By the second half of the first century A.D., the continental European fron
tier of the Roman Empire had been established at the Rhine and Danube rivers. The linear military defence along the river banks had becom e final.
These waterway frontiers not only separated the empire clearly from its neighbours, but the rivers also checked potential enemies and acted as a barrier to minor raids. At the same time, these waterways offered a conven
ient means of communication and acted as a means of transporting various trade comm odities and supplies, as well as building materials between the chain of camps and forts built at fords and at suitable strategic points. The various peoples living on the fringes of the imperial frontier were drawn or forced into alliance with the empire. However, one strong military power
on the other side of the frontier could not be fitted into this system. Conse
quently, the peace concluded between the empire and Decebal in 89 — though in fact adhered to by both sides for quite some time — was not regarded as final by Rome on the experiences of the previous 150 years. The Dacian state, a strong political, economic and military power, became a constant source of tension.
The internal and external political situation of the Roman Empire did not permit any kind of action against the Dacians for some two decades. In 89, Antonius Satum inus rebelled in Germania and a Suebian-Sarm atian war was raging on the Pannonian frontier (89-92). The execution of dissident senators, beginning in 93, and the acute political crisis led to the murder of Domitian in 96. Following Nerva's brief reign, Trajan soon began making preparations for a Dacian war. The emperor took far more comprehensive measures than ever before to ensure his victory. He assembled a vast mili
tary force: the legions, auxiliary troops and other military units stationed along the Middle and the Lower Danube numbered some 200,000 men. Most took part in the battles of the military campaign that began in 102.
The army began its march after three years of preparation. Only frag
m ents of the contemporary accounts of this campaign have survived. The precise chronology of events can best be reconstructed from the historical narrative written by Dion Cassius in the third century, from the 200 metres long spiral band of reliefs on the memorial column erected in Rome after the final victory, and from the results of archaeological investigations. The army was commanded by the emperor and his close friend and colleague, Licinius Sura. The troops were concentrated in Moesia Superior, around the legionary camp of Viminacium. The main objective was undoubtedly the storm ing of Decebal's seat at Sarmizegethusa Regia which was surrounded by a chain of forts and which could be approached from several directions.
The main thrusts of the military advance were determined by the Dan
ube fords that were defended by the fleet. The largest deployment of troops began from Lederata. These troops then marched towards the HAtszeg Mountains through the eastern Banat where a military base was established.
A few surviving fragments from the emperor's campaign journal suggest that he also advanced along this route towards the Dacian heartland. The other attack route was initiated from Drobeta, whilst still other units crossed the Danube at Dierna.
The Romans scored a decisive victory at the very beginning of their cam paign and the Dacians sued for peace. However, Decebal did not appear in person at the peace negotiations and fighting was resumed. The Roman troops advanced along the northern frontiers of Moesia Inferior from the Danube to the southern Carpathians. When the Sz3szv3ros Mountains were encircled, Decebal was forced to surrender and the harsh terms of the arm i
stice, in practice, signalled the end of the Dacian Kingdom. The Dacians were compelled to surrender their weapons, their siege engines, and their military engineers — as well as to extradite all Roman refugees. Their forts, and fortresses were pulled down, and the territory occupied by the Roman troops was formally annexed to the empire. The Dacians became the sub
jects of Rome. The occupied western part of the Dacian Kingdom was in
corporated into Moesia Superior, whilst the eastern areas were absorbed
into M oesia Inferior. After the war, a stone bridge designed by Trajan's engineer, Apollodorus, was constructed at Drobeta making com m unica
tion possible and insuring continuous supply at all times.
Decebal, nevertheless, made a last attempt to reorganize his army and resist. He occupied some territories and established contacts with a few neighbouring peoples. He captured a high-ranking Roman officer, Longinus, and tried first to blackmail the emperor, and then later to have him poi
soned. These events left Rome with no alternatives and the em pire com menced preparations for a final showdown. The second Dacian war broke out in 105. The aim was to capture the central areas of the Dacian Kingdom:
Trajan led his troops towards Sarmizegethusa Regia. By 106 the Romans had captured and destroyed the Dacian forts and strongholds. Before the last fortress fell, the defenders poisoned themselves. Decebal fled and com
mitted suicide in order to avoid capture. His head was cut off and brought before Trajan at his military headquarters by a soldier called Claudius Max
imus.
