Poland’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities
Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz
Institute of Public Affairs, Poland
S
ince accession to the European Union, Poland has faced the challenging task of transforming itself from a beneficiary of assistance to an agent and donor transferring expertise, skills and resources to countries in transition to the south and east of the en-larged EU. The challenge has been compounded by a lack of tradition, shortage of staff, and limited finances; however, the country can rely on its intangible assets - Poland’s own experience of transition, commitment to sharing the democratic ethos, and cultural and social affinity with the target countries.Five years since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) set out the principles, priorities and criteria of Poland’s foreign assistance in the first strategic document, and after the imple-mentation by Polish NGOs of nearly 300 MFA-funded projects supporting democracy, civil society and human rights, it is an appropriate time to take stock of the effectiveness and impact of Polish aid. This study considers grants funded by Polish governmental and non-governmental donors and implemented by Polish NGOs in several locations, paying particular attention to activities implemented in Belarus and Ukraine. The point of depar-ture for the analysis is the framework of Polish assistance, presented in the current and draft strategies of the MFA.
The premise of this study is that a coherent and transparent process of planning, design, implementation and evaluation of Polish assistance is needed, particularly at the early stage of development of state aid policy. However ambitious and desirable the vision of democratisation and support to civil society and human rights, successful outcomes are not likely to be brought about without proper targeting, awareness of beneficiaries’
needs, and application of adequate measures. Therefore, vital components of an effective national assistance policy include a strong institutional framework, mechanism of comm-unication with agents and beneficiaries, involvement of non-governmental actors, and consistent application of well-defined principles of assistance.
KEy CONCLUSIONS
Strengths of Polish democracy assistance
Commitment and experience of NGOs
• in Poland’s eastern neighbours. The big-gest asset of Polish pro-democracy efforts in the East is the community of NGOs. A large number of Polish NGOs have succ-essfully implemented assistance projects in Ukraine and Belarus, and recently have expanded their activities to Georgia, Moldova, and Central Asia. This could serve as the basis for the greater involve-ment of NGOs in the process of planning and evaluating Poland’s national demo-cracy assistance.
Transnationalisation of democracy
ass-• istance efforts of Polish NGOs through participation in European networks. Mem-bers of Grupa Zagranica (an association of Polish NGOs working abroad in operation with, and for the benefit of, foreign partners) have become involved in several pan-European networks, including CONCORD (European NGO Confed-eration for Relief and Development) and PASOS.
More explicit democratisation component
•
of assistance. Since the Orange Revol ution of November 2004 to January 2005, which demonstrated the possibilities for democratic change in the post-Soviet area, the Polish government and NGOs have been more outspoken about the rel-ationship between technical assistance and democratic outcomes. The draft Strat-egy of Polish Development Assistance reflects this shift of focus, devoting an en-tire chapter to democracy promotion.
Broadening of geographic focus and
•
linkage to EU priorities. Since EU access-ion, successive Polish governments and presidents have supported a wider appli-cation of Polish assistance, with countries such as Georgia and Moldova becoming prominent beneficiaries. While the choice of some post-Soviet states appears to be driven by foreign policy considerations (stepping up relations with the countries of the Caucasus or Central Asia), Poland has also aligned some of its priorities to the EU’s key priority areas, such as the West-ern Balkans, or European Neighbourhood Policy countries (e.g. Palestine Authority).
Weaknesses
Priorities of assistance still selected and
• defined by officials. The Polish imple-menting NGOs and their partners in the beneficiary locations are presented with the agenda for assistance to the countries in question, rather than being included in the process of shaping the agenda for the target countries. The current formula of consultations between the MFA and a group of Polish NGOs is limited to tech-nical questions, while the beneficiaries are not consulted at all. This is clearly a problem, especially in new areas of Polish assistance or where Polish diplomacy does not have sufficient on-the-ground exp erience.
No multi-year planning for either the
• government or NGOs. Most government projects with a democratisation component are commissioned through annual tenders for projects, involving Polish NGOs. While these tenders are announced regularly, they do not envisage explicit follow-up funding, and projects cannot span suc-cessive years. This discourages strategic
planning on the part of Polish NGOs, and fails to promote lasting partnerships with beneficiaries in target countries.
