may try”, and the fear on the part of the Christian middle class for the future, the living to be earned by their progeny. However, he did not speak of a date for the amendment of the Act. (As an account by the racist journal later recorded, “though [Bethlen] did promise an amendment to the Act, as usual, he framed the matter not only for the liberals, but also for the nationalist, Christian society at large, so what the government is in fact preparing to do could not be clearly gleaned from his words.”) In the course of the electoral campaign, numerous other representatives of the Unity Party also spoke about an amendment to the numerus clausus Act the journal Egyenlőség claimed 74 Unity Party members of parliament promised to repeal the act.21
Yet once the elections were over, silence settled once again over the numerus clausus. At the parliamentary debate of the 1927/1928 State Budget on 13 May 1927, Béla Fábián commented rather dryly on how those members of parliament “who took to the cities, loudly demanding that the numerus clausus be swept out” were now mute, and had not stood by their promises. In his draft resolution he pressed for changes to the numerus clausus Act. Klebelsberg’s response in this matter was the following: The Bethlen Cabinet has repeatedly said that when the occasion presents itself the Act should be amended, and revised. As for the time appropriate for this, the government did not make a fix statement, noting only that the material situation of a broad strata of the middle class must improve in a degree that means these wide segments of middle-class citizens do not see their own or their children’s future threatened by the elimination of the numerus clausus. This time, so far as the government can appreciate, has not yet come, though we all would welcome its arrival.” On these grounds the parliament—in line with the practice of previous years—rejected the draft resolution.22