Following the triumph in Rome, Decebal's head was exhibited on the Gem onia steps. Plays were held in the circus to celebrate the death of this despised enemy, while coins bearing the legend DACIA CAPTA were struck.
The form er Dacian heartland was now occupied by the Roman army.
The Dacian wars marked the first conscious decision of the em pire to send a Roman army across the European frontier of the Imperium — marked by m ajor waterw ays — with the express aim of protecting this frontier through conquest, the annihilation of the enemy, and the incorporation of the enemy territory into the empire -> though at times it seemed as if Rome was of two minds about the annexation and retention of the Dacian terri
tories.
The organization of the province began at a fast pace during the term of office of the first governor, Terentius Scaurianus between 106 and 110. Coins bearing the legend DACIA AUGUSTI PROVINCIA were struck in 112.
Scaurianus took the necessary measures to transform the conquered terri
tory into a province. He took a population census and then ordered a sur
vey of the area. The first and most important task was the clear demarca
tion of the frontiers of the new province and the organization of its defence.
In the European provinces of the empire, the legions and the auxiliary troops were generally stationed along the river frontiers of the Rhine and the Dan
ube. In areas where this did not prove possible, as in the southern parts of Germania and Raetia, an arrow-straight defensive line with earthworks and ditches was created, even across open hilly countryside. However, the rough terrain of Dacia did not favour either kind of defence system. It took Rome about ten years to build a chain of strong, military forts. The military camps standing on the boundaries of the province served at the same time to mark the frontiers of the empire.
The core of the military defence of the new province was at first formed by two legions and their auxiliary troops. The legio I1II Flavia was stationed in Bersovia until 118-119. The other legion was the legio XIII Gemina whose camp was established in the centre of Transylvania, at Apulum.
In addition to the legions, a high number of auxiliary troops — cavalry and infantry troops totalling 500 men and cavalry units num bering 1000
m en — were stationed in the province. The province was permanently gar
risoned with troops by the 120s. The all-important road network was con
structed in parallel with the forts. The building of roads by the military began at roughly the same time as the organization of the province since supply lines were essential and of strategic importance, especially in a prov
ince which thrust so deeply into hostile territory.
Trajan settled the veterans of the legions who had fought in the Dacian wars in Colonia Dacica, the first settlement in the province. In order to popu
late the territory which had emptied as a result of the wars, Trajan settled large populations in Dacia. These settlements were symbolized by children playing in the lap of a female figure personifying the province of Dacia on coins struck to commemorate the constitutional foundation of the province.
At the beginning of Dacia's existence, in 107-108, a war broke out on the western frontier of the province.17 All that is known of this war is that the governor of Lower Pannonia, who later became the emperor Hadrian, fought against the Sarm atian Jazyges — who were settled in the Danube-Tisza interfluve and had previously been allies of Rome in its war against the Dacians. The unrest among the Sarmatians was, in part, caused by the fact that the territory (the eastern part of the Banat) that had been wrested from them by Decebal had not been returned to them by Trajan, in spite of their repeated demands.18 At the same time, the Jazyges living in the Transdanube- Tisza region, were now bordered by the Roman Empire not only on the west and south, but also on the east as a consequence of the newly-founded prov
ince, a circumstance which, understandably, became a source of tension.