Low level of expenditure and uncertain
• financing. Although Poland has pledged to increase its ODA spending over the next couple of years, the absolute values of assistance have been modest. Even the limited funds available to NGOs are not guaranteed, as the funds are allocated in a general government reserve fund, and are potentially at risk if other spending is given greater priority.
Lack of general framework for democracy
•
promotion efforts. In contrast to the rhetoric of successive governments about the high priority of democracy assistance in Polish foreign policy, the draft of the Strategy of Development Assistance for 2007-2015 has not yet been adopted. The Strat-egy, providing a clear framework for all government-sponsored democracy assist-ance, could be a reference point, which is currently missing, leaving this component of aid “invisible” in many cases.
Opportunities
Development of stable relationships with
• partners from beneficiary countries. Polish NGOs have depended on the expertise and capacity of their counterparts in the area of operation. The development of procedures allowing joint applications for funding by Polish and counterpart NGOs, and the establishment of a category of
“trustworthy” partners in beneficiary countries, could help capitalise on the suc-cessful co-operation so far.
Empowerment of beneficiary NGOs and
• building their capacity for independent
act ivities. Partners from beneficiary coun-tries may soon follow the path of Polish NGOs, which once were the implement-ing agents of assistance projects and have over time become intermediaries and co-ordinators of activities in other geographic areas.
Alignment of donors’ priorities.
• Many
Polish NGOs work in the East through a va-riety of sources of funding including, apart from the Polish government, American and West European donors. The impact of the all-too-frequently diff used efforts could be increased through exchange of inform-ation among donors about their agendas for assistance involv ing Polish NGOs, consultation with NGOs themselves on best practices for implementation, and cross-dissemination of information on opp-ortunities in beneficiary countries.
Greater use of the extensive Polish
consu-•
lar network in the East. Polish embassies and consulates in the Western Balkans or CIS could be involved in the definition of priorities, and provision of on-the-ground support (including funding) and monitor-ing of projects implemented by Polish NGOs. Even more importantly, they could serve as sources of information on various sources in Poland of support available to local civil society organisations.
Following up on the Eastern Partnership
• proposal. The Czech Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2009 could provide Pol-and with an opportunity to launch several initiatives that would stress the democracy promotion component of the Eastern Part-nership. The Polish government should build on its recent intensification of rel-ations with the Belarusian government by proposing areas where EU member states could take common positions
vis-à-Part I Democracy Assistance Policies - Trends and Approaches Poland: Eastern Promises and Achievements - Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz
vis Belarus. The first half of 2009 is also a crucial period for rallying for opening up concrete measures advancing the progress of Georgia and Ukraine towards an EU accession perspective.
The reformed European Instrument for
• Demo cracy and Human Rights (EIDHR II), as well as the establishment of the Euro-pean Partnership for Democracy (EPD) in 2008, provide an opportunity to further the co-operation between NGOs from Poland and other EU member states in democracy assistance activities in their target countries.
Threats
Multiplication of initiatives and
compe-• tition between various schemes could confuse the target audience. In some countries, such as Belarus, the Polish gov-ernment has pursued several initiatives, some dir ectly managed, others imple-mented by NGOs. If the various schemes are programmed separately, there is a risk that the target audience is not going to receive a clear message about the overall objectives of Polish activities.
The democracy component might be
• downplayed in the face of strong opp-osition from authoritarian governments.
While undemocratic governments might prefer Poland to focus on infrastructure or technical projects, the Polish govern-ment should insist on the presence of the democracy assistance aspect and the in-volvement of independent local actors.
If the partner from a target country is not
• consulted about the focus and communic-ation of the project message, it may emerge as less credible at home, and
the message itself might not be suited to the circumstances of the target country.
Particular care must be taken to avoid entangling NGOs from authoritarian countries in political conflict and exposing them to retaliatory government actions.