Rom e's problems in this region appeared to have been resolved after these wars, and the safety of the new province appeared to be secure as well. This period of respite proved to be very fleeting, however. W hen Trajan died in 117, the first real showdown between Rome and its neighbours took place. The Jazyges and the Roxolani attacked the two Moesias. The situa
tion was aggravated by the death of Quadratus Bassus, Dacia's excellent and experienced governor. The outbreak of hostilities was caused by the reduction of the annual stipendium paid by Rome to the Roxolani and by the above-mentioned territorial demands of the Jazyges, as well as by the fact that the newly created province acted as a barrier between these two re
lated peoples. The emperor hastened to Moesia and also visited Dacia en route. At Drobeta, he had the superstructure of the bridge removed "for H adrian was afraid that it might also make it easy for the barbarians, once they had neutralized the fortifications at the bridges, to cross into M oesia".19 After assuring the Sarmatians that they would again receive their previous stipendium, the emperor soon came to an agreement with the Roxolani also.
A rather unusual method was chosen for dealing with the Jazyges. An ex
perienced soldier, Q. Marcius Turbo of the equestrian order was appointed governor of Pannonia Inferior and Dacia. Thus, he was able to crush Jazygian resistance from both directions.
17. SHA, vita Hadriani 3, 9.
18. Dion Ca ssiu s, LXVII, 10, 3-4.
19. Dion Ca ssiu s, LXVIII, 13, 6.
The Sarmatian wars in 116-118 clearly showed that Dacia played but a minor role in the defence of the provinces lying to the south of the Danube River and in staving off possible attacks. Though Rome had eliminated a major source of danger with the overthrow of Decebal, a former buffer zone which had checked the Sarmatian tribes was also eliminated in the process.
The danger of a unified Dacian power had indeed disappeared, but the growing strength of the Sarmatians threatened not only the Danubian fron
tier of the empire, but also sections of the Dacian frontier in Oltenia and the TemeskOz. The equestrian battle tactics employed by the Sarmatians were less of a threat in the mountainous parts of Transylvania, but an alliance with the "free Dacian" Celtic and Germanic tribes on the northern fringes of Dacia was able to bring concentrated attacks along the entire Lower Danubian limes section and the frontiers of Dacia. Consequently, the de
fence of the frontier of the empire — now augmented by Dacia — called for a larger garrison than the shorter Danubian limes section prior to the con
quest had. Thus at the beginning of his reign Hadrian, whose ideas on im perial strategy were basically defensive in nature, contemplated the possi
bility of relinquishing Dacia.20
This possibility must in any case be considered as having been realistic in view of the military situation. It was not alien too Hadrian to relinquish conquests secured by his predecessors in the course of costly expeditions.
For example, he did withdraw the Roman troops from the territories be
yond the Euphrates and the Tigris. But, in the end, he abandoned this idea and reorganized the defence of the province. The legio IIII Flavia w as w ith
drawn to its earlier base beyond the' Danube, to Singidunum. Hadrian an
ticipated a potential Jazygian attack and he hoped to strengthen the Danubian limes with this measure. The military role that fell to Dacia was — besides the defence of its own territory — participation in the battles to ward off an enemy attack. Incapable of independent military manoeuvres, on num er
ous occasions the Dacian army could be successfully deployed only together w ith troops from other provinces.
The Roman Empire was determined to establish in the European border provinces a defensive line which would clearly demarcate the imperial fron
tier for the peoples of the Barbaricum, and which would, at the same time, offer a relatively easy and rapid means of overland and water com m unica
tion between the chain of forts built along this frontier. W hat remain to be researched are Rom e's interests in retaining —along with the shorter Danu
bian frontier which corresponded better to the traditional ideas of defence
— a province the control of which posed considerable difficulties. W hy did Rome decide, after some hesitation, to maintain a province whose defence called for a larger and certainly more costly army than the defence of its other provinces? Having failed to immediately withdraw its troops from this territory after the Dacian wars, Rome could have done so later only at the cost of considerable prestige. The gold resources of Transylvania un
doubtedly influenced the decision to retain the province.
2 0 . Eutropius, Breviarium ... VIII, 6 , 2.
Map2.Daciabetween106 and 261 2.Boundary ofthe empire; 2.Boundary ofthe province; 3.Road; 4. Campofauxiliary troops;5.Legionarycamp; 6.Settlement withmunicipal rights