Requirements of transparency and good
•
management practices may at times ex-pose local partners to potential backlash from authorities. The experience of Polish NGOs working in Belarus confirms the importance of mutual trust between them and the local partners. While all efforts must be made to ensure that the resources are spent towards achieving the objec-tives of the project, confidentiality may be needed in the case of projects with overtly political goals, so that the local NGOs are not endangered.
POLICy RECOMMENDATIONS
Government
Consensus is needed between the main
•
actors of Polish foreign policy on the prior-ity of the democracy agenda in relations with undemocratic states or countries with a democratic deficit (such as Belarus, Rus-sia, or Central Asian states). It is essential that the Prime Minister’s Office, the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry present a consistent message in official contacts with the governments and diplo-mats of these states.
Completion of the work on the Law on
•
Foreign Assistance is urgently needed, as the passage of the law is a prerequisite for the establishment of a dedicated aid budget and increased public funding for
development and democracy assistance.
Once passed, the law will enable state agencies to develop multi-annual aid per-spectives.
Follow-up and multi-year initiatives should
•
be encouraged by pre-announcing the government’s financial commitments with regard to specific countries and issue areas that are defined as part of country strategies. The announcement of priorities should be reflected in higher budgetary outlays for matching activities, while the share of non-priority activities should decrease.
Closer co-ordination is needed to identify
• and oversee the activities of all ministries in the field of external aid, and to ensure that the various initiatives comply with Polish foreign policy priorities in bi lateral rel-ations as well as on the regional level, and that the democracy assistance component is taken into account when prog ramming, implementing and monitoring assistance schemes towards undemocratic states or states in transition.
The Polish government’s annual tenders
• and assistance programmes ought to be based on the comprehensive Strategy of Development Assistance that should reflect the changing needs of beneficiaries, and match the Polish vision for democratis ation in the strategic region of the western CIS.
The Strategy adopted must clearly distin-guish democracy-assistance objectives from the more general development aims.
In the medium- to long-term, it is worth
• considering establishing a dedicated imp-lementation agency for the management of official assistance programmes. The agency should build on the staff and exper-ience of the Department of Development
Co-operation of the MFA. The draft Strat-egy of Development Assistance should outline a roadmap for establishment of the agency.
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs An urgent task for Polish diplomacy is the
• presentation of flagship initiatives within the framework of the Eastern Partner-ship, building on the successful national initiatives (support to media freedom in Belarus, development of local govern-ment in Ukraine). The Partnership ought to stress the link between democratisation, human rights, and the perspective of EU accession.
Democracy assistance should become
• one of the key objectives of co-operation within the Visegrad Group. The Inter-national Visegrad Fund should become a major donor supporting pro-democracy projects in Eastern Europe and the Bal-kans. This would allow Polish NGOs to conduct pro-democracy activities together with experienced partners from other Cent ral European countries, as well as to build partnerships in the target countries.
In particular, Polish assistance to
Bela-• rus could be partly channelled through the international umbrella of Visegrad co- operation, which could be less con-troversial than activities funded by one particular country, especially Poland, and thus make the democracy assistance activities less susceptible to the hostile propaganda of the Lukashenko regime.
Poland ought to collaborate on the
• develop ment of joint positions of the EU towards Belarus within the framework of the Czech EU Presidency.
The MFA is the key institution overseeing Polish state development and democracy ass istance activities. The organisation of assistance within the ministry was gradually determined as the volume of assistance grew. In 1998-2002, the level of assistance was minimal (with fewer than 20 projects annually), so two officials at the Department of the United Nations System handled all the work, which consisted mainly of servicing Poland’s obligations as part of multilateral assistance and maintaining contacts with the Organis-ation for Economic Co-operOrganis-ation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank.
The scope of responsibilities of the MFA in this regard was spelled out for the first time in the Strategy of 2003. The MFA was assigned a key role in planning, co-ordinating and supervising the implementation of development assistance.3 Its planning role was defined broadly, including: devising general guidelines for aid policy and more spec-ific annual assistance plans, laying down priorities by sector and geographical area, drafting framework regional and country assistance programmes, as well as concluding bilateral agreements with priority beneficiary countries. The ministry was entrusted with